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From Proto-Reality to the Act

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Peter Dews' basic criticism of my [[reading ]] of [[Schelling ]] is that, by way of asserting the [[irreconcilable ]] gap in all its guises-the distance that forever separates the radically inert, ahistorical [[Real ]] from its ultimately delusive historicizations, the non-coincidence between the [[subject ]] and the [[signifier]], etc. - I remain blind to Schelling's basic thrust towards the deeper affinity between spirit and [[nature]], and thus towards the possibility of
reconciliation: the ultimate horizon of my reading is the incompatibility between the inert
Real of the ground and the subject's [[freedom]], while, already in his early [[philosophy ]] of [[identity]], Schelling's ultimate [[goal ]] is to bring the two together, demonstrating how nature is the spirit [[unconscious ]] of itself and spirit nature [[conscious ]] of itself. The ultimate motif of this criticism is [[political]]: since my final horizon is that of an irreducible gap and tension, I am, despite my 'ostensibly [[left]]-wing stance', condemned to a [[vision ]] of [[social ]] [[life ]] which is 'ultimately indistinguishable from the familiar forms of [[conservative ]] <i>Kulturkritik</i>'. <a [[name]]="1"></a><a href="#1x">1</a> Say, when I formulate today's tension between [[capitalist ]] globalism and the fundamentalist/particularist reactions to it in the [[terms ]] of the Schellingian opposition
between expansion and contraction, I thereby condone a pessimist vision of the social life
caught in a repetitious deadlock, without any prospect for the [[resolution ]] of this tension. (Incidentally, this political sting, repeatedly made by Dews and propagated by [[others ]] close to <i>Radical Philosophy</i>, this [[double ]] suspicion or, rather, to put it bluntly, unproven insinuation that 1) in contrast to my '[[official]]' [[leftist ]] stance that I display in the Anglo- American West, parading there as a marxisant globetrotter, I show my [[true ]] political colours in [[Slovenia]], where I am advocating some dark irrationalist [[nationalism]], and that 2) this irrationalist nationalism is philosophically grounded in (my version of) [[Lacanian ]] [[theory]], is the blind spot of Dews' [[philosophical ]] argumentation, the point at which a disavowed, non-thematized, political [[passion ]] erupts in the midst of philosophical
argumentation.)<br><br>
However, it is this very example (of today's tension between capitalist globalism and the
fundamentalist/particularist reactions to it) which, when put in its context, belies Dews'
criticism. The [[whole ]] point of the chapter of <i>The Indivisible [[Remainder]]</i> <a name="2"></a><a href="#2x">2</a> in which I deploy this example is that the tension/oscillation between expansion and contraction is not Schelling's last [[word]]: Schelling's [[notion ]] of <i>Ent-Scheidung</i>, of the primordial decision/differentiation, designates precisely the act which breaks this [[vicious cycle ]] of expansion/contraction. And my [[interpretation ]] focuses on why Schelling repeatedly failed at this key point. Therein, perhaps, resides the central misunderstanding: the '[[synthesis]]' between [[being ]] and its ground is a pseudo-problem (in exactly the same way in which, from a strict [[Freudian ]] view, it is meaningless to [[supplement ]] [[psychoanalysis ]] with
'psychosynthesis', as some revisionists tried to do). The problem Schelling was
struggling with, the point of failure of the [[three ]] consecutive drafts of <i>Weltalter</i>, was the very emergence of [[logos ]] out of the vortex of the pre-[[ontological ]] Real of [[drives]], not the
problem of how to bring the two dimensions together again.<br><br>
It is here that we have to look for the central ambiguity of Schelling's thought: apropos of
his [[claim ]] that man's [[consciousness ]] arises from the primordial act which separates the [[present]]/actual consciousness from the [[spectral]], shadowy realm of the unconscious, one
has to ask a seemingly naive, but crucial, question: what, precisely, is here unconscious?
'Unconscious' is not primarily the rotary motion of drives ejected into the eternal [[past]];
'unconscious' is rather the very act of <i>Ent-Scheidung</i> by means of which drives were
ejected into the past. Or, to put it in slightly different terms: what is truly 'unconscious' in
man is not the immediate opposite of consciousness, the obscure and confused '[[irrational]]'
vortex of drives, but the very founding gesture of consciousness, the act of decision by
means of which I 'choose myself', i.e., combine this [[multitude ]] of drives into the [[unity ]] of my [[self]]. 'Unconscious' is not the [[passive ]] stuff of inert drives to be used by the creative 'synthetic' [[activity ]] of the conscious ego; 'unconscious' in its most radical [[dimension ]] is
rather the highest deed of my self-positing, or, to resort to later 'existentialist' terms, the
[[choice ]] of my fundamental '[[project]]' which, in [[order ]] to remain operative, must be '[[repressed]]', kept out of the light of day-or, to quote from the admirable last pages of the
second draft of <i>Weltalter</i>:</font></p>
<font size="3">
<font size="3">The decision that in some manner is truly to begin must not be brought back to
consciousness; it must not be called back, because this would amount to being
taken back. If, in making a decision, somebody retains the [[right ]] to reexamine his
choice, he will never make a beginning at all. <a name="3"></a><a href="#3x">3</a> </font></p>
</blockquote><font size="3">
</font><p align="justify">
<font size="3">What we [[encounter ]] here is, of course, the [[logic ]] of the 'vanishing mediator': of the founding gesture of differentiation which must sink into invisibility once the [[difference ]] between the 'irrational' vortex of drives and the [[universe ]] of logos is in [[place]]. The [[category ]] of 'vanishing mediator' was introduced by Fredric [[Jameson ]] apropos of Max Weber. <a name="4"></a><a href="#4x">4</a> In political theory, the exemplary [[case ]] of a 'vanishing mediator' is provided by the [[Hegelian ]] notion of the historical hero who resolves the deadlock of the passage from the [[natural ]] [[state ]] of [[violence ]] to the civil state of peace guaranteed by legitimate [[power]].
This passage cannot take place directly, in a continuous line, since there is no common
ground, no intersection, between the state of natural violence and the state of civil peace;
what is therefore needed is a paradoxical [[agent ]] who, by means of violence itself, overcomes violence, i.e., the [[paradox ]] of an act which [[retroactively ]] establishes the [[conditions ]] of its own legitimacy and thereby obliterates its violent [[character]],
transforming itself into a solemn founding act.<br><br>
However, the supreme example of the 'vanishing mediator' is provided by the Jewish
assertion of the unconditional iconoclastic [[monotheism]]: God is One, totally [[Other]], with no [[human ]] [[form]]. The commonplace [[position ]] is here that pagan (pre-[[Jewish]]) gods were
anthropomorphic (say, old Greek gods fornicated, cheated, and engaged in other ordinary
human passions), while the Jewish [[religion]], with its iconoclasm, was the first to
thoroughly de-anthropomorphize divinity. What, however, if things are the exact
opposite? What if the very [[need ]] to [[prohibit ]] man making [[images ]] of God bears [[witness ]] to the personification of God discernible in 'Let us make humankind in our [[image]],
according to our likeness' (Genesis 1.26) - what if the true target of Jewish iconoclastic
[[prohibition ]] is not previous pagan [[religions]], but rather its own anthropomorphization/ personification of God? What if Jewish religion itself generates the [[excess ]] it has to
prohibit? It is the Jewish God who is the first fully personified God, a God who says 'I
am who I am'. In other [[words]], iconoclasm and other Jewish prohibitions do not relate to the pagan [[Otherness]], but to the violence of [[Judaism]]'s own [[imaginary ]] excess-in pagan
religions, such prohibition would have been simply meaningless. Making images has to
be prohibited not because of the pagans; its true [[reason ]] is the premonition that, if the [[Jews ]] were to do the same as the pagans, something horrible would have emerged (a hint of this [[horror ]] is given in [[Freud]]'s hypothesis [[about ]] the [[murder ]] of [[Moses]], this [[traumatic ]] [[event ]] on the [[denial ]] of which the Jewish identity is raised). The prohibition to make images is therefore equivalent to the Jewish [[disavowal ]] of the primordial crime: the primordial [[parricide ]] is the ultimate fascinating image. <a name="5"></a><a href="#5x">5</a> (What, then, does the [[Christian ]] assertion of the unique image of the crucified [[Christ ]] stand for?) <a name="6"></a><a href="#6x">6</a> <br><br>
Anthropomorphism and iconoclasm are thus not simple opposites: it is not that pagan
religions depict gods as simple larger-than-life human persons, while Judaism prohibits
such a depiction. It is only with Judaism that God is fully anthropomorphized, that the
encounter with Him is the encounter with [[another ]] person in the fullest [[sense ]] of the term-the Jewish God experiences [[full ]] wrath, revengefulness, [[jealousy]], etc., as every
human being. This is why one is prohibited to make images of Him: not because an
image would humanize the purely spiritual Entity, but because it would render it all too
faithfully, as the ultimate neighbour-[[Thing]]. <a name="7"></a><a href="#7x">7</a> [[Christianity ]] only goes to the end in this
direction by asserting not only the likeness of God and man, but their direct identity in
the [[figure ]] of Christ: no wonder man looks like God, since a man - Christ - is God. With
its central notion of Christ as man-God, Christianity just makes 'for itself' the
personification of God in Judaism. According to the standard notion, pagans were
anthropomorphic, Jews were radically iconoclastic, and Christianity accomplishes a kind
of synthesis, a [[partial ]] [[regression ]] to [[paganism]], by introducing the ultimate [[icon]]-to-erase- all-other-icons, that of the [[suffering ]] Christ. Against this commonplace, one should assert that it is the Jewish religion that remains an 'abstract/immediate' [[negation ]] of
anthropomorphism, and, as such, attached to it, determined by it in its very direct
negation, whereas it is only Christianity that effectively 'sublates' paganism. The
Christian stance is here: instead of prohibiting the image of God, why not, precisely,
allow it, and thus render Him as just another human being, as a miserable man
indiscernible from other [[humans ]] with [[regard ]] to his intrinsic properties? If one is permitted to indulge in a sacrilegious parallel, [[science]]-[[fiction ]] horror movies practise two modes to render the [[alien ]] Thing: either the Thing is wholly Other, a monster whose [[sight ]] one cannot endure, usually a mixture of reptile, octopus and [[machine ]] (like, precisely, the alien from Ridley Scott's [[film ]] of the same name), or it is exactly the same as we, ordinary humans - with, of course, some 'barely [[nothing]]' which allows us to [[identify ]] [[Them ]] (the
strange glimpse in their eyes; too much skin between their fingers...). Christ is fully a
man only in so far as he takes upon himself the excess/remainder, the 'too much' on
account of which a man, precisely, is never fully a man: his [[formula ]] is not man = God,
but man = man, where the divine dimension intervenes only as that 'something' which
prevents the full identity of man to himself. In this sense, Christ's [[appearance ]] itself effectively stands for God's [[death]]: with it, it becomes clear that God is nothing but the
excess of man, the 'too much' of life which cannot be contained in any life form, which
violates the shape (<i>morphe</i>) of anthropomorphism.<br><br>
To put it in an even more pointed way: pagans were not celebrating images, they were
well aware that the images they were making remained inadequate copies of the true
divinity ([[recall ]] the old Hindu statues of gods with dozens of hands, etc. - a clear example
of how any attempt to render divinity in a sensual/material form fails by way of turning
into a half-ridiculous exaggeration). In contrast to the pagans, it was the Jews themselves
who believed/assumed that the (sensual/material) image of the divine Person would show
too much, rendering [[visible ]] some horrifying [[secret ]] better left in shadow, which is why
they had to prohibit it - the Jewish prohibition only has sense against the background of
this [[fear ]] that the image would reveal something shattering, that, in an unbearable way, it
would be true and adequate. The same goes for the Christians: when already Saint
[[Augustine ]] opposed Christianity, the religion of [[love]], to Judaism, the religion of [[anxiety]],
when he conceived of the passage from Judaism to Christianity as the passage from
anxiety to love, he (again) projected onto Judaism the disavowed founding gesture of
Christianity itself - what Christianity endeavours to overcome through the reconciliation
in love is its own [[constitutive excess]], the unbearable anxiety opened up by the [[experience ]] of the impotent God who failed in His [[work ]] of creation, i.e., to refer yet again to [[Hegel]],
the traumatic experience of how the enigma of God is also the enigma for God Himself -
our failure to comprehend God is what Hegel called a 'reflexive determination' of the
And the same goes for the standard opposition between the Cartesian self-transparent
subject of [[thought ]] and the Freudian [[subject of the unconscious]], which is perceived as anti-[[Cartesian]], as undermining the Cartesian '[[illusion]]' of [[rational ]] identity. One should bear in [[mind ]] that the opposite by reference to which a certain position asserts itself is this position's own presupposition, its own inherent excess (as is the case with [[Kant]]: the notion of diabolical [[evil ]] which he rejects is only possible within the horizon of his own [[transcendental ]] [[revolution]]). The point here is not so much that the Cartesian <i>[[cogito]]</i> is the
presupposed 'vanishing mediator' of the Freudian subject of the unconscious (a thought
worth pursuing), but that [[the subject of the unconscious ]] is already operative in the
Cartesian <i>cogito</i> as its own inherent excess: in order to assert the <i>cogito</i> as the self-
[[transparent ]] '[[thinking ]] substance', one has to [[pass ]] through the excessive point of [[madness ]]
which designates the <i>cogito</i> as the vanishing abyss of substanceless thought. Along the
same lines, the Jewish/Christian [[openness ]] to the Other ('Love thy neighbour!') is
thoroughly different from the pagan tribal hospitality: while the pagan hospitality relies
on the clear opposition between the self-enclosed [[domain ]] of my [[community ]] and the [[external ]] Other, what reverberates in the Jewish/Christian openness is a reaction against the traumatic [[recognition ]] of the neighbour as the unfathomable abyssal Thing-the alien
Thing is my closest neighbour himself, not the foreigner visiting my home. In Hegelese,
the Jewish/Christian openness involves the logic of 'positing its presuppositions': it
Kant and Freud both claim to [[repeat ]] the Copernican turn in their respective domains. With regard to Freud, the [[meaning ]] of this reference seems clear and simple: in the same way [[Copernicus ]] demonstrated that our earth is not the centre of the universe, but a planet revolving around the sun, and in this sense '[[decentred]]', [[turning around ]] another centre, Freud also demonstrated that the (conscious) ego is not the centre of the human [[psyche]],
but ultimately an epiphenomenon, a satellite turning around the true centre, the
unconscious or the id. With Kant, things are more ambiguous-at first, it cannot but
appear that he actually did the exact opposite of the Copernican turn: is not the key
premise of his transcendental approach that the conditions of possibility of our experience
of the [[objects ]] are at the same [[time ]] the conditions of possibility of these objects
themselves, so that, instead of a subject which, in its cognition, has to accommodate itself
to some external, 'decentred', measure of [[truth]], the objects have to follow the subject,
i.e., it is the subject itself which, from its central position, constitutes the objects of
[[knowledge]]? However, if one reads Kant's reference to Copernicus closely, one cannot
fail to notice how Kant's emphasis is not on the shift of the substantial fixed centre, but
on something quite different-on the status of the subject itself:</font></p>
<p align="justify"><font size="3">
We here propose to do just what Copernicus did in attempting to explain the
celestial movements. When he found that he could make no [[progress ]] by assuming that all the heavenly bodies revolved round the [[spectator]], he reversed the [[process]],
and tried the experiment of assuming that the spectator revolved, while the stars
remained at rest. <a name="8"></a><a href="#8x">8</a></font></p>
</font><p align="justify">
<font size="3">The precise [[German ]] terms (<i>die Zuschauer sich drehen</i> - not so much 'turn around another centre' as 'turn/rotate around themselves' <a name="9"></a><a href="#9x">9</a>) make it clear what interests Kant: the subject loses its substantial [[stability]]/identity and is reduced to the pure substanceless [[void ]]
of the self-rotating abyssal vortex called 'transcendental apperception'. And it is against
this background that one can locate [[Lacan]]'s '[[return ]] to Freud': to put it as succinctly as
possible, what Lacan does is to read the Freudian reference to the Copernican turn in the
original Kantian sense, as asserting not the simple [[displacement ]] of the centre from the
ego to the id or the unconscious as the 'true' substantial focus of the human psyche, but
the transformation of the subject itself from the self-identical substantial ego, the
[[psychological ]] subject full of emotions, [[instincts]], dispositions, etc., to what Lacan called the '[[barred ]] subject ($)', the vortex of the [[self-relating ]] negativity of [[desire]]. In this precise
sense, the subject of the unconscious is none other than the Cartesian <i>cogito</i>.
The same logic of 'reflexive determination' is at work in the passage from revolutionary
[[terror ]] (absolute freedom) to the Kantian [[moral ]] subject in Hegel's <i>[[Phenomenology]]</i>
(582ff.): the [[revolutionary subject ]] experiences itself as mercilessly exposed to the whim of the terrorist [[regime]]-anyone can at any [[moment ]] be arrested and put to death as 'traitor'. Of course, the passage to moral [[subjectivity ]] occurs when this external terror is internalized by the subject as the terror of the moral law, of the [[voice ]] of [[conscience]]. However, what is often overlooked is that, for this [[internalization ]] to take place, the subject has to profoundly transform its identity: the subject has to [[renounce ]] the very kernel of its [[contingent ]] individuality, and to accept that the centre of its identity resides in its [[universal ]] moral consciousness. In other words, it is only in so far as I cling to my
contingent idiosyncratic identity as to the core of my being that I experience the universal
law as the abstract negativity of an alien power that threatens to annihilate me; in this
precise sense, the internalization of the law is merely the 'reflexive determination' of the
shift that affects the core of my own identity. It is not the law which changes from the
[[agency ]] of external politcal terror to the pressure of the inner voice of conscience; this [[change ]] merely reflects the change in my identity. Perhaps, something similar occurs in the passage from Judaism to Christianity: what changes in this passage is not the [[content ]]
(the status of God), but primarily the identity of the believer him- or herself, and the
change in God (no longer the transcendent Other, but Christ) is just the 'reflexive
Is this not also the implicit lesson of Thomas Hobbes' key insight apropos of the social
contract? In order to be effective, the limitation of individuals' [[sovereignty ]] - when they
agree to transpose it onto the figure of the sovereign and thus end the state of war and
introduce civic peace-must bestow unlimited power to the person of the sovereign. It is
characterizes the state of nature: for the laws to be operative, there must be a One, a
person with the unlimited power to decide what the laws are. Mutually recognized rules
are not enough-there must be a [[master ]] to enforce them. Therein resides the properly [[dialectical ]] paradox of [[Hobbes]]: he starts with the [[individual]]'s unlimited right to self-
preservation, contained by no duties (I have the unalienable right to cheat, steal, lie, kill...
if my survival is at stake), and he ends up with the sovereign who has the unlimited
power to dispose of my life, the sovereign whom I experience not as the extension of my
own will, as the personification of my [[ethical ]] substance, but as an [[arbitrary ]] foreign force.
This external unlimited power is precisely the 'reflexive determination' of my egotist
[[subjective ]] stance-the way to overcome it is to change my own identity...<br><br>
However, back to Schelling, the radical breakthrough of his philosophy resides in the
very notion of the proto-ontological domain of drives: this domain is not simply nature,
but the spectral domain of the not-yet-fully-constituted [[reality]]. Schelling's opposition of [[the Real ]] of drives (the ground of being) and being itself thus radically displaces the standard philosophical couples of nature and spirit, the real and the [[idea]], [[existence ]] and [[essence]], etc. This notion is crucial not only with regard to the [[history ]] of [[ideas]], but even
with regard to art and our daily experience of reality. Recall the extended stains which
'are' the yellow sky in late Van Gogh or the water or grass in [[Munch]]: this [[uncanny ]]
'massiveness' pertains neither to the direct materiality of the colour stains nor to the
materiality of the depicted objects-it dwells in a kind of intermediate spectral domain
Perhaps the most fruitful reverberations of this notion are to be found in the topic of
alternate realities in modem narratives. Say, the universe of alternate realities in
Krzysztof [[Kieslowski]]'s [[films ]] is thoroughly ambiguous. On the one hand, its lesson seems to be that we live in a [[world ]] of alternate realities in which, as in a [[cyberspace ]] [[game]], when
one choice leads to a catastrophic ending, we can return to the starting point and make
another, better, choice - what was the [[first time ]] a suicidal mistake, can be the second
time done in the correct way, so that the opportunity is not missed. In <i>The Double Life of
Veronique</i>, Veronique learns from Weronika, avoids the suicidal choice of singing and
survives; in <i>Red</i>, Auguste avoids the mistake of the judge; even <i>White</i> ends with the
prospect of Karol and his [[French ]] bride getting a second [[chance ]] and remarrying. The very title of Annette Insdorf's [[recent ]] book on Kieslowski (<i>Double Lives, Second Chances</i>) points in this direction: the other life is here to give us a second chance, i.e., '[[repetition ]] becomes accumulation, with a prior mistake as a base for successful [[action]]'. <a name="10"></a><a href="#10x">10</a> However, while this universe sustains the prospect of [[repeating ]] past choices and thus retrieving missed opportunities, it can also be [[interpreted ]] in the opposite, much darker, way. There is a [[material ]] feature of Kies_lowski's films which has long attracted the attention of
perspicacious critics; suffice it to recall the use of filters in <i>A Short Film about Killing</i>:</font></p><font size="3">
</font><p align="justify">
<font size="3">Furthermore, in <i>A Short Film about Killing</i>, the filters are used 'as a kind of mask,
darkening parts of the image which Kies_lowski and Idziak did not [[wish ]] to show'. <a name="12"></a><a href="#12x">12</a> This procedure of having 'large chunks smogged out' <a name="13"></a><a href="#13x">13 - </a> not as part of the formulaic depiction of a [[dream ]] or a vision, but in shots rendering the grey everyday reality-directly evokes the Gnostic notion of the universe which was created imperfect and is as such not yet
fully constituted. The closest one can get to this notion in reality is, perhaps, the
countryside in extreme places like Iceland or the Land of Fire at the southernmost point
of [[Latin ]] America: patches of grass and wild hedges are interspersed by barren raw earth
or gravel, fissures out of which sulphuric steam and fire gush out, as if the pre-
ontological primordial chaos is still able to penetrate the cracks of the imperfectly
Kieslowski's universe is a Gnostic universe, a not-yet-fully-constituted universe created
by a [[perverse ]] and confused, idiotic God who screwed up the work of creation, producing
an imperfect world, and then trying to save whatever can be saved by repeated new
attempts-we are all '[[children ]] of a lesser God'. In mainstream Hollywood itself, this
uncanny in-between dimension is clearly discernible in what is arguably the most
effective [[scene ]] in <i>Alien 4: Resurrection</i>: the cloned Ripley (Sigourney Weaver) enters the
laboratory room in which the previous seven aborted attempts to clone her are on
display-here she encounters the ontologically failed, defective versions of herself, up to
the almost successful version with her own face, but with some of her limbs distorted so
that they resemble the limbs of the alien Thing-this creature asks Ripley to kill her, and,
in an [[outburst ]] of violent rage, Ripley effectively destroys the entire horror show... This
idea of multiple imperfect universes can be discerned at two levels in Kies_lowski's
oeuvre: 1) the botched character of reality is depicted in his films, as well as the ensuing
repeated attempts to (re-)create a new, better, reality; 2) with regard to Kieslowski
himself as [[author]], we also have the repeated attempts to tell the same story in a slightly
different way (not only the difference between TV and movie versions of <i>Dekalog 5</i> and
6, but also his idea to make 20 different versions of <i>Veronique</i> and play them in different
theatres in [[Paris ]] - a different version for each theatre). In this eternally repeated rewriting, the '[[quilting point]]' is forever [[missing]]: there never is a final version, the work is never done and actually put in [[circulation]], delivered from the author to the [[big Other ]] of the [[public]]. (Is the recent fashion of the later release of the allegedly more authentic 'director's cut' not also part of the same [[economy]]?) What does this [[absence ]] of the final
version mean - this everlasting deferral of the moment when, like God after His six days
of work, the author can say 'It's done!' and take a rest?<br><br>
reality into the multitude of parallel lives, is strictly correlative to the assertion of the
proto-cosmic abyss of chaotic, ontologically not-yet-fully-constituted reality-this
primordial, pre-[[symbolic]], inchoate 'stuff' is the very neutral medium in which the
multitude of parallel universes can coexist. In contrast to the standard notion of one, fully
determined and ontologically constituted reality, with regard to which all other realities
are its secondary shadows, copies, reflections, 'reality' itself is thus multiplied into the
spectral [[plurality ]] of [[virtual ]] realities, beneath which lurks the pre-ontological proto-reality,
the Real of the unformed ghastly matter-and, as we have seen, the first to clearly
articulate this pre-ontological dimension was Schelling with his notion of the
<font size="2">This paper was first published <i>Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities</i> 5 (2000),
141-48; it was written in response to Peter Dews, 'The Eclipse of Coincidence',
<i>Angelaki: Journal of the [[Theoretical ]] Humanities</i> 4 (1999), 13-23.<br><br>
[[Notes]]: <br><br>
<a name="1x"></a><a href="#1">1</a> Dews, 'The Eclipse of Coincidence', 22. <br>
<a name="2x"></a><a href="#2">2</a> Slavoj [[Zizek]], <i>[[The Indivisible Remainder]]: An Essay on Schelling and Related Matters</i> ([[London ]] and New York: Verso, 1996), 13-91.<br>
<a name="3x"></a><a href="#3">3</a> F.W.J. von Schelling, <i>Die Weltalter</i> (second draft 1813), trans. [[Judith ]] Norman, in [[Slavoj Zizek ]] and F.W.J. von Schelling, <i>[[The Abyss of Freedom ]] / Ages of the World</i> (Ann Arbor: [[University ]] of Michigan Press, 1997), 182.<br>
<a name="4x"></a><a href="#4">4</a> [[Fredric Jameson]], 'The [[Vanishing Mediator]]; or, [[Max Weber ]] as Storyteller', in <i>The [[Ideologies ]] of Theory: Essays 1971-1986. Volume 2: Syntax of History</i>
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 3-34.<br>
<a name="5x"></a><a href="#5">5</a> See [[Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe]], <i>Musica Ficta: [[Figures ]] of [[Wagner]]</i>, trans. Felicia
McCarren (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).<br>
<a name="6x"></a><a href="#6">6</a> Similar is the case of Nazi anti-Semitism: the standard (pseudo-) explanation for
the growing acceptance of [[Nazi ]] [[ideology ]] in the [[Germany ]] of the 1920s is that the [[Nazis ]] were deftly manipulating ordinary middle-[[class ]] [[people]]'s fears and [[anxieties ]] generated by the [[economic ]] crisis and fast social changes. The problem
with this explanation is that it overlooks the self-referential circularity at work
here: yes, the Nazis certainly did deftly manipulate fears and anxieties-
however, far from being simple pre-[[ideological ]] facts, these fears and anxieties
were already the product of a certain ideological perspective. In other words,
Nazi ideology itself (co-)generated anxieties and fears against which it then
<a name="7x"></a><a href="#7">7</a> Along these lines, one is tempted to claim that Judaism is caught in the paradox
of prohibiting what is already in itself [[impossible]]: if one cannot render God
through images, why prohibit images? To claim that, by making images of Him,
we do not show a proper respect for Him, is all too simple, since, as we [[know ]]
from psychoanalysis, respect is ultimately the respect for the Other's weakness -
to treat someone with respect means that one maintains a proper distance towards
him/her, avoiding [[acts ]] which, if accomplished, would unmask his/her stance as an imposture. Say, when a [[father ]] boasts to his son that he could run fast, the
respectful thing to do is not to defy him to do it, since this would reveal his
[[impotence]]. In other words, the idea that iconoclasm expresses respect for the
divine Other makes sense only as the indication of the divine Other's impotence
or limitation.<br>
<a name="8x"></a><a href="#8">8</a> [[Immanuel Kant]], <i>[[Critique of Pure Reason]]</i>, trans. J.M.D. Meiklejohn (London:
J.M. Dent &amp; Sons, 1934), 12.<br>
<a name="9x"></a><a href="#9">9</a> For a [[good ]] account of the incorrect translations of this key passage, see Gerard
Guest, <i>La tournure de l'événement</i> (Berlin: Duncker und Humboldt, 1994).<br>
<a name="12x"></a><a href="#12">12</a> Charles Eidsvik, 'Dekalog 5 and 6 and the Two Short Films', in <i>Lucid Dreams:
The Films of [[Krzysztof Kieslowski]]</i>, ed. [[Paul ]] Coates (Trowbridge: Flick, 1999), 85.<br>
<a name="13x"></a><a href="#13">13</a> Eidsvik, 'Dekalog 5 and 6 and the Two Short Films', 85.
==Source==
* [[From Proto-Reality to the Act]]. ''Centre for [[Theology ]] and [[Politics]]''. <http://www.lacan.com/zizproto.htm>
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