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My comments on the paradoxes of US populist conservatism were made just before the US election. The result, it seems to me, poses the basic [[paradox ]] of [[democracy ]] itself. In The [[History ]] of the VKP, [[Stalin ]] (who [[ghost]]-wrote the book) describes the outcome of the voting at a party congress in the late 1920s: "With a large majority, the delegates unanimously approved the [[resolution ]] proposed by the Central Committee." If the vote was unanimous, where then did the minority [[disappear]]? Far from demonstrating some [[perverse ]] totalitarian twist, this anecdote lays bare the [[nature ]] of democracy. It is based on a short-circuit between majority and the [[totality]]: the majority accounts for everyone and the winner takes all, even if his majority is merely a couple of hundred votes among millions.

"Democracy" is not merely the "[[power ]] of, by and for the [[people]]"; it is not the salient feature of democracy that the will and interests (the two do not automatically coincide) of the large majority determine [[state ]] decisions. Democracy - in the way the term is used today - means that, whatever electoral manipulation takes [[place]], every [[political ]] [[agent ]] will unconditionally respect the results. In this [[sense]], the US presidential elections of 2000 were, despite appearances, effectively 'democratic': in spite of obvious electoral manipulation, and of the absurdity of the fact that a couple of hundred votes in Florida decided who would be president, the Democratic candidate accepted his defeat. When, in the weeks of uncertainty after the election, Bill [[Clinton ]] said, "The American people have spoken; we just don't [[know ]] what they said," the remark should have been taken more seriously than it was meant: even now, we don't know the '[[true]]' result - and maybe this is because there was no substantial "[[message]]" behind the result. Those old enough to [[recall ]] the attempts of "democratic socialists" to oppose to the miseries of "really-existing [[socialism]]" a [[vision ]] of authentic socialism will know that such attempts deserve the standard [[Hegelian ]] response: the failure of [[reality ]] to live up to its [[notion ]] bears [[witness ]] to the inherent weakness of the notion. Why should the same not hold for democracy? Isn't it all too simple to oppose to "really-existing" [[liberal ]] capitalo-democracy a more true 'radical' democracy?

This is not to say, however, that [[Bush]]'s victory was just an accident or a mistake, the result of fraud and manipulation. [[Hegel ]] wrote apropos of Napoleon that it was only after his second defeat, at Waterloo, that it became clear to him that his defeat was the expression of a deeper historical shift. The same goes for Bush: he had to win twice in [[order ]] for [[liberals ]] to perceive that we are entering a new era.

And, in this respect, [[thinking ]] leftists should be glad that Bush won. It's better this way because the contours of the confrontations to come will be drawn in a much clearer way. Had [[Kerry ]] won, it would have been a historical anomaly, blurring the true lines of [[division]]; he didn't have a [[global ]] vision that presented a viable alternative to Bush's. Besides, Bush's victory is paradoxically better for the [[economic ]] prospects of both [[Europe ]] and [[Latin ]] America: in order to win the support of the trade unions, Kerry had promised more protectionist measures.

However, the main advantage has to do with international [[politics]]. If Kerry had won, liberals would have had to face up to the consequences of the [[Iraq ]] war, and the Bush camp would have been able to ascribe to [[them ]] the results of its own catastrophic decisions. In 1979, in her essay "Dictators and [[Double ]] Standards", Jeanne Kirkpatrick elaborated the [[distinction ]] between "authoritarian" and "totalitarian" regimes which served as the justification for the US policy of collaborating with rightist dictators while attempting to destabilise [[Communist ]] regimes: authoritarian dictators are pragmatic rulers who care [[about ]] their power and wealth and are indifferent to [[ideological ]] issues, even if they pay lip service to some big [[idea]]. In contrast, totalitarian leaders are selfless ideological fanatics who are ready to put everything at stake for their ideals. Authoritarian rulers react rationally and predictably to [[material ]] and military [[threats ]] - they can be dealt with. Totalitarian leaders are much more dangerous and have to be confronted directly. The irony is that this distinction perfectly encapsulates what went wrong with the US occupation of Iraq: [[Saddam ]] was a corrupt authoritarian dictator guided by brutal pragmatic considerations. The US [[intervention ]] has generated a much more uncompromising, "fundamentalist" opposition which rejects pragmatic compromises.

Bush's victory will dispel any illusions there may have been about the [[solidarity ]] of interests among developed countries; it will also give new impetus to the painful but necessary [[process ]] of building new alliances such as the [[European Union ]] or Mercosur in Latin America. It is a journalistic cliché to praise '[[postmodern]]', [[dynamic ]] US [[capitalism ]] at the expense of [[old Europe]]'s regulatory illusions. However, Europe is now going much further than the US towards constituting itself as a properly "postmodern" [[unity ]] in which there is room for everyone, independent of [[geography ]] or [[culture]], including Cyprus and [[Turkey]].

No [[reason ]] to despair, then. Even if today the prospects look dark, we should [[remember ]] one of the great Bushisms: "The [[future ]] will be better tomorrow."

* [[Hooray for Bush!]] ''[[London ]] Review of Books''. December 2, 2004. <http://www.lacan.com/zizhooray.htm>