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The [[English ]] term "[[frustration]]" came into increasing prominence in certain branches of [[psychoanalytic theory]] in the 1950s, together with a shift in emphasis from the [[Oedipus complex|Oedipal]] [[structure|triangle]] to the [[mother]]-[[child]] [[dual relation|relation]].

In this context, [[frustration]] was generally [[understood ]] as the [[act]] whereby the [[mother]] denies the [[child]] the [[object]] which would satisfy one of his [[biology|biological]] [[need]]s. To [[frustrate]] a [[child]] in this way was [[thought ]] by some [[analyst]]s to be a major factor in the aetiology of [[neurosis]].

"[[Frustration]]" is also the term which the ''[[Standard Edition]]'' uses to translate [[Freud]]'s term ''[[Frustration|Versagung]]''. While this term is not extremely prominent in [[Freud]]'s [[work]], it does [[form ]] part of his [[theoretical ]] [[vocabulary]]. At a first glance, indeed, it may appear that [[Freud]] discusses [[frustration]] in the way described above. For example he certainly attributes to [[frustration]] an impor­tant [[place ]] in the aetiology of [[symptom]]s, [[stating ]] that "it was a frustration that made the patient ill."<ref>{{F}} "[[Works of Sigmund Freud|Lines of Advance in Psycho-Analytic Therapy]]," 1919a [1918]. [[SE]] XVII, 162.</ref>

Hence when [[Lacan]] argues that the term "[[frustration]]" is "quite simply [[absent]] from Freud's work,"<ref>{{S3}} p.235</ref> what he means is that the [[Freud]]ian [[concept ]] of ''[[Frustration|Versagung]]'' does not correspond to the concept of [[frustration]] as described in the above paragraph. [[Lacan]] argues that those who have theorized the concept of [[frustration]] in this way have, by deviating from [[Freud]]'s work, led [[psychoanalytic theory]] into a series of impasses.<ref>{{S4}} p. 180</ref> Thus in the [[seminar]] of 1956-7 he seeks a way of reformulating the concept in accordance with the [[logic ]] of [[Freud]]ian [[psychoanalytic theory|theory]].

[[Lacan]] begins by classifying [[frustration]] as one of the [[three ]] types of "[[lack|lack of object]]," distinct from both [[castration]] and [[privation]].

Although he concedes that [[frustration]] is at the heart of the primary relations between [[mother]] and [[child]],<ref>{{S4}} p. 66</ref> he argues that [[frustration]] does not concern [[biology|biological]] [[need]]s but the [[demand]] for [[love]]. This is not to say that [[frustration]] has [[nothing ]] to do with a [[real]] [[object]] capable of [[satisfying ]] a [[need]] (e.g. a [[breast]], or a feeding bottle); on the contrary, such an [[object]] is certainly involved, at least at first.<ref>{{S4}} p.66</ref>

However, what is important is that the [[real]] function of this [[object]] (to [[satisfaction|satisfy]] a [[need]], such as hunger) is soon completely overshadowed by its [[symbolic]] function, namely, the fact that it functions as a [[symbol]] of the [[mother]]'s [[love]].<ref>{{S4}} p.180-2</ref> The [[object]] is thus valued more for [[being ]] a [[symbolic]] [[object|gift]] than for its capacity to [[satisfy]] a [[need]].

As a [[gift]], it is inscribed in the [[symbolic order|symbolic network]] of [[law]]s which regulate the circuit of exchanges, and thus seen as something to which the [[subject]] has a legitimate [[claim]].<ref>{{S4}} p. 101</ref> [[Frustration]], properly [[speaking]], can only occur in the context of this [[law|legal]] [[order]], and thus when the [[object]] which the [[infant]] [[demand]]s is not provided, one can only [[speak ]] of [[frustration]] when the [[infant]] senses that it has been wronged.<ref>{{S4}} p. 101</ref> In such a [[case]], when the [[object]] is eventually provided, the [[sense ]] of wrong (of broken promises, of [[love]] withheld) persists in the [[child]], who then consoles himself for this by [[enjoyment|enjoying]] the sensations which follow the [[satisfaction]] of the original [[need]].

Thus, far from [[frustration]] involving the failure to [[satisfy]] a [[biological]] [[need]], it often involves precisely the opposite; a [[biological]] [[need]] is [[satisfied]] as a vain attempt to compensate for the [[true ]] [[frustration]], which is the [[refusal ]] of [[love]].

[[Frustration]] plays an important [[role ]] in [[psychoanalytic treatment]]. [[Freud]] noted that, to the extent that distressing [[symptom]]s [[disappear ]] as the [[treat­ment]] progresses, the [[patient]]'s motivation to continue the [[treatment]] tends to diminish accordingly. In order, therefore, to avoid the risk of the [[patient]] losing motivation altogether and breaking off the [[treatment]] prematurely, [[Freud]] recommended that the [[analyst]] must "re-instate [the patient's suffer­ing] elsewhere in the form of some appreciable privation."<ref>{{F}} "[[Works of Sigmund Freud|Lines of Advance in Psycho-Analytic Therapy]]," 1919a [1918]. [[SE]] XVII, 163.</ref>

<blockquote>"The analyst is he who supports the demand, not, as has been said, to frustrate the subject, but in order to allow the [[signifiers ]] in which his frustration is bound up to reappear."<ref>{{E}} p. 255</ref></blockquote>

The aim of the [[analyst]] is, by supporting the [[analysand]]'s [[demand]]s in a [[state ]] of [[frustration]], to go beyond [[demand]] and [[cause ]] the [[analysand]]'s [[desire]] to appear.<ref>{{E}} p. 276</ref>

[[Lacan]] differs from [[Freud]] in the way he theorizes the rule of [[frustration|abstinence]]. For [[Freud]], the rule of [[frustration|abstinence]] primarily concerned the [[analysand]]'s [[frustration|abstinence]] from [[sexual ]] [[activity]]; if a [[patient]] implores the [[analyst]] to make [[love]] to her, the [[analyst]] must [[frustrate]] her by refusing to do so. While [[Lacan]] agrees with this advice, he stresses that there is a much more common [[demand]] that the [[analyst]] can also [[frustrate]] -- the [[analysand]]'s [[demand]] for a reply. The [[analysand]] expects the [[analyst]] to follow the rules of everyday [[communication|conversation]]. By refusing to follow these rules -- remaining silent when the [[analysand]] asks a question, or taking the [[analysand]]'s [[word]]s in a way [[other ]] than that in which they were intended -- the [[analyst]] has a powerful means at his disposal for [[frustrating]] the [[analysand]].

There is [[another ]] way that the [[analyst]] [[frustrates]] the [[analysand]] which [[Lacan]] mentions in 1961. This is the [[analyst]]'s refusal to give the [[sign]]al of [[anxiety]] to the [[analysand]] - -the [[absence]] of [[anxiety]] in the [[analyst]] at all [[times]], even when the [[analysand]] [[demand]]s that the [[analyst]] [[experience ]] [[anxiety]]. [[Lacan]] suggests that this may be the most fruitful of all forms of [[frustration]] in [[psychoanalytic treatment]].