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From "Passionate Attachments" to Dis-Identification<br>{{BSZ}}By Slavoj Zizek</font></td></trBR><trBR>I [[want]] to address the problem of [[identification]] by confronting the predominant deconstructionist doxa according to which the main problem with [[Lacanian]] [[theory]] - which allegedly also limits its [[political]] use - is that [[Lacan]] elevates the [[symbolic]] into a kind of [[transcendental]] [[position]] of a fixed [[normative]] [[order]] exempted from the transformative [[process]] of historical [[practice]]. According to this critique, [[the symbolic]] fixes in advance the constraints of compulsory [[heterosexuality]] and reduces all [[resistance]] to it to [[imaginary]] [[misrecognition]]. And if one does effectively break up the chains of the [[symbolic order]], one is expelled into the [[void]] of [[psychosis]]. Since the main proponent of this criticism is [[Judith]] [[Butler]], let me focus on her latest book, </tri>The [[Psychic]] [[Life]] of [[Power]]</tbodyi>.</tableref>[[Judith Butler]], The Psychic Life of Power (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1997). Numbers in parentheses refer to the pages of this book.</center><brref>

  <table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" height="100%" width="100%"> <tbody><tr><td width="15%"></td><td valign="top" width="70%"><font face1="Times New Roman,Times,Courier" size="3"></font><p class="b" align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,Times,Courier" size="3">I want to address the problem of identification by confronting the predominant deconstructionist doxa according to which the main problem with Lacanian theory - which allegedly also limits its political use - is that Lacan elevates the symbolic into a kind of transcendental position of a fixed normative order exempted from the transformative process of historical practice. According to this critique, the symbolic fixes in advance the constraints of compulsory heterosexuality and reduces all resistance to it to imaginary misrecognition. And if one does effectively break up the chains of the symbolic order, one is expelled into the void of psychosis. Since the main proponent of this criticism is Judith Butler, let me focus on her latest book, <i>The Psychic Life of Power</i>.[1]<br><br> 1<br><br> Butler's, as well as Lacan's, starting point is the old [[Leftist ]] one -- how is it possible not only to resist effectively, but also to undermine and/or displace the existing socio-symbolic network - the Lacanian "big [[Other]]" - which predetermines the only [[space ]] within which the [[subject ]] can [[exist]]. Significantly, Butler [[identifies ]] "subject" with the [[symbolic position ]] occupied within this space, while she reserves the term "[[psyche]]" for the larger [[unity ]] encompassing that in the [[individual ]] which resists [[being ]] included in the symbolic space.<ref>Butler demonstrates that the Foucauldian "[[body]]" as the site of resistance is none other than the [[Freudian]] "psyche." Paradoxically, "body" is [[Foucault]]'s [[name]] for the psychic [[apparatus]] insofar as it resists the soul's domination. That is to say, when, in his well-known definition of the soul as the "prison of the body," Foucault turns around the standard Platonic-[[Christian]] definition of the body as the "prison of the soul," what he calls the "body" is not simply the [[2biological] ] body, but is that which is already caught in some kind of pre-[[subjective]] [[psychic apparatus]].</ref> Butler, of course, is well aware that the site of this resistance cannot be simply and directly [[identified ]] as the [[unconscious]]; the existing order of Power is also supported by unconscious "passionate attachments," attachments publicly non-acknowledged by the subject:</font></p>

If the unconscious escapes from a given normative [[injunction]], to what other injunction does it [[form]] an attachment? What makes us [[think]] that the unconscious is any less [[structured]] by the power relations that pervade [[cultural]] [[signifiers]] than is the [[language]] of the subject? If we find an attachment to subjection at the level of the unconscious, what kind of resistance is to be wrought from that? (88).<p align="justify"/blockquote>

<font face=The exemplary [[case]] of the unconscious "Times New Roman,Times,Courierpassionate attachments" size="2">If which sustain Power is precisely the unconscious escapes from a given normative injunction, to what other injunction does it form an attachment? What makes us think that the unconscious is any less structured by inherent reflective eroticization of the regulatory power relations that pervade cultural signifiers than is -mechanisms and procedures themselves. In the language performance of the subject? If we find an attachment [[obsessional]] [[ritual]], one designated to subjection keep at bay the level illicit temptation, the ritual itself becomes the source of [[libidinal]] [[satisfaction]]. It is thus the "reflexivity" involved in the [[relationship]] between regulatory power and [[sexuality]], the unconsciousway the repressive regulatory procedures themselves get libidinally invested, what kind that functions as a source of resistance libidinal satisfaction. And it is to be wrought from that? (88)this radical masochistic reflective turn which remains unaccounted for in the standard [[notion]] of the "[[internalization]]" of [[social]] norms into psychic prohibitions.</font></p></blockquote>

<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,Times,Courier" size="3">The exemplary case of the unconscious "passionate attachments" which sustain Power is precisely the inherent reflective eroticization of the regulatory power-mechanisms and procedures themselves. In the performance of an obsessional ritual, one designated to keep at bay the illicit temptation, the ritual itself becomes the source of libidinal satisfaction. It is thus the "reflexivity" involved in the relationship between regulatory power and sexuality, the way the repressive regulatory procedures themselves get libidinally invested, that functions as a source of libidinal satisfaction. And it is this radical masochistic reflective turn which remains unaccounted for in the standard notion of the "internalization" of social norms into psychic prohibitions.The second problem with the quick identification of the unconscious as the site of resistance is that, even if we concede that the unconscious is the site of resistance which forever prevents the smooth functioning of power mechanisms, that [[interpellation ]] - the subject's [[recognition ]] in his or her allotted symbolic [[place ]] - is always ultimately incomplete, failed. "Does such resistance do anything," asks Butler, "to alter or expand the dominant injunctions or interpellations of subject [[formation]]?" (88). In short, she concludes that "this resistance establishes the incomplete [[character ]] of any effort to produce a subject by disciplinary means, but it remains unable to rearticulate the dominant [[terms ]] of productive power" (89).<br><br>

Therein resides the kernel of Butler's criticism of Lacan. According to her, Lacan reduces resistance to [[the imaginary ]] misrecognition of the symbolic [[structure]]. Such a resistance, although it thwarts the [[full ]] symbolic realization, nonetheless depends on the symbolic order and asserts it in its very opposition, unable to rearticulate its terms - "For the Lacanian, then, the imaginary signifies the [[impossibility ]] of the discursive - that is, symbolic - [[constitution ]] of [[identity]]" (96-97). Along these lines, she even identifies the Lacanian unconscious itself as imaginary, as "that which thwarts any effort of the symbolic to constitute sexed identity coherently and fully, an unconscious indicated by the slips and gaps that characterize the workings of the imaginary in language" (97).<ref>Incidentally, Butler here blatantly contradicts Lacan for whom the unconscious is "the Other's [3[discourse] ]," i.e. symbolic, not imaginary. Is not the best known single line from Lacan the assertion that "the Unconscious is structured like a language?" Slips and gaps are not for Lacan thoroughly symbolic facts. They confirm the functioning of the signifying network.</ref> Against this background, it is then possible to [[claim ]] that, in Lacan, "psychic resistance presumes the continuation of the law in its anterior, symbolic form and, in that [[sense]], contributes to its status quo. In such a view, resistance appears doomed to perpetual defeat" (98).<br><br>

The first [[thing ]] to take note of here is that Butler seems to conflate two radically opposed uses of the term "resistance." One is the socio-critical use - resistance to power, for [[instance ]] - and the other the [[clinical ]] use operative in [[psychoanalysis ]] - the [[patient]]'s resistance to acknowledge the unconscious [[truth ]] of his [[symptoms]], the [[meaning ]] of his [[dreams]], and so on. When Lacan determines resistance as "imaginary," he has thereby in [[mind ]] the misrecognition of the symbolic network which determines us. On the other hand, for Lacan, radical rearticulation of the predominant symbolic order is altogether possible. This is what his notion of <i>[[point de capiton]]</i> - the "[[quilting point]]" or the [[master]]-[[signifier ]] - is [[about]]. When a new point de capiton emerges, the socio-symbolic field is not only [[displaced]], its very [[structuring ]] [[principle ]] changes. Here, one is thus tempted to turn around the opposition between Lacan and Foucault as elaborated by Butler. It is Foucault who insists on the immanence of the entire symbolic field by means of an act proper, a passage through "symbolic [[death]]." In short, it is Lacan who allows us to conceptualize the [[distinction ]] between imaginary resistance -- [[false ]] [[transgression ]] which reasserts the symbolic status quo and even serves as a positive condition of its functioning - and the effective symbolic rearticulation via the [[intervention ]] of the [[real ]] of an act.<br><br>

Only at this level, assuming that we take into account the Lacanian notions of point de capiton and the act as real, does a meaningful dialogue with Butler become possible. Butler's [[matrix ]] of social [[existence ]] as well as Lacan's is that of a [[forced ]] [[choice]]. In order to exist at all within the socio-symbolic space, one has to accept the fundamental [[alienation]], the definition of one's existence in the terms of the "[[big Other]]." As she is quick to add, however, this should not constrain us to - what she perceives as - the Lacanian view according to which the symbolic order is a given which can only be effectively transgressed if the subject pays the price of psychic [[exclusion]]. So on the one hand we have the false imaginary resistance to the symbolic norm, and on the [[other, the ]] [[psychotic ]] breakdown, with the only "realistic option" being full acceptance of alienation in the symbolic order - the [[goal ]] of the [[psychoanalytic ]] [[treatment]]. Butler opposes to this Lacanian fixity of the symbolic the [[Hegelian ]] [[dialectic ]] of presupposing and positing. Not only is the symbolic order always-already presupposed as the sole milieu of the subject's social existence, but this order itself [[exists ]] and is reproduced, only insofar as [[subjects ]] recognize themselves in it and, via repeated [[performative ]] gestures, again and again assume their places in it. This, of course, opens up the possibility of changing the symbolic contours of our socio-symbolic existence by way of its parodically displaced performative enactings. Therein resides the thrust of Butler's anti-[[Kantianism]]. She rejects the Lacanian symbolic a priori as a new version of the transcendental framework which fixes the coordinates of our existence in advance, leaving no space for the [[retroactive ]] [[displacement ]] of these presupposed [[conditions]]. So when in a key passage Butler asks the question:</font></p>

<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,Times,Courier" size="2">What would it mean for the subject to [[desire ]] something other than its continued 'social existence'? If such an existence cannot be undone without falling into some kind of death, can existence nevertheless be risked, death courted or pursued, in order to expose and open to transformation the hold of social power on the conditions of life's persistence? The subject is compelled to [[repeat ]] the norms by which it is produced, but the [[repetition ]] establishes a [[domain ]] of risk, for if one fails to reinstate the norm "in the [[right ]] way," one becomes subject to further sanction, one feels the prevailing conditions of existence threatened. And yet, without a repetition that risks life - in its current organization - how might we begin to imagine the [[contingency ]] of that organization, and performatively reconfigure the contours of the conditions of life? (28-29).</font></p>

<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,Times,Courier" size="3">The Lacanian answer to this is clear - "to desire something other than its continued 'social existence'" and thus to fall "into some kind of death," that is, to risk a gesture by means of which death is "courted or pursued," points precisely towards the way Lacan reconceptualized the Freudian death-[[drive ]] as the elementary form of the [[ethical ]] act. Note that the act, insofar as it is irreducible to a "[[speech ]] act," relies for its performative power on the preestablished set of symbolic rules and/or norms.<br><br> Is this not the whole point of Lacan's reading of Antigone? Antigone effectively puts at risk her entire social existence, defying the socio-symbolic power of the city embodied in the rule of Creon, thereby "falling into some kind of death" - i.e., sustaining symbolic death, the exclusion from the socio-symbolic space. For Lacan, there is no ethical act proper without taking the risk of such a momentary "suspension of the big Other," of the socio-symbolic network which guarantees the subject's identity; an authentic act occurs only when a subject risks a gesture which is no longer "covered up" by the big Other. For that reason, Lacan pursues all possible versions of this entering the domain "between the two deaths," not only citing Antigone after her expulsion, but also Oedipus at Colonus, King Lear, Poe's Mr. Valdemar, and so on. Up to Sygne from Claudel's Coufontaine-trilogy, their common predicament is that they all found themselves in this domain of the undead, "beyond death and life," in which the causality of the symbolic fate is suspended. Butler, in the above-quoted passage, too quickly conflates this act in its radical dimension with the performative reconfiguration of one's symbolic condition via its repetitive displacements. The two are not the same. In other words, one should maintain the crucial distinction between mere "performative reconfiguration," a subversive displacement which remains within the hegemonic field and, as it were, fights against it an internal guerilla battle of turning against the hegemonic field its own terms, and the much more radical act of a thorough reconfiguration of the entire field which redefines the very conditions of socially sustained performativity - in Foucault's terms, the passage from one episteme to another.<br><br>

The difference between Butler and Lacan is that for Butler primordial repression is Is it possible to undermine also the foreclosure most fundamental level of the primordial subjection, what Butler calls "passionate attachment,attachments" while ? The Lacanian name for Lacan, the fundamental fantasy, the stuff of which "primordial passionate attachments" are made, is already a filler, a formation on which covers up a certain gap or void. Thus it is only here, at this the very point where consistency of the difference between Butler and Lacan subject's being hinges is almost imperceptible, that we encounter the ultimate gap that separates Butler from Lacanof course, fundamental [[fantasy]]. Butler again interprets these The "primordial attachmentsattachment to [[subjectivation]]" as constitutive of the subject's presuppositions is thus none other than the primordial "[[masochist]]" [[scene]] in a proto-Hegelian meaning of which the termsubject "makes/sees himself suffer," that is, assumes la doleur d' exister and therefore counts on thus provides the subject's ability dialectically minimum of support to rearticulate these presuppositions of his or her being, to reconfigure and displace them. The subject- like [[Freud]]'s identity primordially [[repressed]] middle term "[[Father]] is beating me"will remain always and forever rooted in its injury as long as the essay "A [[Child]] is Being Beaten." This [[fundamental fantasy]] is thoroughly "inter-[[passive]]." In it remains an identity, but it does imply that the possibilities a scene of resignification will rework passive [[suffering]], or subjection, is staged which simultaneously sustains and unsettle threatens the passionate attachment to subjection without which subject formation 's being - and re-formation - cannot succeed" (105)only insofar, that is, as being remains [[foreclosed]], primordially repressed. For exampleFrom this perspective, subjects are confronted with a forced choice in which rejecting an injurious interpellation amounts new approach opens up to not existing at all; under the threat [[recent]] artistic practices of nonsado-existencemasochistic performance. In such practices, they areisn't this very [[foreclosure]] ultimately undone? In other words, as it were, emotionally blackmailed into identifying with what if the open assuming/staging of the imposed symbolic identity, [[fantasmatic]] scene of primordial "nigger," "bitch,passionate attachment" etc. Since symbolic identity retains its hold only by its incessant repetitive re-enacting, however, it is possible for far more subversive than the subject to displace dialectic rearticulation and/or displacement of this identity, to recontextualize it, to make it work for other purposes, to turn it against its hegemonic mode of functioning.<br><br>scene?

What The [[difference]] between Butler and Lacan does here is to introduce a distinction between that for Butler primordial [[repression]] is the foreclosure of the two terms which are identified in Butlerprimordial "passionate attachment," while for Lacan, the fundamental fantasy , the stuff of which serves as "primordial attachments" are made, is already a filler, a formation which covers up a certain gap or void. Thus it is only here, at this very point where the difference between Butler and Lacan is almost imperceptible, that we [[encounter]] the ultimate support of gap that separates Butler from Lacan. Butler again interprets these "primordial attachments" as the subject's beingpresuppositions in a proto-Hegelian meaning of the term, and therefore counts on the symbolic identification which is already a symbolic response subject's ability [[dialectically]] to the trauma rearticulate these presuppositions of the fantasmatic "passionate attachmenthis or her being, to reconfigure and displace [[them]]." The symbolic subject's identity we assume "will remain always and forever rooted in a forced choice when we recognize ourselves in ideological interpellation relies on its [[injury]] as long as it remains an identity, but it does imply that the disavowal possibilities of resignification will rework and unsettle the fantasmatic "passionate attachmentto subjection without which subject formation - and re-formation - cannot succeed" which serves as its ultimate support(105).For example, subjects are confronted with a [4[forced choice]] This leads in which rejecting an injurious interpellation amounts to a further distinction between symbolic rearticulations and variations on not existing at all; under the fundamental fantasy [[threat]] of non- like existence, they are, as it were, emotionally blackmailed into [[identifying]] with the variations on imposed symbolic identity, "nigger," "Father is beating mebitch," - which do not effectively undermine etc. Since symbolic identity retains its holdonly by its incessant repetitive re-enacting, that however, it is, between this dialecticization and the possible "traversing" the very fundamental fantasy. The ultimate aim of the psychoanalytic process is precisely for the subject to undo the ultimate "passionate attachment" which guarantees the consistency of his or her beingdisplace this identity, to recontextualize it, and thus to undergo what Lacan calls the "subjective destitution." At its most fundamental levelmake it [[work]] for other purposes, the primordial "passionate attachment" to the scene turn it against its hegemonic mode of fundamental fantasy is not "dialecticizablefunctioning."<br><br>

An example What Lacan does here is to introduce a distinction between the two terms which are identified in Butler, the fundamental fantasy which serves as the ultimate support of the reconfiguration of fantasy would be Clint Eastwoodsubject's Dirty Harry seriesbeing, and the [[symbolic identification]] which is already a symbolic response to the [[trauma]] of the fantasmatic "passionate attachment. In " The symbolic identity we assume in a forced choice when we recognize ourselves in [[ideological]] interpellation relies on the first film, [[disavowal]] of the masochist fantasy in all fantasmatic "passionate attachment" which serves as its ambiguity is almost directly acknowledgedultimate support.<ref>For example, while in apropos of the following installments[[army]] life, such a "passionate attachment" is provided by a [[homosexual]] link which has to be disavowed if it looks as if Eastwood self-consciously accepted the politically correct criticism is to remain operative. See Chapter 2 of Slavoj [[Zizek]], ''The Plague of [[Fantasies]]'' ([[London]]: Verso, 1997).</ref> This leads to a further distinction between symbolic rearticulations and displaced variations on the fundamental fantasy to give to - like the story a more acceptable variations on "progressiveFather is beating me" flavor. In all these reconfigurations- which do not effectively undermine its hold, howeverthat is, between this dialecticization and the same possible "[[traversing]]" the very fundamental fantasy remains operative. With all respect The ultimate aim of the psychoanalytic process is precisely for the political efficiency subject to undo the ultimate "passionate attachment" which guarantees the consistency of such reconfigurationshis or her being, they do not really touch and thus to undergo what Lacan calls the hard fantasmatic kernel - they even sustain it"[[subjective destitution]]. And in contrast to Butler" At its most fundamental level, Lacan's wager is that even and also in politics, it is possible to accomplish a more radical gesture of the primordial "traversingpassionate attachment" to the very scene of fundamental fantasyis not "dialecticizable. Only such gestures which disturb this fantasmatic kernel are authentic acts.<br><br>"

Here, one should look to An example of the problematic reconfiguration of the original Hilflosigkeit (fantasy would be Clint Eastwood'helplessness,' 'distress') of small infantss Dirty Harry series. The In the first feature to be noted [[film]], the masochist fantasy in all its ambiguity is that this "distress" covers two interconnectedalmost directly acknowledged, but nonetheless differentwhile in the following installments, levels it looks as if Eastwood [[self]]-- first a purely organic helplessness, consciously accepted the inability of politically correct criticism and displaced the small child fantasy to survive, give to satisfy his or her most elementary needsthe story a more acceptable "progressive" flavor. In all these reconfigurations, without the parents' helphowever, and second the traumatic perplexion when same fundamental fantasy remains operative. With all respect for the child is thrown into the position political efficiency of a helpless witness of sexual interplay among such reconfigurations, they do not really touch the parents, other adults, or between adults and himhard fantasmatic kernel - or herselfthey even sustain it. The child is helpless, without "cognitive mappingAnd in contrast to Butler," when confronted with the enigma of the OtherLacan's <i>jouissance</i>wager is that even and also in [[politics]], unable it is possible to symbolize the mysterious sexual gestures and innuendoes he or she is witnessing. Crucial for "becoming-human" is the overlapping accomplish a more radical gesture of the two levels, the implicit "sexualizationtraversing" of the way a parent satisfies a child's bodily needs - say, when the mother feeds the child by excessively caressing him, and the child detects in very fundamental fantasy. Only such gestures which disturb this excess the mystery of sexual <i>jouissance</i>fantasmatic kernel are authentic [[acts]].<br><br>

SoHere, back one should look to Butler - the crucial question concerns problematic of the philosophical status of this original and constitutive <i>[[Hilflosigkeit</i>]] ('[[helplessness]],' 'distress') of small infants. Is The first feature to be noted is that this <i>Hilflosigkeit</i> not another name for the gap of the primordial dis-attachment which triggers the need for the fantasmatic primordial "passionate attachmentdistress"? In other wordscovers two interconnected, but nonetheless different, what if we turn around the perspective and conceive of the obstacle which prevents the infans fully to fit into its environs levels - this original "out-of-joint" state - in its positive aspectfirst a purely [[organic]] helplessness, as another name for the very abyss inability of freedomthe small child to survive, for that gesture of "disconnecting" that liberates a subject from its direct immersion into its environs? Orto [[satisfy]] his or her most elementary [[needs]], to put it in yet another way - truewithout the [[parents]]' [[help]], and second the subject [[traumatic]] perplexion when the child is as it were "blackmailed" thrown into passively submitting to some form the position of a [[helpless]] [[witness]] of [[sexual]] interplay among the primordial "passionate attachmentparents," sinceother [[adults]], outside of it, he simply does not existor between adults and him- or herself. This non-existence The child is not directly the absence of existencehelpless, howeverwithout "cognitive [[mapping]], but a certain gap or void in the order of being which "is" when confronted with the subject itself. The need for "passionate attachment" to provide a minimum enigma of being implies that the subject qua "abstract negativityOther's <i>[[jouissance]]</i>," qua unable to [[symbolize]] the primordial gesture of dis-attachment from its environs, mysterious sexual gestures and innuendoes he or she is already herewitnessing. Fantasy is thus a defenseCrucial for "becoming-formation against the primordial abyss if dis-attachment that [[human]]"is" the subject itself. At this precise point, then, Butler should be supplemented - the emergence overlapping of the subject and subjection in the sense of two levels, the implicit "passionate attachment,sexualization" i.e. submission to some figure of the Otherway a parent [[satisfies]] a child's [[bodily]] needs - say, are not strictly equivalent, since, for when the [[mother]] feeds the "passionate attachment" to take placechild by excessively caressing him, and the gap which "is" the subject must already be here. Only if child detects in this gap is already here, can we account for how it is possible for the subject to escape [[excess]] the hold mystery of the fundamental fantasy.[5]sexual <bri>jouissance<br/i>.

3So, back to Butler - the crucial question concerns the [[philosophical]] status of this original and constitutive <bri>Hilflosigkeit<br/i>. Is this <i>Hilflosigkeit</i> not another name for the gap of the primordial dis-attachment which triggers the [[need]] for the fantasmatic primordial "passionate attachment"? In other words, what if we turn around the perspective and conceive of the obstacle which prevents the [[infans]] fully to fit into its environs - this original "out-of-joint" [[state]] - in its positive aspect, as another name for the very abyss of [[freedom]], for that gesture of "disconnecting" that liberates a subject from its direct immersion into its environs? Or, to put it in yet another way - [[true]], the subject is as it were "blackmailed" into passively submitting to some form of the primordial "passionate attachment," since, [[outside]] of it, he simply does not exist. This non-existence is not directly the [[absence]] of existence, however, but a certain gap or void in the order of being which "is" the subject itself. The need for "passionate attachment" to provide a minimum of being implies that the subject qua "abstract negativity," qua the primordial gesture of dis-attachment from its environs, is already here. Fantasy is thus a [[defense]]-formation against the primordial abyss if dis-attachment that "is" the subject itself. At this precise point, then, Butler should be supplemented - the emergence of the subject and subjection in the sense of the "passionate attachment," i.e. submission to some [[figure]] of the Other, are not strictly equivalent, since, for the "passionate attachment" to take place, the gap which "is" the subject must already be here. Only if this gap is already here, can we account for how it is possible for the subject to escape the hold of the fundamental fantasy.<ref>One should link this opposition of attachment and dis-attachment to the old Freudian metapsychological opposition of Life and Death [[drives]]. In The Ego and [[the Id]], Freud defines these drives as the opposition between the forces of connection/unity and the forces of disconnection/disunity. Dis-attachment is thus [[death drive]] at its purest, the gesture of [[ontological]] "derailment" which throws "out of joint" the order of Being. It is the gesture of disinvestment, of "contraction"/withdrawal from being immersed in the [[world]]. The primordial attachment is the counter-move to this [[negative]] gesture. In the last resort, this negative tendency to disruption is none other than [[libido]] itself: what throws a subject "out of joint" is none other than the [[traumatic encounter]] with ''jouissance''.</ref>

Would it not be possible, along these lines, also to interpret the unique figure of the So what is a proper act? Jacques-[[Alain]] [[Miller]]<iref>femme fatale</i> in the new noir of the 90sSee [[Jacques-Alain Miller]], "Des Semblants dans la Relation Entre les [[Sexes]], as exemplified by Linda Fiorentino in John Dahl" ''La [[Cause]] Freudianne''s <i>The Last Seduction36 (1997): 7-15.</iref>? In contrast to proposes as the classic noir <i>femme fatale</i> definition of "a true [[woman]]" a certain radical act - the 40sact of taking from man, who remains an elusive spectral presenceher partner, the new <i>femme fatale</i> is characterized by directof obliterating, outspoken sexual aggressivitydestroying even, verbal and physical, by direct self-commodification and self-manipulation. She has the that which is "mind of a pimp in the body of a whore.him more than himself," Two dialogues are here indicative - the classic exchange of double entendres about a that which "speed limitmeans everything to him" and to which finishes he holds more than his own life, the first encounter precious [[agalma]] round which his life turns. The exemplary figure of Barbara Stanwyck and Fred McMurray such an act in Billy Wilder[[literature]] is that of Medea who, upon learning that Jason, her husband, plans to abandon her for a younger woman, kills their two young [[children]], her husband's <i>Double Indemnity</i>, and the first encounter most precious possessions. It is in this horrible act of Linda Fiorentino with destroying that which matters most to her partner in husband that she acts as une vraie [[femme]], as Lacan put it.<iref>The Last Seduction</i>. In the latterLacan's other example is that of Andre Gide's wife who, Fiorentino directly opens up after his flydeath, reaches into it and inspects burned all his merchandise before accepting him as a lover: "I never buy anything sight unseen," she says, and later rejects any "warm human contact" with him.[8[love]] How does this brutal "self-commodification," this reduction of herself and letters to her male partner to an object to be satisfied and exploited, affect the allegedly "subversive" status of the <i>femme fataleconsidered by him his most precious possession.</i> with regard to the paternal Law of speech?<br><brref>

According Would it not be possible, along these lines, also to standard feminist cinema theory, in [[interpret]] the classical noir, unique figure of the <i>[[femme fatale]]</i> is punished at the level of the explicit narrative line. She is destroyed for being assertive and undermining the male patriarchal dominance and for presenting a threat to it. Although she is destroyed or domesticated, her image survives her physical destruction as the element which effectively dominates the scene. The subversive character of the noir films is exhibited in the way the texture of the film belies and subverts its explicit narrative line. In contrast to this classic noir, the neo-new noir of the 80s and 90s, from Kasdanas exemplified by Linda Fiorentino in John Dahl's <i>Body HeatThe Last [[Seduction]]</i> ? In contrast to the classic noir <i>The Last Seductionfemme fatale</i>of the 40s, at the level of explicit narrativewho remains an elusive [[spectral]] [[presence]], openly allows the new <i>femme fatale</i> to triumphis characterized by direct, outspoken sexual [[aggressivity]], [[verbal]] and [[physical]], to reduce her partner to a sucker condemned to death by direct self- she survives rich commodification and alone over his dead self-manipulation. She has the "mind of a pimp in the bodyof a whore. She does not survive as " Two dialogues are here indicative - the classic [[exchange]] of [[double]] entendres about a spectral "undeadspeed [[limit]]" threat which libidinally dominates finishes the scene even after her physical first encounter of Barbara Stanwyck and social destruction. She triumphs directlyFred McMurray in Billy Wilder's <i>Double Indemnity</i>, in social reality itself. How does this affect and the subversive edge first encounter of the Linda Fiorentino with her partner in <i>femme fatale[[The Last Seduction]]</i> figure? Does . In the fact that her triumph is real not undermine her much stronger spectral/fantasmatic triumphlatter, so thatFiorentino directly opens up his fly, instead of reaches into it and inspects his merchandise before accepting him as a spectral alllover: "I never buy anything [[sight]] unseen," she says, and later rejects any "warm human contact" with him.<ref>I rely here on Kate Stables, British Film Institute, London.</ref> How does this brutal "self-powerful threatcommodification, indestructible in " this reduction of herself and her very physical destruction, she turns out [[male]] partner to an [[object]] to be just a vulgar[[satisfied]] and exploited, cold, manipulative [[affect]] the allegedly "bitchsubversive" deprived status of any aura?the <bri>femme fatale<br/i>with [[regard]] to the paternal Law of speech?

Perhaps what one should do here is change the terms of the debate byAccording to standard [[feminist]] [[cinema]] theory, first, pointing out that, far from being simply a threat to in the male patriarchal identityclassical noir, the classic <i>femme fatale</i> functions as is punished at the "inherent transgression" level of the patriarchal symbolic universe, as [[explicit]] [[narrative]] line. She is destroyed for being assertive and undermining the male masochist-paranoiac fantasy of the exploitative patriarchal dominance and sexually insatiable woman who simultaneously dominates us and enjoys in her sufferingfor presenting a threat to it. Although she is destroyed or domesticated, provoking us violently to take her and to abuse [[image]] survives her.physical [[9destruction] ] as the element which effectively dominates the scene. The threat subversive character of the <i>femme fatale</i> noir [[films]] is thus a false oneexhibited in the way the [[texture]] of the film belies and subverts its explicit narrative line. It is effectively a fantasmatic support of patriarchal dominationIn contrast to this classic noir, the figure neo-noir of the enemy engendered by the patriarchal system itself. In Judith Butler80s and 90s, from Kasdan's terms, <i>femme fatale[[Body Heat]]</i> to <i>The Last Seduction</i> is the fundamental disavowed "passionate attachment" of the modern male subject, a fantasmatic formation which is needed, but cannot be openly assumed, so that it can only be evoked on the condition that, at the level of the explicit narrative line - standing for the public socio-symbolic sphere - she is punished and the order of male domination is reasserted. Or, to put it in Foucauldian terms, in the same way that the discourse on sexuality creates sex as the mysterious, impenetrable entity to be conquered, the patriarchal erotic discourse creates openly allows the <i>femme fatale</i> to triumph, to reduce her partner to a sucker condemned to death - she survives rich and alone over his [[dead]] body. She does not survive as the inherent a spectral "undead" threat against which libidinally dominates the male identity should assert scene even after her physical and social destruction. She triumphs directly, in social [[reality]] itself. And How does this affect the neo-noir's achievement is to bring to light this underlying fantasy: subversive edge of the new <i>femme fatale</i> who fully accepts figure? Does the male game of manipulation, and as it were beats him at his own game, fact that her triumph is real not undermine her much more effective in threatening the paternal Law than the classic stronger spectral <i>femme fatale</i>.<br><br>fantasmatic triumph, so that, instead of a spectral all-powerful threat, indestructible in her very physical destruction, she turns out to be just a vulgar, cold, manipulative "bitch" deprived of any aura?

One can arguePerhaps what one should do here is [[change]] the terms of the debate by, of coursefirst, pointing out that this new <i>femme fatale</i> is no less hallucinatory, that her direct approach far from being simply a threat to a man is no less the realization of a (masochist) male fantasy; what one should not forgetpatriarchal identity, however, is that the new classic <i>femme fatale</i> subverts functions as the "inherent transgression" of the patriarchal symbolic [[universe]], as the male masochist-[[paranoiac]] fantasy precisely by way of directly the exploitative and sexually [[insatiable]] woman who simultaneously dominates us and brutally realizing it[[enjoys]] in her suffering, acting it out in "real lifeprovoking us violently to take her and to abuse her." It is thus <ref>The fantasy of the all-powerful woman whose irresistible attraction presents a threat not only that she realizes to male domination, but to the very identity of the male hallucination; she is fully aware that men hallucinate about such a direct approachsubject, and that directly giving them what they hallucinate about is the most effective way to undermine their domination"fundamental fantasy" against which the male symbolic identity defines and sustains itself. In other words, what we have in </ref> The threat of the above-described scene from <i>The Last Seductionfemme fatale</i> is thus a false one. It is effectively a fantasmatic support of patriarchal domination, the figure of the exact feminine counterpart to [[enemy]] engendered by the scene from Lynchpatriarchal [[system]] itself. In Judith Butler's terms, <i>Wild at Heartfemme fatale</i> in which Wilem Defoe verbally abuses Laura Dern, forcing her to utter is the words fundamental disavowed "Fuck me!passionate attachment" And when she finally does respondof the modern male subject, i.e. when her fantasy a fantasmatic formation which is arousedneeded, but cannot be openly assumed, so that it can only be evoked on the condition that, he treats this offer as an authentic free offer at the level of the explicit narrative line - standing for the [[public]] socio-symbolic sphere - she is punished and politely rejects the order of male domination is reasserted. Or, to put it - "Noin Foucauldian terms, thanksin the same way that the discourse on sexuality creates sex as the mysterious, I've got impenetrable entity to go, but maybe some other time..." In both scenesbe conquered, the subject is humiliated when his or her fantasy is brutally externalized.patriarchal [[10erotic]] In short, Linda Fiorentino acts here discourse creates the <i>femme fatale</i> as a true sadist, not only on account of her reduction of her partner to the bearer of partial objects inherent threat against which provide pleasure the male identity should assert itself. And the neo- thereby depriving noir's [[achievement]] is to bring to light this underlying fantasy: the sexual act new <i>femme fatale</i> who fully accepts the male [[game]] of its "human manipulation, and emotional warmth" and transforming as it into a cold physiological exercise -- but also because of the cruel manipulation of the other's fantasy which were beats him at his own game, is directly acted out and thus thwarted much more effective in its efficiency as threatening the paternal Law than the support of desire.classic spectral <bri>femme fatale<br/i>.

Is One can argue, of course, that this gesture of intentionally and brutally dropping the spectral aura of the traditional new <i>femme fatale</i> not another version of is no less [[hallucinatory]], that her direct approach to a man is no less the act realization of une vraie femme? Is a (masochist) male fantasy; what one should not the object which is to her partner "more than himselfforget," the treasure around which his life turnshowever, is that the new <i>femme fatale</i> herself? By brutally destroying subverts the spectral aura male fantasy precisely by way of directly and brutally realizing it, acting it out in "feminine mystery,real life." by acting as a cold manipulating subject interested It is thus not only in raw sex, reducing her partner to that she realizes the male [[hallucination]]; she is fully aware that men hallucinate about such a partial objectdirect approach, and that directly giving them what they hallucinate about is the appendix most effective way to - and undermine their domination. In other words, what we have in the bearer of above- his penis, does she not also violently destroy what is "for him more than himself"? The enigma of this new described scene from <i>femme fataleThe Last Seduction</i> is that although, in contrast the exact [[feminine]] [[counterpart]] to the classic scene from Lynch's <i>femme fataleWild at Heart</i>in which Wilem Defoe verbally abuses Laura Dern, she is totally transparent, openly assuming the role of a calculating bitch, the perfect embodiment of what Baudrillard called forcing her to utter the words "[[Fuck]] me!"transparency of EvilAnd when she finally does respond," i.e. when her enigma persists. Here we encounter the paradox already discerned by Hegel - sometimesfantasy is aroused, total self-exposure he treats this offer as an authentic free offer and selfpolitely rejects it -transparency"No, thanks, iI've got to go, but maybe some other [[time]]..e. the awareness that there is no hidden content" In both scenes, makes the subject even more enigmaticis humiliated when his or her fantasy is brutally externalized. Sometimes<ref>For a detailed [[analysis]] of the scene from Wild at Heart, being totally outspoken is the most effective and cunning way see Appendix 2 to [[Slavoj Zizek]]'s [[The Plague of deceiving the OtherFantasies]]. For that reason, the neo-noir <i>femme fatale</iref> continues to exert her irresistible seductive power In short, Linda Fiorentino acts here as a true [[sadist]], not only on account of her poor partner. Her strategy is the one reduction of deceiving him by openly telling the truth. The male her partner is unable to accept this, and so, he desperately clings to the conviction that, behind bearer of [[partial]] [[objects]] which provide [[pleasure]] - thereby depriving the cold manipulative surface, there must be a heart sexual act of gold to be saved, a person of warm its "human feeling, and that her emotional warmth" and transforming it into a cold manipulative approach is just a kind [[physiological]] exercise -- but also because of defensive strategy. So, in the vein cruel manipulation of Freudthe other's well-known Jewish joke "Why are you telling me that you are going to Lemberg, when you are actually going to Lemberg?" fantasy which is directly acted out and thus thwarted in its efficiency as the basic implicit reproach support of the sucker-partner to the new <i>femme fatale</i> could be formulated as "Why do you act if you are just a cold manipulative bitch, when you are really just a cold manipulative bitch?"<br><br>desire.

4Is this gesture of intentionally and brutally dropping the spectral aura of the traditional <bri>femme fatale<br/i>not another version of the act of une vraie femme? Is not the object which is to her partner "more than himself," the treasure around which his life turns, the <i>femme fatale</i> herself? By brutally destroying the spectral aura of "feminine mystery," by acting as a cold manipulating subject interested only in raw sex, reducing her partner to a [[partial object]], the appendix to - and the bearer of - his [[penis]], does she not also violently destroy what is "for him more than himself"? The enigma of this new <i>femme fatale</i> is that although, in contrast to the classic <i>femme fatale</i>, she is totally [[transparent]], openly assuming the [[role]] of a calculating bitch, the perfect embodiment of what [[Baudrillard]] called the "[[transparency]] of [[Evil]]," her enigma persists. Here we encounter the [[paradox]] already discerned by [[Hegel]] - sometimes, [[total]] self-exposure and [[self-transparency]], i.e. the [[awareness]] that there is no hidden [[content]], makes the subject even more enigmatic. Sometimes, being totally outspoken is the most effective and cunning way of deceiving the Other. For that reason, the neo-noir <i>femme fatale</i> continues to exert her irresistible [[seductive]] power on her poor partner. Her strategy is the one of deceiving him by openly telling the truth. The male partner is unable to accept this, and so, he desperately clings to the conviction that, behind the cold manipulative surface, there must be a heart of gold to be saved, a person of warm human [[feeling]], and that her cold manipulative approach is just a kind of defensive strategy. So, in the vein of Freud's well-known [[Jewish]] [[joke]] "Why are you telling me that you are going to Lemberg, when you are actually going to Lemberg?" the basic implicit reproach of the sucker-partner to the new <i>femme fatale</i> could be formulated as "Why do you act if you are just a cold manipulative bitch, when you are really just a cold manipulative bitch?"

This shift is homologous allows us further to that implied in specify the Kierkegaardian Lacanian notion of an authentic act. Act is to be opposed to mere [[activity]]. Activity relies on some fantasmatic support, while the authentic act involves disturbing - "traversing"sickness unto death- the fantasy.In this precise sense, act is for Lacan on the side of the object qua real as opposed to signifier - to " The [[speech act]]."sickness unto death" properWe can only perform speech acts insofar as we have accepted the fundamental alienation in the symbolic order and the fantasmatic support necessary for the functioning of this order, while the act as real is an [[event]] which occurs ex nihilo, without any fantasmatic support. As such, its despairact as object is also to be opposed to the subject, opposes at least in the standard despair Lacanian sense of the individual who "[[alienated]]" [[divided]] subject. The correlate to the act is split between a divided subject, but not in the certainty sense that because of that death [[division]] act is always failed or displaced. On the endcontrary, that there act as traumatic tuche is no beyond of eternal life and the equal certainty that death is not which [[divides]] the last thingsubject who cannot ever subjectivize this act, assume it as "his own, that there is another life with " posit himself as its promise of redemption and eternal bliss[[author]]-[[agent]]. The "sickness unto death" rather involves the opposite paradox of the subject who knows authentic act that death I accomplish is not the endalways by definition a foreign body, an intruder which simultaneously attracts/fascinates and also repels me, so that he has an immortal soul, but cannot face the exorbitant demands of this fact - the necessity to abandon vain aesthetic pleasures if and when I come too close to work for his salvation - and soit, desperately wants this leads to believe that death is the endmy [[aphanisis]], that self-erasure. If there is no divine unconditional demand exerting its pressure upon him. The standard religious je sais biena subject to the act, mais quand meme is inverted here. It it is not that the subject of [[subjectivization]], of integrating the act into the universe of symbolic integration and recognition, of assuming the act as "I know very well that I am a mere mortal living beingmy own, " but I nonetheless desperately want to believe rather it is an [[uncanny]] "acephalous" subject through which the act takes place as that there which is redemption "in eternal lifehim more than himself." It is rather that Act thus designates the level at which the fundamental divisions and displacements usually associated with the "Lacanian subject"I know very well that I have an eternal soul responsible to God's unconditional commandments, but I desperately want to believe that there <ref>That is nothing beyond death, I want to be relieved the [[split]] between the subject of the unbearable pressure [[enunciation]] and the subject of divine injunction.the [[enunciated]]/statement, the subject's "decenterment" In other words, in contrast with regard to the individual caught in the standard skeptical despair - isymbolic big Other, and so on.e</ref> are momentarily suspended.In the act, the individual who knows he will die but cannot accept subject, as Lacan puts it , posits itself as its own cause and hopes for eternal life is no longer determined by the decentered object- cause. Thus if we have heresubtract from it its scenic imagery, its [[fascination]] with the divine majesty, and reduce it to the essential, [[Kant]]'s well-known description of how a direct insight into the noumenal God as the Thing in itself would deprive us of our freedom and turn us into lifeless puppets paradoxically fits perfectly the case description of the ethical act.<ref>"sickness unto death," Instead of the [[conflict]] which now the individual who desperately wants [[moral]] disposition has to die[[wage]] with inclinations and in which, after some defeats, moral strength of mind may be gradually won, God and [[eternity]] in their awful majesty would stand unceasingly before our eyes... Thus most actions conforming to disappear foreverthe law would be done from [[fear]], but knows that he cannot do itfew would be done from hope, that he is condemned to eternal lifenone from [[duty]]. The predicament moral worth of our actions, on which alone the individual "sick unto death" is worth of the same as that person and even of the Wagnerian heroesworld depends in the eyes of supreme wisdom, would not exist at all. The conduct of man, so long as his [[nature]] remained as it is now, would be changed into mere [[mechanism]], from where, as in a puppet show, everything would gesticulate well but no life would be found in the [[figures]]." [[Immanuel Kant]], ''Critique of [[Practical]] Reason'' (New York: Macmillan, 1956), 152-153.<i/ref>Flying DutchmanThis act is precisely something which unexpectedly "just occurs." It is an occurrence which most surprises its agent itself.</iref> After an authentic act, my reaction is always, "I myself do not [[know]] how I was able to Amfortas in <i>Parsifaldo that - it just happened!"</iref>The paradox is that in an authentic act, the highest freedom coincides with the utmost [[passivity]], with a reduction to a lifeless [[automaton]] who desperately strive for death, for just blindly performs its gestures. The problematic of act thus compels us to accept the radical shift of perspective involved in the modern notion of [[finitude]]. What is so difficult to accept is not the fact that the final annihilation true act - in which noumenal and selfphenomenal dimensions coincide -obliteration which would relieve them is forever out of our reach. The true trauma resides in the hell of their "undead" existenceopposite awareness that there are acts, that they do occur and that we have to come to terms with them.<br><br>

In This shift is homologous to that implied in the criticism of Kant implicit in this Kierkegaardian notion of the act"sickness unto death." The "sickness unto death" proper, its despair, Lacan is thus close to Hegel who also claimed that opposes the unity standard despair of the noumenal and individual who is split between the phenomenal adjourned ad infinitum in Kant [[certainty]] that death is precisely what takes place every time an authentic act is accomplished. Kant's mistake was to presuppose the end, that there is an act only insofar as it no beyond of eternal life and the equal certainty that death is adequately "subjectivizednot the last thing," that there is, accomplished another life with a pure will, a will free its promise of any redemption and eternal bliss. The "pathologicalsickness unto death" motivations. And, since one can never be sure rather involves the opposite paradox of the subject who [[knows]] that what I did was effectively motivated by death is not the moral Law as its sole motiveend, the moral act turns into something which effectively never happensthat he has an immortal soul, but can only be posited as cannot face the final point of an infinite asymptotic approach exorbitant [[demands]] of this fact - the purification of the soul. For this reason, Kant, in order [[necessity]] to abandon vain aesthetic pleasures and to guarantee the ultimate possibility of the actwork for his salvation - and so, had desperately wants to propose his postulate of believe that death is the immortality of the soulend, which, as it can be shown, effectively amounts to that there is no divine unconditional [[demand]] exerting its very oppositepressure upon him. The standard [[religious]] je sais bien, the Sadean fantasy of the immortality of the bodymais quand meme is inverted here.It is not that "I know very well that I am a mere mortal [14[living] Only in such a way can one hope that] being, after endless approximation, one will reach the point of being able but I nonetheless desperately want to accomplish a true moral actbelieve that there is redemption in eternal life. The point of Lacan's criticism " It is thus rather that "I know very well that I have an authentic act does not presuppose its agenteternal soul [[responsible]] to God's unconditional commandments, the way Kant assumes with misleading self-evidencebut I desperately want to believe that there is [[nothing]] beyond death, "at the level I want to be relieved of the act" with his will purified unbearable pressure of all pathological motivationsdivine injunction. It is inevitable" In other words, then, that in contrast to the agent is not "at individual caught in the level of its actstandard skeptical despair - i.e.," for he is himself unpleasantly surprised by the "crazy thing individual who knows he just did" will die but cannot accept it and is unable fully to come to terms with what he did. This, incidentally, is the usual structure of heroic acts - somebody who, hopes for a long time, led an opportunistic eternal life of maneuvering and compromises- we have here, all in the case of a sudden"sickness unto death, inexplicably even " the individual who desperately wants to himselfdie, resolves to stand firmly[[disappear]] forever, cost what but knows that he cannot do it may, that he is condemned to eternal life. Thus the paradox The predicament of the act resides in the fact that although it is not individual "intentionalsick unto death" in is the usual sense same as that of the termWagnerian heroes, it is nonetheless accepted as something for which its agent is fully responsible - "I cannot do otherwise, yet I am nonetheless fully free from the <i>Flying Dutchman</i> to Amfortas in doing it."<bri>Parsifal<br/i>, who desperately strive for death, for the final annihilation and self-obliteration which would relieve them of the hell of their "undead" existence.

SoIn the criticism of Kant implicit in this notion of the act, Lacan is thus close to Hegel who also claimed that the unity of the noumenal and the phenomenal adjourned ad infinitum in Kant is precisely what takes place every time an authentic act is accomplished. Kant's mistake was to presuppose that there is an act only insofar as it is adequately "subjectivized," that is, accomplished with a pure will, if we return for a brief moment will free of any "pathological" motivations. And, since one can never be sure that what I did was effectively motivated by the moral Law as its sole motive, the moral act turns into something which effectively never happens, but can only be posited as the final point of an infinite asymptotic approach of the purification of the soul. For this reason, Kant, in order to [[guarantee]] the ultimate possibility of the act, had to propose his postulate of the immortality of the soul, which, as it can be shown, effectively amounts to its very opposite, the Sadean fantasy of the immortality of the body.<iref>See Alenka [[Zupancic]], "[[The Last SeductionSubject]] of the Law," SIC 2, ed. Slavoj Zizek (Durham: Duke UP, 1998).</iref>Only in such a way can one hope that, after endless approximation, Linda Fiorentino's gesture nevertheless does not quite fit one will reach the description point of being able to accomplish a true ethical moral act. The point of Lacan's criticism is thus that an authentic act does not presuppose its agent, insofar as she is presented as a perfect demoniac beingthe way Kant assumes with misleading self-evidence, as "at the level of the subject act" with a diabolical his will who is perfectly aware purified of what she all pathological motivations. It is doing; she fully subjectivizes her actsinevitable, then, insofar as her Will that the agent is not "at the level of her wicked deedsits act," for he is himself unpleasantly surprised by the "crazy thing he just did" and is unable fully to come to terms with what he did. As suchThis, incidentally, is the usual structure of heroic acts - somebody who, for a long time, led an opportunistic life of maneuvering and compromises, she remains all of a male fantasy: sudden, inexplicably even to himself, resolves to stand firmly, cost what it may. Thus the fantasy paradox of encountering a perfect subject the act resides in the fact that although it is not "intentional" in the guise usual sense of the absolutely corrupted woman who term, it is nonetheless accepted as something for which its agent is fully responsible - "I cannot do otherwise, yet I am nonetheless fully knows and wills what she is free in doingit.<br><br>"

ConsequentlySo, this Lacanian notion of act also enables us to break with the deconstructionist ethics of the irreducible finitude, of how our situation is always that of if we [[return]] for a displaced being, caught in a constitutive lack, so that all we can do is brief [[moment]] to assume heroically this lack, to assume heroically the fact that our situation is that of being thrown into an impenetrable finite context. <i>The corollary of this ethics, of courseLast Seduction</i>, is that the ultimate source of totalitarian and other catastrophes is manLinda Fiorentino's presumption that he can overcome this condition gesture nevertheless does not quite fit the description of finitude, lack and displacement, and "a true ethical act like God," in insofar as she is presented as a total transparencyperfect demoniac being, surpassing his constitutive division. Lacan's answer to this is that absolute/unconditional acts do occur, but not in as the idealist guise of a self-transparent gesture performed by a subject with a pure diabolical will who is perfectly aware of what she is doing; she fully intends them. They occur, on the contrarysubjectivizes her acts, insofar as a totally unpredictable tuche, a miraculous event which shatters our lives. To put it in somewhat pathetic terms, this her Will is how at the "divine" dimension is present in our liveslevel of her wicked deeds. As such, and she remains a male fantasy: the different modalities fantasy of ethical betrayal relate precisely to encountering a perfect subject in the different ways guise of betraying the act-event. The true source of evil is not a finite mortal man absolutely corrupted woman who acts like God, but a man who disavows that divine miracles occur fully knows and reduces himself to just another finite mortal beingwills what she is doing.[15]<br><br>

Notes:<br><br> 1. Judith ButlerConsequently, this Lacanian notion of act also enables us to break with the deconstructionist [[ethics]] of the irreducible finitude, The Psychic Life of Power (Stanford: Stanford UPhow our [[situation]] is always that of a displaced being, 1997). Numbers caught in parentheses refer a constitutive [[lack]], so that all we can do is to assume heroically this lack, to assume heroically the pages fact that our situation is that of being thrown into an impenetrable finite context. The corollary of this book.<br>2. Butler demonstrates ethics, of course, is that the Foucauldian ultimate source of totalitarian and other catastrophes is man's presumption that he can overcome this condition of finitude, lack and displacement, and "bodyact like God," as in a total transparency, surpassing his constitutive division. Lacan's answer to this is that absolute/unconditional acts do occur, but not in the site idealist guise of resistance is none other than a self-transparent gesture performed by a subject with a pure will who fully intends them. They occur, on the Freudian "psychecontrary, as a totally unpredictable tuche, a miraculous event which shatters our lives." ParadoxicallyTo put it in somewhat pathetic terms, this is how the "bodydivine" dimension is Foucault's name for [[present]] in our lives, and the different modalities of ethical [[betrayal]] relate precisely to the psychic apparatus insofar as it resists different ways of betraying the soul's dominationact-event. That The true source of evil is not a finite mortal man who acts like God, but a man who disavows that divine miracles occur and reduces himself to sayjust another finite mortal being.<ref>In a further elaboration, when, in his well-known definition one should thus reread Lacan's matrix of the soul four [[discourses]] as [[three]] modes of coming to terms with the "prison trauma of the body," Foucault turns around [[analytic]] act. The master's [[semblance]] resides in the standard Platonic-Christian definition of fact that he pretends to nominate and thus directly translate into the body as symbolic fidelity the "prison dimension of the soulact. That is," what he calls the "body" defining feature of the Master's gesture is not simply to change the biological body, but is that which is already caught in some kind of preact into a new master-subjective psychic apparatussignifier._<br>3. IncidentallyIn contrast to the master, Butler here blatantly contradicts Lacan for whom the unconscious is "[[hysteric]] maintains the ambiguous attitude of division towards the Other's discourseact," iinsisting on the simultaneous necessity and impossibility of its [[symbolization]].e. symbolicIn contrast to both of them, not imaginary. Is not the best known single line from Lacan [[perverse]] agent of the assertion [[university]] discourse disavows that "there was the event of an act in the Unconscious is structured like a language?" Slips and gaps are not for Lacan thoroughly symbolic factsfirst place. They confirm By means of the [[chain]] of [[knowledge]], he wants to reduce the functioning consequences of the signifying networkact to just another thing which can be explained away as part of the normal run of things.<br/ref>

4. For example, apropos of the army life, such a "passionate attachment" is provided by a homosexual link which has to be disavowed if it is to remain operative. See Chapter 2 of Slavoj Zizek, <i>The Plague of Fantasies</i> (London: Verso, 1997).<br>5. One should link this opposition of attachment and dis-attachment to the old Freudian metapsychological opposition of Life and Death drives. In The Ego and the Id, Freud defines these drives as the opposition between the forces of connection/unity and the forces of disconnection/disunity. Dis-attachment is thus death drive at its purest, the gesture of ontological "derailment" which throws "out of joint" the order of Being. It is the gesture of disinvestment, of "contraction"/withdrawal from being immersed in the world. The primordial attachment is the counter-move to this negative gesture. In the last resort, this negative tendency to disruption is none other than libido itself===Notes: what throws a subject "out of joint" is none other than the traumatic encounter with <i>jouissance</i>.<br>===6. See Jacques-Alain Miller, "Des Semblants dans la Relation Entre les Sexes," <i>La Cause Freudianne<references /i> 36 (1997): 7-15.<br>7. Lacan's other example is that of Andre Gide's wife who, after his death, burned all his love letters to her, considered by him his most precious possession._<br>8. I rely here on Kate Stables, British Film Institute, London.<br>

9. The fantasy of the all-powerful woman whose irresistible attraction presents a threat not only to male domination, but to the very identity of the male subject, is the ==Source==* [[From "fundamental fantasyPassionate Attachments" against which the male symbolic identity defines and sustains itselfto Dis-identification]]._<br>10. For ''Umbr(a detailed analysis of the scene from Wild at Heart, see Appendix 2 to Slavoj Zizek): Identity/Identification''s <i>The Plague of Fantasies</i>.<br>11[[Number]] 1. That is, the split between the subject of the enunciation and the subject of the enunciated/statement, the subject's "decenterment" with regard to the symbolic big Other, and so on1998.<br>12http://www. "Instead of the conflict which now the moral disposition has to wage with inclinations and in which, after some defeats, moral strength of mind may be gradually won, God and eternity in their awful majesty would stand unceasingly before our eyesgsa.buffalo.edu/lacan/zizekidentity. Thus most actions conforming to the law would be done from fear, few would be done from hope, none from dutyhtm>. The moral worth of our actions, Also listed on which alone the worth of the person and even of the world depends in the eyes of supreme wisdom, would not exist at all''[[Lacan. The conduct of man, so long as his nature remained as it is now, would be changed into mere mechanism, where, as in a puppet show, everything would gesticulate well but no life would be found in the figurescom]]''." Immanuel Kant, <i>Critique of Practical Reason<http://i> (New York: Macmillan, 1956), 152-153www.lacan.<br>13com/zizekpassionate. After an authentic act, my reaction is always, "I myself do not know how I was able to do that - it just happened!"<brhtm>14. See Alenka Zupancic, "The Subject of the Law," SIC 2, ed. Slavoj Zizek (Durham: Duke UP, 1998).<br>