Difference between revisions of "Identification"

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{{Top}}identify|identification{{Bottom}}
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=====Sigmund Freud=====
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=====Human Subject=====
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=====Subjectivity=====
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In [[Freud]]'s [[Works of Sigmund Freud|work]] the term "[[identification]]" denotes a process whereby one [[subject]] adopts as his own one or more attributes of another [[subject]].
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In his [[Works of Sigmund Freud|later work]], as [[Freud]] developed the idea that the [[ego]] and the [[superego]] are constructed on the basis of a series of [[identification]]s, the concept of [[identification]] eventually came to denote "the operation itself whereby the human subject is constituted."<ref>
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* [[Subject]]
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In Freud's wark the term 'identifica­an' denates a pracess whereby ane subject adapts as his awn ane ar mare attributes af an ather subject. In his later wark, as Freud develaped the idea that - Jhe ego. and the superego. are canstructed an the basis af a serie~ af identifica­tians, the cancept af identificatian eventually came to. denate 'the a\2erati0!l itself whereb he human subject is . uted' (Laplanche and Pantalis,
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_ 1"9 IS S a cancep a cen ra impartance in psychaanalytic
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theary. Hawever, it is also. a cancept which raises impartant thearetical prablems. One af the mast impartant af these problems, which Freud himself
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80
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IDENTIFICA nON
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struggled with, is the difficulty of establishing the precise relationship between , identification and object-love. I
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The concept of identification occupies an equally important position in ­Lacan's work. Lacan places a special emphasis on the role of the image, defining identification as 'the transformation that takes place in the subject ­when he assumes an image' (E, 2). To 'assume' an image is to recognise -
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oneself in the image, and to appropriate the image as oneself. - *'
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From early on in his work, Lacan distinguishes between imaginary identi: ication and symbolic identification.
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I. Ima mary identificatIOn IS the mechanism b which the ego is created in -
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the MIRROR STAGE; it belongs abso u e y to t e imagmary or er. en e_
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human infant sees its reflection in the mirror, it identifies with that image. The constitution of the ego by identification with something which is outside (and even against) the subject is what 'structures the subject as a rival with himself' (E, 22) and thus involves aggressivity and alienation. The mirror stage constitutes the 'primary identification', and gives birth to the IDEAL EGO.
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2. Symbolic identification is the identification with the father in the final stage of the OEDIPUS COMPLEX which gives rise to the formation of the EGO­IDEAL. It is by means of this secondary identification that the subject trans­cends the aggressivity inherent in primary identification (E, 23), and thus can be said to represent a certain 'libidinal normalisation' (E, 2). Although this identification is called 'symbolic', it is still a 'secondary identification' (E, 22) modelled on primary identification and thus, like all identification, partakes of the imaginary; it is only called 'symbolic' because it represents the completion of the subject's passage into the symbolic order.
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Lacan's ideas on the nature of symbolic identification undergo complex changes during the course of his work. In 1948 he sees it in terms of the 'introjection of the imago of the parent of the same sex' (E, 22), whereas by 1958 he has moved on to seeing it in terms of the identification with the real father in the third time of the Oedipus complex.
 +
In 1961, Lacan goes on to describe symbolic identification as an identifica­tion with the signifier. He finds support for this idea in the catalogue of three types of identification which Freud presents in chapter seven of Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (Freud, 1921c). In the first two types of identification (with a 'love object or with a rival), the subject may often express the identification purely and simply by developing a symptom iden­tical to the symptom suffered by the person with whom he identifies. In such cases, 'the identification is a partial and extremely limited one and only borrows a single trait [nur einen einzigen Zug] from the person who is its object' (Freud, 1921c: SE XVIII, 107). This 'single trait' (in French, trait unaire - which English translations of Lacan render variously as 'unbroken line', 'single-stroke' or 'unitary trait') is taken by Lacan to be a primordial symbolic term which is introjected to produce the ego-ideal. Though this trait may originate as a sign, it becomes a signifier when incorporated into a
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.. ,
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81
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IMAGINARY
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signifying system (S8, 413-14). In 1964, Lacan links the single trait to the first signifier (SI), and compares it to the notch that primitive man made on a stick to signify that he had killed one animal (SI1, 141, 256).
 +
Lacan is firmly opposed to those writers (e.g. Balint) who claim that identification with the analyst is the END OF ANALYSIS; on the contrary, Lacan insists not only that 'the crossing of the plane of identification is possible' (S 11, 273), but also that this is a necessary condition of true psychoanalysis. Thus the end of analysis is conceived of by Lacan as the destitution of the subject, a moment when the subject's identifications are placed under question in such a way that these identifications can no longer be maintained in the same way as before. However, while the end of analysis is precisely not a question of identification with the analyst, Lacan argues that it is possible to speak about identification at the end of analysis in a different sense: identifica­tion with the symptom (see SINTHOME).
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imaginary (imaginaire) Lacan's use of the term 'imaginary' as a substantive dates back to 1936 (Ec, 81). From the beginning, the term has connotations of illusion, fascination and seduction, and relates specifically to the DUAL RELATION between the EGO and the SPECULAR IMAGE. It is important to note, however, that while the imaginary always retains connotations of illusion and lure, it is not simply synonymous with 'the illusory' insofar as the latter term implies something unnecessary and inconsequential (Ec, 723). The imaginary is far from inconsequential; it has powerful effects in the real, and is not simply something that can be dispensed with or 'overcome'.
 +
From 1953 on, the imaginary becomes one of the three ORDERS which constitute the tripartite scheme at the centre of Lacanian thought, being opposed to the symbolic and the real. The basis of the imaginary order continues to be the formation of the ego in the MIRROR STAGE. Since the ego is formed by identifying with the counterpart or specular image, IDENTIFICATION is an important aspect of the imaginary order. The ego and the counterpart form the prototypical dual relationship, and are interchangeable. This relation­ship whereby the ego is constituted by identification with the little other means that the ego, and the imaginary order itself; are both sites of a radical ALIENATION; 'alienation is constitutive of the imaginary order' (S3, 146). The dual relationship between the ego and the counterpart is fundamentally narcissistic, and NARCISSISM is another characteristic of the imaginary order. Narcissism is always accompanied by a certain AGGRESSIVITY. The imaginary is the realm of image and imagination, deception and lure. The principal illusions of the imaginary are those of wholeness, synthesis, autonomy, duality and, above all, similarity. The imaginary is thus the order of surface appearances which are deceptive, observable phenomena which hide underlying structure; the affects are such phenomena.
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However, the opposition between the imaginary and the symbolic does not mean that the imaginary is lacking in structure. On the contrary, the imaginary
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.•. ,
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82
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== References ==
 
== References ==
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[[Category:Imaginary]]
 
[[Category:Imaginary]]
 
[[Category:Concepts]]
 
[[Category:Concepts]]
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[[Category:Terms]]
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[[Category:Terms]]</ref>

Revision as of 13:17, 28 August 2006

French: identification


Sigmund Freud
Human Subject
Subjectivity

In Freud's work the term "identification" denotes a process whereby one subject adopts as his own one or more attributes of another subject.

In his later work, as Freud developed the idea that the ego and the superego are constructed on the basis of a series of identifications, the concept of identification eventually came to denote "the operation itself whereby the human subject is constituted."[1]

  1. ↑ In Freud's wark the term 'identifica­an' denates a pracess whereby ane subject adapts as his awn ane ar mare attributes af an ather subject. In his later wark, as Freud develaped the idea that - Jhe ego. and the superego. are canstructed an the basis af a serie~ af identifica­tians, the cancept af identificatian eventually came to. denate 'the a\2erati0!l itself whereb he human subject is . uted' (Laplanche and Pantalis, _ 1"9 IS S a cancep a cen ra impartance in psychaanalytic theary. Hawever, it is also. a cancept which raises impartant thearetical prablems. One af the mast impartant af these problems, which Freud himself 80 IDENTIFICA nON struggled with, is the difficulty of establishing the precise relationship between , identification and object-love. I The concept of identification occupies an equally important position in ­Lacan's work. Lacan places a special emphasis on the role of the image, defining identification as 'the transformation that takes place in the subject ­when he assumes an image' (E, 2). To 'assume' an image is to recognise - oneself in the image, and to appropriate the image as oneself. - *' From early on in his work, Lacan distinguishes between imaginary identi: ication and symbolic identification. I. Ima mary identificatIOn IS the mechanism b which the ego is created in - the MIRROR STAGE; it belongs abso u e y to t e imagmary or er. en e_ human infant sees its reflection in the mirror, it identifies with that image. The constitution of the ego by identification with something which is outside (and even against) the subject is what 'structures the subject as a rival with himself' (E, 22) and thus involves aggressivity and alienation. The mirror stage constitutes the 'primary identification', and gives birth to the IDEAL EGO. 2. Symbolic identification is the identification with the father in the final stage of the OEDIPUS COMPLEX which gives rise to the formation of the EGO­IDEAL. It is by means of this secondary identification that the subject trans­cends the aggressivity inherent in primary identification (E, 23), and thus can be said to represent a certain 'libidinal normalisation' (E, 2). Although this identification is called 'symbolic', it is still a 'secondary identification' (E, 22) modelled on primary identification and thus, like all identification, partakes of the imaginary; it is only called 'symbolic' because it represents the completion of the subject's passage into the symbolic order. Lacan's ideas on the nature of symbolic identification undergo complex changes during the course of his work. In 1948 he sees it in terms of the 'introjection of the imago of the parent of the same sex' (E, 22), whereas by 1958 he has moved on to seeing it in terms of the identification with the real father in the third time of the Oedipus complex. In 1961, Lacan goes on to describe symbolic identification as an identifica­tion with the signifier. He finds support for this idea in the catalogue of three types of identification which Freud presents in chapter seven of Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (Freud, 1921c). In the first two types of identification (with a 'love object or with a rival), the subject may often express the identification purely and simply by developing a symptom iden­tical to the symptom suffered by the person with whom he identifies. In such cases, 'the identification is a partial and extremely limited one and only borrows a single trait [nur einen einzigen Zug] from the person who is its object' (Freud, 1921c: SE XVIII, 107). This 'single trait' (in French, trait unaire - which English translations of Lacan render variously as 'unbroken line', 'single-stroke' or 'unitary trait') is taken by Lacan to be a primordial symbolic term which is introjected to produce the ego-ideal. Though this trait may originate as a sign, it becomes a signifier when incorporated into a .. , 81 IMAGINARY signifying system (S8, 413-14). In 1964, Lacan links the single trait to the first signifier (SI), and compares it to the notch that primitive man made on a stick to signify that he had killed one animal (SI1, 141, 256). Lacan is firmly opposed to those writers (e.g. Balint) who claim that identification with the analyst is the END OF ANALYSIS; on the contrary, Lacan insists not only that 'the crossing of the plane of identification is possible' (S 11, 273), but also that this is a necessary condition of true psychoanalysis. Thus the end of analysis is conceived of by Lacan as the destitution of the subject, a moment when the subject's identifications are placed under question in such a way that these identifications can no longer be maintained in the same way as before. However, while the end of analysis is precisely not a question of identification with the analyst, Lacan argues that it is possible to speak about identification at the end of analysis in a different sense: identifica­tion with the symptom (see SINTHOME). imaginary (imaginaire) Lacan's use of the term 'imaginary' as a substantive dates back to 1936 (Ec, 81). From the beginning, the term has connotations of illusion, fascination and seduction, and relates specifically to the DUAL RELATION between the EGO and the SPECULAR IMAGE. It is important to note, however, that while the imaginary always retains connotations of illusion and lure, it is not simply synonymous with 'the illusory' insofar as the latter term implies something unnecessary and inconsequential (Ec, 723). The imaginary is far from inconsequential; it has powerful effects in the real, and is not simply something that can be dispensed with or 'overcome'. From 1953 on, the imaginary becomes one of the three ORDERS which constitute the tripartite scheme at the centre of Lacanian thought, being opposed to the symbolic and the real. The basis of the imaginary order continues to be the formation of the ego in the MIRROR STAGE. Since the ego is formed by identifying with the counterpart or specular image, IDENTIFICATION is an important aspect of the imaginary order. The ego and the counterpart form the prototypical dual relationship, and are interchangeable. This relation­ship whereby the ego is constituted by identification with the little other means that the ego, and the imaginary order itself; are both sites of a radical ALIENATION; 'alienation is constitutive of the imaginary order' (S3, 146). The dual relationship between the ego and the counterpart is fundamentally narcissistic, and NARCISSISM is another characteristic of the imaginary order. Narcissism is always accompanied by a certain AGGRESSIVITY. The imaginary is the realm of image and imagination, deception and lure. The principal illusions of the imaginary are those of wholeness, synthesis, autonomy, duality and, above all, similarity. The imaginary is thus the order of surface appearances which are deceptive, observable phenomena which hide underlying structure; the affects are such phenomena. However, the opposition between the imaginary and the symbolic does not mean that the imaginary is lacking in structure. On the contrary, the imaginary .•. , 82

    References

    1. ↑ In Freud's wark the term 'identifica­an' denates a pracess whereby ane subject adapts as his awn ane ar mare attributes af an ather subject. In his later wark, as Freud develaped the idea that - Jhe ego. and the superego. are canstructed an the basis af a serie~ af identifica­tians, the cancept af identificatian eventually came to. denate 'the a\2erati0!l itself whereb he human subject is . uted' (Laplanche and Pantalis, _ 1"9 IS S a cancep a cen ra impartance in psychaanalytic theary. Hawever, it is also. a cancept which raises impartant thearetical prablems. One af the mast impartant af these problems, which Freud himself 80 IDENTIFICA nON struggled with, is the difficulty of establishing the precise relationship between , identification and object-love. I The concept of identification occupies an equally important position in ­Lacan's work. Lacan places a special emphasis on the role of the image, defining identification as 'the transformation that takes place in the subject ­when he assumes an image' (E, 2). To 'assume' an image is to recognise - oneself in the image, and to appropriate the image as oneself. - *' From early on in his work, Lacan distinguishes between imaginary identi: ication and symbolic identification. I. Ima mary identificatIOn IS the mechanism b which the ego is created in - the MIRROR STAGE; it belongs abso u e y to t e imagmary or er. en e_ human infant sees its reflection in the mirror, it identifies with that image. The constitution of the ego by identification with something which is outside (and even against) the subject is what 'structures the subject as a rival with himself' (E, 22) and thus involves aggressivity and alienation. The mirror stage constitutes the 'primary identification', and gives birth to the IDEAL EGO. 2. Symbolic identification is the identification with the father in the final stage of the OEDIPUS COMPLEX which gives rise to the formation of the EGO­IDEAL. It is by means of this secondary identification that the subject trans­cends the aggressivity inherent in primary identification (E, 23), and thus can be said to represent a certain 'libidinal normalisation' (E, 2). Although this identification is called 'symbolic', it is still a 'secondary identification' (E, 22) modelled on primary identification and thus, like all identification, partakes of the imaginary; it is only called 'symbolic' because it represents the completion of the subject's passage into the symbolic order. Lacan's ideas on the nature of symbolic identification undergo complex changes during the course of his work. In 1948 he sees it in terms of the 'introjection of the imago of the parent of the same sex' (E, 22), whereas by 1958 he has moved on to seeing it in terms of the identification with the real father in the third time of the Oedipus complex. In 1961, Lacan goes on to describe symbolic identification as an identifica­tion with the signifier. He finds support for this idea in the catalogue of three types of identification which Freud presents in chapter seven of Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (Freud, 1921c). In the first two types of identification (with a 'love object or with a rival), the subject may often express the identification purely and simply by developing a symptom iden­tical to the symptom suffered by the person with whom he identifies. In such cases, 'the identification is a partial and extremely limited one and only borrows a single trait [nur einen einzigen Zug] from the person who is its object' (Freud, 1921c: SE XVIII, 107). This 'single trait' (in French, trait unaire - which English translations of Lacan render variously as 'unbroken line', 'single-stroke' or 'unitary trait') is taken by Lacan to be a primordial symbolic term which is introjected to produce the ego-ideal. Though this trait may originate as a sign, it becomes a signifier when incorporated into a .. , 81 IMAGINARY signifying system (S8, 413-14). In 1964, Lacan links the single trait to the first signifier (SI), and compares it to the notch that primitive man made on a stick to signify that he had killed one animal (SI1, 141, 256). Lacan is firmly opposed to those writers (e.g. Balint) who claim that identification with the analyst is the END OF ANALYSIS; on the contrary, Lacan insists not only that 'the crossing of the plane of identification is possible' (S 11, 273), but also that this is a necessary condition of true psychoanalysis. Thus the end of analysis is conceived of by Lacan as the destitution of the subject, a moment when the subject's identifications are placed under question in such a way that these identifications can no longer be maintained in the same way as before. However, while the end of analysis is precisely not a question of identification with the analyst, Lacan argues that it is possible to speak about identification at the end of analysis in a different sense: identifica­tion with the symptom (see SINTHOME). imaginary (imaginaire) Lacan's use of the term 'imaginary' as a substantive dates back to 1936 (Ec, 81). From the beginning, the term has connotations of illusion, fascination and seduction, and relates specifically to the DUAL RELATION between the EGO and the SPECULAR IMAGE. It is important to note, however, that while the imaginary always retains connotations of illusion and lure, it is not simply synonymous with 'the illusory' insofar as the latter term implies something unnecessary and inconsequential (Ec, 723). The imaginary is far from inconsequential; it has powerful effects in the real, and is not simply something that can be dispensed with or 'overcome'. From 1953 on, the imaginary becomes one of the three ORDERS which constitute the tripartite scheme at the centre of Lacanian thought, being opposed to the symbolic and the real. The basis of the imaginary order continues to be the formation of the ego in the MIRROR STAGE. Since the ego is formed by identifying with the counterpart or specular image, IDENTIFICATION is an important aspect of the imaginary order. The ego and the counterpart form the prototypical dual relationship, and are interchangeable. This relation­ship whereby the ego is constituted by identification with the little other means that the ego, and the imaginary order itself; are both sites of a radical ALIENATION; 'alienation is constitutive of the imaginary order' (S3, 146). The dual relationship between the ego and the counterpart is fundamentally narcissistic, and NARCISSISM is another characteristic of the imaginary order. Narcissism is always accompanied by a certain AGGRESSIVITY. The imaginary is the realm of image and imagination, deception and lure. The principal illusions of the imaginary are those of wholeness, synthesis, autonomy, duality and, above all, similarity. The imaginary is thus the order of surface appearances which are deceptive, observable phenomena which hide underlying structure; the affects are such phenomena. However, the opposition between the imaginary and the symbolic does not mean that the imaginary is lacking in structure. On the contrary, the imaginary .•. , 82

      References

      <references/>

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