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In [[Freud]]'s [[Works of Sigmund Freud|work]] the term "[[identification]]" denotes a [[process ]] whereby one [[subject]] adopts as his own one or more attributes of [[another ]] [[subject]].

In his [[Works of Sigmund Freud|later work]], as [[Freud]] developed the [[idea ]] that the [[ego]] and the [[superego]] are constructed on the basis of a series of [[identification]]s, the [[concept ]] of [[identification]] eventually came to denote "the operation itself whereby the human subject is constituted."<ref>Laplanche, Jean and Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand. ''The [[Language ]] of [[Psycho]]-[[Analysis]]'', trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith, [[London]]: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1973 [1967]. p. 206</ref>

However, it is also a concept which raises important [[theoretical ]] problems.

One of the most important of these problems, which [[Freud]] himself struggled with, is the difficulty of establishing the precise [[relationship ]] between [[identification]] and [[object]]-[[love]].

The concept of [[identification]] occupies an equally important [[position ]] in ­[[Lacan]]'s [[Works of Jacques Lacan|work]].

[[Lacan]] places a special emphasis on the [[role ]] of the [[image]], defining [[identification]] as "the transformation that takes [[place ]] in the subject ­when he assumes an image."<ref>{{E}} p. 2</ref>

=====[[Imaginary Identification]]===== [[Identification|Imaginary identification]] is the [[mechanism ]] by which the [[ego]] is created in the [[mirror stage]]; it belongs absolutely to the [[imaginary order]].

When the [[human]] [[infant]] sees its [[reflection ]] in the [[mirror]], it [[identification|identifies]] with that [[image]].

The [[constitution ]] of the [[ego]] by [[identification]] with something which is [[outside ]] (and even against) the [[subject]] is what "[[structures ]] the subject as a rival with himself"<ref>{{E}} p. 22</ref> and thus involves [[aggressivity]] and [[alienation]].

The [[mirror stage]] constitutes the "[[identification|primary identification]]", and gives [[birth ]] to the [[ideal ego]].

It is by means of this [[identification|secondary identification]] that the [[subject]] trans­cends the [[aggressivity]] inherent in [[identification|primary identification]],<ref>{{E}} p. 23</ref> and thus can be said to [[represent ]] a certain "[[libido|libidinal normalisation]]."<ref>{{E}} p. 2</ref>

[[Lacan]]'s [[ideas ]] on the [[nature ]] of [[identification|symbolic identification]] undergo [[complex ]] changes during the course of his [[work]].

In [[1948 ]] he sees it in [[terms ]] of the "[[introjection ]] of the [[imago ]] of the parent of the same sex,"<ref>{{E}} p. 22</ref> whereas by 1958 he has moved on to [[seeing ]] it in terms of the [[identification]] with the [[real]] [[father]] in the [[third ]] [[time ]] of the [[Oedipus complex]].

He finds support for this idea in the catalogue of [[three ]] types of [[identification]] which [[Freud]] presents in chapter seven of "[[Works of Sigmund Freud|Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego]]."<ref>{{F}} ''[[Works of Sigmund Freud|Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego]]'', 1921c: SE XVIII, 107</ref>

In such cases, "the identification is a [[partial ]] and extremely limited one and only borrows a single [[trait ]] [nur einen einzigen Zug] from the person who is its object."<ref>{{F}} ''[[Works of Sigmund Freud|Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego]]'', 1921c: SE XVIII, 107</ref>

This "[[identification|single trait" (in [[French]], ''[[identification|trait unaire]]'' -- which [[English ]] translations of [[Lacan]] render variously as "[[identification|unbroken line]]", "[[identification|single-stroke]]" or "[[identification|unitary trait]]") is taken by [[Lacan]] to be a primordial [[symbolic]] term which is [[introjection|introjected]] to produce the [[ego-ideal]].

In 1964, [[Lacan]] [[links ]] the [[identification|single trait]] to the first [[signifier]] (S1), and compares it to the notch that [[primitive ]] man made on a stick to [[signify ]] that he had killed one [[animal]].<ref>{{S11}} p. 141, 256</ref>

[[Lacan]] is firmly opposed to those writers who [[claim ]] that [[identification]] with the [[analyst]] is the [[end of analysis]]; on the contrary, [[Lacan]] insists not only that "the crossing of the plane of identification is possible,"<ref>{{S11}} p. 273</ref> but also that this is a necessary condition of [[true ]] [[psychoanalysis]].

Thus the [[end of analysis]] is conceived of by [[Lacan]] as the destitution of the [[subject]], a [[moment ]] when the [[subject]]'s [[identification]]s are placed under question in such a way that these [[identification]]s can no longer be maintained in the same way as before.

However, while the [[end of analysis]] is precisely not a question of [[identification]] with the [[analyst]], [[Lacan]] argues that it is possible to [[speak ]] [[about ]] [[identification]] at the [[end of analysis]] in a different [[sense]]: [[identifica­tion]] with the [[symptom]].