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Fantasy

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==Sigmund Freud==The [[concept]] of [[fantasy]] is central to [[Freud]]'s [[Works of Sigmund Freud|work]].<ref>"[[Fantasy]]" is spelt "[[fantasy|phantasy]]" (in the ''[[FrStandard Edition]]. ''.</ref> Indeed, the origin of [[psychoanalysis]] is bound up with [[fantasmeFreud]]'s [[recognition]] in 1897 that [[memory|memories]] of [[seduction]] are sometimes the product of [[fantasy]] rather than traces of [[real]] [[sexual]] abuse. This crucial [[moment]] in the [[development]] of [[Freud]]'s [[thought]] (which is often simplistically dubbed "the abandonment of the seduction [[theory]]")seems to imply that [[fantasy]] is opposed to [[reality]], a purely [[illusory]] product of the [[imagination]] which stands in the way of a correct [[perception]] of reality. However, such a view of [[fantasy]] cannot be maintained in [[psychoanalytic theory]], since [[reality]] is not seen as an unproblematic given in which there is a single objectively correct way of perceiving, but as something which is itself discursively constructed.
The concept of Therefore the [[fantasychange]] is central to in [[Freud]]'s [[Works ideas]] in 1897 does not imply a [[rejection]] of Sigmund Freudthe fundamentally discursive and imaginative [[nature]] of [[memory]]; [[memory|workmemories]].<ref>of [[past]] events are continually [[being]] reshaped in accordance with [[unconscious]] [[desire]]s, so much so that [[symptom]]s originate not in any supposed "[[Fantasyobjective]]facts" is spelt "but in a [[complex]] [[dialectic]] in which [[fantasy|phantasy]]" in the ''plays a vital [[Standard Editionrole]]''.</ref>
Indeed[[Freud]] uses the term "[[fantasy]]", then, to denote a [[scene]] which is presented to the oirgin of imagination and which [[stages]] an [[unconscious]] [[desire]]. The [[subject]] invariably plays a part in this [[psychoanalysisscene]] , even when this is bound up with not immediately [[Freudapparent]]'s recognition in 1897 that . The [[memoryfantasy|memoriesfantasized]][[scene] of ] may be [[conscious]] or [[unconscious]]. When [[unconscious]], the [[seductionanalyst]] are sometimes must reconstruct it on the product basis of other clues.<ref>{{F}} "[[Works of Sigmund Freud|A Child Is Being Beaten]]," 1919e. [[fantasySE]] rather than traces of real sexual abuseXVII, 177.</ref>
This crucial moment in the development of ==Jacques Lacan=====Protection Function===While [[Lacan]] accepts [[Freud]]'s thought (formulations on the importance of [[fantasy]] and on its [[visual]] quality as a scenario which is often simplistically dubbed "stages [[desire]], he emphasizes the abandonment protective function of [[fantasy]]. [[Lacan]] compares the seduction theory") seems to imply that [[fantasy]] is opposed [[scene]] to a frozen [[realityimage]], on a purely illusory product of [[cinema]] [[screen]]; just as the imagination [[film]] may be stopped at a certain point in [[order]] to avoid showing a [[trauma]]tic [[scene]] which stands in follows, so also the way of [[fantasy]] [[scene]] is a [[defence]] which veils [[castration]].<ref>{{S4}} pp. 119-120</ref> The [[fantasy]] is thus characterized by a correct perception of realityfixed and immobile quality.
However===Defence and Clinical Structure===Although "[[fantasy]]" only emerges as a significant term in [[Lacan]]'s [[work]] from 1957 on, such the concept of a view relatively [[stable]] mode of [[defence]] is evident earlier on. This concept is at the root both of [[Lacan]]'s [[idea]] of [[fantasy]] cannot be maintained in and his [[psychoanalytic theorynotion]], since of [[realityclinical structure]] is not seen ; both are conceived of as an unproblematic given in which there is a single objectively correct relatively stable way of perceivingdefending oneself against [[castration]], but as something against the [[lack]] in the [[Other]]. Each [[clinical structure]] may thus be distinguished by the [[particular]] way in which is itself discursively constructedit uses a [[fantasy]] [[scene]] to [[veil]] the [[lack]] in the [[Other]].
Therefore ===Neurotic Fantasy===The [[neurotic]] [[fantasy]], which [[Lacan]] formalizes in the change [[matheme]] ('''$ <> a'''), appears in the [[graph of desire]] as the [[Freudsubject]]'s ideas in 1897 does not imply response to the enigmatic [[desire]] of the [[Other]], a rejection way of answering the question [[about]] what the fundamentally discursive and imaginative nature of [[memoryOther]]; wants from me. (''[[memory|memoriesChe vuoi?]] of past events are continually being reshaped in accordance with '')<ref>{{E}} p. 313</ref>The [[unconsciousmatheme]] is to be read: the [[desirebar]]s, so much so that red [[symptomsubject]]s originate not in any supposed "objective facts" but in a complex relation to the [[object]]. The [[dialecticperverse]] in which [[fantasy]] plays inverts this relation to the [[object]], and is thus formalized as '''''a vital role'' <> $'''.<ref>{{Ec}} p.774</ref>
===Fantasy of the Hysteric and Obsessional Neurotic===Although the [[matheme]] ('''S <> a''') designates the general [[Freudstructure]] uses of the term "[[neurotic]] [[fantasy]]", then[[Lacan]] also provides more specific [[formulas]] for the [[fantasy]] of the [[hysteric]] and that of the [[obsessional neurotic]].<ref>{{S8}} p. 295</ref> While the various formulas of [[fantasy]] indicate the common features of the [[fantasy|fantasies]] of those who share the same [[clinical structure]], to denote a the [[sceneanalyst]] which is presented must also attend to the imagination and unique features which stages an characterise each [[unconscious desirepatient]]'s particular fantasmatic scenario.
The ===Fantasy and the Subject===These unique features express the [[subject]] invariably plays 's particular mode of ''[[jouissance]]'' though in a part distorted way. The [[distortion]] evident in this the [[fantasy]] marks it as a compromise [[formation]]; the [[fantasy]] is thus both that which enables the [[subject]] to sustain his [scene[desire]], even when this is not immediately apparent<ref>{{S11}} p. 185; {{Ec}} p. 780</ref> and "that by which the subject sustains himself at the level of his vanishing desire."<ref>{{E}} p.272</ref>
The ===Fundamental Fantasy===[[Lacan]] holds that beyond all the myriad [[images]] which appear in [[dream]]s and elsewhere there is always one "[[fantasy|fantasizedfundamental fantasy]]" which is [[unconscious]].<ref>{{S8}} p. 127</ref> In the course of [[psychoanalytic treatment]] , the [[sceneanalyst]] may be reconstructs the [[consciousanalysand]] or 's [[unconsciousfantasy]] in all its details. However, the [[treatment]] does not stop there; the analysand must go on to "[[fantasy|traverse the fundamental fantasy]]."<ref>{{S11}} p. 273</ref> In other [[words]], the [[treatment]] must produce some modification of the [[subject]]'s fundamental mode of [[defence]], some alteration in his mode of ''[[jouissance]]''.
When ===Image and Symbolic Structure===Although [[unconsciousLacan]] recognizes the [[power]] of the [[image]] in [[fantasy]], he insists that this is due not to any intrinsic quality of the [[image]] in itself but to the [[analystplace]] must reconstruct which it on occupies in a [[symbolic]] [[structure]]; the [[fantasy]] is always "an image set to work in a signifying structure."<ref>{{E}} p. 272</ref> <!--===Kleinian Account of Fantasy===[[Lacan]] criticizes the [[Klein]]ian account of [[fantasy]] for not taking this [[symbolic]] [[structure]] fully into account, and thus remaining at the level of the [[imaginary]]; "any attempt to reduce [fantasy] to the imagination . . . is a permanent misconception."<ref>{{E}} p. 272</ref> In the 1960s, [[Lacan]] devotes a [[whole]] year of his [[seminar]] to discussing what he calls "the [[logic]] of fantasy," again stressing the basis importance of other cluesthe [[signification|signifying]] [[structure]] in [[fantasy]].<ref>{{S14}}</ref>--> == In the work of Slavoj Žižek ==Like many of Žižek’s foundational theories, fantasy derives from the [[psychoanalytic]] work of Freud and Lacan. For Freud, fantasy emerged in his 1897 discovery that [[memories]] of seduction may be the result of fantasy as opposed to actual sexual [[violence]]. In common parlance, fantasy denotes a [[separation]] from reality, a [[construction]] that is fictional and therefore opposed to reality. Freud’s discovery, though, challenges this widespread [[understanding]]. For psychoanalysis, reality is problematic when it is assumed that it distinguishes authentic or unmediated [[experience]] for the subject. Reality is more properly [[understood]] as a way of perceiving that is already stained by the [[human]] subject’s desire. Therefore, reality is already a [[subjective]] [[process]] mediated by desire and constructed discursively. Fantasy, then, [[acts]] as a scene that stages desire in the imagination of the subject. For this [[reason]], Lacan states in his fourteenth seminar, ''The [[Logic of Fantasy]]'': “Desire is the [[essence]] of reality” (''S''XIV: 6). The principal point for Lacan, here, is that fantasy is the setting for desire where fantasy provides the [[matrix]] through which [[subjects]] begin to desire. For Žižek, fantasy is not an exercise in fulfilment, contentment or [[satisfaction]]. Instead, it provides a scene for a privileged yet [[arbitrary]] object that embodies the force of desire. The foundational premise of fantasy in this rendering lies in the [[claim]] that desire is not something that is given; rather, it is assembled. Therefore, fantasy acts as a structure that provides the coordinates for a subject’s desire. That is, fantasy provides the idea of a privileged object that desire fixates on in order to provide the subject with its [[position]] in relation to it. This privileged object acts as the ''[[objet petit a]]'' or object-[[cause]] of desire. This object [[structures]] the subject’s experience of the [[world]] in so far as this object is taken as more than its [[material]] property. 1919eThe object that consumes desire and therefore occupies the fantasy of the subject must first fall prey to the [[illusion]] that it is more than its pragmatic material.The object is marked by this structure as being more than its materiality, as being endowed with the promise to [[satisfy]] the desire that necessitates it. Thus, fantasy acts as the mode whereby the subject learns to desire because through fantasy the subject is situated as [[desiring]]. The role fantasy plays is twofold: [[universal]] and particular. Fantasy is a universal structure that indexes, points or directs our desire towards a [[physical]] manifestation that occupies desire. Yet, what is particular to each and every subject is the way fantasy structures the relation to the trauma of lack predicated by desire. This constitutive lack that the privileged object promises to fulfil acts as a screen that orients each fantasy, which in turn supports desire in order to shield the subject from the trauma of lack itself. In this way, fantasy bestows reality with a fictional [[coherence]] and consistency that appears to fulfil the lack that constitutes [[social]] reality. Hence, Žižek’s foremost contribution to this long-theorized notion lies in showing how fantasy serves as a [[political]] structure. He reveals how fantasy can fill in [[ideological]] gaps and provide access to [[obscene]] ''[[jouissance]]'', and he contends that a failure to explicate the essence of political beliefs does not imply any failure in the hold these beliefs have over us. Instead, political [[ideologies]] serve to give subjects a means of envisioning the world in which such a failure emerges as evidence as to how transcendent is their particular [[ideology]]. Fantasy serves [[politics]] precisely in that each political group must recognize its point of view as manifested in the extrapolitical fantasy [[objects]] customary within that specific [[nation]], [[culture]] or [[religion]]. If not, these groups must displace the sitting ideologies’ fantasy objects with their chosen manifestations. Consequently, for Žižek, fantasy goes beyond the usual symbolic coordinates, so that [[traversing]] the fantasy does not mean getting rid of the fantasy but being even more taken up by it. Fantasy, therefore, acts as a way for the subject to envisage a way out of the [[dissatisfaction]] produced by the [[demands]] of [[social reality]] through these objects or ideas (e.g. [[freedom]], brotherhood, the [[Church]]). In this [[sense]], fantasy is a [[psychological]] structure that manifests itself in a [[phenomenological]] [[form]]. And, while fantasy might not provide us with the object itself, it can provide something of equal consequence: the scene of attaining the privileged object that renders attainment as a possibility. Fantasy organizes and domesticates the ''jouissance'' that provides the framework through which we experience reality; therefore, this structure – and the arbitrary object that animates it – acts as a defence against the [[traumatic]] [[loss]] of ''jouissance'' that occurs through entering [[the symbolic]] order. In turn, fantasy can surface in a more evident socio-symbolic way in which it assuages unrest by depoliticizing the social [[body]] for the purposes of accepting a ruling ideology. Fantasy thus serves as a way to distract, even encourage, the [[social body]] from directly engaging with the dissatisfaction of lack. Although lack is constitutive of every human subject, the political advocacy of a social body can [[help]] organize a [[society]] better to manage dissatisfaction as a by-product of the demands of that social reality. Therefore, fantasy acts as a way to fracture political [[unity]] by focusing attention on [[individual]] satisfaction imagined to be the promise of a unique privileged object. Because fantasy offers the promise of satisfaction as part of a privileged object, we [[understand]] this object as being apart from our [[self]]. [[Enjoyment]] derived from this fantasy image is therefore projected onto the Other. As a path to [[repress]] the idea of a non-[[lacking]] subject, the subject we fantasize and therefore imagine as a possibility, we [[project]] onto the Other the enjoyment we lack. Žižek argues that this places the subject in a position of understanding the Other obtaining enjoyment at our expense. Because we are able to fantasize an [[impossible]] enjoyment, we also misattribute this [[impossibility]] to an Other that seems to [[enjoy]] in a way we cannot experience but only imagine. Since fantasy provides us with the coordinates to domesticate our [[desire,]] in order to fulfil lack we rarely attribute lack as an experience beyond our self. The [[distinction]] between our own lack of impossible enjoyment and the non-lacking status of the Other opens the possibility of a violence predicated on destroying the enjoyment we fantasize this Other to possess at our expense. [[The logic of fantasy]] in relation to lack suggests that, if I am lacking, it is because some other nefarious [[figure]] has stolen it, and thus the lack of lack, as it were, becomes an object of possession under [[capitalism]]. This rendering is consistent with Žižek’s assertion that fantasy leads to all varieties of discrimination: [[racism]], sexism, ageism and [[homophobia]], among [[others]]. Th is non-lacking status takes the form of a person or [[thing]] we understand through [[cultural]] [[myth]] or [[capitalist]] ideology. Consequently, fantasy offers us the illusion that the object we pursue will assuage the discomfort of lack. In this formulation, desire is separated from [[drive]] because it privileges the object of our fantasy that presents itself as the [[cure]] for lack. Desire, in this [[case]], predicates its function on the attainment of the object of our fantasies, while drive reaches satisfaction through the continual pursuit of this object. That is, drive functions through the [[repetition]] of this cycle whereas desire places [[faith]] in the redeeming quality of the object. The privileged object of our desire and the fantasy that supports it act in two ways: (a) as the site where the human subject invests in the hope for an enjoyment (''jouissance'') that will [[return]] the subject to a non-lacking [[state]], which allows each human subject to tolerate this status; and (b) as a fantasmatic, and thus arbitrary, promise of a non-lacking status that does not [[exist]], which replaces a [[partial]] and obtainable enjoyment by holding out the idea of a [[total]] enjoyment that it ultimately cannot produce or [[guarantee]]. Desire constantly moves forwards from object to object because each new instantiation of our fantasy fails to provide the satisfaction the human subject believes it will provide. In this sense, fantasy remains the same, but our desire forces us to continue the [[search]] for the impossible owing to the inherent failure each object represents. Because the subject does not lack an experiential object, lack is misattributed as a [[negative]] [[category]] that can be overcome by addition. The subject [[lacks]], but what it lacks is [[nothing]] and each new object fails to satisfy because it can only offer something. ==See Also=={{See}}* [[Castration]]* [[Hysteria]]* [[Image]]||* ''[[Jouissance]]''* [[Lack]]* [[Matheme]]||* [[Neurosis]]* [[Obsessional neurosis]]* [[Structure]]||* [[Subject]]* [[Treatment]]* [[Unconscious]]{{Also}} ==References==<div style="font-size:11px" class="references-small"><references /ref></div>[[Category:Psychoanalysis]][[Category:Jacques Lacan]][[Category:Practice]][[Category:Dictionary]][[Category:Treatment]][[Category:Sexuality]][[Category:Concepts]][[Category:Terms]][[Category:Zizek Dictionary]]{{OK}}__FORCETOC__
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