What does Lacan's thesis on "Joyce-the-symptom" aim at? Joyce's famous statement that he wrote Finnegans Wake in order to keep literary historians busy for the next 400 years has to be read against the background of Lacan's assertion that, within a psychoanalytic cure, a symptom is always addressed at the analyst and as such points forward towards its interpretation. The "modernism" of Joyce resides in the fact that his works, at least Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, are not simply external to their interpretation but, as it were, in advance take into account their possible interpretations and enter into dialogue with them. Insofar as an interpretation or theoretical explanation of a work of art endeavours to "frame" its object, one can say that this modernist dialectics provides another example of how the frame is always included in, is a part of, the framed content: in modernism, theory about the work is comprised in the work, the work is a kind of preemptive strike at possible theories about itself. On that account, it is inappropriate to reproach Joyce for no longer writing for a naive reader capable of an immediate consumption of his works, but for a reflected reader, who is only able to read with an eye on possible theoretical interpretations of what he is reading, in short, for a literary scientist: such a "reflected" approach in no way diminishes our enjoyment in the work — quite the contrary, it supplements our reading with a surplus-enjoyment which is one of the trademarks of true modernism.{{BSZ}}
What interests us here, however, is does [[Lacan]]'s [[thesis]] on "[[Joyce]]-the-[[symptom]]" aim at? Joyce's famous [[statement]] that he wrote [[Finnegans Wake]] in [[order]] to keep [[literary]] historians busy for the next 400 years has to be read against the general background of the all- pervasive reflectivity of everyday life Lacan's assertion that, within which this Joyce'a attitude [[psychoanalytic]] [[cure]], a symptom is inscribedalways addressed at the [[analyst]] and as such points forward towards its [[interpretation]]. In one The "modernism" of Joyce resides in the fact that his lettersworks, at least [[Ulysses]] and Finnegans Wake, Freud refers are not simply [[external]] to the well-known joke about the newly married whotheir interpretation but, as it were, when asked by his friend how his wife looksin advance take into account their possible [[interpretations]] and enter into dialogue with [[them]]. Insofar as an interpretation or [[theoretical]] explanation of a [[work]] of art endeavours to "[[frame]]" its [[object]], one can say that this modernist dialectics provides [[another]] example of how beautiful she the frame isalways included in, answers: "I personally don't like her, but that's is a matter of taste." The paradox of this answer does not point towards an attitude part of selfish calculation ("True, I don't like herthe framed [[content]]: in modernism, but I married her for other reasons — her wealth[[theory]] [[about]] the work is comprised in the work, the social influence work is a kind of her parents…")[[preemptive strike]] at possible theories about itself. Its crucial feature is On thataccount, by providing this answer, the subject pretends it is inappropriate to assume the standpoint reproach Joyce for no longer [[writing]] for a naive reader capable of universality from which "to be likeable" appears as an idiosyncrasyimmediate consumption of his works, as but for a contingent "pathological" feature which, as suchreflected reader, who is not only able to be taken into consideration. The joke therefore relies read with an eye on the impossible/untenable position possible theoretical interpretations of enunciation of the newly marriedwhat he is [[reading]], in short, for a literary [[scientist]]: from this position, marriage appears as an act which belongs to such a "reflected" approach in no way diminishes our [[enjoyment]] in the domain of universal symbolic determinations and should as such be independent of personal idiosyncrasies work — as if quite the very notion contrary, it supplements our reading with a [[surplus]]-enjoyment which is one of marriage does not involve precisely the "pathological" fact trademarks of liking a particular person for no particular rational reason[[true]] modernism.
One encounters the same "impossible" position of enunciation in contemporary "postmodern" racism. We all remember one of the highlights of Bernstein's West Side StoryWhat interests us here, "Officer Krupke"however, is the song in which general background of the delinquents provide the amazed policeman with the socioall-psychological explanation pervasive reflectivity of their everyday [[life]] within which this Joyce'a attitude: they are victims is inscribed. In one of disadvantageous social circumstances and unfavorable family relations… When asked about the reasons for their violence against foreigners, neo-Nazi skinheads in Germany tend do give the same answers: they suddenly start to talk like social workers, sociologists and social psychologists, quoting diminished social mobilityhis letters, rising insecurity, the disintegration of paternal authority, etc. The same goes even for Zhirinovsky: in interviews [[Freud]] refers to the "enlightened" Western press, he also speaks the language of popwell-sociologists and psychologists. That is to say, there are two main pop-scientific cliches known [[joke]] about the rise of populist demagogues: they feed on the frustrations of ordinary people at the economic crisis, and social insecurity; the populist totalitarian leader is a distorted personality newly [[married]] who, when asked by means of his aggressivityfriend how his wife looks, abreacts the traumatic personal pasthow beautiful she is, the lack of genuine parental love and support in his childhood — the very two reasons quoted by Zhirinovsky when he is asked to explain his successanswers: "If there were a healthy economy and security for the peopleI personally don't like her, I would lose all the votes I have."; "It seems to have been my fate but that I never experienced real love or friendship's a matter of taste." This is what Lacan had in mind when he claimed that The [[paradox]] of this answer does not point towards an attitude of selfish calculation ("there is no metalanguage": what Zhirinovsky or skinheads assert is a lie even ifTrue, or rather precisely insofar asI don't like her, it is factually true but I married her for [[other]] reasons — their assertions are belied by their very position her wealth, the [[social]] influence of enunciationher parents…"). Its crucial feature is that, i.e. by the neutralproviding this answer, disengaged position from which the victim is able [[subject]] pretends to tell assume the objective truth about itself. And it is easy standpoint of [[universality]] from which "to imagine be likeable" appears as an idiosyncrasy, as a more theoretically updated version of [[contingent]] "pathological" feature which, as such a false attitude — a racist, for example, who claims he is not to be taken into consideration. The joke therefore relies on the true author [[impossible]]/untenable [[position]] of [[enunciation]] of his violent verbal outbursts against the African-Americans or Jews ar Arabsnewly married: the charges against him presuppose traditional metaphysical notions which have to be deconstructed; in his performative utterancefrom this position, which by itself perpetrated [[marriage]] appears as an act of violence, he was merely referring which belongs to, quoting, drawing from the historically available stock [[domain]] of insults, so that the entire historical tradition, not himself, must [[universal]] [[symbolic]] determinations and should as such be put to trial; independent of personal idiosyncrasies — as if the very [[notion that there exists a self-identical responsible subject who can be held accountable for racist outbursts is an illusion already denounced by Nietzsche who proved that the deed or rather the doing is original, and that ]] of marriage does not involve precisely the "doerpathological" behind the doing is fact of liking a symbolic fiction, a metaphysical hypostasis, etc, etc[[particular]] person for no particular [[rational]] [[reason]].
This One encounters the same "impossible " position of enunciation characterizes the in contemporary cynical attitude: in it, ideology can lay its cards on the table, reveal "[[postmodern]]" [[racism]]. We all [[remember]] one of the secret highlights of its functioning, and still continue to function. Exemplary is here Robert ZemeckisBernstein' Forest Gumps West Side Story, a film which offers as the point of identification"Officer Krupke", as the ideal ego, a simpleton, and thus directly asserts stupidity as a key category of ideology. The principal ideological axis of Forest Gump is song in which the opposition of delinquents provide the hero and his life-long love. Gump is a blessedly-innocent simpleton amazed policeman with a "heart of gold" who executes the orders socio-[[psychological]] explanation of his superiors undisturbed by any ideological qualms or fanatical devotions. Renouncing even a minimum their attitude: they are victims of "cognitive mapping"(Jameson)disadvantageous social circumstances and unfavorable [[family]] relations… When asked about the reasons for their [[violence]] against [[foreigners]], he is caught in a tautological symbolic machine towards which he lacks any ironic distance — a passive witness and/or participant of great historiconeo-political battles whose significance he doesn't even try to understand (he never asks himself why he has to fight [[Nazi]] skinheads in Vietnam, why he is [[Germany]] tend do give the same answers: they suddenly sent start to China to play ping-pongtalk like social [[workers]], sociologists and social psychologists, quoting diminished social mobility, rising insecurity, etc.). His love is a girl fully engaged in the ideological struggles disintegration of the last decades (anti-Vietnam demonstrationspaternal [[authority]], etc.) — The same goes even for Zhirinovsky: in a wordinterviews to the "enlightened" Western press, she participates in history he also speaks the [[language]] of pop-sociologists and endeavours to understand what psychologists. That is effectively going on. The first thing to note say, there are two main pop-[[scientific]] cliches about the film is that Gump is ideology at its purestrise of populist demagogues: they feed on the opposition frustrations of Gump ordinary [[people]] at the [[economic]] crisis, and social insecurity; the populist totalitarian [[leader]] is a distorted [[personality]] who, by means of his girlfriend does not stand for [[aggressivity]], abreacts the opposition between [[traumatic]] personal [[past]], the extra-ideological zero-degree [[lack]] of social life genuine parental [[love]] and ideological struggles which divide the social body; it rather exemplifies the tension between Ideology support in its zero-degree (his [[childhood]] — the meaningless ideological machine) very two reasons quoted by Zhirinovsky when he is asked to explain his success: "If there were a healthy [[economy]] and security for the people, I would lose all the antagonisms Ideology endeavours votes I have."; "It seems to master and/have been my fate that I never experienced [[real]] love or render invisible[[friendship]]. Gump" This is what Lacan had in [[mind]] when he claimed that "there is no [[metalanguage]]": what Zhirinovsky or skinheads assert is a lie even if, this slow-wittedor rather precisely insofar as, automatic executor it is factually true — their assertions are belied by their very position of ordersenunciation, who doesn't even try to understand anythingi.e. by the neutral, gives body to disengaged position from which the impossible pure subject of Ideology, [[victim]] is able to tell the ideal of a subject in whom Ideology would function flawlessly[[objective]] [[truth]] about itself. The ideological mystification of the film resides in the fact that And it presents Ideology at its purest as non- ideology, as extra-ideological good-natured participation in social life. That is easy to sayimagine a more theoretically updated version of such a [[false]] attitude — a racist, for example, who claims he is not the ultimate lesson true [[author]] of his violent [[verbal]] outbursts against the film isAfrican-Americans or [[Jews]] ar Arabs: do not try the charges against him presuppose traditional metaphysical notions which have to understandbe deconstructed; in his [[performative]] [[utterance]], obeywhich by itself perpetrated an act of violence, and you shall succeed! (Gump ends up as a famous millionaire.) His girlhe was merely referring to, who endeavours to acquire a kind of "cognitive mapping" of the social situationquoting, is symbolically punished for her thirst of knowledge: at drawing from the end historically available stock of the filminsults, she dies of AIDS. Forest Gump reveals the secret of ideology (the fact so that its successful functioning involves the stupidity of its subjects) in such an open way thatentire historical [[tradition]], in different historical circumstancesnot himself, it would undoubtedly have subversive effectsmust be put to trial; today, however, in the era of cynicism, ideology very notion that there [[exists]] a [[self]]-identical [[responsible]] subject who can afford to reveal be held accountable for racist outbursts is an [[illusion]] already denounced by [[Nietzsche]] who proved that the deed or rather the secret of its functioning (its constitutive idiocydoing is original, which and that the "doer" behind the traditionaldoing is a symbolic [[fiction]], a metaphysical hypostasis, etc, pre-cynical ideology had to keep secret) without in the least affecting its efficiencyetc.
This impossible position of enunciation characterizes the contemporary cynical attitude also provides : in it, [[ideology]] can lay its cards on the table, reveal the [[secret]] of its functioning, and still continue to function. Exemplary is here Robert Zemeckis' Forest Gump, a [[film]] which offers as the point of [[identification]], as the [[ideal]] ego, a simpleton, and thus directly asserts stupidity as a key for today's resurgent ethnic [[category]] of ideology. The principal [[ideological]] axis of Forest Gump is the opposition of the hero and religious his life-long love. Gump is a blessedly-innocent simpleton with a "fundamentalismsheart of gold"who executes the [[orders]] of his superiors undisturbed by any ideological qualms or fanatical devotions. Lacan already emphasized how Renouncing even a cynic minimum of "cognitive [[mapping]]"([[Jameson]]), he is caught in a tautological symbolic [[machine]] towards which he [[lacks]] any ironic distance — a [[passive]] [[witness]] and/or participant of great historico-[[political]] battles whose [[significance]] he doesn't believe even try to [[understand]] (he never asks himself why he has to fight in words (Vietnam, why he is suddenly sent to China to play ping-pong, etc.). His love is a [[girl]] fully engaged in the "symbolic efficiency"ideological struggles of the last decades (anti-Vietnam demonstrations, etc.)— in a [[word]], but only she participates in [[history]] and endeavours to understand what is effectively going on. The first [[thing]] to note about the film is that Gump is ideology at its purest: the real opposition of jouissance — Gump and is his girlfriend does not stand for the opposition between the Nationextra-Thing not today's supreme embodiment ideological zero-degree of political jouissance? This accounts for social life and ideological struggles which [[divide]] the social [[body]]; it rather exemplifies the tension between Ideology in its zero-degree (the meaningless ideological machine) and the paradox that[[antagonisms]] Ideology endeavours to [[master]] and/or render invisible. Gump, this slow-witted, todayautomatic executor of orders, the cynically "enlightened" intellectuals who are no longer able doesn't even try to understand anything, gives body to believe in any social Cause are the first impossible pure subject of Ideology, to fall prey to "fanatical" ethnic fundamentalismthe ideal of a subject in whom Ideology would function flawlessly. The link between cynicism and (ethnic or religious) fundamentalism does not concern primarily [[ideological mystification]] of the film resides in the fact thatit presents Ideology at its purest as non- ideology, as extra-ideological [[good]]-natured [[participation]] in today's "society social life. That is to say, the ultimate lesson of spectacle"the film is: do not try to understand, obey, fundamentalism itself is just another mediatic show and, you shall succeed! (Gump ends up as such, feigneda famous millionaire.) His girl, who endeavours to acquire a cynical mask kind of "cognitive mapping" of power intereststhe social [[situation]], but rather its oppositeis [[symbolically]] punished for her thirst of [[knowledge]]: at the cynical distance itself relies on end of the film, she dies of AIDS. Forest Gump reveals the unacknowledged attachment to an ethnic secret of ideology (or religious) Thing — the more this attachment is disavowed, fact that its successful functioning involves the more violent stupidity of its sudden eruption… We should always bear [[subjects]]) in mind such an open way that, within our ideological spacein different historical circumstances, it would undoubtedly have subversive effects; today, however, in the reference to one's Nation is the supreme form era of [[cynicism]], ideology in can afford to reveal the guise secret of anti- or non-ideology its functioning (in shortits constitutive idiocy, which the traditional, of pre-cynical ideology tout courthad to keep secret): "let's leave aside our petty political and ideological struggles, it's without in the fate of our nation which is at stake now"least affecting its efficiency.
We encounter This cynical attitude also provides a key for today's resurgent ethnic and [[religious]] "fundamentalisms". Lacan already emphasized how a homologous falsity cynic doesn't believe in [[words]] (in the attitude of those traditional psychoanalysts who prefer their patients to be "naivesymbolic efficiency" and ignorant ), but only in the real of psychoanalytic theory [[jouissance]] — this ignorance allegedly enables them to produce "purer" symptoms, i.e. symptoms in which their unconscious and is the [[Nation]]-Thing not too much distorted by their rational knowledge. For exampletoday's supreme embodiment of political jouissance? This accounts for the paradox that, today, the incestuous dream of a patient cynically "enlightened" intellectuals who already knows all about are no longer able to believe in any social [[Cause]] are the Oedipus complex will be far more distorted, resorting first to more complex strategies fall prey to conceal its desire, than the dream of a "naivefanatical" patientethnic [[fundamentalism]]. We all have a longing for The link between cynicism and (ethnic or religious) fundamentalism does not concern primarily the good old heroic times of psychoanalysisfact that, in which a patient told his analyst today's "[[society]] of [[spectacle]]"Last night, I had a dream about killing a dragon fundamentalism itself is just another mediatic show and then advancing through a thick forest to a castle…", whereupon the analyst triumphantly answered "Elementaryas such, feigned, my dear patient! Dragon is your father and the dream expresses your desire to kill him in order to return to the safe haven a cynical mask of the maternal castle…". Lacan's wager is here exactly the [[power]] interests, but rather its opposite: the subject of psychoanalysis is cynical distance itself relies on the modern subject of science, which means — among other things — that his symptoms are by definition never "innocent", they are always addressed unacknowledged attachment to the analyst qua subject supposed to know an ethnic (their meaningor religious) and thus as it were implyThing — the more this attachment is disavowed, point towards, their own interpretation. For that reason, one is quite justified the more violent its sudden eruption… We should always bear in saying mind that we have symptoms which are Jungian, Kleinianwithin our ideological [[space]], Lacanian, etc., i.e. whose reality involves implicit the reference to some psychoanalytic theory. Today, one's Nation is the "free associations" supreme [[form]] of a typical educated analysand consist for ideology in the most part guise of anti- or non-ideology (in short, of attempts to provide a psychoanalytic explanation ideology tout court): "let's leave aside our petty political and ideological struggles, it's the fate of their disturbances…our nation which is at stake now".
So, at We [[encounter]] a homologous [[falsity]] in the political level, the problem today is how attitude of those traditional [[psychoanalysts]] who prefer their [[patients]] to counteract be "naive" and ignorant of [[psychoanalytic theory]] — this [[ignorance]] allegedly enables them to produce "reflectedpurer" racism: [[symptoms]], i.e. symptoms in which their [[unconscious]] is there a specific kind of not too much distorted by their rational knowledge which renders impossible . For example, the act, incestuous [[dream]] of a knowledge which can no longer [[patient]] who already [[knows]] all about the [[Oedipus]] [[complex]] will be co-opted by cynical distance ("I know what I am doingfar more distorted, resorting to more complex strategies to conceal its [[desire]], but I am nevertheless doing it")? Or must we leave behind than the domain dream of knowledge and a "naive" patient. We all have recourse to a directlonging for the good old heroic [[times]] of [[psychoanalysis]], extra-symbolicin which a patient told his analyst "Last night, bodily intervention, or I had a dream about killing a dragon and then advancing through a thick forest to an intuitive a castle…"Enlightenment, whereupon the analyst triumphantly answered "Elementary, a change my dear patient! Dragon is your [[father]] and the dream expresses your desire to kill him in order to [[return]] to the safe haven of subjective attitude, beyond knowledge? The fundamental the [[maternal]] castle…". Lacan's wager is here exactly the opposite: the subject of psychoanalysis is that there exists such a knowledge which produces effects in the Realmodern subject of [[science]], which means — among other things — that we can his symptoms are by definition never "innocent"undo things , they are always addressed to the analyst qua subject supposed to [[know]] (symptomstheir [[meaning]]) with words" — the whole and thus as it were imply, point of psychoanalytic cure towards, their own interpretation. For that reason, one is quite justified in saying that it operates exclusively at we have symptoms which are Jungian, [[Kleinian]], [[Lacanian]], etc., i.e. whose [[reality]] involves implicit reference to some psychoanalytic theory. Today, the level of "knowledgefree [[associations]]" (words), yet has effects in of a typical educated [[analysand]] consist for the Real most part of bodily symptoms.attempts to provide a psychoanalytic explanation of their disturbances…
HowSo, thenat the political level, are we the problem today is how to specify counteract this "knowledgereflected" which, even in our era of cynicism, brings about effects in the Real? Perhaps the best approach to it racism: is via the opposition between violent coercion and "genuine" subordination. This opposition, of course, is never to be accepted at its face value: subordination (of women to men in there a patriarchal society, specific kind of a "lower" to a "higher" race, of a colonized to knowledge which renders impossible the colonizeract, etc.), precisely when it is experienced as "genuine" and "sincere" by the subordinated subjects themselves, presents a case of ideological delusion beneath knowledge which critical analysis should can no longer be able to discern the traces of co-opted by cynical distance (internalized, "naturalized") external brute coercion. However, I know what about the far more sinister inverse operation which makes us (mis)perceive as mere coercion to which we submit ourselves in a wholly external wayI am doing, something that effectively has a hold on us "from withinbut I am nevertheless doing it")? In a first approach, i.e. at an immediate-abstract level, our yielding to Or must we leave behind the raw coercion is, domain of course, to be contrasted knowledge and have recourse to a relationship towards some "genuine" authority in which I experience my subordination to it as the fulfillment of my personalitydirect, not as something that thwarts my selfextra-realization — by way of subordinating myself to a genuine authority, I realize my own essence (in a traditional patriarchal societysymbolic, for example[[bodily]] [[intervention]], a woman is supposed to fulfill her inner vocation by subordinating herself or to her husband). The "spirit" of such an immediate opposition between external coercion and genuine subordination is, however, profoundly anti-Hegelian: Hegel's wager is precisely to demonstrate how the two opposites pass over into each other (see his exemplary analyses of intuitive "noble[[Enlightenment]]" and "low" consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit). On the one hand, a close dialectical analysis renders visible how our external subordination to brutal coercion is never simply external, i.e. how this very experience [[change]] of the force to which we yield as simply external is an illusion of abstract consciousness. Suffice it to recall the traditional liberal [[subjective]] attitude towards State as a "mechanical" instrument of external coercion which limits my freedom: what this liberal individualist attitude fails to notice is how this limitation , beyond knowledge? The fundamental wager of my freedom involved in the notion of a citizen psychoanalysis is not external but the self- limitation which actually increases my true freedom, i.e. elevates me to the level of a free rational being — that part of me which resists the State order, which experiences this order as a threat, is the unfree aspect of my personality. In it, I am effectively enslaved to the contingent "pathological" features of my non-rational nature, to the insignificant whims of my particular nature — as there exists such, this part has to be sacrificed if I am to become a truly free individual. Perhaps an even better example is provided by an adolescent who resists his father's authority and experiences it as external "repression", misrecognizing thereby the extent to knowledge which this authority holds him produces effects in sway "from within" and guarantees [[the integrity of his self-experience — witness the disorientationReal]], the sense of loss, which takes place when the paternal authority effectively disintegrates … As a true Hegelian, Lacan was fully justified in inverting the commonplace about the liberating potential of the unconscious impulses which resist the "repression" of the Authority to which that we submit consciously: the Master is unconscious, he exerts his hold upon us in the unconscious. On the other hand, insofar as can "human beingundo things (symptoms) with words" implies — the infinite freedom [[whole]] point of subjectivity, an element of falsehood sticks to every allegedly "genuine" subordination: beneath psychoanalytic cure is that it, there always lurks a hypocritical calculation or a fear of raw violence. The dialectic of liberation resides precisely in breaking operates exclusively at the spell level of "genuineknowledge" authority, in denouncing it as a mask of brutal coercion; exemplary is here (againwords) the case of the feminist critique that discerns the traces of brutal coercion in what, within the patriarchal space, appears as woman's "natural" vocation. At a more general level, one can assert that "progress" does not consist only yet has effects in reducing the amount Real of violent coercion but also in recognizing violent coercion in what was previously perceived as the "natural" state of things. The logic of this recognition involves the properly Hegelian dialectical tension between the In-itself and the For-itself: it is wrong simply to claim that the patriarchal subordination of women always was founded on violent coercion and that liberating reflection just brings to light an already existing state of things; yet it is no less wrong to claim that, prior to feminist critical reflection, things just took their course without any antagonistic tension and that violence becomes violence only when it is experienced as such. The paradox of reflection is that it retroactively makes the past state of things what it always-already "truly was": by means of the feminist retroactive gaze, the past is retroactively posited in its "truth"bodily symptoms.
On that accountHow, then, are we to specify this "knowledge" which, even in our era of cynicism, one should be very careful not brings about effects in the Real? Perhaps the best approach to reify it is via the psychic impact opposition between violent coercion and "genuine" subordination. This opposition, of course, is never to be accepted at its face [[value]]: subordination (of [[women]] to men in a certain sexual practice into its immediate property. For some feministspatriarchal society, for exampleof a "lower" to a "higher" [[race]], fellatio stands for of a colonized to the worst humiliation colonizer, etc.), precisely when it is experienced as "genuine" and debasement "sincere" by the subordinated subjects themselves, presents a [[case]] of ideological [[delusion]] beneath which critical [[analysis]] should be able to discern the woman — traces of (internalized, "naturalized") external brute coercion. However, what ifabout the far more sinister [[inverse]] operation which makes us (mis)perceive as mere coercion to which we submit ourselves in a wholly external way, something that effectively has a hold on us "from within"? In a first approach, i.e. at an immediate-abstract level, our yielding to the contraryraw coercion is, we imagine an intersubjective of course, to be contrasted to a [[relationship ]] towards some "genuine" authority in which fellatio bears witness I [[experience]] my subordination to men's humiliationit as the fulfillment of my personality, not as something that thwarts my self-realization — by way of subordinating myself to his abasement to a passive bearer of his phallusgenuine authority, I realize my own [[essence]] (in a traditional patriarchal society, for example, a plaything in [[woman]] is supposed to fulfill her inner vocation by subordinating herself to her husband). The "spirit" of such an immediate opposition between external coercion and genuine subordination is, however, profoundly anti-[[Hegelian]]: [[Hegel]]'s hands? Our point here wager is not merely that precisely to demonstrate how the relationship two opposites [[pass]] over into each other (see his exemplary [[analyses]] of domination "noble" and "low" [[consciousness]] in the [[Phenomenology]] of Spirit). On the one hand, a sexual contact close [[dialectical]] analysis renders [[visible]] how our external subordination to brutal coercion is always tainted with ambiguitynever simply external, i.e. how this very experience of the force to which we yield as simply external is an illusion of abstract consciousness. Suffice it to [[recall]] the traditional [[liberal]] attitude towards [[State]] as a "mechanical" [[instrument]] of external coercion which limits my [[freedom]]: what this liberal individualist attitude fails to notice is how this limitation of my freedom involved in the notion of a [[citizen]] is not external but the self- limitation which actually increases my true freedom, i.e. elevates me to the level of a free rational [[being]] — that it part of me which resists the State order, which experiences this order as a [[threat]], is the very ambiguityunfree aspect of my personality. In it, I am effectively enslaved to the contingent "undecidabilitypathological"features of my non-rational [[nature]], to the insignificant whims of my particular nature — as such, this part has to be sacrificed if I am to become a Master/Servant relationship that truly free [[individual]]. Perhaps an even better example is provided by an adolescent who resists his father's authority and experiences it as external "[[repression]]", misrecognizing thereby the extent to which this authority holds him in sway "sexualizesfrom within" it. In and guarantees the minimal dispositif integrity of sexual intercoursehis self-experience — witness the disorientation, the one stares blindly[[sense]] of [[loss]], intoxicated with enjoymentwhich takes [[place]] when the paternal authority effectively disintegrates … As a true Hegelian, while Lacan was fully justified in inverting the commonplace about the liberating potential of the unconscious impulses which resist the other "worksrepression" — who of the Authority to which we submit consciously: the Master is here unconscious, he exerts his hold upon us in the Master and who unconscious. On the Servant? Who effectively serves whom other hand, insofar as "[[human]] being" implies the means infinite freedom of [[subjectivity]], an element of his falsehood sticks to every allegedly "genuine" subordination: beneath it, there always lurks a hypocritical calculation or her enjoyment? Is not the apparent Master a [[fear]] of raw violence. The [[dialectic]] of liberation resides precisely in breaking the Slave spell of his Slave"genuine" authority, in denouncing it as a mask of brutal coercion; exemplary is not here (again) the true Master he who demands case of his Slave the [[feminist]] critique that he play discerns the role traces of Master? In brutal coercion in what, within the standard (hetero)sexual actpatriarchal space, man appears as woman's "takes[[natural]]"vocation. At a more general level, one can assert that "makes use [[progress]]" does not consist only in reducing the amount of", a woman — violent coercion but with a small shift also in recognizing violent coercion in perspective, what was previously perceived as the "natural" state of things. The [[logic]] of this [[recognition]] involves the properly Hegelian dialectical tension between the [[In-itself]] and the [[For-itself]]: it is possible wrong simply to assert [[claim]] that the patriarchal subordination of women always was founded on violent coercion and that he effectively reduces himself liberating [[reflection]] just brings to light an instrument already existing state of her enjoymentthings; yet it is no less wrong to claim that, subordinating himself prior to feminist critical reflection, things just took their course without any antagonistic tension and that violence becomes violence only when it is experienced as such. The paradox of reflection is that it [[retroactively]] makes the insatiable superegopast state of things what it always-injunction already "Encore!truly was" (: by means of the feminist [[retroactive]] [[gaze]], the title of Lacan's Seminar XX)past is retroactively posited in its "truth".
What we must avoid hereOn that account, apropos one should be very careful not to reify the [[psychic]] impact of such dialectical passages of an opposite a certain [[sexual]] [[practice]] into its otherimmediate property. For some feminists, for example, is fellatio stands for the lure worst [[humiliation]] and debasement of symmetry: Hegelthe woman — what if, on the contrary, we imagine an [[intersubjective]] relationship in which fellatio bears witness to men's humiliation, to his abasement to a passive bearer of his [[phallus]], a plaything in woman's hands? Our point here is not merely that the two reversals (relationship of "genuine" authority into external coercion and vice versa) are somehow exchangeabledomination in a sexual contact is always tainted with ambiguity, but that they follow the same logic. Their asymmetry it is best epitomized by means of reference to the couple of cynicism and irony. The fundamental gesture of cynicism is to denounce very ambiguity, "genuine authorityundecidability" as a pose, whose sole effective content is raw coercion or submission for the sake of some material gain, while an ironist doubts if a cold calculating utilitarian is really what he pretends to be, i.e,. he suspects Master/Servant relationship that this appearance of calculating distance can conceal a much deeper commitment"sexualizes" it. The cynicist is quick to denounce In the ridiculous pretense minimal dispositif of solemn authority; sexual intercourse, the ironist is able to discern true attachment in dismissive disdain or in feigned indifference. In matters of loveone stares blindly, for exampleintoxicated with enjoyment, while the other "works" — who is here the cynicist excels in denigrating exalted declarations Master and who the Servant? Who effectively serves whom as the means of deep spiritual affinity as a stratagem to exploit sexually his or otherwise her enjoyment? Is not the [[apparent]] Master the partner[[Slave]] of his Slave, whereas the ironist is prone to ascertain, in a melancholic mood, how not the brutal making sport true Master he who [[demands]] of our partner, even humiliation, often just expresses our unreadiness to admit to ourselves his Slave that he play the full depth [[role]] of our attachment… PerhapsMaster? In the standard (hetero)sexual act, the artist of irony par excellence was none other than Mozart — suffice it to recall his masterpiece Cosi fan tutte. The trio man "Soave il ventotakes", "makes use of course", can be read a woman — but with a small shift in a cynical wayperspective, as the faked imitation of a sad farewell which barely conceals a glee at the coming erotic intrigue; the ironic point of it is possible to assert that the subjects who sing it, inclusive he effectively reduces himself to an instrument of don Alfonzoher enjoyment, subordinating himself to the manipulator who staged the event, are nonetheless authentically taken with [[insatiable]] [[superego]]-[[injunction]] "[[Encore]]!" (the sadness title of the situation — this unexpected authenticity is what eludes the grasp of the cynicistLacan's [[Seminar]] XX).
In a first approachWhat we must avoid here, apropos of such dialectical passages of an opposite into its other, cynicism may appear to involve a much more radical distance than ironyis the [[lure]] of symmetry: Hegel's point is irony not a benevolent ridicule that the two reversals (of "from abovegenuine"authority into external coercion and vice versa) are somehow exchangeable, from within that they follow the same logic. Their asymmetry is best epitomized by means of reference to the confines couple of cynicism and irony. The fundamental gesture of cynicism is to denounce "genuine authority" as a pose, whose sole effective content is raw coercion or submission for the symbolic ordersake of some [[material]] gain, while an ironist doubts if a cold calculating utilitarian is really what he pretends to be, i.e,. the he suspects that this [[appearance]] of calculating distance of can conceal a subject who views the world from much deeper commitment. The cynicist is quick to denounce the elevated position ridiculous pretense of solemn authority; the big Other towards those who are enticed by vulgar earthly pleasures, an awareness of their ultimate vanity, while cynicism relies on the "earthly" point-of-view which undermines "from below" our belief ironist is able to discern true attachment in dismissive disdain or in the binding power feigned indifference. In matters of the Wordlove, of the symbolic pactfor example, and advances the substance cynicist excels in denigrating exalted declarations of enjoyment deep spiritual affinity as a stratagem to exploit sexually or otherwise the only thing that really matters — Socrates versus Diogenes partner, whereas the Cynicist? The true relationship ironist isprone to ascertain, howeverin a melancholic mood, how the reverse: from the right premise that "the big Other doesn't exist"brutal making sport of our partner, even humiliation, i.e. that often just expresses our unreadiness to admit to ourselves the symbolic order is a fiction[[full]] depth of our attachment… Perhaps, the cynicist draws the wrong conclusion that the big Other doesn't [[artist]] of irony par excellence was none other than [[Mozart]] — suffice it to recall his masterpiece Cosi fan tutte. The trio "functionSoave il vento", that its role of course, can simply be discounted — due to his failure to notice how read in a cynical way, as the symbolic fiction nonetheless regulates his relationship to the real faked imitation of enjoyment, he remains all a sad farewell which barely conceals a glee at the more enslaved to coming [[erotic]] intrigue; the symbolic context ironic point of it is that defines his access to the Thing- Enjoymentsubjects who sing it, inclusive of don Alfonzo, caught in the symbolic ritual he publicly mocks. This, preciely, is what Lacan has in mind with his "les non-dupes errent": those manipulator who are not duped by staged the symbolic fiction [[event]], are most deeply in error. The ironist's apparently "softer" approach, on nonetheless authentically taken with the other hand, far more effectively unbinds sadness of the nodal points that hold together the symbolic universe, i.e. it situation — this unexpected authenticity is what eludes the ironist who effectively assumes the non-existence grasp of the Othercynicist.
A common notion In a first approach, cynicism may appear to involve a much more radical distance than irony: is irony not a benevolent ridicule "from above", from within the confines of psychoanalysis[[the symbolic]] order, i.e. the distance of coursea subject who views the [[world]] from the elevated position of the [[big Other]] towards those who are enticed by vulgar earthly pleasures, makes it almost an epitome [[awareness]] of their ultimate vanity, while cynicism as an interpretative attitude: does psychoanalytic interpretation not involve in its very essence relies on the act "earthly" point-of discerning -view which undermines "lowerfrom below" motivations (sexual lust, unacknowledged aggressivity) behind our [[belief]] in the apparently "noble" gestures binding power of spiritual elevation the Word, of the belovedsymbolic pact, and advances the substance of heroic self-sacrifice, etc.enjoyment as the only thing that really matters — [[Socrates]] versus [[Diogenes]] the Cynicist? PerhapsThe true relationship is, however, this notion the reverse: from the [[right]] premise that "[[the big Other]] doesn't [[exist]]", i.e. that the [[symbolic order]] is somewhat too slick; perhaps a fiction, the cynicist draws the wrong conclusion that the original enigma big Other doesn't "function", that psychoanalysis endeavours its role can simply be discounted — due to explain is exactly his failure to notice how the opposite: how can symbolic fiction nonetheless regulates his relationship to the effective behaviour real of a person who professes enjoyment, he remains all the more enslaved to the symbolic context that defines his/her freedom from "prejudices" and "moralistic constraints" bear witness access to inumerable inner impedimentsthe Thing- Enjoyment, unavowed prohibitionscaught in the symbolic [[ritual]] he publicly mocks. This, etc.? Why does a person free to preciely, is what Lacan has in mind with his "enjoy life[[les non-dupes errent]]" engage : those who are not duped by the symbolic fiction are most deeply in systematic error. The ironist's apparently "pursuit of unhappinesssofter"approach, on the other hand, far more effectively unbinds the nodal points that hold together the symbolic [[universe]], methodically organizing his/her failures? What's in i.e. it for him/her, what perverse libidinal profit?is the ironist who effectively assumes the non-[[existence]] of the Other.
Another way to define the trap into which cynicism gets caught is via the difference between the public Law and its obscene undersideA common notion of psychoanalysis, the unwritten superego rules: cynicism mocks the public Law from the position of its obscene underside which, consequentlycourse, makes it leaves intact. A personal experience revealed to me this inherent obscenity almost an epitome of Power cynicism as an interpretative attitude: does psychoanalytic interpretation not involve in a most distastefully-enjoyable way. In its very essence the 70sact of discerning "lower" motivations (sexual lust, I did my (obligatoryunacknowledged aggressivity) army service in behind the old Yugoslav People's Army, in small barracks with no proper medical facilities. In a room which also served as sleeping quarters for a private trained as a medical assistant, once a week a doctor from the nearby military hospital held his consulting hours. On the frame apparently "noble" gestures of spiritual elevation of the large mirror above the wash-basin in this room[[beloved]], the soldier had stuck a couple of postcards of halfheroic self-naked girls — a standard resource for masturbation in those pre- pornography timessacrifice, to be sureetc. When ? Perhaps, however, this notion is somewhat too slick; perhaps the doctor was paying us his weekly visit, all of us who had reported for medical examination were seated on a long bench alongside original enigma that psychoanalysis endeavours to explain is exactly the wall opposite : how can the wash-basin and were then examined in turn. So, one day while I was also waiting to be examined, it was the turn effective [[behaviour]] of a young, half-illiterate soldier person who complained of pains in professes his penis (which, of course, was in itself sufficient /her freedom from "prejudices" and "[[moralistic]] constraints" bear witness to trigger obscene giggles from all of usinumerable inner impediments, the doctor included): the skin on its head was too tightunavowed prohibitions, so he was unable to draw it back normallyetc. The doctor ordered him to pull down his trousers and demonstrate his trouble; the soldier did so and the skin slid down the head smoothly, though the soldier was quick ? Why does a person free to add that his trouble occurred only during erection. The doctor then said: "OK, then masturbate, get an erection, so that we can check it![[enjoy]] life" Deeply embarrassed and red engage in the face, the soldier began to masturbate in front systematic "pursuit of all of us butunhappiness", of course, failed to produce an erection; the doctor then took one of the postcards of half-naked girls from the mirror, held it close to the soldiermethodically organizing his/her failures? What's head and started to shout at in it for him: "Look! What breasts/her, what a cunt! Masturbate! How is it that you don't get the erection[[perverse]] [[libidinal]] profit? What kind of a man are you! Go on, masturbate!" All of us in the room, including the doctor himself, accompanied the spectacle with obscene laughter; the unfortunate soldier himself soon joined us with an embarrassed giggle, exchanging looks of solidarity with us while continuing to masturbate… This scene brought about in me an experience of quasi-epiphany: in nuce, there was everything in it, the entire dispositive of Power — the uncanny mixture of imposed enjoyment and humiliating exercise of Power, the agency of Power which shouts severe orders, but simultaneously shares with us, his subordinates, obscene laughter bearing witness to a deep solidarity…
Another way to define the trap into which cynicism gets caught is via the [[difference]] between the [[public]] Law and its [[obscene]] underside, the unwritten superego rules: cynicism mocks the public Law from the position of its [[obscene underside]] which, consequently, it leaves intact. A personal experience revealed to me this inherent [[obscenity]] of Power in a most distastefully-enjoyable way. In the 70s, I did my (obligatory) [[army]] service in the old Yugoslav People's Army, in small barracks with no proper medical facilities. In a room which also served as sleeping quarters for a private trained as a medical assistant, once a week a doctor from the nearby military hospital held his consulting hours. On the frame of the large [[mirror]] above the wash-basin in this room, the soldier had stuck a couple of postcards of half-naked girls — a standard resource for [[masturbation]] in those pre- pornography times, to be sure. When the doctor was paying us his weekly visit, all of us who had reported for medical examination were seated on a long bench alongside the wall opposite the wash-basin and were then examined in turn. So, one day while I was also waiting to be examined, it was the turn of a young, half-illiterate soldier who complained of pains in his [[penis]] (which, of course, was in itself sufficient to trigger obscene giggles from all of us, the doctor included): the skin on its head was too tight, so he was unable to draw it back normally. The doctor ordered him to pull down his trousers and demonstrate his trouble; the soldier did so and the skin slid down the head smoothly, though the soldier was quick to add that his trouble occurred only during erection. The doctor then said: "OK, then masturbate, get an erection, so that we can check it!" Deeply embarrassed and red in the face, the soldier began to masturbate in front of all of us but, of course, failed to produce an erection; the doctor then took one of the postcards of half-naked girls from the mirror, held it close to the soldier's head and started to shout at him: "Look! What breasts, what a cunt! Masturbate! How is it that you don't get the erection? What kind of a man are you! Go on, masturbate!" All of us in the room, including the doctor himself, accompanied the spectacle with obscene [[laughter]]; the unfortunate soldier himself soon joined us with an embarrassed giggle, exchanging looks of [[solidarity]] with us while continuing to masturbate… This [[scene]] brought about in me an experience of quasi-epiphany: in nuce, there was everything in it, the entire dispositive of Power — the [[uncanny]] mixture of imposed enjoyment and humiliating exercise of Power, the [[agency]] of Power which shouts severe orders, but simultaneously shares with us, his subordinates, obscene laughter bearing witness to a deep solidarity… One could also say that this scene renders the symptom of Power: the grotesque [[excess ]] by means of which, in a unique short-circuit, attitudes which are officially opposed and mutually exclusive reveal their uncanny complicity, where the solemn [[agent ]] of Power suddenly starts to wink at us across the table in a gesture of obscene solidarity, letting us know that [[the thing ]] (i.e. his orders) is not to be taken too seriously and thereby consolidating his power. The aim of the "critique of ideology", of the analysis of an ideological edifice, is to extract this symptomal kernel which the [[official]], public ideological [[text ]] simultaneously disavows and [[needs ]] for its undisturbed functioning.
==Source==
* [[From Joyce-the-Symptom to the Symptom of Power]] ''Lacaniank Ink''. Volume 11. Fall 1997. pp 12-25. <http://www.lacan.com/frameXI2.htm> Independent [[Media ]] Center, [[Israel]]. <http://www.plexus.org/lacink/lacink11/zizek.html>
[[Category:Slavoj Žižek]]
