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[[Lacan]] asserts that [[ethics|ethical thought]] "is at the centre of our [[work ]] as [[analysts]],"<ref>{{S7}} p. 38</ref> and a [[whole ]] year of his [[seminar]] is devoted to discussing the articulation of [[ethics]] and [[psychoanalysis ]].<ref>{{L}} ''[[Seminar VI|Le Séminaire. Livre VI. L'éthique de la psychanalyse, 1959-60]]''. Ed. [[Jacques-Alain Miller]]. [[Paris]]: Seuil, 1986 [''[[Seminar VI|The Seminar. Book VI. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-60]]''. Trans. Dennis Porter. [[London]]: Routledge, 1992].

On the side of the [[analysand]] is the problem of [[guilt]] and the pathogenic [[nature ]] of [[civilized]] [[morality]].

In his earlier work, [[Freud]] posited a basic [[conflict ]] between the [[demand]]s of "[[ethics|civilized morality]]" and the essentially [[moral|amoral]] [[sexual]] [[drive]]s of the [[subject]].

When [[ethics|morality]] gains the upper hand in this conflict, and the [[drives ]] are too strong to be [[sublimation|sublimated]], [[sexuality]] is either expressed in [[perversion|perverse forms]] or [[repression|repressed]], the latter leading to [[neurosis]].

[[Freud]] further developed his [[ideas ]] on the pathogenic nature of [[ethics|morality]] in his [[theory ]] of an [[unconscious]] [[sense ]] of [[guilt]], [[superego]], an [[superego|interior moral agency]] which becomes more cruel to the extent that the [[ego]] submits to its [[demand]]s.<ref>{{F}} ''[[Works of Sigmund Freud|The Ego and the Id]]''. 1923b. [[SE]] XIX, 3.</ref>).

Secondly, how is the [[analyst]] to respond to the [[ethics|pathogenic morality]] which [[acts ]] via the [[superego]]?

[[Freud]]'s views of [[ethics|morality]] as a pathogenic force might seem to imply that the [[analyst]] simply has to [[help ]] the [[analysand]] free himself from [[moral ]] constraints.

However, which such an [[interpretation]] may find some support in [[Freud]]'s earlier work,<ref>{{F}} "[[Works of Sigmund Freud|'Civilized' Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness]]." 1908d. [[SE]] IX, 179</ref> [[Lacan]] is firmly opposed to such a view of [[Freud]], preferring the more [[pessimistic ]] [[Freud]] of ''[[Civilization and Its Discontents]]''<ref>{{F}} ''[[Civilization and Its Discontents]]''. 1930a. [[SE]] XXI, 59.</ref> and [[stating ]] categorically that "Freud was in no way a progressive."<ref>{{S7}} p. 183</ref>

This seems to [[present ]] the [[analyst]] with a moral dilemma.

On the [[other ]] hand, nor can he simply adopt an opposing libertine approach, since this too remains within the field of [[morality]].<ref>{{S7}} p. 3-4</ref>

The rule of [[neutrality ]] may seem to offer the analyst a way out of this dilemma, but in fact it does not, for [[Lacan]] points out that there is no such [[thing ]] as an [[ethics|ethically neutral position]].

An [[ethics|ethical position]] is implicit in every way of directing [[psychoanalytic treatment]], whether this is admitted or not by the [[analysanalyst]]t.

For example the formulations of [[ego-psychology]] [[about ]] the [[adaptation]] of the [[ego]] to [[reality]] imply a [[ethics|normative ethics]].<ref>{{S7}} p. 207</ref>

Firstly, [[ethics|traditional ethics]] revolves around the the [[concept ]] of the [[ethics|Good]], proposing different "[[ethics|goods]]" which all compete for the [[position ]] of the [[ethics|Sover­eign Good]].

The [[ethics|psychoanalytic ethic]], however, sees the [[ethics|Good]] as an obstacle in the path of [[desire]]; thus in [[psychoanalysis]] "a radical [[repudiation ]] of a certain [[ideal ]] of the [[good ]] is necessary."<ref>{{S7}} p. 230</ref>

The [[ethics|psychoanalytic ethic]] rejects all ideals, including ideals of "[[happiness]]" and "health"; and the fact that [[ego-­psychologypsychology]] has embraced these ideals bars it from claiming to be a [[form ]] of [[psychoanalysis]].<ref>{{S7}} p. 219</ref>

The [[desire of the analyst]] cannot therefore be the [[desire]] to "do good" or "to [[cure]]".<ref>{{S7}} p. 218</ref>

The [[ethics|psychoanalytic ethic]], however, cannot take such an approach because [[treatment|psychoanalytic experience]] has revealed the duplicity of [[pleasure principle|pleasure]]; there is a [[limit ]] to [[pleasure principle|pleasure]] and, when this is transgressed, [[pleasure principle|pleasure]] becomes [[jouissance|pain]].

Thirdly, [[ethics|traditional ethics]] revolves around "the service of goods"<ref>{{S7}} p. 314</ref> which puts work and a safe, ordered [[existence]] before questions of [[desire]]; it tells [[people ]] to make their [[desire]]s wait.<ref>{{S7}} p. 315</ref>

He [[interpretation|interprets]] the ''soll'' in [[Freud]]'s famous phrase ''Wo es war, soll Ich werden'' ("Where id was, there ego shall be")<ref>{{F}} ''[[Works of Sigmund Freud|New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis]]''. 1933a: [[SE]] XXII, 80</ref> as an [[ethics|ethical duty]],<ref>{{E}} p.128), </ref> and argues that the status of the [[unconscious]] is not [[ontological ]] but [[ethical]].<ref>{{S11}} p. 33</ref>.

In the 1970s he shifts the emphasis of [[ethics|psychoanalytic ethics]] from the question of [[act]]ing ("Have you acted in accordance with your desire?") to the question of [[speech]]; it now becomes an [[ethics|ethic]] of "[[speaking ]] well" (''l'éthique du Bien-[[dire]]''.<ref>{{L}} 1973a: 65</ref>

However, this is more a [[difference ]] of emphasis than an opposition, since for [[Lacan]] to [[speak ]] well is in itself an [[act]].