Difference between revisions of "Nature"
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| − | [[Jacques Lacan]] posits a distinction between human | + | |
| − | The basis of this distinction is [[language]]; | + | |
| − | As a result, animal psychology is entirely dominated by the imaginary, whereas human psychology is complicated by the additional dimension of the [[symbolic]]. | + | [[Jacques Lacan]] posits a distinction between [[human]]s and other [[animal]]s, that is, between 'human society' and 'animal society'.<ref>S1 p.223</ref> |
| − | [[Lacan]] adopts the traditional anthropological opposition between [[ | + | |
| − | Like [[Claude Levi-Strauss]] and other anthropologists, [[Lacan]] points to the [[prohibition]] of [[incest]] as the kernel of the [[law|legal]] [[structure]]] which differentiates [[culture]] from [[nature]]. | + | The basis of this distinction is [[language]]; [[human]]s have [[language]], whereas [[animal]]s merely have [[code]]s. |
| + | |||
| + | As a result, [[animal]] [[psychology]] is entirely dominated by the [[imaginary]], whereas [[human]] [[psychology]] is complicated by the additional dimension of the [[symbolic]]. | ||
| + | |||
| + | [[Lacan]] adopts the traditional [[anthropology|anthropological]] opposition between [[nauture]] and [[culture]] ([[culture]] being, in [[Lacan]]ian terms, the [[symbolic]] [[order]]). | ||
| + | |||
| + | Like [[Claude Levi-Strauss]] and other [[anthropology|anthropologists]], [[Lacan]] points to the [[prohibition]] of [[incest]] as the kernel of the [[law|legal]] [[structure]]] which differentiates [[culture]] from [[nature]]. | ||
| + | |||
<blockquote>"The primordial Law is therefore that which in regulating marriage superimposes the kingdom of culture on that of a nature abandoned to the law of mating."<ref>E. p.66</ref></blockquote> | <blockquote>"The primordial Law is therefore that which in regulating marriage superimposes the kingdom of culture on that of a nature abandoned to the law of mating."<ref>E. p.66</ref></blockquote> | ||
| − | The regulation of kinship by the [[incest]] [[taboo]] points to the fact that the [[paternal function]] is at the heart of the rift between | + | |
| − | By insribing a line of descent from male to male and thus ordering a series of generations, the [[Father]] marks the difference between the [[symbolic]] and the [[imaginary]]. | + | The regulation of [[kinship]] by the [[incest]] [[taboo]] points to the fact that the [[paternal function]] is at the heart of the rift between [[human]]s and [[animal]]s. |
| − | In other words, what is unique about human beings is not that they lack the imaginary dimension of animal psychology, but that in human beings this imaginary order is distorted by the added dimension of the [[symbolic]]. | + | |
| − | [[Lacan]] uses the term '[[nature]]' to denote the idea that there is a 'natural order' in human existence. | + | By insribing a line of descent from [[male]] to [[male]] and thus ordering a series of generations, the [[Father]] marks the difference between the [[symbolic]] and the [[imaginary]]. |
| − | This great fantasy of nature underlies modern psychology, which attempts to explain human behavior by reference to ethological categories such as [[instinct]] and [[adaptation]]. | + | |
| + | In other words, what is unique about [[human]] beings is not that they lack the [[imaginary]] dimension of [[animal]] [[psychology]], but that in human beings this [[imaginary]] [[order]] is distorted by the added dimension of the [[symbolic]]. | ||
| + | |||
| + | [[Lacan]] uses the term '[[nature]]' to denote the idea that there is a 'natural order' in [[human]] [[existence]]. | ||
| + | |||
| + | This great [[fantasy]] of [[nature]] underlies [[modern]] [[psychology]], which attempts to explain [[human]] [[behavior]] by reference to ethological categories such as [[instinct]] and [[adaptation]]. | ||
| + | |||
[[Lacan]] is highly critical of all such attempts to explain the phenomena in terms of [[nature]]. | [[Lacan]] is highly critical of all such attempts to explain the phenomena in terms of [[nature]]. | ||
| + | |||
He argues that they are based on a failure to recognize the importance of the [[symbolic order]], which radically [[alienation|alienates]] human beings from natural givens. | He argues that they are based on a failure to recognize the importance of the [[symbolic order]], which radically [[alienation|alienates]] human beings from natural givens. | ||
| + | |||
In the human world, even "those significations that are closest to need, significations that are relative to the most purely biological insertion into a nutrittive and captivating environment, primordial significations, are, in theri sequence and in their very foundation, subject to the laws of the signifier.<ref>S3. 198</ref> | In the human world, even "those significations that are closest to need, significations that are relative to the most purely biological insertion into a nutrittive and captivating environment, primordial significations, are, in theri sequence and in their very foundation, subject to the laws of the signifier.<ref>S3. 198</ref> | ||
| − | Lacan thus argued that 'the Freudian discovery teaches us that all natural harmony in man is profoundly disconcerted."<ref>S3. 83</ref> | + | |
| − | + | [[Lacan]] thus argued that 'the Freudian discovery teaches us that all natural harmony in man is profoundly disconcerted."<ref>S3. 83</ref> | |
| − | [[Need]] is never present in a pure pre-linguistic state in the human being: such a 'mythical' pre-linguistic [[need]] can only be hypothesized after it has been articulated in [[demand]]. | + | |
| − | The [[absence]] of a natural order in human existence can be seen most clearly in human [[sexuality]]. | + | There is not even a pure natural state at the beginning in which the [[human]] [[subject]] might [[exist]] before being caught up in the [[symbolic]] [[order]]. |
| − | [[Freud]] and [[Lacan]] both argue that even [[sexuality]], which might seem to be the [[signification]] closest to nature in the human being, is completely caught up in the cultural order; there is no such thing, for the human being, as a natural sexual relationship. | + | |
| − | One consequence of this is that [[perversion]] cannot be defined by reference to a supposed natural or biological norm governing [[sexuality]]. | + | [[Need]] is never present in a pure pre-[[linguistic]] state in the human being: such a 'mythical' pre-linguistic [[need]] can only be hypothesized after it has been articulated in [[demand]]. |
| − | Whereas animal [[ | + | |
| + | The [[absence]] of a [[natural]] [[order]] in [[human]] [[existence]] can be seen most clearly in human [[sexuality]]. | ||
| + | |||
| + | [[Freud]] and [[Lacan]] both argue that even [[sexuality]], which might seem to be the [[signification]] closest to nature in the human being, is completely caught up in the [[cultural]] [[order]]; there is no such thing, for the human being, as a natural [[sexual relationship]]. | ||
| + | |||
| + | One consequence of this is that [[perversion]] cannot be defined by reference to a supposed [[natural]] or [[biological]] [[norm]] governing [[sexuality]]. | ||
| + | |||
| + | Whereas [[animal]] [[instincts]] are relatively invariable, [[human]] [[sexuality]] is governed by [[drive]]s which are extremely variable and do not aim at a [[biology|biological]] function. | ||
| + | |||
| + | |||
| + | |||
==See Also== | ==See Also== | ||
Revision as of 11:24, 19 June 2006
Jacques Lacan posits a distinction between humans and other animals, that is, between 'human society' and 'animal society'.[1]
The basis of this distinction is language; humans have language, whereas animals merely have codes.
As a result, animal psychology is entirely dominated by the imaginary, whereas human psychology is complicated by the additional dimension of the symbolic.
Lacan adopts the traditional anthropological opposition between nauture and culture (culture being, in Lacanian terms, the symbolic order).
Like Claude Levi-Strauss and other anthropologists, Lacan points to the prohibition of incest as the kernel of the legal structure] which differentiates culture from nature.
"The primordial Law is therefore that which in regulating marriage superimposes the kingdom of culture on that of a nature abandoned to the law of mating."[2]
The regulation of kinship by the incest taboo points to the fact that the paternal function is at the heart of the rift between humans and animals.
By insribing a line of descent from male to male and thus ordering a series of generations, the Father marks the difference between the symbolic and the imaginary.
In other words, what is unique about human beings is not that they lack the imaginary dimension of animal psychology, but that in human beings this imaginary order is distorted by the added dimension of the symbolic.
Lacan uses the term 'nature' to denote the idea that there is a 'natural order' in human existence.
This great fantasy of nature underlies modern psychology, which attempts to explain human behavior by reference to ethological categories such as instinct and adaptation.
Lacan is highly critical of all such attempts to explain the phenomena in terms of nature.
He argues that they are based on a failure to recognize the importance of the symbolic order, which radically alienates human beings from natural givens.
In the human world, even "those significations that are closest to need, significations that are relative to the most purely biological insertion into a nutrittive and captivating environment, primordial significations, are, in theri sequence and in their very foundation, subject to the laws of the signifier.[3]
Lacan thus argued that 'the Freudian discovery teaches us that all natural harmony in man is profoundly disconcerted."[4]
There is not even a pure natural state at the beginning in which the human subject might exist before being caught up in the symbolic order.
Need is never present in a pure pre-linguistic state in the human being: such a 'mythical' pre-linguistic need can only be hypothesized after it has been articulated in demand.
The absence of a natural order in human existence can be seen most clearly in human sexuality.
Freud and Lacan both argue that even sexuality, which might seem to be the signification closest to nature in the human being, is completely caught up in the cultural order; there is no such thing, for the human being, as a natural sexual relationship.
One consequence of this is that perversion cannot be defined by reference to a supposed natural or biological norm governing sexuality.
Whereas animal instincts are relatively invariable, human sexuality is governed by drives which are extremely variable and do not aim at a biological function.
