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'''[[German ]] [[Idealism]]''' was a [[philosophy|philosophical]] movement in [[Germany]] in the late [[eighteenth century|eighteenth]] and early [[nineteenth century|nineteenth]] centuries. It developed out of the [[work ]] of [[Immanuel Kant]] in the [[1780s]] and [[1790s]], and was closely linked both with [[romanticism]] and the revolutionary [[politics ]] of the [[Enlightenment]]. The most well-known thinkers in the movement were [[Johann Gottlieb Fichte]], [[Friedrich Schelling]], and [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel]]. However, thinkers such as [[Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi]], [[Karl Leonhard Reinhold]], and [[Friedrich Schleiermacher]] were major contributors to German Idealism.

The [[word ]] "idealism" has more than one [[meaning]]. (For [[instance]], it could mean [[thinking ]] [[about ]] things or [[people ]] as having the best or most perfect qualities. This is not the meaning that should be associated with German Idealism.)

The [[philosophical ]] meaning of idealism is that we do not directly [[know ]] [[objects]]. We directly know only the sensations, [[ideas]], [[images]], or representations that are in our minds. These directly known ideas stand for or [[represent ]] the objects, which are known indirectly. This is the meaning that should be associated with the [[philosophy ]] of German Idealism.

Kant ([[1724]] - [[1804]]) is sometimes considered the first of the German idealists. Kant's work purported to bridge the two dominant philosophical [[schools ]] in the [[eighteenth century]]: 1) [[rationalism]], which held that [[knowledge ]] could be attained by [[reason ]] alone ''[[a priori]]'' (prior to [[experience]]), and 2) [[empiricism]], which held that knowledge could be arrived at only through the senses. Kant's solution was to propose that while we could know [[particular ]] facts about the [[world ]] only via sensory experience, we could know the ''[[form]]'' they must take prior to any experience. That is, we cannot know what objects we will [[encounter]]. Kant called his mode of philosophising "[[critical]] philosophy," in that it was supposedly less concerned with setting out positive [[doctrine ]] than with critiquing the limits to the theories we ''can'' set out. The conclusion he presented, as above, he called "[[Transcendental idealism]]". This distinguished it from earlier "idealism", such as [[George Berkeley]]'s, which held that we can only directly know the ideas in our minds, not the objects that they represent. Kant claimed that we know more. He said that we also directly know that there possibly are things-in-themselves, that is, things that [[exist ]] [[other ]] than [[being ]] merely sensations and ideas in our minds. Kant held that the world of appearances is empirically [[real ]] and transcendentally [[ideal]]. The world of things-in-themselves cannot be known as being actual, only possible. The mind plays a central [[role ]] in influencing the way that the world is experienced. It is this [[notion ]] that was taken to heart by Kant's philosophical successors.

At the other end of the movement, [[Arthur Schopenhauer]] is not normally classed as a German Idealist although he considered himself one and his work reflects similar themes. The [[Young Hegelians]], a [[number ]] of [[philosophers ]] who developed [[Hegel]]'s work in various directions, were in some cases idealists. On the other hand, [[Karl Marx]] numbered among [[them]], and he professed to be a [[materialist]].

Kant's [[Transcendental ]] idealism consisted of taking a point of view [[outside ]] of and above oneself (transcendentally) and [[understanding ]] that the mind directly [[knows ]] only phenomena or ideas. Whatever [[exists ]] other than [[mental ]] phenomena, or ideas that appear to the mind, is a [[thing]]-[[in-itself ]] and cannot be directly and immediately known.

In 1787, [[Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi]] addressed, in his book ''On [[Faith]], or Idealism and Realism'', Kant's [[concept ]] of "thing-in-itself." Jacobi agreed that the [[objective ]] thing-in-itself cannot be directly known. However, he stated, it must be taken on faith. A [[subject ]] must believe that there is a real [[object ]] in the [[external ]] world that is related to the [[representation ]] or mental [[idea ]] that is directly known. This faith or [[belief ]] is a result of revelation or immediately known, but logically unproved, [[truth]]. The real [[existence ]] of a thing-in-itself is revealed or disclosed to the observing subject. In this way, the subject directly knows the ideal, [[subjective ]] representations that appear in the mind, and strongly believes in the real, objective thing-in-itself that exists outside of the mind. By presenting the external world as an object of faith, Jacobi legitimized belief and its theological [[associations]].

Karl L. Reinhold published two volumes of ''Letters Concerning the Kantian Philosophy'' in 1790 and 1792. They provided a clear explication of Kant's [[thoughts]], which were previously inaccessible due to Kant's use of [[complex ]] or technical language.

Reinhold also tried to prove Kant's assertion that [[humans ]] and other animals can know only images that appear in their minds, never "things-in-themselves" (things that are not mere appearances in a mind). In [[order ]] to establish his proof, Reinhold stated an axiom that could not possibly be doubted. From this axiom, all knowledge of [[consciousness ]] could be deduced. His axiom was: "Representation is distinguished in consciousness by the subject from the subject and object, and is referred to both."

He thereby started, not from definitions, but, from a [[principle ]] that referred to mental images or representations in a [[conscious ]] mind. In this way, he [[analyzed ]] knowledge into (1) the [[knowing ]] subject, or [[observer]], (2) the known object, and (3) the [[image ]] or representation in the subject's mind. In order to [[understand ]] Transcendental Idealism, it is necessary to reflect deeply enough to distinguish experience as consisting of these [[three ]] components: subject, representation, and object.

[[Kant]] felt that a mental idea or representation must be of something external to the mind. He gave the [[name ]] of "thing-in-itself" to that which is represented. However, [[G.E. Schulze]] wrote, anonymously, that the law of [[cause ]] and effect only applies to the phenomena within the mind, not between those phenomena and any things-in-themselves outside of the mind. That is, a thing-in-itself cannot be the cause of an idea or image of a thing in the mind. In this way, he discredited Kant's philosophy by using Kant's own reasoning to disprove the existence of a thing-in-itself.

After Schulze had seriously criticized the notion of a thing-in-itself, [[Fichte ]] ([[1762]] - [[1814]]) produced a philosophy similar to Kant's, but without a thing-in-itself. Fichte asserted that our representations, ideas, or mental images are merely the productions of our ego, or knowing subject. For him, there is no external thing-in-itself that produces the ideas. On the contrary, the knowing subject, or ego, is the cause of the external thing, object, or non-ego.

Fichte's style was an exaggeration of Kant's difficult [[writing]]. It was to be assumed that Fichte's exposition was not easy to comprehend because it was profound. Also, Fichte claimed that his truths were [[apparent ]] to [[intellectual]], non-perceptual, intuition. That is, the truth can be immediately seen by the use of reason.

[[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel]] ([[1770]] - [[1831]]) was a [[German people|German]] [[philosopher]] [[born ]] in [[Stuttgart]], [[Württemberg]], in [[present]]-day southwest Germany. After [[Kant]] had discredited proofs for the existence of the traditional [[God]], Hegel published his [[Absolute idealism|Absolute Idealism]]. This abstraction represented a [[pantheism]] patterned after [[Spinoza]]'s, but influenced by Kant's Transcendental Idealism. Impersonal [[mind]] or [[spirit]] (German ''[[geist (philosophy)|geist]]'') was [[thought ]] to have brought forth the [[universe]] in accordance with reasonable, [[logical ]] thought. All individuals were said to be part of the overall [[universal]] which always operated in accordance with a rigid three-step sequence. This pattern was named [[dialectical]], after the usual way that dialogues, conversations or arguments were conducted. A [[thesis ]] was proposed, which inevitably led to a countering antithesis. These were always resolved in a [[synthesis]].

With [[regard ]] to the experience of objects, [[Schelling ]] ([[1775]] - [[1854]]) claimed that the ideas or mental images in the mind are identical to the extended objects which are external to the mind. Schelling's "absolute [[identity]]" asserted that there is no [[difference ]] between the subjective and the objective, that is, the ideal and the real. In the book [[Sex, Ecology, Spirituality]], philosopher [[Ken Wilber]] called Schelling's thought "[[Plotinus]] temporalized". That is, Schelling transformed Plotinus' [[Neo-Platonic]] [[emanationism|emanationist]] [[metaphysics]] into an [[evolution|evolutionary]] [[ontology]].

In 1851, [[Schopenhauer]] criticized Schelling's absolute identity of the subjective and the objective, or of the ideal and the real. "...[E]verything that rare minds like Locke and Kant had separated after an incredible amount of [[reflection ]] and judgment, was to be again poured into the pap of that absolute identity. For the teaching of those two thinkers [Locke and Kant] may be very appropriately described as the doctrine of the ''absolute diversity of the ideal and the real, or of the subjective and the objective''." (''Parerga and Paralipomena'', Vol. I, "Fragments for the [[History ]] of Philosophy," § 13).

Ken Wilber's view on Schelling is that this was a mistaken view-point, and that Schelling was insightful in [[seeing ]] beyond the [[separation ]] of knowledge, to a [[future ]] synthesis and integration of that differentiated knowledge, which opponents mistook for a call to [[regression ]] and re-merging of that knowledge in undifferentiated form.

[[Friedrich Schleiermacher]] was a theologian who asserted that the ideal and the real are united in God. He [[understood ]] the ideal as the subjective mental activities of thought, intellect, and reason. The real was, for him, the objective area of [[nature ]] and [[physical ]] being. Schleiermacher declared that the [[unity ]] of the ideal and the real is manifested in God. The two divisions do not have a productive or causal effect on each other. Rather, they are both equally existent in the absolute transcendental entity which is God.

Spinoza had a great influence on post-Kantian German Idealists. Schopenhauer wrote: "In consequence of Kant's criticism of all speculative [[theology]], almost all the philosophizers in [[Germany]] cast themselves back on to [[Spinoza]], so that the [[whole ]] series of unsuccessful attempts known by the name of post-Kantian philosophy is simply Spinozism tastelessly got up, veiled in all kinds of unintelligible [[language]], and otherwise twisted and distorted," (from [[The World as Will and Representation]], Vol.II, ch. L).

Kant's original philosophy, with its refutation of all speculative [[theology]], had been transformed by the German Idealists. Through the use of his technical [[terms]], such as "transcendental," "transcendent," "reason," "intelligibility," and "thing-in-itself" they attempted to [[speak ]] of what exists beyond experience and, in this way, to revive the notions of God, free will, and immortality of soul. This was continued later in the century by American [[Transcendentalists]].