Changes

{{Top}}théorie du relation d'[[objet]]{{Bottom}}

[[Freud]] defined the [[object]] as that in which and through which the [[drive]] attains its [[aim]]. In the years following [[Freud]]'s [[death]], the twin [[concepts ]] of the "[[object]]" and the "[[object relation]]" attained a growing importance in [[psychoanalytic theory]], and eventually a [[whole ]] [[school]] of [[psychoanalytic theory]] came to be known as "[[object-relations theory]]. (The main proponents of [[object-relations theory]] were [[Ronald Faibairn]], [[D.W. Winnicott]] and [[Michael Balint]], all of whom were members of the Middle Group of the British [[Psycho]]-Analytical [[Society]].) These [[analyst]]s differed on many points, and hence [[object-relations theory]] covers a wide range of [[theoretical ]] points of view.

However, despite its [[lack ]] of precise definition, [[object-relations theory]] can be contrasted with [[ego-psychology]] on account of its focus on [[object]] rather than on the [[drive]]s in themselves. This focus on [[object]]s means that [[object-relations theory]] pays more attention to the [[intersubjective]] [[constitution ]] of the [[psyche]], in contrast to the more atomistic approach of [[ego-psychology]].

Although [[Lacan]]ian [[psychoanalysis]] has been compared with [[object-relations theory]] in that both [[school|schools of thought]] [[place ]] more emphasis on [[intersubjectivity]], [[Lacan]] himself criticizes [[object-relations theory]] repeatedly.

His criticisms focus most on the way in which [[object-relations theory]] envisions the possibility of a [[complete ]] and perfectly [[satisfying ]] relation between the [[subject]] and the [[object]]. [[Lacan]] is opposed to such a view, arguing that for [[human]] [[being]]s there is no such [[thing ]] as a "pre-established [[harmony]]" betrween "a need and an object that [[satisfies ]] it."<ref>{{S1}} p. 209</ref> The root of the error is, argues [[Lacan]], that in [[object-relations theory]], "the object is first and foremost an object of satisfaction."<ref>{{S1}} p. 209</ref>

In [[other ]] [[words]], by locating the [[object]] in the [[register]] of [[satisfaction]] and [[need]], [[object-relations theory]] confuses the [[object]] of [[psychoanalysis]] with the [[object]] of [[biology]] and neglects the [[symbolic]] [[dimension ]] of [[desire]]. One [[dire ]] consequence that follows from this is that the specific difficulties which arise from the [[symbolic]] constitution of [[desire]] are neglected, with the result that "mature [[object relations]]" and ideals of "[[genital|genital love]]" are proposed as the [[goal ]] of [[treatment]]. Thus [[object-relations theory]] becomes the site of a "delirious moralism."<ref>{{Ec}} p. 716</ref>

A closely related aspect of [[object-relations theory]] which [[Lacan]] also criticizes is its shift of emphasis from the [[Oedipal]] [[structure|triangle]] onto the [[mother]]-[[child]] [[dual relation|relation]], with the latter conceived of as a perfectly symmetrical, reciprocal relation. One of [[Lacan]]'s fundamental concern is to restore the centrality of the [[Oedipal]] [[structure|triangle]] to [[psychoanalysis]] by re-emphasizing the importance of the [[father]] in contrast to the [[object-relations]] emphasis on the [[mother]]. This concern can be seen in [[Lacan]]'s criticism of the [[object-relations theory|object relation]] as a symmetrical [[dual relation]], and his view that the [[object-relations theory|object relation]] is an [[intersubjective]] relation which involves not two but [[three ]] [[terms]].

[[Lacan]]'s criticism of British [[object-relations theory]] is one of the main themes of the first year of his [[public ]] [[seminar]] (1953-4). In the fourth year of the [[seminar]], entitled "[[Object Relations]]," [[Lacan]] discusses not the British school of [[object-relations theory]] but the [[French ]] school.