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It ===Middle Work===However, from [[{{Y}}|1950]] on, there is important a gradual but constant tendency to stress the point that for Freud himself dissociate [[psychoanalysis was a ]] from [[psychology]]. In 1923 he wrote: "Psychoanalysis [[Lacan]] begins by arguing that [[psychology]] is the name (1) confined to an [[understanding]] of a procedure for the investigation of mental processes which are almost inaccessible in any other way, [[nature|animal psychology]] (2[[nature|ethology]]) of a method (based upon that investigation) for the treatment of neurotic disorders and (3) of a collection of psychological information obtained along those lines, which is gradually being accumulated into a new scientific discipline" (1923a, p. 235).:

Rarely in his writings did he make any mention of contemporary work in <blockquote>"academic" psychologyThe psychological is, however. He sometimes cited authors who wrote in German (Wundt, Hering, and Ehrenfels), French (Binet and Claparède), or English, like Darwin and his cousin Francis Galtonif we try to grasp it as firmly as possible, or Stanley Hall, whom he met in 1909 on his voyage to the United Statesethological, but such references remain episodic. The two most frequently cited authors are Fechner, from whom he borrowed that is the principle [[whole]] of constancy the [[biological]] [[individual]]'s [[behaviour]] in the framework of relation to his energy approach to psychic function, and Pierre Janet, with whom he had a long controversy based both on a conflict of prestige and priority and on a fundamental theoretical divergence: Janet explained hysteria in terms of reduced "psychic tone,[[natural]] [[environment]]." whereas Freud saw the effects of conflictual tension in it<ref>{{S3}} p.7</ref></blockquote>

One could therefore consider Freud This is not to be ill informed say that it cannot say anything [[about work by psychologists in his own time. This would probably be completely false: his interest in memory and perception fits readily into the framework of a "psychology of the faculties]] [[human]] [[being]]s," which was still very much present in Project for a Scientific Psychology (1950c [1895[human]])s are also [[animal]]s, the main points being reviewed in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a)but that it cannot say anything about that which is uniquely [[human]]. Over <ref>Although at one point [[Lacan]] does [[state]] that the years, however, his concepts, which were initially strongly influenced by the dominant empiricist associationism [[theory]] of the late nineteenth century, progressively evolved toward a radically different approach to memory [[ego]] and perception that allows for the effects of deferred action and also focuses on the psychoses and delusions (Perron)[[narcissism]] 'extend' modern ethological research. This provides a new solution to the whole problem of the relations between the "reality of the external world" and "psychic reality," a solution that has nothing in common with the views developed elsewhere in psychology{{Ec}} p.472</ref>

We must also bear in mind that while he was still at school it was from a psychologist, albeit an amateur, Herbart, that Freud acquired the fundamental ideas Thus [[psychology]] is reduced to general laws of psychoanalysis, ideas such as repressionbehavior which apply to all [[animal]]s, including [[human]] [[being]]s; [[Lacan]] rejects "the threshold [[doctrine]] of consciousness, a discontinuity between animal psychology and the unconscious (Andersson)—these were the origins of the topical model of metapsychology. The origins of the economic model can be found in the "energetic" trend that included, among others, Brücke, his mentor, and Fechnerhuman psychology which is far away from our [[thought]]. The "dynamic" model is specifically psychoanalytic<ref>{{Ec}} p. There is also what is sometimes referred to as a "fourth point of view484</ref> However," [[Lacan]] vigorously rejects the developmental perspective: case studies analyzing the stages in [[biology|behaviorist theory]] according to which the development same general laws of a given child were very much in vogue in psychology between 1880 and 1930, from Baldwin and Binet behaviour are sufficient to Piaget himselfexplain all [[human]] [[psychic]] phenomena. With Only [[psychoanalysis]], which uncovers the cases [[linguistics|linguistic basis]] of "Little Hans" and the "Wolf Man" Freud fit into this stream of ideas in his own way[[human]] [[subjectivity]], is adequate to explain those psychic phenomena which are specifically [[human]].

After Freud, what were and what are the influences of psychology on psychoanalysis? And conversely, what are the influences on psychology of psychoanalysis? The asymmetry is patently clear. Although certain psychoanalytic developments are deliberately based on ideas and facts coming from disciplines such as psychiatry, biology, linguistics, sociology, and ethnology, it is not easy to cite analogous importations from psychology or any of its so-called scientific branches (experimental psychology and differential psychology, for example). Perhaps the epistemological (in terms of basic postulates) and methodological gap is such that this type of importation seems unacceptable to psychoanalysts, who dread a "psychologization" that would empty metapsychology of its essential substance. In Europe, at any rate, the opposition to Hartmannian "Ego Psychology" has often been justified in this way. However, psychoanalytic theories on memory, perception, and thought processes would gain by being better informed about the current work of psychologists and neuropsychologists on these questions, and it is regrettable that they are still too often discussed in psychoanalysis in the same terms in which Freud posed them. This discrepancy could be attributed to the "narcissism of minor differences," the separation between things that are too similar. However, it is obvious that, seen from the reverse point of view, the influences of psychoanalysis on psychology are of major importance, in at least three respects:  * In terms of theories. Certain research trends have developed in experimental and differential psychology based on hypotheses that have been imported from psychoanalysis (albeit with distortions and simplifications): work on selective forgetting of unpleasant experiences and on aggressive behavior caused by frustration. * In terms of techniques. Here we are referring mainly to so-called "projective" and "expressive" trials. It is important to remember that Rorschach, a psychiatrist at the Burghölzli asylum (directed by Bleuler, and where Jung also worked), created his famous ink blot test in the context of psychoanalytic ideas, as they were accepted in that institution around 1920. It is patently obvious that in recent years psychoanalytic theory has had a strong effect on this Rorschach test, as well as so-called thematic tests (Murray's TAT), both in terms of research work and its interpretation in individual clinical practice. As for children's drawings (classified among the "expressive" techniques), it has become commonplace though nevertheless still pertinent to interpret them in psychoanalytic terms, as Françoise Dolto illustrated particularly well. * In more general terms, a whole new sector of psychology has developed in a context where many consider psychoanalytic references to be dominant, which creates no small difficulties for the professionals in question (Perron). In fact, no valid questions concerning the relations between psychology and psychoanalysis can be posed without first asking: which psychology, which psychoanalysis? In both fields questions are being asked concerning the permanently threatened unity of the respective disciplines. There is no doubt very little in common between the "pure" experimental psychologist working on the memorization of meaningless syllables and the clinical psychologist who is trying to understand the dynamics of phobic behavior leading to a total inability to work. In a similar vein, apart from very general principles, there is very little common ground to be found between Jacques Lacan, Heinz Hartmann, Melanie Klein, Heinz Kohut, Wilfred Bion, and numerous others. Can these gaps between and within each of these disciplines one day be reduced? Such an effort presupposes an analysis of the epistemological bases of each approach, and it seems doubtful that such an analysis would produce any unified theory.==definition=Latest Work=== psychology (psychologie) In his pre-1950 writings, Lacan sees psychoanalysis and psychology as parallel disciplines which can cross-fertilise each other.  Although he is very critical of the conceptual inadequacies of associationist psychology, Lacan argues that psychoanalysis can help to build an 'authentic psychology' free from such errors by providing it with truly scientific concepts such as the [[imago{{Y}}|1960s]] and the distance between [[complexpsychoanalysis]].<ref>and [[Lacan, Jacquespsychology]]. 1936</ref> makes of such comparisons, it is clear that Lacan's discussions of emphasised further in [[PsychosisLacan]] are among the most significant and original aspects of his work.  Lacan's most detailed discussion of [[Psychosis]] appears in his seminar Works of 1955-6, entitled simply The Pychoses.  It is here that he expounds what come to be the main tenets of the Lacanian approach to [[madnessJacques Lacan|work]].   [[PsychosisLacan]] is defined as one of the three clinical argues that [[Structurepsychology]]s, one of which is defmed by the operation of [[foreclosure]].  In this operation, the [[Name-of-the-Father]] is not integrated in the [[Symbolic]] universe of the psychotic (it is 'foreclosed'), with the result that essentially a hole is left in the [[Symbolic]] order.  To speak tool of a hole in the [[Symbolic]] order is not to say that the psychotic does not have an unconscious: on the contrary, in [[psychosis]] "the unconscious is present but not functioning.technocratic exploitation",<ref>{{S3Ec}} p.851; {{Ec}} p.208832</ref>  The and that it is dominated by the [[psychotic]] [[structuredelusion|illusions]] thus results from a certain malfunction of the [[Oedipus]] [[complex]], a lack in the paternal function; more specifically, in [[psychosis|wholeness]] the [[paternal function]] is reduced to the image of the father (the [[symbolic]] is reduced to the and [[imaginary]]). In [[Lacanian]] [[psychoanalysis]] it is important to distinguish between [[Psychosis|synthesis]], which is a [[clinicalnature]] and [[structureinstinct]], and [[psychotic]] phenomena such as [[delusionautonomy]]s and[[hallucination]]s. Two conditions are required for psychotic phenomena to emerge: the subject must have a psychotic structure, and the Nameconsciousness|self-of-the-Father must be "called into [[Symbolicconsciousness]] opposition to the subject."<ref>{{EEc}} p.217832</ref>  In the absence of the first condition, no confrontation with the paternal signifier will ever lead to psychotic phenomena; a neurotic can never 'become psychotic."<ref>(see S3, 15</ref> In the absence of the second condition, the psychotic structure  will remain latent. It is thus conceivable that a subject may have a psychotic  structure and yet never develop [[Delusions]] or experience hallucinations. When  both conditions are fulfilled, the [[PsychosisPsychoanalysis]] is 'triggered off', the latent [[Psychosis]] becomes manifest in hallucinations and/or [[Delusions]].  Lacan bases his arguments on a detailed reading of the Schreber case (Freudother hand,  1911c). Daniel Paul Schreber was an Appeal Court judge in Dresden who  wrote an account of his paranoid [[Delusions]]; an analysis of subverts these writings  constitutes Freud's most important contribution to the study of [[Psychosisillusion]].  Lacan argues that Schreber's [[Psychosis]] was triggered off cherished by both his failure  to produce a child and his election to an important position in the judiciary;  both of these experiences confronted him with the question of paternity in the  [[Realpsychology]], and thus called the Name-of-the-Father into [[Symbolic]] opposition with the subject.  In the 1970s Lacan reformulates his approach to [[Psychosis]] around the notion  of the [[BORROMEAN KNOT]]. The three rings in the knot represent the three orders:  the this [[Realsense]], "the [[SymbolicFreudian]] and the [[Imaginaryenunciation]]. While in neurosis these three rings  are linked together in a particular way, in has [[Psychosis]] they become disentangled.  This psychotic dissociation may sometimes however be avoided by a sympto-  matic formation which acts as a fourth ring holding the other three together  (see SINTHOME).  Lacan follows Freud in arguing that while [[Psychosisnothing]] is of great interest for However, from 1950 on, there is a gradual but constant tendency to dissociate psychoanalysis from do with psychology. Lacan begins by arguing that psychology is confined to an understanding of animal psychology (ethol- ogy): 'The psychological is, if we try to grasp it as firmly as possible, the ethological, that is the whole of the biological individual's behaviour in relation to his natural environment' (S3, 7). This is not to say that it cannot say anything about human beings, for humans are also animals, but that it  cannot say anything about that which is uniquely human (although at one point Lacan does state that the theory of the ego and of narcissism 'extend' modern ethological research; Ec, 472). Thus psychology is reduced to general laws of behaviour which apply to all animals, including human beings; Lacan rejects 'the doctrine of a discontinuity between animal psychology and human psychology which is far away from our thought' (Ec, 484). However, Lacan vigorously rejects the behaviourist theory according to which the same general laws of behaviour are sufficient to explain all human psychic phenomena. Only psychoanalysis, which uncovers the linguistic basis of human subjectivity, is adequate to explain those psychic phenomena which are specifically human.  In the 1960s the distance between psychoanalysis and psychology is empha- sised further in Lacan's work. Lacan argues that psychology is essentially a tool of 'technocratic exploitation' (Ec, 851; see Ec, 832), and that it is dominated by the illusions of wholeness and synthesiS, NATURE and instinct, autonomy and self-consciousness (Ec, 832)<ref>{{S17}} p. Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, subverts these illusions cherished by psychology, and in this sense 'the Freudian enunciation has nothing to do with psychology' (Sl7, 144). </ref> For example the most cherished [[illusion ]] of [[psychology ]] is '"the [[unity ]] of the subject' (",<ref>{{E, }} p. 294)</ref>, and [[psychoanalysis ]] subverts this [[notion ]] by demonstrating that the [[subject ]] is irremediably [[split ]] or 'barred'"[[bar]]red".

* [[Analytical psychology]]{{See}}* [[L' Année psychologiqueBar]]* [[Applied psychoanalysis and the interaction of psychoanalysisBiology]]* [[Archives de psychologie, Les]]||* [[Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific InterestInstinct]]* [[Claparède,ÉdouardLanguage]]* [[Cognitivism and psychoanalysis]]||* [[Ego psychologyNature]]* [[Janet, PierrePsychoanalysis]]* [[Lagache, Daniel]]||* [[MetapsychologyScience]]* [[Meyerson, IgnaceSplit]]* [[National Psychological Associaton for Psychoanalysis]]* [[Piaget, Jean]]* [[A Project for a Scientific Psychology]]||* [[Psychological typesSubject]]* [[Self psychology]]{{Also}}

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