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[[Imaginary]][[The imaginary ]] in [[Lacan]]'s [[theory ]] immediately invokes a set of characteristic[[terms]], most of which are already [[present ]] in his article onthe [[mirror ]] [[stage ]] (1949).This set comprises the notions of [[Gestalt ]] ([[ideal]]), ego and [[identification]],[[lure ]] and méconnaissancemé[[connaissance]], reciprocity, [[counterpart]], [[object]],([[paranoiac]]) [[knowledge ]] and [[aggressivity]]. Of the [[three ]] [[registers ]] (or[[orders]]) of the [[subject]], the imaginary is the first to enter on stageboth in Lacan's writings and [[teachings]]. It dominates his [[thinking]]
until the mid-1950s.
The imaginary as such is not a [[Freudian ]] [[concept]], although Lacancautions us not to [[think ]] that the function of the imaginary is[[absent ]] in [[Freud]]'s [[texts]]. In his elaboration of the imaginary, Lacanmakes use of at least three major references, namely the [[notion ]] ofGestalt, [[animal ]] [[ethology ]] and Freud's early theory on [[narcissism]].For Lacan, the function of the Gestalt in animal [[behaviour]],
which presents itself par excellence in the behaviour of the animal
couple, allows a much clearer [[structuring ]] of the function of the
imaginary in man than was possible for Freud. To illustrate this
function of the imaginary in animal behaviour, Lacan takes the
example of the stickleback ([[Seminar ]] I, 1953-54, p. 137). Gestaltencome into play in releasing the complementary [[sexual ]] behaviour ofthe [[male ]] and the [[female ]] stickleback; the male or the female is captivated by a Gestalt. Typical for animal behaviour is that the animal subject is completely identical to the [[image ]] governing the release of a specific motor behaviour. Man's relation to the unitary image (Gestalt) is fundamentally different. This is linked to the fact that man comes into the [[world ]] in a structurally premature [[state]], whichis mastered at an early stage — the [[mirror stage ]] — by means of theidentification with the unitary image of the [[body]].
[[The mirror stage ]] constitutes a first structuring [[moment ]] for the[[human ]] subject. It also functions as the prime reference in distinguishing between the imaginary relation in animal and in man. 'Inman, the imaginary is reduced, specialized, centred on the [[specular]]image' ([[Seminar I]], 1953-54, p. 282).
The assumption of the unitary image of the body, [[meaning ]] thatthe human subject recognizes the [[specular image ]] as [[being ]] its own,presents the [[anticipation ]] of [[real ]] [[mastery]]. Both anticipation and[[recognition ]] are crucial in man's relation to the specular image.Combined, they typify the imaginary as [[illusory ]] and [[alienating ]] -one recognizes and assumes an attainable [[totality]]. It is important to
add that this recognition of the specular image is a function of
something [[outside ]] the imaginary relation, namely the [[symbolic]].Lacan accentuates the [[difference ]] between animal and man instill [[another ]] way:For the animal there is a limited [[number ]] of pre-established correspondencesbetween its imaginary [[structure ]] and whateverinterests it in its [[Umwelt ]] ... In man, by contrast, the [[reflection ]] in
the mirror indicates an original noetic possibility, and introduces
a second narcissism. Its fundamental pattern is immediately the
relation to the [[other]]. (Seminar I, 1953-54, p. 125)
This takes us back to the Freudian reference of narcissism, including
both the [[formation ]] of the ego and the object. In Lacan's view, thespecular image as a [[total ]] [[unity ]] functions as a primordial [[form ]] of theego, which 'simply because it is an image ... is [[ideal ego]]' (Seminar
I, 1953-54, p. 282).
At this point, Lacan also refers to the notion of specular Urbild.
Conceived as such, the ego is constituted by an alienating identification
with a Gestalt - of the body or the other - functioning as an
[[ideal image]]. The ego is an imaginary function serving (imaginary)mastery. In linking the [[constitution ]] of the ego to the relation to the[[other, the ]] ego is defined as the identification with the other. This
has a certain implication for the relation to the object:
... [man] only perceives the unity of this specific image [of the
body] from the outside, and in an anticipated manner. Because
of this [[double ]] relation which he has with himself, all the [[objects]]of his world are always [[structured ]] around the wandering shadowof his own ego. ([[Seminar II]], 1954-55, p. 166)
Hence, the specular image (of the other) is both the framework of
the ego and the object.
Imaginary 89
Lacan's further [[development ]] of the dialectics between ego, otherand object as being a function of [[rivalry ]] and competition is clearlyinfluenced by [[Hegel]]. Here the ([[Hegelian]]) notion of [[desire ]] comes
into play. Since the ego is constituted in reference to the other,
whatever the ego is oriented towards will depend on what this
1954-55, p. 51). All this implies that the object of man's desire is
essentially an object desired by someone else.
Thus far, it has become [[apparent ]] that the imaginary relation isalways a (specular) relation between similar or equal [[others]]. Thismeans that in a certain [[sense ]] the notion of 'sameness' is central.
This is also invoked in the characterization of the imaginary in
terms of reciprocity, and symmetrical and interchangeable positions.
Lacan illustrates this by means of what he calls the
phenomenon of [[transitivism]], in which the [[infant ]] takes as equivalenthis own [[action ]] and that of the other. For [[instance]], an infantsaying '[[Paul ]] hit me', whereas it was he who hit Paul. In discussing
transitivism, Lacan refers to the well-known 1927 study by
Charlotte Bühler.
With all this, the coordinates of the relation between the imaginary
and aggressivity are given. Aggressivity always refers to the
imaginary [[register]]. In his [[1948 ]] article on aggressivity, Lacan posits
that aggressivity is the 'correlative tendency of a mode of identification
that we call [[narcissistic]]' ([[Écrits]], 1977, p. 16), thus linkingaggressivity to the imaginary relation. This link can be [[interpreted]]
in two ways.
First, the constitution of the ego implies a certain [[satisfaction ]] as[[compensation ]] for the original [[organic ]] disarray of the human
subject. However, the tension implied in the relation between the
initial [[fragmentation ]] (original disarray) and the [[unifying ]] image also
becomes a source of aggressivity in the sense that the image that
shapes the subject also [[structures ]] the subject as rival for himself.
Furthermore, since the narcissistic identification mediates the imaginary
relation, rivalry is at the core of the imaginary relation to the
the similar other, which is perceived as ideal. The other is always one
step ahead of the subject, and is thus seen as a rival. At this point we
90 A [[Compendium ]] of [[Lacanian ]] Terms
can more clearly refer to animal ethology to render the functioning
of aggressivity, as essentially different from [[aggression]]. The functionof the imaginary in animals makes it possible that a [[struggle]]
between two males, that is, between two rivals, is not turned into a
real struggle which would lead to the [[destruction ]] of one of theanimals. By transposing the [[conflict ]] on to the imaginary plane, real
destruction is prevented. Here it becomes clear that aggressivity has
[[nothing ]] to do with aggression. 'At the [[limit]], virtually, aggressivity
turns into aggression ... aggression is an existential act linked to an
imaginary relation' (Seminar I, 1953-54, p. 177).
Second, aggressivity emerges in the [[situation ]] of the ego encountering
another subject like itself, giving rise to a desire for the object
of this other's desire. Here also, the potential struggle is a function
of something the other has, namely the object of his desire. Thus,
aggressivity is linked to the object which is always the object of a
counterpart, and therefore in the [[logic ]] of the imaginary, an object
that belongs to the ego. According to Lacan, the human object
differs fundamentally from the object of the animal in that it is
the relation to the rival ... man's desire is the desire of the other'
(Seminar I, 1953-54, pp. 176-7). Hence, aggressivity, rivalry and
desire are closely linked within the [[frame ]] of the imaginary relation.
The imaginary is also linked by Lacan to knowledge (connaissance).
This link, which is a function of Lacan's critique of the
[[Cartesian ]] [[cogito]], is centred on the ego's relation to [[reality ]] and istypified by Lacan as miscognition ([[méconnaissance]]) and as beingparanoiac in [[nature]].
Although based on the recognition of the specular image, the
ego can be conceived as 'a capacity to fail to recognize (méconnaissance)'
(Seminar I, 1953-54, p. 153). Indeed, one of the
fundamental characteristics of the specular image is that the reflection
in the mirror is an [[inversion ]] of what stands before the mirror.This implies that there is a [[primitive ]] [[distortion ]] and thus miscognitionin the ego's [[experience ]] of reality. Another way to [[understand]]
this miscognition, is to link it to the alienating nature of the ego.
In [[identifying ]] with the image of the other, the subject inevitablyfails to recognize many things [[about ]] itself. In the same sense, all
knowledge deriving from the imaginary relation — the ego's relation
to the world of objects and similar others — is a function of miscog-
In his article on the mirror stage, Lacan speaks of human knowledge
as paranoiac in nature. The term 'paranoiac knowledge' refers
to what is found in [[paranoia ]] (e.g., in the [[external ]] [[persecution ]] and
observation) and which is also detectable in the imaginary relation,
especially in the phenomenon of transitivism. It concerns the
[[captivation ]] by the image of the other — one recognizes the image of
the other as one's own — and thus again reinforces the imaginary
[[alienation ]] of the ego.
During the period 1953 to 1974, the imaginary maintained
importance, especially in relation to the [[signified ]] and its effect; seefor example, 'The function and field of [[speech ]] and [[language ]] in[[psychoanalysis]]' (1953); 'On a question preliminary to any possible[[treatment ]] of [[psychosis]]' (1955-56); 'The [[agency ]] of the [[letter ]] in the[[unconscious ]] or [[reason ]] since Freud' (1957); 'The direction of thetreatment and the principles of its [[power]]' (1958). All are publishedin the [[English ]] [[translation ]] of Écrits (1977) and The Four Fundamental[[Concepts ]] of [[Psycho]]-[[Analysis ]] (1978).However, from the late 1950s onwards the [[ideas ]] of [[the symbolic]]relation or the radical Other and the subject as subject of the [[signifier]]occupy a more central [[position]]. This does not mean that Lacan
suddenly ceases to acknowledge the importance of the imaginary,
or that the imaginary is depreciated or pushed aside. This should be
stressed, since the imaginary is often regarded in a pejorative way
for being pure '[[illusion]]'. Although the imaginary is indeed essentiallylinked to miscognition, to mirage and thus also to '[[false]]
reality', it is nonetheless a 'verified reality' (Seminar II, 1954-55, p.
244), mediating man's relation to similar others and to the objects
of his desire.
One [[thing ]] is certain: without the imaginary there can be no
human reality as such. Moreover, the imaginary is the only 'consistency'
man has. This is developed by Lacan in one of his later
[[seminars]], on R.S.I. (1974-75). As far as the imaginary is concerned,
Lacan here refers to his earliest formulations on the subject, by
defining it as essentially departing from the body as a reflection of
of the imaginary does not fundamentally alter over the years. In
this sense, it indeed functions as a consistency.
92 [[A Compendium of Lacanian Terms]]
The function of the imaginary is always related to the other two
registers used by Lacan, namely, the symbolic and the real.
See also: aggressivity, [[desire, ]] ideal ego, mirror stage, real, symbolic
Other terms: ego, identification
References
Lacan, J. (1975-76) [1974-75] `Le Séminaire de [[Jacques Lacan]], BookXXII: [[Réel]], [[symbolique]], [[imaginaire ]] (Real, symbolic, imaginary)'.In [[Ornicar]]? (2, 3, 4) 1975, (5) 1975-76.Lacan, J. (1977) [1948] '[[Aggressivity in psychoanalysis]]'. In Écrits: ASelection (trans. A. [[Sheridan]]). [[London]]: Tavistock.
Lacan, J. (1977) [1949] `The mirror stage as formative of the
function of the I as revealed in [[psychoanalytic ]] experience' in[[Écrits: A Selection ]] (trans. A. Sheridan). London: Tavistock.
Lacan, J. (1977) [1953] `The function and field of speech and
language in psychoanalyis'. In Écrits: A Selection (trans. A.
treatment of psychosis'. In Écrits: A Selection (trans. A. Sheridan).
London: Tavistock.
Lacan, J. (1977) [1957] `[[The agency of the letter ]] in the unconscious
or reason since Freud'. In Écrits: A Selection (trans. A. Sheridan).
London: Tavistock.
principles of its power'. In Écrits: A Selection (trans. A. Sheridan).
London: Tavistock.
Lacan, J. (1978) The [[Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis]](trans. [[Alan Sheridan]]). New York: W.W. Norton.Lacan, J. (1988) [1975] [[The Seminar ]] of Jacques Lacan, Book I. Freud'sPapers on [[Technique ]] I953-I954. (ed. J. A. [[Miller]]; trans. J.Forrester). Cambridge: Cambridge [[University ]] Press.
Lacan, J. (1988) [1978] The Seminar o fJacques Lacan. Book II. The Ego
in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis.
