Changes

Lurking behind the reproach Although [[Lacan]]'s [[notion]] of belonging to "[[university ]] [[discourse ]]" circulates widely today, it isseldom used in its precise [[meaning]] (designating a specific "discourse, " [[social]] link). As a rule, it functions as a vague notion of course, the question some [[speech]] [[being]] part of the relationship between psychoanalysis and cultural studiesacademic interpretive machinery. The first fact In contrast to note here is this use, one should always bear in [[mind]] that what , for Lacan, [[university discourse]] is missing in cultural studies is precisely psychoanalysis not directly linked to the university as a social linkinstitution-for example, structured around he states that the [[Soviet Union]] was the desire pure reign of the analystuniversity discourse. TodayConsequently, one often mentions how not only does the reference to psychoanalysis in cultural studies and the psychoanalytic clinic supplement each other: cultural studies lack the real fact of being turned into an [[object]] of clinical experience, while the clinic lacks the broader criticouniversity interpretive machinery prove [[nothing]] [[about]] one's discursive status-historical perspective (saynames like [[Kierkegaard]], of the historic specificity of the categories of psychoanalysis[[Nietzsche]], Oedipal complexor [[Benjamin]], castration, or paternal authority). The answer to this should be all [[three]] great antiuniversitarians whose [[presence]] in the academy is today all-pervasive-demonstrate that each of the approaches should work on its limitation from within its horizon-not by relying on "excluded" or "damned" authors are the other to fill up its lack. If cultural studies cannot account [[Ideal|IDEAL]] feeding stuff for the real of the clinical experience, this signals academic [[machine]]. Can the insufficiency upper level of its theoretical framework itself; if the clinic cannot reflect its historical presuppositions, it is a bad clinic. One should add to this standard Hegelian dialectical paradox (in fighting the foreign or external opposite, one fights one's own essence) its inherent supplement: in impeding oneself, one truly impedes oneLacan's external opposite. When cultural studies ignore the real [[formula]] of clinical experience, the ultimate victim is university discourse - S2 directed toward a - not cultural studies itself but also be read as standing for the clinic, which remains caught in pretheoretical empiricism. And, vice versa, when the clinic fails (university [[knowledge]] endeavoring to take into account its historical presuppositions)integrate, the ultimate victim is theory itselfdomesticate, which, cut off from clinical experience, remains an empty ideological exercise. The ultimate horizon is here not the reconciliation of theory and clinic: their very gap is appropriate the positive condition of psychoanalysis. Freud already wrote [[excess]] that, in the conditions in which resists and rejects it would finally be possible, psychoanalysis would no longer be needed. Psychoanalytic theory is ultimately the theory of why its clinical practice is doomed to fail.?

One of Lurking behind the telltale signs reproach of belonging to university discourse is, of course, the question of the [[relationship]] between [[psychoanalysis]] and [[cultural]] studies. The first fact to note here is that what is [[missing]] in cultural studies is precisely psychoanalysis as a social link, [[structured]] around the opponent is accused [[desire]] of being "dogmatic" the [[analyst]]. Today, one often mentions how the reference to psychoanalysis in cultural studies and "sectarianthe [[psychoanalytic]] [[clinic]] [[supplement]] each [[other]]: cultural studies [[lack]] the [[real]] of [[clinical]] [[experience]], while the clinic [[lacks]] the broader critico-historical perspective (say, of the historic specificity of the [[categories]] of psychoanalysis, [[Oedipal]] [[complex]], [[castration]], or paternal [[authority]]). The answer to this should be that each of the approaches should [[work]] on its limitation from within its horizon-not by relying on the other to fill up its lack." University discourse If cultural studies cannot account for the real of the clinical experience, this signals the insufficiency of its [[theoretical]] framework itself; if the clinic cannot tolerate an engaged subjective stancereflect its historical presuppositions, it is a bad clinic. One should add to this standard [[Hegelian]] [[dialectical]] [[paradox]] (in fighting the foreign or [[external]] opposite, one fights one's own [[essence]]) its inherent supplement: in impeding oneself, one truly impedes one's external opposite. Should When cultural studies ignore the real of clinical experience, the ultimate [[victim]] is not our first gesture becultural studies itself but the clinic, which remains caught in pretheoretical [[empiricism]]. And, as Lacaniansvice versa, when the clinic fails (to heroically assume this designation take into account its historical presuppositions), the ultimate victim is [[theory]] itself, which, cut off from clinical experience, remains an empty [[ideological]] exercise. The ultimate horizon is here not the reconciliation of being "sectarian" theory and engage clinic: their very gap is the positive condition of psychoanalysis. [[Freud]] already wrote that, in the [[conditions]] in a "sectarian" polemic?which it would finally be possible, psychoanalysis would no longer be needed. [[Psychoanalytic theory]] is ultimately the theory of why its clinical [[practice]] is doomed to fail.

University discourse as One of the hegemonic telltale [[signs]] of university discourse of modernity has two forms of existence in which its inner tension ("contradiction") is externalized: capitalism, its logic of that the integrated excess, opponent is accused of the system reproducing itself through constant self-revolutionizing, and the bureaucratic being "totalitarianismdogmatic" conceptualized in different guises as the rule of technology, of instrumental reason, of biopolitics, as the and "administered worldsectarian." HowUniversity discourse cannot tolerate an engaged [[subjective]] stance. Should not our first gesture be, preciselyas Lacanians, do these two aspects relate to each other? We should not succumb to the temptation of reducing capitalism to a mere form of appearance of the more fundamental ontological attitude of technological domination; we should rather insist, in the Marxian mode, that the capitalist logic of integrating the surplus into the functioning heroically assume this designation of the system is the fundamental fact. Stalinist being "totalitarianismsectarian" was the capitalist logic of self-propelling productivity liberated from its capitalist form, which is why it failed: Stalinism was the symptom of capitalism. Stalinism involved the matrix of general intellect, of the planned transparency of social life, of total productive mobilization- and its violent purges and paranoia were a kind of engage in a "return of the repressed,sectarian" the "irrationality" inherent to the project of a totally organized "administered society." This means the two levels, precisely insofar as they are two sides of the same coin, are ultimately incompatible: there is no metalanguage enabling us to translate the logic of domination back into the capitalist reproduction-through-excess, or vice versa.polemic?

The key question here concerns the relationship between University discourse as the hegemonic discourse of [[modernity]] has two excessesforms of [[existence]] in which its inner tension ("[[contradiction]]") is externalized: [[capitalism]], its [[logic]] of the economic integrated excess/surplus integrated into , of the capitalist machine as the force that drives it into permanent [[system]] reproducing itself through constant [[self]]-revolutionizing , and the political excess bureaucratic "[[totalitarianism]]" conceptualized in different guises as the rule of [[technology]], of instrumental [[reason]], of [[biopolitics]], as the "administered [[world]]." How, precisely, do these two aspects relate to each other? We should not succumb to the temptation of power-exercise inherent reducing capitalism to modern power (a mere [[form]] of [[appearance]] of the more fundamental [[ontological]] attitude of technological domination; we should rather insist, in the Marxian mode, that the [[capitalist]] logic of integrating the [[surplus]] into the constitutive excess functioning of representation over the represented: system is the fundamental fact. Stalinist "totalitarianism" was the legitimate state power responsible to capitalist logic of self-propelling productivity liberated from its subjects capitalist form, which is supplemented by why it failed: [[Stalinism]] was the [[symptom]] of capitalism. Stalinism involved the [[matrix]] of general intellect, of the obscene message planned [[transparency]] of unconditional exercise social [[life]], of Power[[total]] productive mobilization-laws do not really bind meand its violent purges and [[paranoia]] were a kind of a "[[return]] of the [[repressed]], I can do " the "[[irrationality]]" inherent to you whatever I wantthe [[project]] of a totally organized "administered [[society]]." This means the two levels, I can treat you precisely insofar as guilty if I decide they are two sides of the same coin, are ultimately incompatible: there is no [[metalanguage]] enabling us totranslate the logic of domination back into the capitalist reproduction-through-excess, I can destroy you if I say so)or vice versa.

Perhaps the The key to this problem is provided by question here concerns the historicity inscribed in Lacan's matrix of relationship between the four discourses, two excesses: the historicity of modern European development. The master's discourse stands not for [[economic]] excess/surplus integrated into the premodern master, but for capitalist machine as the absolute monarchy, this first figure of modernity force that effectively undermined the articulate network of feudal relations and interdependences, transforming fidelity to flattery: [[drives]] it is the "Suninto permanent self-King" Louis XIV with his L'état, c'est moi who is the master par excellence. Hysterical discourse revolutionizing and university discourse then deploy two outcomes of the vacillation [[political]] excess of [[power]]-exercise inherent to modern power (the direct reign [[constitutive excess]] of [[representation]] over the masterrepresented: the expert-rule of bureaucracy that culminates in legitimate [[state]] power [[responsible]] to its [[subjects]] is supplemented by the biopolitics [[obscene]] [[message]] of reducing the population to a collection unconditional exercise of homo sacer (what Heidegger called "enframingPower-laws do not really [[bind]] me," Adorno "the administered worldI can do to you whatever I [[want]]," Foucault the society of "discipline and punish"); the explosion of the hysterical capitalist subjectivity that reproduces itself through permanent self-revolutionizingI can treat you as [[guilty]] if I decide to, through the integration of the excess into the "normal" functioning of the social link (the true "permanent revolution" is already capitalism itselfI can destroy you if I say so).

Perhaps the key to this problem is provided by the [[historicity]] inscribed in Lacan's formula matrix of the four [[discourses thus enables us to deploy ]], the two faces historicity of modernity (total administration and capitalist-individualist dynamics) as two ways to undermine the modern European [[development]]. The [[master]]'s discourse: doubt about stands not for the efficiency of premodern master, but for the master-absolute monarchy, this first [[figure (what Eric Santner called the "crisis ]] of investiture") can be supplemented by modernity that effectively undermined the direct rule articulate network of feudal relations and interdependences, transforming fidelity to flattery: it is the experts legitimized by their knowledge"Sun-King" Louis XIV with his L'état, or c'est moi who is the excess of doubt, of permanent questioning, can be directly integrated into social reproductionmaster par excellence. Finally, the analyst's [[Hysterical]] discourse and university discourse stands for then deploy two outcomes of the emergence vacillation of revolution-ary-emancipatory subjectivity that resolves the split direct reign of university and hysteria. In it, the revolutionary agent master: the expert- a - addresses rule of [[bureaucracy]] that culminates in the subject from the position biopolitics of knowledge that occupies reducing the place population to a collection of truth [[homo sacer]] (i.e.what [[Heidegger]] called "enframing, which intervenes at " [[Adorno]] "the [[administered world]],"symptomal torsion[[Foucault]] the society of " [[discipline]] and punish"); the explosion of the subject's constellation)hysterical capitalist [[subjectivity]] that reproduces itself through permanent self-revolutionizing, and through the goal is to isolate, get rid integration of, the master signifier that structured excess into the "normal" functioning of the subject's social link (ideologico-politicalthe [[true]] "permanent [[revolution]]" is already capitalism itself) unconscious.

Or does it? JacquesLacan's formula of the [[four discourses]] thus enables us to deploy the two faces of modernity (total administration and capitalist-Alain Miller has recently proposed that today individualist dynamics) as two ways to undermine the master's discourse is no longer : [[doubt]] about the "obverse" efficiency of the analyst's discourse. master-figure (what [[1Eric Santner]] Today, on called the contrary, our "civilizationcrisis of investiture" itself-its hegemonic symbolic matrix) can be supplemented by the direct rule of the experts legitimized by their knowledge, as it were-fits or the formula excess of doubt, of permanent questioning, can be directly integrated into [[social reproduction]]. Finally, the [[analyst's discourse. The agent ]] stands for the emergence of the social link is today a, surplus enjoyment, the superego injunction to enjoy revolution-ary-emancipatory subjectivity that permeates our discourse; this injunction addresses $ (resolves the divided subject) who is put to work in order to live up to this injunction. The truth [[split]] of this social link is S2, scientific-expert knowledge in its different guises, university and the goal is to generate S1[[hysteria]]. In it, the selfrevolutionary [[agent]] - a -mastery of addresses the [[subject, ]] from the [[position]] of knowledge that is, to enable occupies the subject to cope with the stress [[place]] of the call to enjoyment [[truth]] (through self-help manuals, etci.)e. Provocative as this notion is, it raises a series which intervenes at the "symptomal torsion" of questions. If it is true, in what, then[[The Subject|the subject]]'s constellation), resides the difference between the discursive functioning of civilization as such and the psychoanalytic social link? Miller resorts here [[goal]] is to a suspicious solution: in our civilizationisolate, the four terms are kept apart, isolated; each operates on its ownget rid of, while only in psychoanalysis are they brought together into a coherent link: "in civilization, each of the four terms remains disjoined... it is only in psychoanalysis, in pure psychoanalysis, master [[signifier]] that these elements are arranged into a discoursestructured the subject's (ideologico-political) [[unconscious]]."

However, is Or does it not ? Jacques-[[Alain]] [[Miller]] has recently proposed that today the master's discourse is no longer the fundamental operation "obverse" of the psychoanalytic treatment is not synthesisanalyst's discourse. [1] Today, bringing elements into a linkon the contrary, butour "[[civilization]]" itself-its hegemonic [[symbolic]] matrix, preciselyas it were-fits the formula of the analyst's discourse. The agent of the social link is today a, analysissurplus [[enjoyment]], separating what the [[superego]] [[injunction]] to [[enjoy]] that permeates our discourse; this injunction addresses $ (the [[divided]] subject) who is put to work in a social link appears [[order]] to belong together? This path, opposed live up to that this injunction. The truth of Miller, this social link is indicated by Giorgio AgambenS2, who[[scientific]]-expert knowledge in its different guises, in and the last pages of The State of Exception, imagines two Utopian options of how goal is to break out of the vicious cycle of law and violencegenerate S1, of the rule of law sustained by violence. self-[[2mastery]] One is the Benjaminian vision of "pure" revolutionary violence with no relationship to the law. The other subject, that is , to enable the relationship subject to cope with the stress of the law without regard call to its enjoyment (violent) enforcementthrough self-[[help]] manuals, such as Jewish scholars do in their endless (reetc.)interpretation of the Law. Agamben starts from the right insight that the task today Provocative as this notion is not synthesis but separation, distinction: nor bringing law and violence together (so that right will have might and the exercise it raises a series of might will be fully legitimized)questions. If it is true, but thoroughly separating themin what, untying their knot. Although Agamben confers on this formulation an anti-Hegelian twistthen, a more proper reading resides the [[difference]] between the discursive functioning of Hegel makes it clear that civilization as such and the psychoanalytic social link? Miller resorts here to a gesture of separation is what the Hegelian "synthesis" is effectively about. In itsuspicious solution: in our civilization, the opposites four [[terms]] are nor reconciled kept apart, isolated; each operates on its own, while only in psychoanalysis are they brought together into a coherent link: "higher synthesis"; in civilization, each of the four terms remains disjoined... it is rather only in psychoanalysis, in pure psychoanalysis, that their difference is posited "as suchthese elements are arranged into a discourse."

The example However, is it not that the fundamental operation of Paul may help us to clarify this logic of Hegelian reconciliation: the radical gap that he posits between life and deathpsychoanalytic [[treatment]] is not [[synthesis]], bringing elements into a link, but, precisely, between life in Christ and life in sin[[analysis]], is separating what in no need of a further synthesis; it is itself the resolution of the "absolute contradiction" of Law and sinsocial link appears to belong together? This path, opposed to that of the vicious cycle of their murual imphcarion. In other wordsMiller, once the distinction is drawnindicated by Giorgio [[Agamben]], once who, in the subject becomes aware last pages of the very existence The State of Exception, imagines two [[Utopian]] options of how to break out of this other dimension beyond the [[vicious cycle ]] of law and its transgression[[violence]], of the battle rule of law sustained by violence. [2] One is formally already won. So, the Benjaminian [[vision]] of "pure" revolutionary violence with regard no relationship to the old question of law. The other is the passage from Kant to Hegel, Hegel's move is not relationship to overcome the Kantian division, but, rather, law without [[regard]] to assert it as such, to drop the need for its overcoming(violent) enforcement, for such as [[Jewish]] scholars do in their endless (re)[[interpretation]] of the additional reconciliation of Law. Agamben starts from the opposites, [[right]] insight that the task today isnot synthesis but [[separation]], to gain insight - through a purely formal parallax shift - into how positing the [[distinction as such already is the looked-for reconciliation. The limitation of Kant is not in his remaining within ]]: nor bringing [[Law and Violence|law and violence]] together (so that right will have might and the confines exercise of finite oppositions, in his inability to reach the Infinitemight will be fully legitimized), butthoroughly separating [[them]], untying their [[knot]]. Although Agamben confers on the contrarythis formulation an anti-Hegelian twist, in his very search for a transcendent domain beyond the realm more proper [[reading]] of [[Hegel]] makes it clear that such a gesture of finite oppositions. Kant separation is not unable to reach what the Infinite - what he Hegelian "synthesis" is unable to see effectively about. In it, the opposites are nor reconciled in a "higher synthesis"; it is how he already has what he rather that their difference is looking forposited "as such."

However, is The example of [[Paul]] may help us to clarify this vision not again the case logic of our late capitalist reality going further than our dreams? Are we not already encountering in our social reality what Agamben envisages as a Utopian vision? Isn't the Hegelian lesson of reconciliation: the global reflexivization-mediatization of our lives radical gap that it generates its own brutal immediacy? This has best been captured by Etienne Balibar's notion of excessivehe posits between life and [[death]], nonfunctional cruelty as a feature of contemporary between life in [[Christ]] and lifein sin, is in no [[need]] of a cruelty whose figures range from "fundamentalist" racist and/or religious slaughter to further synthesis; it is itself the [[resolution]] of the "senselessabsolute contradiction" outbursts of violence performed by adolescents Law and sin, of the homeless in our megalopolisesvicious cycle of their murual imphcarion. In other [[words]], a violence one once the distinction is tempted to call Id-Evildrawn, once the subject becomes aware of the very existence of this other [[dimension]] beyond the vicious cycle of law and its [[transgression]], a violence grounded in no utilitarian or ideological reasonsthe battle is formally already won. All So, with regard to the old question of the talk about foreigners stealing work passage from us or about the threat they represent [[Kant]] to our Western values should Hegel, Hegel's move is not deceive us: under closer examinationto overcome the Kantian [[division]], but, it soon becomes clear that this talk provides a rather superficial secondary rationalization. The answer we ultimately obtain from a skinhead is that , to assert it makes him feel good as such, to beat foreignersdrop the need for its overcoming, that their presence disturbs him. What we encounter here is indeed Id-Evilfor the additional reconciliation of the opposites, that is, to gain insight - through a purely [[formal]] [[parallax]] shift - into how positing the Evil structured and motivated by distinction as such already is the most elementary imbalance looked-for reconciliation. The limitation of Kant is not in his remaining within the relationship between confines of finite oppositions, in his inability to reach the ego and jouissanceInfinite, but, by on the tension between pleasure and the foreign body of jouissance contrary, in the his very heart of it. Id-Evil thus stages [[search]] for a transcendent [[domain]] beyond the most elementary short circuit in the relationship realm of the subject to the primordially missing object cause of his desirefinite oppositions. What bothers us in the other (Jew, Japanese, African, Turk) Kant is that he appears to entertain a privileged relationship not unable to reach the objectInfinite -the other either possesses the object treasure, having snatched it away from us (which what he is unable to see is why we don't have it), or how he already has what he poses a threat to our possession of the objectis [[looking]] for.

What one should propose here However, is this vision not again the [[case]] of our late capitalist [[reality]] going further than our [[dreams]]? Are we not already encountering in our [[social reality]] what Agamben envisages as a Utopian vision? Isn't the Hegelian "infinite judgmentlesson of the [[global]] reflexivization-mediatization of our lives that it generates its own brutal immediacy? This has best been [[captured]] by Etienne [[Balibar]]'s notion of excessive," asserting the speculative identity nonfunctional [[cruelty]] as a feature of these contemporary life, a cruelty whose [[figures]] range from "uselessfundamentalist" racist and /or [[religious]] slaughter to the "excessive[[senseless]]" outbursts of violent immediacyviolence performed by adolescents and the homeless in our megalopolises, which display nothing but a pure and naked ("nonviolence one is tempted to call Id-sublimated") hatred of the Otherness[[Evil]], with a violence grounded in no utilitarian or ideological reasons. All the global reflexiv-ization of society. Perhaps talk about [[foreigners]] stealing work from us or about the ultimate example of [[threat]] they [[represent]] to our Western values should not deceive us: under closer examination, it soon becomes clear that this coincidence talk provides a rather superficial secondary [[rationalization]]. The answer we ultimately obtain from a skinhead is the fate of psychoanalytic interpretationthat it makes him feel [[good]] to beat foreigners, that their presence disturbs him. TodayWhat we [[encounter]] here is indeed Id-Evil, that is, the formations of Evil structured and motivated by the most elementary imbalance in the relationship between the ego and [[jouissance]], by the unconscious (from dreams to hysterical symptoms) have definitely lost their innocence tension between [[pleasure]] and are thoroughly reflexivized: the "free associations" foreign [[body]] of jouissance in the very heart of a typical educated analysand consist for it. Id-Evil thus [[stages]] the most part elementary short circuit in the relationship of attempts the subject to provide a psychoanalytic explanation the primordially missing object [[cause]] of their disturbances, so that one is quite justified his desire. What bothers us in saying that we have not only Jungian, Kleinian, Lacanian, and so on, interpretations of the symptomsother (Jew, but symptoms themselves that are JungianJapanese, KleinianAfrican, Lacanian, and so on, that is, whose reality involves implicit reference to some psychoanalytic theory. The unfortunate result of this global reflexivization of interpretation (everything becomes interpretation, the unconscious interprets itselfTurk) is that he appears to entertain a privileged relationship to the analyst's interpretation itself loses its performative "symbolic efficiency" and leaves object-the symptom intact in other either possesses the immediacy object treasure, having snatched it away from us (which is why we don't have it), or he poses a threat to our possession of its idiotic jouissancethe object.

What happens in psychoanalytic treatment one should propose here is strictly homologous to the response of the neo-Nazi skinhead whoHegelian "[[infinite judgment]], when really pressed for " asserting the reasons for his violence, suddenly starts to talk like social workers, sociologists, speculative [[identity]] of these "useless" and social psychologists, quoting diminished social mobility, rising insecurity, the disintegration "excessive" outbursts of paternal authorityviolent immediacy, the lack of maternal love in his early childhood-the unity of practice which display nothing but a pure and its inherent ideological legifimization disintegrates into raw violence and its impotent, inefficient interpretation. This impotence of interpretation is also one of the necessary obverses of the universalized reflexivity hailed by the risk-society-theorists: it is as if our reflexive power can flourish only insofar as it draws its strength and relies on some minimal naked ("prereflexnon-ivesublimated" substantial support that eludes its grasp, so that its universaliza-tion comes at ) [[hatred]] of the price of its inefficiency, that is[[Otherness]], by with the paradoxical reglobal reflexiv-emergence ization of the brute real of "irrational" violence, impermeable and insensitive to reflexive interpretationsociety. So the more today's social theory proclaims Perhaps the end ultimate example of nature or tradition and this coincidence is the rise fate of the "risk societypsychoanalytic interpretation. Today," the more [[formations]] of the implicit reference unconscious (from dreams to hysterical [[symptoms]]) have definitely lost their innocence and are thoroughly reflexivized: the "naturefree [[associations]]" pervades our daily discourse: even when we do not speak of a typical educated [[analysand]] consist for the "end most part of attempts to provide a psychoanalytic explanation of historytheir disturbances," do we not put forward the same message when we claim so that we are entering a "postideological" pragmatic era, which one is another way of claiming quite justified in saying that we are entering a postpolitical order in which the have not only legitimate conflicts are ethnic/cultural conflicts? TypicallyJungian, [[Kleinian]], [[Lacanian]], in today's critical and political discourseso on, [[interpretations]] of the term worker has disappeared from the vocabularysymptoms, substituted or obliterated by immigrants or immigrant workers: Algerians in Francebut symptoms themselves that are Jungian, Turks in GermanyKleinian, Mexicans in the United States. In this way, the class problematic of workers' exploitation is transformed into the multiculturalist problematic of "intolerance of othernessLacanian," and the excessive investment of the multiculturalist liberals in protecting immigrants' ethnic rights clearly draws its energy from the "repressed class dimension. Although Francis Fukuyama's thesis so on the "end of history" quickly fell into disrepute, we still silently presume that the liberal-democratic capitalist global order is somehow the finally found "natural" social regime, we still implicitly conceive conflicts in the Third World countries as a subspecies whose reality involves implicit reference to some [[Psychoanalytic Theory|psychoanalytic theory]]. The unfortunate result of natural catastrophes, as outbursts this global reflexivization of quasi-natural violent passionsinterpretation (everything becomes interpretation, or as conflicts based on the fanatic identification to oneunconscious interprets itself) is that the analyst's ethnic roots (and what is interpretation itself loses its [[performative]] "the ethnicsymbolic efficiency" here if not again a code word for "nature"?). And, again, and leaves [[The Symptom|the key point is that this all-pervasive renaturalization is strictly correlative to symptom]] intact in the global reflexiviza-tion immediacy of our daily livesits idiotic jouissance.

What this means, with regard happens in [[psychoanalytic treatment]] is strictly homologous to Agamben's Utopian vision the response of untying the knot of neo-[[Nazi]] skinhead who, when really pressed for the Law reasons for his violence, suddenly starts to talk like social [[workers]], sociologists, and violence is thatsocial psychologists, in our postpohtical societiesquoting diminished social mobility, this knot is already untied: we encounterrising insecurity, on the one handdisintegration of paternal authority, the globalized lack of [[maternal]] [[love]] in his early [[childhood]]-the [[unity]] of practice and its inherent ideological legifimization disintegrates into raw violence and its impotent, inefficient interpretation. This [[impotence]] of interpretation whose globalization is paid for also one of the necessary obverses of the universalized reflexivity hailed by the risk-society-theorists: it is as if our reflexive power can flourish only insofar as it draws its impotencestrength and relies on some minimal "prereflex-ive" substantial support that eludes its grasp, so that its failure to enforce itself, to generate effects in universaliza-tion comes at the realprice of its inefficiency, andthat is, on by the other hand, explosions paradoxical re-emergence of the raw brute real of a "[[irrational]]" violence that cannot be affected by its symbolic , impermeable and insensitive to reflexive interpretation. WhereSo the more today's [[social theory]] proclaims the end of [[nature]] or [[tradition]] and the rise of the "[[risk society]], then, is " the more the implicit reference to "nature" pervades our daily discourse: even when we do not [[speak]] of the solution here"end of [[history]], between " do we not put forward the same message when we [[claim ]] thatwe are entering a "postideological" pragmatic era, which is [[another]] way of claiming that we are entering a postpolitical order in which the only legitimate conflicts are ethnic/cultural conflicts? Typically, in today's hegemonic constellationcritical and political discourse, the elements of term worker has disappeared from the social link are separated and as such to be brought together [[vocabulary]], substituted or obliterated by psycho-analysis (Miller)immigrants or [[immigrant]] workers: Algerians in [[France]], Turks in [[Germany]], and Mexicans in the knot between Law and violence to be untied[[United States]]. In this way, their separation to be enacted (Agamben)? What if these two separations are not symmetrical? What if the gap between [[class]] problematic of workers' exploitation is transformed into the symbolic multiculturalist problematic of "[[intolerance]] of otherness," and the raw real epitomized by excessive investment of the multiculturalist [[liberals]] in protecting immigrants' ethnic rights clearly draws its [[energy]] from the "repressed class dimension. Although Francis [[Fukuyama]]'s [[thesis]] on the figure "[[End of History|end of history]]" quickly fell into disrepute, we still silently presume that the skinhead [[liberal]]-democratic capitalist [[global order]] is somehow the finally found "[[natural]]" social [[regime]], we still implicitly conceive conflicts in the [[Third]] World countries as a false onesubspecies of natural catastrophes, since this real as outbursts of quasi-natural violent passions, or as conflicts based on the outbursts of fanatic [[identification]] to one's ethnic roots (and what is "the ethnic" here if not again a [[code]] [[word]] for "irrationalnature" violence ?). And, again, the key point is that this all-pervasive renaturalization is generated by strictly correlative to the globalization global reflexiviza-tion of the symbolic?our daily lives.

WhenWhat this means, exactly, does the objet a function as the superego injunction with regard to enjoy? When it occupies Agamben's Utopian vision of untying the place knot of the master signifierLaw and violence is that, in our postpohtical societies, that this knot isalready untied: we encounter, as Lacan formulated it in on the last pages of his Seminar XIone hand, when the short circuit between S1 and a occurs. The key move to be accomplished in order to break the vicious cycle of the superego injunction globalized interpretation whose [[globalization]] is thus paid for by its impotence, its failure to enact the separation between S1 and a. Consequentlyenforce itself, would it not be more productive to follow a different pathgenerate effects in the real, that isand, to start with on the different modus operandi of l'objet aother hand, which in psychoanalysis no longer functions as the agent of the superego injunction-as it does in the discourse of perversion? This is how Miller's claim explosions of the identity raw real of the analyst's discourse and the discourse of today's civilization should a violence that cannot be read: as an indication that this latter discourse (social link) is that of perversionaffected by its symbolic interpretation. That Where, then, is to saythe solution here, between the fact claim that the upper level of Lacan, in today's formula of the analyst's discourse is the same as his formula of perversion (a-$) opens up a possibility of reading hegemonic constellation, the entire formula elements of the analyst's discourse also as a formula of the perverse social link: its agent, the masochist pervert are separated and as such to be brought together by [[psycho]]-analysis (the pervert par excellenceMiller), occupies and the position of the object instrument of the other's desire, knot between Law andviolence to be untied, in this way, through serving his their separation to be enacted (feminineAgamben) victim, he posits her as ? What if these two separations are not symmetrical? What if the gap between [[the hystericized/divided subject who "doesn't know what she wants." Rather, symbolic]] and the pervert knows it for her, that is, he pretends to speak from raw real epitomized by the position figure of knowledge (about the other's desire) that enables him to serve the other; and, finallyskinhead is a [[false]] one, since this real of the product outbursts of this social link is the master signifier, that "irrational" violence is, generated by the hysterical subject elevated into the role globalization of [[The Symbolic|the master (dominatrix) whom the pervert masochist serves.symbolic]]?

In contrast When, exactly, does the [[objet]] a function as the [[SuperEgo|superego]] [[Injunction to hysteriaEnjoy|injunction to enjoy]]? When it occupies the place of the [[master signifier]], the pervert knows perfectly what he that is for the Other: a knowledge supports his position , as Lacan formulated it in the object last pages of his Other's (divided subject's) jouissance[[Seminar]] XI, when the short circuit between S1 and a occurs. The difference between key move to be accomplished in order to break the social link vicious cycle of perversion the superego injunction is thus to enact the separation between S1 and a. Consequently, would it not be more productive to follow a different path, that of analysis is grounded in , to start with the radical ambiguity different modus operandi of l'[[objet a in Lacan]], which stands simultaneously for in psychoanalysis no longer functions as the agent of the superego injunction-as it does in the discourse of [[perversion]]? This is how Miller's claim of the identity of the imaginary fantasmatic lure/screen analyst's discourse and for the discourse of today's civilization should be read: as an indication that which this lure latter discourse (social link) is obfuscatingthat of perversion. That is to say, for the void behind fact that the upper level of Lacan's formula of the analyst's discourse is the lure. Consequently, when we pass from same as his formula of perversion to (a-$) opens up a possibility of reading the entire formula of the analyst's discourse also as a formula of the analytic [[perverse]] social link: its agent, the agent [[masochist]] [[pervert]] (analystthe pervert par excellence) reduces himself to the void, which provokes occupies the subject into confronting position of the truth object [[instrument]] of his the other's [[desire. Knowledge ,]] and, in this way, through serving his ([[feminine]]) victim, he posits her as the position of hystericized/divided subject who "truthdoesn't [[know]] what she wants." below Rather, the bar under the "agentpervert [[knows]] it for her," of coursethat is, refers he pretends to speak from the supposed position of knowledge of (about the other's desire) that enables him to serve the analyst, other; and, simultaneouslyfinally, signals that the knowledge gained here will not be product of this social link is the neutral objective knowledge of scientific adequacy[[Master Signifier|master signifier]], but the knowledge that concerns is, the hysterical subject elevated into the [[role]] of the master (analysanddominatrix) in whom the truth of his subjective positionpervert masochist serves.

RecallIn contrast to hysteria, again, Lacan's outrageous statements that, even if the pervert knows perfectly what he is for the Other: a jealous husband claims about knowledge supports his wife position as the object of his Other's (divided subject's) jouissance. The difference between the social link of perversion and that she sleeps around with other men) of analysis is all truegrounded in the radical ambiguity of objet a in Lacan, his jealousy is still pathological. Along which stands simultaneously for the same lines, one could say [[imaginary]] [[fantasmatic]] [[lure]]/screen and for thatwhich this lure is obfuscating, even if most of for the Nazi claims about [[void]] behind the Jews were true (they exploit Germanslure. Consequently, they seduce German girls)when we [[pass]] from perversion to the [[analytic]] social link, their anti-Semitism would still be the agent (and wasanalyst) pathological - because it represses reduces himself to the true reason void, which provokes the subject into confronting the Nazis needed anti-Semitism in order to sustain their ideological positiontruth of his desire. So, Knowledge in the case position of anti-Semitism, knowledge about what the Jews "really aretruth" is a fake, irrelevant, while below the only knowledge at bar under the place "agent," of truth is course, refers to the supposed knowledge about why a Nazi needs a figure of the Jew to sustain his ideological edifice. In this precise senseanalyst, the analyst's discourse produces the master signifierand, the swerve of the patient's knowledgesimultaneously, the surplus element signals that situates the patient's knowledge at gained here will not be the level neutral [[objective]] knowledge of truth: after the master signifier is producedscientific adequacy, even if nothing changes at but the level of knowledge, that concerns the same knowledge as before starts to function subject (analysand) in a different mode. The master signifier is the unconscious sinthome, the cipher truth of enjoyment, to which the subject was unknowingly subjectedhis [[subjective position]].

The crucial point not to be missed here is how the late [[Recall]], again, Lacan's identification outrageous statements that, even if what a jealous husband claims about his wife (that she sleeps around with other men) is all true, his [[jealousy]] is still pathological. Along the same lines, one could say that, even if most of the subjective position of Nazi claims about the [[Jews]] were true (they exploit Germans, they [[seduce]] [[German]] girls), their [[anti-Semitism]] would still be (and was) pathological - because it represses the true reason the analyst as that of objet petit a presents an act of radical self[[Nazis]] needed [[Anti-semitism|anti-criticismSemitism]] in order to sustain their ideological position. EarlierSo, in the 1950'scase of anti-Semitism, Lacan conceived knowledge about what the analyst not as the small other (Jews "really are" is a)fake, butirrelevant, on while the only knowledge at the place of truth is the contrary, as knowledge about why a Nazi [[needs]] a kind figure of stand-in for the big Other (A, the anonymous symbolic order)Jew to sustain his ideological edifice. At In this levelprecise [[sense]], the function of the analyst was to frustrate the subject's imaginary misrecognitions and to make them accept their proper symbolic place within discourse produces the master signifier, the circuit swerve of symbolic exchangethe [[patient]]'s knowledge, the place surplus element that effectively (and unbeknownst to them) determines their symbolic identity. Later, however, situates the analyst stands precisely for patient's knowledge at the ultimate inconsistency and failure level of truth: after the master signifier is produced, even if nothing changes at the big Otherlevel of knowledge, that the same knowledge as before starts to function in a different mode. The master signifier isthe unconscious [[sinthome]], for the symbolic order's inability cipher of enjoyment, to guarantee which the subject's symbolic identitywas unknowingly subjected.

One should thus always bear in mind The crucial point not to be missed here is how the thoroughly ambiguous status late Lacan's identification of objet a in Lacan. Miller recently proposed a Benjaminian distinction between "constituted anxiety" and "constituent anxiety": while the first designates the standard notion subjective position of the terrifying and fascinating abyss analyst as that of anxiety that haunts us, its infernal circle that threatens to draws us in, the second stands for the "pure" confrontation with objet [[petit a as constituted in its very loss. [3] Miller is right to emphasize here two features: the difference that separates constituted from constituent anxiety concerns the status ] presents an act of the object with regard to fantasyradical self-criticism. In a case of constituted anxietyEarlier, in the object dwells within the confines of a fantasy, while we get the constituent fantasy only when the subject "traverses the fantasy" and confronts the void, the gap, filled up by the fantasmatic object. Clear and convincing as it is. Miller1950's formula misses , Lacan conceived the true paradox or, rather, ambiguity of objet a: when he defines objet a analyst not as the object that overlaps with its loss, that emerges at the very moment of its loss small other (so that all its fantasmatic incarnationsa), from breasts to voice and gazebut, are metonymic figurations of on the void of nothing)contrary, he remains within the horizon as a kind of destand- sire- the true object cause of desire is the void filled in by its fantasmatic incarnations. While, as Lacan emphasizes, objet a is also for the object of the drive[[big Other]] (A, the relationship is here thoroughly differentanonymous [[symbolic order]]). Although in both cases, the link between object and loss is crucialAt this level, in the case function of objet a as the object cause of desire, we have an object which is originally lost, which coincides with its own loss, which emerges as lost, while, in analyst was to [[frustrate]] the case of objet a as subject's imaginary misrecognitions and to make them accept their proper symbolic place within the object circuit of the drivesymbolic [[exchange]], the "object" is directly the loss itselfplace that effectively (and unbeknownst to them) determines their symbolic identity. In the shift from desire to driveLater, we pass from the lost object to loss itself as an object. That is to sayhowever, the weird movement called "drive" is not driven by the "impossible" quest analyst stands precisely for the lost object, bur by a push to directly enact ultimate [[inconsistency]] and failure of [[the "loss" - the gapbig Other]], cut, distance - itself. There that is thus a double distinction to be drawn here: not only between objet a in its fantasmaric and posrfantasmatic status, but also, within this postfantas-matic domain itself, between for the lost object cause of desire and the object loss of the drive. Far from concerning an abstract scholastic debate, this distinction has crucial ideologico-political consequences: it enables us symbolic order's inability to articulate [[guarantee]] the libidinal dynamics of capitalismsubject's symbolic identity.

Following One should thus always bear in mind the thoroughly ambiguous status of objet a in Lacan. Miller himself, recently proposed a Benjaminian distinction has to be introduced here between lack "constituted [[anxiety]]" and hole. Lack is spatial, designating a void within a space, "constituent anxiety": while the hole is more radical-it first designates the point at which this spatial order itself breaks down (as standard notion of the terrifying and fascinating abyss of anxiety that haunts us, its infernal circle that threatens to draws us in , the second stands for the "black holepure" confrontation with objet a as constituted in physics)its very [[loss]]. Therein resides [3] Miller is right to emphasize here two features: the difference between desire and drive: desire is grounded in its constitutive lack, while drive circulates around a hole, a gap in that separates constituted from constituent anxiety concerns the order status of beingthe object with regard to [[fantasy]]. In other wordsa case of constituted anxiety, the circular movement object dwells within the confines of drive obeys a fantasy, while we get the constituent fantasy only when the subject "traverses the fantasy" and confronts the weird logic of void, the curved space in which gap, filled up by the shortest distance between two points fantasmatic object. Clear and convincing as it is not a straight line. Miller's formula misses the true paradox or, rather, but ambiguity of objet a curve: when he defines objet a as the drive "knows" object that overlaps with its loss, that emerges at the shortest way to attain very [[moment]] of its loss (so that all its aim is fantasmatic incarnations, from breasts to circulate around its goal[[voice]] and [[gaze]], are [[metonymic]] figurations of the void of nothing), he remains within the horizon of de- sire-the true object[[cause of desire]] is the void filled in by its fantasmatic incarnations. At the immediate level of addressing individualsWhile, capitalism of course interpellates them as consumersLacan emphasizes, as subjects objet a is also the object of desiresthe [[drive]], soliciting the relationship is here thoroughly different. Although in them ever new perverse both cases, the link between object and excessive desires (for which it offers products to satisfy them); furthermoreloss is crucial, it obviously also manipulates in the case of objet a as the "desire to object cause of desire," celebrating we have an object which is originally lost, which coincides with its own loss, which emerges as lost, while, in the very desire to desire ever new objects and modes case of pleasure. However, even if if already manipulates desire in objet a way that takes into account as the object of the fact that drive, the most elementary desire "object" is directly the desire to reproduce loss itself as . In the shift from desire (and not to find satisfaction), at this leveldrive, we do not yet reach pass from the drive[[lost object]] to loss itself as an object. The drive inheres That is to capitalism at a more fundamentalsay, systemic level: drive propels the entire capitalist machinery; it is the impersonal compulsion to engage in the endless circular weird movement of expanded self-reproduction. The capitalist called "drive thus belongs to no definite individual - it " is rather that those individuals who act as direct not driven by the "agents[[impossible]]" of capital (capitalists themselvesquest for the [[Lost Object|lost object]], top managers) have bur by a push to practice it. We enter directly enact the mode of "loss" - the drive when (as Marx put it) the circulation of money as capital becomes "an end gap, cut, distance - itself. There is thus a [[double]] distinction to be drawn here: not only between objet a in itselfits fantasmaric and posrfantasmatic status, but also, for the expansion of value takes place only within this constantly renewed movement. The circulation of capital has therefore no limits." One should bear in mind here Lacan's wellpostfantas-known distinction matic domain itself, between the aim lost object cause of desire and the goal object loss of drive: while the goal is the object around which drive circulates. Far from concerning an abstract scholastic debate, its (true) aim is this distinction has crucial ideologico-political consequences: it enables us to articulate the endless continuation [[libidinal]] dynamics of this circulation as suchcapitalism.

NotesFollowing Miller himself, a distinction has to be introduced here between lack and [[hole]]. Lack is spatial, designating a void within a [[space]], while the hole is more radical-it designates the point at which this spatial order itself breaks down (as in the "black hole" in [[physics]]). Therein resides the difference between desire and drive:desire is grounded in its constitutive lack, while drive circulates around a hole, a gap in the order of being. In other words, the circular movement of drive obeys the weird logic of the curved space in which the shortest distance between two points is not a straight line, but a curve: the drive "knows" that the shortest way to attain its aim is to circulate around its goal-object. At the immediate level of addressing individuals, capitalism of course interpellates them as consumers, as subjects of desires, soliciting in them ever new perverse and excessive desires (for which it offers products to [[satisfy]] them); furthermore, it obviously also manipulates the "desire to desire," celebrating the very desire to desire ever new [[objects]] and modes of pleasure. However, even if if already manipulates desire in a way that takes into account the fact that the most elementary desire is the desire to reproduce itself as desire (and not to find [[satisfaction]]), at this level, we do not yet reach the drive. The drive inheres to capitalism at a more fundamental, systemic level: drive propels the entire capitalist machinery; it is the impersonal [[compulsion]] to engage in the endless circular movement of expanded self-reproduction. The capitalist drive thus belongs to no definite [[individual]] - it is rather that those individuals who act as direct "agents" of [[capital]] (capitalists themselves, top managers) have to practice it. We enter the mode of the drive when (as [[Marx]] put it) the [[circulation]] of [[money]] as capital becomes "an end in itself, for the expansion of [[value]] takes place only within this constantly renewed movement. The circulation of capital has therefore no limits." One should bear in mind here Lacan's well-known distinction between the aim and the goal of drive: while the goal is the object around which drive circulates, its (true) aim is the endless continuation of this circulation as such.

[[Notes]]: [1] [[Miller, Jacques-Alain]], "La [[passe]]: Conférence de [[Jacques-Alain Miller]]." paper presented at the fourth Congrès de l'AMP, Comandatuba - Bahia, [[Brazil]], August 9-12, 2004.

[3] Miller, J.-A., "Le nom-du-[[père]], s'en passer, s'en servir," available at www.lacan.com. It is interesting to note how, in his very [[polemics ]] against the Hegelian Aufhebug, Miller repeats its operation. That is to say, when Miller deploys the [[concept ]] of anxiety as the effect which signals the proximity of [[the Real]], he opposes it to the central role of the [[Name]]-of-the-[[Father]], of the paternal Law, in Lacan's previous [[thought]]: the paternal Law functions as the operator of [[Aufhebung]], of the "significantization," symbolic mediation/integration, of the real, while anxiety enters as a [[remainder ]] of the Real that resists its symbolic Aufhebung. However, when Miller asks the question of what happens with the paternal Law after this introduction of anxiety as the [[signal ]] of the Real, he strangely reproduces the very terms of Aufhebung. Of course, the [[Name-of-the-Father ]] continues to play a function, but a subordinate one within a new theoretical context. In short, the [[Name-of-the-father|Name-of-the-Father ]] is maintained, negated and elevated to a higher level - the very three features of the Hegelian Aufhebung.