Changes

<blockquote>My fundamental connection with the Other-as-subject must be able to be referred back to my permanent possibility of ''being seen'' by the Other.<ref>[[Jean-Paul Sartre|Sartre, Jean-Paul]]. ''[[Jean-Paul Sartre|Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology]]'', trans. Hazel E. Barnes, London, Methuen, 1958 [1943]. p. 256</ref></blockquote>

When the [[subject]] is surprised by the [[gaze]] of the [[Other]], the [[subject]] is reduced to shame.<ref>[[Jean-Paul Sartre|Sartre, Jean-Paul]]. ''[[Jean-Paul Sartre|Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology]]'', trans. Hazel E. Barnes, London, Methuen, 1958 [1943]. p. 261</ref> [[Lacan]] does not, at this point, develop his own concept of the [[gaze]], and seems to be in general agreement with [[Sartre]]'s views on the [[subject]].<ref>{{S1}} p. 215</ref> [[Lacan]] is especially taken with [[Sartre]]'s view that the [[gaze]] does not necessarily concern the organ of sight: