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[[Freud]] regarded "[[philosophy]]" as one of the great [[cultural ]] institutions, alongside [[art]] and [[religion]] - the mark of a highly developed [[state ]] of [[civilization]]. However, he viewed the [[relationship ]] between [[philosophy]] and [[psychoanalysis]] in ambiguous [[terms]]. On the one hand, he credited certain philosophers (such as Empedocles and [[Nietzsche]]) with having anticipated purely by intuition what [[psychoanalysts ]] discovered only by laborious investigation.<ref>{{F}} 1914d: [[SE]] XIV, 15-16</ref>. On the [[other ]] hand, he repeatedly criticised philosophers for equating the [[psyche]] with [[consciousness]] and thus excluding the [[unconscious]] on purely ''a priori'' grounds,<ref>{{F}} 1925e [1924]: [[SE]] XIX, 216-17</ref> and likened philosophical systems to [[paranoia]]c [[delusions]].<ref>{{F}} 1912-13: [[SE]] XIII, 73</ref>

In [[Lacan]]'s [[work ]] too there is an ambivalent relationship between [[psychoanalysis]] and [[philosophy]]. On the one hand, [[Lacan]] opposes [[psychoanalysis]] to the totalising explanations of philosophical systems,<ref>{{S1}} p.118-19; {{S11}} p.77</ref> and [[links ]] [[philosophy]] with the [[discourse ]] of the [[master]], the reverse of [[psychoanalysis]].<ref>{{S20}} p. 33</ref> On the other hand, [[Lacan]]'s work is [[full ]] of philosophical references; indeed, this is often regarded as one of the features that distinguishes [[Lacan]] from other [[psychoanalytic ]] thinkers.

[[Lacan]] often compares the psychoanalytic method to the Socratic dialogue. He also refers specifically to a [[number ]] of [[Plato]]'s works, especially ''[[The Symposium]]'', to which he dedicates a large part of his 1960-1 [[seminar]].

[[Lacan]] discusses [[Aristotle]]'s typology of [[causality|causation]] in the 1964 seminar, and Aristotelian [[logic ]] in the seminar of 1970-1.

References to [[Descartes]] abound in [[Lacan]]'s work, since he sees the [[philosophy]] of the ''[[cogito]]'' as summing up the very heart of the [[psychology]] of modern man.<ref>{{S2}} p. 6</ref> The [[Lacan]]ian [[concept ]] of the [[subject]] is both the [[subject|Cartesian subject]] (in its quest to move from [[doubt ]] to [[certainty]]) and the [[subversion ]] of the [[subject|Cartesian subject]].

[[Lacan]] attended a series of lectures on [[Hegel]] given by [[Alexandre Kojeve]] in 1933-9 at the ''Ecole des Hautes [[Etudes]]''. The influence of these lectures on his work, especially his earlier work, is immense, and whenever [[Lacan]] refers to [[Hegel]] it is [[Kojeve]]'s [[reading ]] of [[Hegel]] that he has in [[mind]]. From [[Hegel]] [[Lacan]] takes (among other things) an emphasis on [[dialectic]]al modes of [[thought]], the concept of the [[beautiful soul]], the [[dialectic]] of the [[master]] and the [[slave]], and a [[distinction ]] between [[animal]] and [[human]] [[desire]].

[[Lacan]] established a personal [[friendship ]] with [[Heidegger]], visiting him and translating some of his works. [[Heidegger]]'s influence on [[Lacan]]'s work can be seen in [[Lacan]]'s metaphysical discussions of [[being]], and in the distinction between [[speech|full speech]] and [[speech|empty speech]]. These are only the philosophers to whom [[Lacan]] refers most frequently; he also discusses the work of many other philosophers such as St [[Augustine]], [[Spinoza]], [[Sartre]], and [[others]]. [[Lacan]]'s work engages with many philosophical [[schools ]] and areas of enquiry. In his early work he shows a bent towards [[phenomenology]], even presenting a "[[phenomenological ]] description of the psychoanalytic [[experience]]" in 1936,<ref>{{Ec}} pp. 82-5</ref> but he later becomes quite opposed to [[phenomenology]], and in 1964 presents a critique of [[Merleau-Ponty]]'s ''Phenomenology of [[Perception]]''.<ref>{{S11}} pp. 71-6</ref> Insofar as [[psychoanalysis]] engages with [[ontological ]] questions, [[Lacan]] aligns [[psychoanalysis]] with [[materialism]], against all forms of [[idealism]]. [[Lacan]] also engages with [[epistemology]] and the [[philosophy]] of [[science]], where his constant approach is rationalist rather than empiricist.