The term <blockquote>Most of the "pain" refers to we [[experience]] is of a physical sensation perceptual [[order]], [[perception]] either of the urge of [[unsatisfied]] [[instincts]] or a distress linked to instinctual tension, of something in the [[external]] [[world]] which may be painful in itself or may arouse painful anticipations in the [[psychic ]] [[apparatus then seeks to discharge ]] and is recognized by work according to the principle of pleasureit as "[[danger]]."<ref>{{BPP}} Ch. 1</ref></unpleasure.blockquote>
Jean-Bertrand Pontalis (1981) noted that the outline for an original theory of pain can be found in Freud's work from "A Project for a Scientific Psychology" (1950c [1895]) onward. Taken up again in Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety (1926d [1925]), this theory covers the basic reference points of analytic theory: the theory of narcissism, the question of trauma, the definition of primary masochism, and the presentation of the death instinct. Finally, with the concept of negative therapeutic reaction in place, Freud, in The Ego and the Id (1923b), described how pain drives resistance to analysis, indeed, how pain is the final refuge from renouncing the lost object, as the resistance implies.
By 1895 Freud had postulated bipolarity ==Pain, Physical==<blockquote>Pain-primarily and as a rule-occurs if a stimulus impinging on the principle periphery breaks through the defenses that oppose stimuli of psychic functioning, excessive strength and, anticipating his later theory of hence [[acts]] like a continuous [[instinctual dualism, he opposed ]] stimulus against which otherwise efficacious muscular [[activity]] such as serves to remove the experience of pain to stimulated region from the experience of satisfactionstimulus remains powerless. In qualitative terms, If the pain is different does not originate from unpleasure in that pain is situated outside a point on the economic apparatus of pleasure/unpleasure. In dynamic termsskin but from an [[internal]] [[organ]], "this does not alter the [p[situation]ain ] in any way; it is only that a bit of the internal periphery has replaced the external. . . characterized as an irruption . In the [[case]] of excessively large Qs [quantities[physical]] into N pain there arises an intense [neurones that don't retain quantities of energy[cathexis]] and R , which may be termed [[neurones that do retain energy and are capable narcissistic]], of the painful region of retaining memory" (1950c, p. 307). Then the [[body discharges ]] - a cathexis which increases progressively and which acts upon the accumulated excitation. Pain can cause the subject to break out of preestablished paths only because there are boundaries (bodily boundaries, ego boundaries); however, its internal discharge has an implosive effect. Like in a physical or psychic hole (so to be distinguished from a possible lacuna or a lack), the excess of excitation caused by pain obstructs all binding activity[[speak]] evacuative manner. Pontalis (1981) has stressed that this theory of pain breaching is a departure from the economic apparatus where the theory of anxiety is more generally situated<ref>{{PoA}} Ch.11</ref></blockquote>
In 1926, in addendum C to Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, Freud again tried to differentiate pain from anxiety, though not without difficulty or contradiction. Pain is primarily a reaction to the loss of the object, whereas anxiety is a reaction to the danger that loss entails. Pain is the consequence of a breaching of the protective shield, and by acting as a constant instinctual excitation (some authors have proposed the idea of a pseudo-instinct here), it prevents the subject from escaping from it. Nonetheless, pain has a locus: it emanates from the periphery of the body or the organs. If anxiety has already led the subject to regard the loss of the object metaphorically, the unmediated reality of pain ensures that the subject can survive without the loss of the object or the nostalgia of that loss. In a third stage of his exposition in addendum C, Freud returns to the difference between mental pain and physical pain, arguing that the former is much more closely related to the mechanism of anxiety. "The transition from physical pain to mental pain corresponds to a change from narcissistic cathexis to object-cathexis. An object-presentation which is highly cathected by instinctual need plays the same role as a part of the body which is cathected by an increase of stimulus" (1926d, pp. 171-172).
Freud thus uses the same model to describe both physical pain and psychic pain. As Pontalis ==Pain, Psychic==<blockquote>It certainly cannot be without signficance that [[language]] has made clear, pain is not a case of metaphor but rather a case of analogy—a direct exchange between one level and another, as if with pain created the body mutates into psyche and the psyche into body. But while anxiety can be communicated, pain cannot. Despite a scream [[concept]] of paininward, the cry does nothing to ease it. The experience of pain takes place within a bodily ego. Both physical pain and mental pain partake of the content-container relationship (Enriquezpsychic, 1980; McDougall, 1978). The subject in pain finds it impossible to recover the object by means of representation: "Where there is pain, it is and has equated the lost, absent sensations attendant upon [[object that is present; the real, present object that is absent." The distinctive feature of pain is its blurring of boundaries. Thus, for example, certain types of ]] [[loss]] with physical suffering serve to alleviate mental pain. Recent clinical work on somatization and borderline states is often faced with this inchoate nature of pain: absolute, naked pain<ref>{{PoA}} Ch.11</ref></blockquote>
Cathexis; Dead mother complex; Elisabeth von R. case of; Erotogenic masochism; Guilt, unconscious sense of; Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety; Masochism; Melancholia; Mourning; Physical pain/psychic pain; Pleasure/unpleasure principle; Protective shield, breaking through the; Psychosomatic limit/boundary; "Project for a Scientific Psychology, A"; Quota of affect; Sadism; Sadomasochism; Self-mutilation in children; Suffering; Unpleasure.
Bibliography
* Enriquez The term "pain" refers to a physical [[sensation]] or a distress linked to instinctual tension, Michelinewhich the [[psychic apparatus]] then seeks to [[discharge]] by [[work]] according to the [[principle]] of [[pleasure]]/unpleasure. Jean-Bertrand Pontalis (19801981) noted that the [[outline]] for an original [[theory]] of pain can be found in [[Freud]]'s work from "A [[Project]] for a [[Scientific]] [[Psychology]]" (1950c [1895])onward. Du corps de souffrance au corps en souffranceTaken up again in Inhibitions, [[Symptoms]], and [[Anxiety]] (1926d [1925]), this theory covers the basic reference points of [[analytic]] theory: the theory of [[narcissism]], the question of [[trauma]], the definition of primary [[masochism]], and the presentation of the [[death]] [[instinct]]. TopiqueFinally, 26with the concept of [[negative]] therapeutic reaction in [[place]], Freud, in The Ego and [[the Id]] (1923b), 5-27described how pain [[drives]] [[resistance]] to [[analysis]], indeed, how pain is the final refuge from renouncing the [[lost object]], as the resistance implies. * By 1895 Freudhad postulated bipolarity as the principle of psychic functioning, and, anticipating his later theory of instinctual [[dualism]], Sigmundhe opposed the experience of pain to the experience of [[satisfaction]]. In qualitative [[terms]], pain is different from [[unpleasure]] in that pain is situated [[outside]] the [[economic]] apparatus of pleasure/unpleasure. In [[dynamic]] terms, "[p]ain is . . . characterized as an irruption of excessively large Qs [quantities] into N [neurones that don't retain quantities of [[energy]]] and R [neurones that do retain energy and are capable of retaining [[memory]]" (1923b1950c, p. 307). The ego and Then the body discharges the idaccumulated [[excitation]]. SEPain can [[cause]] the [[subject]] to break out of preestablished paths only because there are boundaries ([[bodily]] boundaries, 19: 1-66. * ——ego boundaries); however, its internal discharge has an implosive effect. Like a physical or psychic [[hole]] (1926d to be distinguished from a possible lacuna or a [[lack]]), the [[1925excess]]of excitation caused by pain obstructs all binding activity. Pontalis (1981)has stressed that this theory of pain breaching is a departure from the economic apparatus where the theory of anxiety is more generally situated. In 1926, in addendum C to Inhibitions, symptomsSymptoms and Anxiety, and Freud again tried to differentiate pain from anxiety, though not without difficulty or [[contradiction]]. SEPain is primarily a reaction to the loss of the object, 20: 75-172. * ——whereas anxiety is a reaction to the danger that loss entails. Pain is the consequence of a breaching of the protective shield, and by acting as a constant instinctual excitation (1950c some authors have proposed the [[1895idea]]of a pseudo-instinct here), it prevents the subject from escaping from it. A project for Nonetheless, pain has a scientific psychologylocus: it emanates from the periphery of the body or the organs. SEIf anxiety has already led the subject to [[regard]] the loss of the object metaphorically, 1: 281the unmediated [[reality]] of pain ensures that the subject can survive without the loss of the object or the [[nostalgia]] of that loss. In a [[third]] [[stage]] of his exposition in addendum C, Freud returns to the [[difference]] between [[mental]] pain and physical pain, arguing that the former is much more closely related to the [[mechanism]] of anxiety. "The transition from physical pain to mental pain corresponds to a [[change]] from narcissistic cathexis to object-387cathexis. * McDougallAn object-presentation which is highly cathected by instinctual [[need]] plays the same [[role]] as a part of the body which is cathected by an increase of stimulus" (1926d, Joycepp. (1978171-172). Plaidoyer pour une certaine anormalité Freud thus uses the same [[model]] to describe both physical pain and psychic pain. As Pontalis has made clear, pain is not a case of [[metaphor]] but rather a case of analogy—a direct [[exchange]] between one level and [[another]], as if with pain the body mutates into [[psyche]] and the psyche into body. Paris: GallimardBut while anxiety can be communicated, pain cannot. * PontalisDespite a scream of pain, Jeanthe cry does [[nothing]] to ease it. The experience of pain takes place within a bodily ego. Both physical pain and mental pain partake of the [[content]]-Bertrand. container [[relationship]] (1981Enriquez, 1980; McDougall, 1978). Frontiers The subject in psychoanalysispain finds it [[impossible]] to recover the object by means of [[representation]]: Between "Where there is pain, it is the dream lost, [[absent]] object that is [[present]]; the [[real]], present object that is absent." The distinctive feature of pain is its blurring of boundaries. Thus, for example, certain types of physical [[suffering]] serve to alleviate mental pain. [[Recent]] [[clinical]] work on somatization and psychic borderline states is often faced with this inchoate [[nature]] of pain (Catherine Cullen and Philip Cullen: absolute, Transnaked pain.) Cathexis; [[Dead]] [[mother]] [[complex]]; Elisabeth von R. London: Hogarth Press case of; [[Erotogenic]] masochism; [[Guilt]], [[unconscious]] [[sense]] of; Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety; Masochism; [[Melancholia]]; [[Mourning]]; Physical pain/psychic pain; Pleasure/unpleasure principle; Protective shield, breaking through the Institute ; [[Psychosomatic]] [[limit]]/boundary; "Project for a Scientific Psychology, A"; Quota of Psycho[[affect]]; [[Sadism]]; [[Sadomasochism]]; [[Self]]-Analysismutilation in [[children]]; Suffering; Unpleasure. (Original work published 1977) {{Freudian Dictionary}}{{!}}
