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Around 1958, [[Lacan]] develops an important [[distinction ]] between [[three ]] [[terms]]:

In the context of this distinction, "[[need]]" comes close to what [[Freud]] referred to as "'''[[instinct]]'''" (''[[Instinkt]]''); that is, a purely '''''[[biological]]''''' [[concept ]] opposed to the realm of the '''[[drive]]''' (''[[Trieb]]'').

[[Lacan]] bases this distinction on the fact that in [[order ]] to [[desire|satisfy]] his [[needs]] the [[infant]] must articulate [[them ]] in '''[[language]]'''; in other [[words]], the [[infant]] must articulate his [[needs]] in a "'''[[demand]]'''". However, in doing so, something else is introduced which causes a '''[[split]]''' between [[need]] and '''[[demand]]'''; this is the fact that every '''[[demand]]''' is not only an articulation of [[need]] but also an (unconditional) '''[[demand]]''' for '''[[love]]'''. Now, although the [[other]] to whom the [[demand]] is addressed (in the first [[instance]], the [[mother]]) can and may supply the [[object]] which [[satisfies]] the [[infant]]'s [[need]], she is never in a [[position ]] to answer the [[demand]] for [[love]] unconditionally, because she too is [[division|divided]]. The result of this '''[[split]]''' between [[need]] and '''[[demand]]''' is an [[insatiable]] leftover, which is '''[[desire]]''' itself.

[[Need]] is thus an ''intermittent tension'' which arises for purely [[organic]] reasons and which is [[discharged]] entirely by the specific [[action]] corresponding to the [[particular ]] [[need]] in question. [[Desire]], on the other hand, is a ''constant force'' which can never be [[satisfied]], the constant 'pressure' which underlies the [[drives]].

This account presents in [[chronological]] terms what is in fact a question of [[structure]]. In [[truth]], it is not the [[case ]] that there first [[exists ]] a [[subject]] of pure [[need]] which then attempts to articulate that [[need]] in [[language]], since the distinction between pure [[need]] and its articulation in [[demand]] only exists from the [[moment ]] of its articulation, by which [[time ]] it is [[impossible ]] to determine what that pure [[need]] could have been. The concept of a [[linguistics|pre-linguistic]] [[need]] is thus merely a hypothesis, and the [[subject]] of this pure [[need]] is a [[mythical ]] [[subject]]; even the paradigmatic [[need]] of hunger never exists as a pure [[biological]] given, but is marked by the [[structure]] of [[desire]]. Nevertheless, this hypothesis is useful to [[Lacan]] for maintaining his theses [[about ]] the radical divergence between [[human]] [[desire]] and all [[natural]] or [[biological]] [[categories]].