Difference between revisions of "Reality Principle"

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[[Real]]ity principle (principe de rÈalitÈ) According to Freud, the
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{{Top}}principe de réalité{{Bottom}}
  
psyche is at first regulated entirely by the PLEASURE PRINCIPLE, Which seeks to
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==Sigmund Freud==
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According to [[Freud]], the [[psyche]] is at first regulated entirely by the [[pleasure principle]], which seeks to [[experience]] [[satisfaction]] via a [[hallucinatory]] [[cathexis]] of a [[memory]] of [[time|prior]] [[satisfaction]].
  
experience satisfaction via a hallucinatory cathexis of a memory of prior
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However, the [[subject]] soon discovers that [[hallucination|hallucinating]] does not relieve his [[need]]s, and is thus [[forced]] "to [[form]] a conception of the [[real]] circumstances in the [[external]] [[world]]."<ref>[[Freud|Freud, Sigmund]]. "Formulations on the Two Principles of [[Mental]] Functioning." SE XII. 215. 1911. p.219.</ref>
  
satisfaction. However, the subject soon discovers that hallucinating does not
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A new "[[principle]] of mental functioning" is thus introduced (the "[[reality principle]]"), which modifies the [[pleasure principle]] and forces the [[subject]] to take more circuitous routes to [[satisfaction]].
  
relieve his needs, and is thus forced 'to form                a conception of the [[Real]]
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Since, however, the ultimate aim of the [[reality principle]] is still the [[satisfaction]] of the [[drive]]s, it can be said that "the [[substitution]] of the reality principle for the [[pleasure]] principle implies no deposing of the pleasure principle, but only a safeguarding of it."<ref>[[Freud|Freud, Sigmund]]. "Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning." SE XII. 215. 1911. p.223</ref>
  
circumstances in the external world' (Freud, 1911b: SE XII, 219). A new
 
  
'principle of mental functioning' is thus introduced (the '[[Real]]ity principle'),
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==Jacques Lacan==
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From early on, [[Lacan]] is opposed to what he calls "a naive conception of the reality principle."<ref>[[Lacan, Jacques]]. "Some reflections on the ego." ''Int. J. [[Psycho]]-[[Anal]].'' Vol 34. 1953. pp. 11</ref>
  
which modifies the pleasure principle and forces the subject to take              more
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That is, he rejects any account of [[human]] [[development]] based on an unproblematic [[notion]] of "[[reality]]" as an [[objective]] and [[self]]-evident given.
  
circuitous routes to satisfaction. Since, however, the ultimate aim of the
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He emphasizes [[Freud]]'s [[position]] that the [[reality principle]] is still ultimately in the serve of the [[pleasure principle]].
  
[[Real]]ity principle is still the satisfaction of the drives, it can be said that 'the
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<blockquote>"The reality principle is a delayed [[action]] pleasrue principle."<ref>{{S2}} p.60</ref></blockquote>
  
substitution of the [[Real]]ity principle for the pleasure principle implies                no
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[[Lacan]] thus challenges the [[idea]] that the [[subject]] has access to an infallible means of distinguishing between [[reality]] and [[fantasy]].
  
deposing of the pleasure principle, but only            a safeguarding of it' (Freud,
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<blockquote>"[R]eality isn't jus tthere so that we bump our heads up against the [[false]] paths along which the functioning of the pleasure principle leads us.  In [[truth]], we make reality out of pleasure."<ref>{{S7}} p.225</ref></blockquote>
  
1911b: SE XII, 223).
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==See Also==
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{{See}}
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* [[Desire]]
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* [[Fantasy]]
 +
||
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* [[Pleasure Principle]]
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* [[Reality]]
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{{Also}}
  
      From early on, Lacan is opposed to what he calls 'a naive conception of the
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==References==
 
 
[[Real]]ity principle' (1951b: ll). That is, he rejects any account of human
 
 
 
development based on an unproblematic notion of '[[Real]]ity'          as an objective
 
 
 
and self-evident given. He emphasises Freud's position that the [[Real]]ity prin-
 
 
 
ciple is still ultimately in the service of the pleasure principle; 'the [[Real]]ity
 
 
 
principle is a delayed action pleasure principle' (S2, 60). Lacan thus chal-
 
 
 
lenges the idea that the subject has access to an infallible means of distinguish-
 
 
 
ing between [[Real]]ity and [[Fantasy]]. '[R]eality isn't just there so that we bump our
 
 
 
heads up against the false paths along which the functioning of the pleasure
 
 
 
principle leads us. In truth, we make [[Real]]ity out of pleasure' (S7, 225).
 
 
 
 
 
== def ==
 
Respectively, the desire for immediate gratification vs. the deferral of that gratification. Quite simply, the pleasure-principle drives one to seek pleasure and to avoid pain. However, as one grows up, one begins to learn the need sometimes to endure pain and to defer gratification because of the exigencies and obstacles of reality: "An ego thus educated has become 'reasonable'; it no longer lets itself be governed by the pleasure principle, but obeys the reality principle, which also at bottom seeks to obtain pleasure, but pleasure which is assured through taking account of reality, even though it is pleasure postponed and diminished" (Introductory Lectures 16.357).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
== References ==
 
 
<references/>
 
<references/>
  
[[Category:Lacan]]
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[[Category:Jacques Lacan]]
 
[[Category:Terms]]
 
[[Category:Terms]]
 
[[Category:Concepts]]
 
[[Category:Concepts]]
 
[[Category:Psychoanalysis]]
 
[[Category:Psychoanalysis]]
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[[Category:Freudian psychology]]
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[[Category:Real]]
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[[Category:Symbolic]]
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[[Category:Dictionary]]

Revision as of 21:57, 20 May 2019

French: principe de réalité

Sigmund Freud

According to Freud, the psyche is at first regulated entirely by the pleasure principle, which seeks to experience satisfaction via a hallucinatory cathexis of a memory of prior satisfaction.

However, the subject soon discovers that hallucinating does not relieve his needs, and is thus forced "to form a conception of the real circumstances in the external world."[1]

A new "principle of mental functioning" is thus introduced (the "reality principle"), which modifies the pleasure principle and forces the subject to take more circuitous routes to satisfaction.

Since, however, the ultimate aim of the reality principle is still the satisfaction of the drives, it can be said that "the substitution of the reality principle for the pleasure principle implies no deposing of the pleasure principle, but only a safeguarding of it."[2]


Jacques Lacan

From early on, Lacan is opposed to what he calls "a naive conception of the reality principle."[3]

That is, he rejects any account of human development based on an unproblematic notion of "reality" as an objective and self-evident given.

He emphasizes Freud's position that the reality principle is still ultimately in the serve of the pleasure principle.

"The reality principle is a delayed action pleasrue principle."[4]

Lacan thus challenges the idea that the subject has access to an infallible means of distinguishing between reality and fantasy.

"[R]eality isn't jus tthere so that we bump our heads up against the false paths along which the functioning of the pleasure principle leads us. In truth, we make reality out of pleasure."[5]

See Also

References

  1. Freud, Sigmund. "Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning." SE XII. 215. 1911. p.219.
  2. Freud, Sigmund. "Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning." SE XII. 215. 1911. p.223
  3. Lacan, Jacques. "Some reflections on the ego." Int. J. Psycho-Anal. Vol 34. 1953. pp. 11
  4. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book II. The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-55. Trans. Sylvana Tomaselli. New York: Nortion; Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press, 1988. p.60
  5. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book VII. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-60. Trans. Dennis Porter. London: Routledge, 1992. p.225