Changes

“Democracy” means that[[Democracy]] is not merely the “[[power]] of, whatever electoral manipulation actually takes placeby, every political agent will unconditionally respect and for the results[[people]]. ” In this senseIt is not enough just to [[claim]] that, in democracy, the U.S. presidential elections of 2000 were effectively “democratic.” Despite obvious will and patent electoral manipulations in Florida, the Democratic candidate accepted his defeat. In interests (the weeks two in no way automatically coincide) of uncertainty after the elections, Bill Clinton made an appropriately acerbic comment: “The American people have spokenlarge majority determine [[state]] decisions. We just don’t know what they said.” This comment should have been taken more seriously than it was meantDemocracy—in the way the term is used today—concerns, for it revealed how the present machinery of democracy can be problematicabove all, to say the least‘’’[[formal]] legalism’’’. ‘’’Why should the left always and unconditionally respect Its minimal definition is ‘’the unconditional adherence to a certain set of formal rules which [[guarantee]] that [[antagonisms]] are fully absorbed into the formal “rules of the game”? Why should it not, in some circumstances, put in question the legitimacy of the outcome of a formal democratic procedure?’’’[[game]].”’’’

Alternatively“Democracy” means that, there is at least one case in which formal democrats themselves (orwhatever electoral manipulation actually takes [[place]], at leastevery [[political]] [[agent]] will unconditionally respect the results. In this [[sense]], a substantial portion the U.S. presidential elections of them) would tolerate 2000 were effectively “democratic.” Despite obvious and patent electoral manipulations in Florida, the suspension Democratic candidate accepted his defeat. In the weeks of democracy: What if formally free uncertainty after the elections are won by , Bill [[Clinton]] made an anti-democratic party whose platform promises appropriately acerbic comment: “The American people have spoken. We just don’t [[know]] what they said.” This comment should have been taken more seriously than it was meant, for it revealed how the abolition [[present]] machinery of formal democracy? (This did happencan be problematic, among other places, in Algeria a few years agoto say the least.) In such a case, many a democrat would concede that ‘’’Why should the [[left]] always and unconditionally respect the formal “rules of the people were game”? Why should it not yet “mature” enough to be allowed democracy, and that in some kind circumstances, put in question the legitimacy of enlightened despotism whose aim is to educate the majority to become proper democrats is preferable.outcome of a formal democratic procedure?’’’

Following this rhetorical line of attackAlternatively, the gradual limitation of democracy there is clearly perceptible at least one [[case]] in attempts to “rethink” the present situation in the aftermath which formal [[democrats]] themselves (or, at least, a substantial portion of [[them]]) would tolerate the Iraq war. One is, suspension of course, for democracy and : What if formally free elections are won by an anti-[[human rightsDemocratic Party|democratic party]], but one should “rethink” them. A series of recent interventions in whose platform promises the public debate give a clear sense abolition of the direction of this “rethinking.” In <i>The Future of Freedom</i>formal democracy? (This did happen, among [[Fareed Zakariaother]]places, Bush’s favored columnistin [[Algeria]] a few years ago.) In such a case, locates many a democrat would concede that the threat people were not yet “mature” enough to freedom in “overdoing be allowed democracy,” i.e., in the rise of “illiberal democracy at home and abroad.” He draws the lesson that democracy can only “catch on” in economically developed countries: If developing countries are “prematurely democratized,” some kind of enlightened despotism whose aim is to educate the result majority to become proper democrats is a [[populism]] which ends in economic catastrophe and political despotismpreferable.

No wonder, goes Following this theoryrhetorical line of attack, that today’s economically most successful Third World countries (Taiwan, South Korea, Chile) embraced full the gradual limitation of democracy only after a period is clearly perceptible in attempts to “rethink” the present [[situation]] in the aftermath of authoritarian rulethe [[Iraq]] war. The immediate lessons One is, of course, for Iraq are clear democracy and unambiguous: Yes[[human rights]], the United States but one should bring democracy to Iraq, but not immediately“rethink” them. There should first be a period A series of five or so years [[recent]] interventions in which the [[public]] debate give a benevolently authoritarian, U.S.-controlled regime would create proper conditions for clear sense of the effective functioning direction of democracythis “rethinking. This regime will not tolerate” In <i>The [[Future]] of [[Freedom]]</i>, [[Fareed Zakaria]], for exampleBush’s favored columnist, a democratic desire locates the [[threat]] to nationalize oil revenuesfreedom in “overdoing democracy, or to apply sanctions to Israel” i.e., or to refuse global free trade schemesin the rise of “illiberal democracy at home and abroad. ” We know now what bringing He draws the lesson that democracy meanscan only “catch on” in economically developed countries: It means that If developing countries are “prematurely democratized,” the United States result is a [[populism]] which ends in [[economic]] catastrophe and its “willing partners” impose themselves as the ultimate judges who decide if and when a country is ripe for democracypolitical despotism.

As No wonder, goes this [[theory]], that today’s economically most successful [[Third]] [[World]] countries (Taiwan, South Korea, Chile) embraced [[full]] democracy only after a period of authoritarian rule. The immediate lessons for Iraq are clear and unambiguous: Yes, the [[United States itself]] should bring democracy to Iraq, Zakaria’s diagnosis is that “America is increasingly embracing but not immediately. There should first be a period of five or so years in which a simplebenevolently authoritarian, U.S.-minded populism that values popularity and openness as controlled [[regime]] would create proper [[conditions]] for the key measures effective functioning of legitimacydemocracy. … The result is This regime will not tolerate, for example, a deep imbalance in the American systemdemocratic [[desire]] to nationalize oil revenues, or to apply sanctions to [[Israel]], more democracy but less libertyor to refuse [[global]] free trade schemes.” The remedy is thus to counteract this excessive “democratization of democracy” by delegating more power to impartial experts insulated from We know now what bringing democracy means: It means that the democratic fray, like United States and its “willing partners” impose themselves as the independent central banksultimate judges who decide if and when a country is ripe for democracy.

Such a diagnosis cannot but provoke ironic laughter: Today, in this alleged “overdemocratization,” As for the United States itself, Zakaria’s diagnosis is that “America is increasingly embracing a simple-minded populism that values popularity and Britain started a war on Iraq against [[openness]] as the overwhelming will of the rest key measures of the planet (and, in Britain’s case, its own people)legitimacy. And are we not, all the time, witnessing the imposition of key decisions concerning global trade agreements by “impartial” bodies exempted from democratic control? Even more fundamentally, … The result is it not ridiculous to complain about “overdemocratization” in a time when the key economic and geopolitical decisions are, as a rule, not an issue deep imbalance in elections? For at least the past three decades, what Zakaria demands is already fact. What we experience today are acrimonious splits over ideological lifestyle issues, where fierce debates rage and choices are solicited (on abortion, on gay marriages, etc.)American [[system]], more democracy but where basic economic policy is presented as a depoliticized domain of expert authorityless liberty. ” The proliferation remedy is thus to counteract this excessive “democratization of “overdemocracy” with its “excesses” of a “culture of complaint” is ultimately democracy” by delegating more power to impartial experts insulated from the front whose backside is democratic fray, like the silent, sturdy weaving of economic, corporatist logicindependent central banks.

The obverse of Such a diagnosis cannot but provoke ironic [[laughter]]: Today, in this alleged “overdemocratization,” the same tendency to counteract democratic “excesses” is United States and [[Britain]] started a war on Iraq against the open dismissal overwhelming will of any international body that would effectively control the conduct rest of war—which mightthe planet (and, in Britain’s case, its own people). And are we not, after allthe [[time]], be necessary witnessing the imposition of key decisions concerning global trade agreements by “impartial” bodies exempted from time democratic [[control]]? Even more fundamentally, is it not ridiculous to complain [[about]] “overdemocratization” in a time to enforce when the key economic agenda. Exemplary is Kenneth Anderson’s recent <i>New York Times Magazine</i> essayand geopolitical decisions are, as a rule, “Who Owns the Rules of Warnot an issue in elections?” whose subtitle makes For at least the point unambiguously clear: “The war in Iraq [[past]] [[three]] decades, what Zakaria [[demands ]] is already fact. What we [[experience]] today are acrimonious splits over [[ideological]] lifestyle issues, where fierce debates rage and choices are solicited (on abortion, on gay marriages, etc.), but where basic economic policy is presented as a rethinking depoliticized [[domain]] of expert [[authority]]. The proliferation of “overdemocracy” with its “excesses” of a “[[culture]] of complaint” is ultimately the front whose backside is the international rules silent, sturdy weaving of conduct. The outcome could mean less power for neutraleconomic, well-meaning human rights groups and more for big-stick-wielding statescorporatist [[logic]]. That would be a good thing.”

The obverse of the same tendency to counteract democratic “excesses” is the open dismissal of any international [[body]] that would effectively control the conduct of war—which might, after all, be necessary from time to time to enforce the economic agenda. Exemplary is Kenneth Anderson’s recent <i>New York [[Times]] Magazine</i> essay, “Who Owns the Rules of War?” whose subtitle makes the point unambiguously clear: “The war in Iraq demands a rethinking of the international rules of conduct. The outcome could mean less power for neutral, well-[[meaning]] [[human]] rights groups and more for big-stick-wielding states. That would be a [[good]] [[thing]].” The main complaint of this essay is that, “For the past 20 years, the center of gravity in establishing, [[interpreting ]] and shaping the law of war has gradually shifted away from the military establishments of leading states and toward more activist and publicly [[aggressive ]] NGOs.” This tendency is perceived as unbalanced, “unfair” toward the big military powers who intervene in other countries, and [[partial ]] toward the attacked countries—with the clear conclusion that the militaries on the “big-stick-wielding states” should themselves determine the standards by which their actions will be judged.

* [[How Much Democracy Is Too Much?]] ''[[In These Times]]''. May 19, 2003. <http://www.inthesetimes.com/site/main/article/73/>