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Saussure's Concept of the Sign

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<blockquote><blockquote>[[[Saussure ]] introduces the [[structuralist ]] point of view into[[linguistics ]] which is marked first of all by giving special relief tothe [[synchronic ]] [[dimension ]] in the study of [[language]]. Thesynchronic dimension is distinguished from the [[diachronic]], thatis, historic. The [[idea ]] is that an account of the [[present ]] [[meaning]]of [[words ]] and sentences, i.e. semantics, can't be reduced to a

historical study. This may seem obvious to us, but the study of

[[linguistic ]] meaning prior to Saussure had been historical withconsiderations of [[structure ]] limited largely to a consideration ofgrammar. The idea is that meaning, or [[signification]], depends onthe SYSTEM of language given by a [[number ]] of laws of equilibriumwhich constitute the relative systemic [[stability ]] of linguisticmeaning at the [[moment ]] when, in virtue of this [[system]], onespeaks. So we have the [[distinction ]] between la [[langue]] and la[[parole]]. Language is the articulated use of the system, la langue

in [[speech]], la parole. La langue is language minus la parole. It isdifficult to overestimate the [[significance ]] of Saussure's idea fora [[whole ]] generation of [[French ]] thinkers. For insofar as languageenters into the determination of a whole variety of [[social]]

phenomena, its effects as structure enter in as well. Post

structuralist thinkers remain in debt to Saussure for however

[[dynamic ]] and open-textured[[structures ]] come to be, one

can't go back to purely

historical modes of

[[interpretation]]. The[[structuring ]] effects of[[discourse]], the [[agency ]] of the[[letter ]] in [[Lacan]]'s [[terms]], must be taken into account.]</blockquote>

<blockquote>1. [[Sign]], [[Signified]], [[Signifier]]

Some people regard language, when reduced to its elements, as

a naming-[[process ]] only‹a [[list ]] of words, each corresponding to the

[[thing ]] that it names. For example:

This conception is open to criticism at several points. It assumes

that ready-made [[ideas ]] [[exist ]] before words (on this point, see below, p. 111); it does not tell us whether a [[name ]] is vocal or [[psychological]]

in [[nature ]] (arbor, for [[instance]], can be considered from either view-

point); finally, it lets us assume that the linking of a name and a

thing is a very simple operation‹an assumption that is anything

but [[true]]. But this rather naive approach can bring us near the [[truth ]] by showing us that the linguistic unit is a [[double ]] entity, one

formed by the associating of two terms

The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept

and a sound-[[image]].[l] The latter is not the [[material ]] sound, a purely [[physical ]] thing, but the psychological imprint of the sound, the

impression that it makes on our senses. The sound-image is sensory,

and if I happen to call it "material,"' it is only in that [[sense]], and by way of opposing it to the [[other ]] term of the [[association]], the [[concept]],

which is generally more abstract.

parent when we observe our own speech. Without moving our lips

or tongue, we can talk to ourselves or recite mentally a selection of

verse. Because we [[regard ]] the words of our language as sound- [[images]], we must avoid [[speaking ]] of the "phonemes" that make up the words. This term, which suggests vocal [[activity]], is applicable to the spoken [[word ]] only, to the realization of the inner image in

discourse. We can avoid that misunderstanding by speaking of the

sounds and syllables of a word provided we [[remember ]] that the

names refer to the sound-image.

The two elements are intimately united, and each recalls the

other. Whether we try to find the meaning of the [[Latin ]] word arbor

or the word that Latin uses to designate the concept "tree," it is

1. The term sound-image may seem to be too restricted inasmuch as beside

the [[representation ]] of the sounds of a word there is also that of its articulation,

tbe muscular image of the phonational act. But for F. de Saussure language is

essentially a depository, a thing received from without (see p. 13). The sound

image is par excellence the [[natural ]] representation of the word as a fact of potential language, [[outside ]] any actual use of it in speaking. The motor side is thus implied or, in any [[event]], occupies only a subordinate [[role ]] with respect

to the sound-image. [Ed.]

clear that only the [[associations ]] sanctioned by that language appeal to us to conform to [[reality]], and we disregard whatever [[others]]

might be imagined.

Ambiguity would disappear if the three notions involved here

were designated by [[three ]] names, each suggesting and opposing the others. I propose to retain the word sign [[[signe]]] to designate the

whole and to replace concept and sound-image respectively by

[signifié] and

signifier

[[[signifiant]]];

the last two

terms have

the advantage of indicating the opposition that separates [[them]]

from each other and from the whole of which they are parts. As

regards sign, if I am [[satisfied ]] with it, this is simply because I do not [[know ]] of any word to replace it, the ordinary language suggesting

no other.

any study of this type.

2. [[Principle ]] 1: The [[Arbitrary ]] Nature of the Sign

The bond between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary.

the succession of sounds s-ö-r which serves as its signifier in French;

that it could be represented equally by just any other sequence is

proved by differences among [[languages ]] and by the very [[existence]]

of different languages: the signified "ox" has as its signifier b-ô-f

No one disputes the principle of the arbitrary nature of the sign,

but it is often easier to discover a truth than to assign to it its

proper [[place]]. Principle I dominates all the linguistics of language;

its consequences are numberless. It is true that not all of them are

One remark in passing: when semiology becomes organized as

a [[science]], the question will arise whether or not it properly includes modes of expression based on completely natural [[signs]], such as

pantomime. Supposing that the new science welcomes them, its

main concern will still be the whole group of systems grounded on

the arbitrariness of the sign. In fact, every means of expression used

in [[society ]] is based, in principle, on collective [[behavior ]] or‹what amounts to the same thing‹on convention. Polite [[formulas]], for

instance, though often imbued with a certain natural expressive-

ness (as in the [[case ]] of a Chinese who greets his emperor by bowing down to the ground nine [[times]]), are nonetheless fixed by rule; it is this rule and not the intrinsic [[value ]] of the gestures that obliges one

to use them. Signs that are wholly arbitrary realize better than the

others the [[ideal ]] of the semiological process; that is why language,

the most [[complex ]] and [[universal ]] of all systems of expression, is also

the most characteristic; in this sense linguistics can become the

[[master]]-pattern for all branches of [[semiology ]] although language is only one [[particular ]] semiological system.

The word symbol has been used to designate the linguistic sign,

particular weighs against the use of this term. One characteristic

of the [[symbol ]] is that it is never wholly arbitrary; it is not empty,

for there is the rudiment of a natural bond between the signifier

and the signified. The symbol of justice, a pair of scales, could not

The word arbitrary also calls ior commcnt. The term should not

imply that the [[choice ]] of the signifier is [[left ]] entirely to the [[speaker]] (we shall see below that the [[individual ]] does not have the [[power ]] to [[change ]] a sign in any way once it has become established in the linguistic [[community]]); I mean that it is unmotivated, i.e. arbitrary

in that it actually has no natural connection with the signified.

In concluding let us consider two objections that might be raised

1) Onomatopoeia might be used to prove that the choice of the

signifier is not always arbitrary. But onomatopoeic [[formations ]] are never [[organic ]] elements of a linguistic system. Besides, their number

is much smaller than is generally supposed. Words like French

fouet 'whip' or glas 'knell' may strike certain ears with suggestive

sonority, but to see that they have not always had this property

we [[need ]] only examine their Latin forms (fouet is derived from fagus

'beech-tree,' glas from classicum 'sound of a trumpet'). The quality

somewhat arbitrarily, for they are only approximate and more or

less conventional imitations of certain sounds (cf. [[English ]] bo~boto

and French ouaoua). In addition, once these words have been intro-

duced into the language, they are to a certain extent subjected to

the same evolution‹phonetic, morphological, etc.‹that other

words undergo (cf. pigeon, ultimately from Vulgar Latin pipio,

derived in turn from an onomatopoeic [[formation]]): obvious proof

that they lose something of their original [[character ]] in [[order ]] to

assume that of the linguistic sign in general, which is unmotivated.

2) Interjections, closely related to onomatopoeia, can be at-

tacked on the same grounds and come no closer to refuting our

[[thesis]]. One is tempted to see in them spontaneous expressions of reality dictated, so to [[speak]], by natural forces. But for most inter-

jectlons we can show that there is no fixed bond between their sig-

guage to the next (e.g. the English equivalent of French aie! is

ouch!). We know, moreover, that many interjections were once

words with specific [[meanings ]] (cf. French diable! 'darn!' mordieu!

'golly!' from [[mort ]] Dieu 'God's [[death]],' etc.).'

Onomatopoeic formations and interjections are of secondary

irnportance, and their [[symbolic ]] origin is in part open to dispute.

which it gets the following characteristics: (a) it represents a span,

and (b) the span is measurable in a single dimension; it is a line.

While Principle II is obvious, apparently [[linguists ]] have always neglected to [[state ]] it, doubtless because they found it too simple;

nevertheless, it is fundamental, and its consequences are incal-

culable. Its importance equals that of Principle I; the whole

[[mechanism ]] of language depends upon it (see p. 122 f.). In contrast

to [[visual ]] [[signifiers ]] (nautical signals, etc.) which can offer simul-

taneous groupings in several dimensions, auditory signifiers have

at their command only the dimension of [[time]]. Their elements are presented in succession; they [[form ]] a [[chain]]. This feature becomes readily [[apparent ]] when they are represented in [[writing ]] and the

spatial line of graphic marks is substituted for succession in time.

more than one significant element on the same point. But this is an

[[illusion]]; the syllable and its accent constitute only one phonational act. There is no [[duality ]] within the act but only different op- positions to what precedes and what follows (on this [[subject]], see

p. 131).

The signifier, tbough to all appearances freely chosen with re-

spect to the idea that it represcnts, iæ fixed, not free, with respect

to the linguistic community that uses it. The masses have no [[voice]]

in the matter, and the signifier chosen by language could be re-

placed by no other. This fact, which seems to embody a contradic-

way at all the choice that hag been made; and what is more, the

community itself cannot [[control ]] so much as a single word; it is

bound to the existing language.

No longer can language be identified with a contract pure and

simple, and it is precisely from this viewpoint that the linguistic

sign is a particularly interesting [[object ]] of study; for language

furnishes the best proof that a law accepted by a community is a

thing that is tolerated and not a rule to which all freely consent.

guage always appears as a heritage of the preceding period. We

might conceive of an act by which, at a given moment, names were

assigned to things and a contract was formed between [[concepts]]

and sound-images; but such an act has never been recorded. The

[[notion ]] that things might have happened like that was prompted by our acute [[awareness ]] of the arbitrary nature of the sign-

No society, in fact, knows or has ever known language other than

accepted as such. That is why the question of the origin of speech

is not so important as it is generally assumed to be. The question

is not even worth asking; the only [[real ]] object of linguistics is the normal, regular [[life ]] of an existing idiom. A particular language-

state is always the product of historical forces, and these forces

explain why the sign is unchangeable, i.e. why it resists any

arbitrary [[substitution]].

Nothing is explained by saying that language is something

To meet that objection, we must put language into its social

setting and [[frame ]] the question just as we would for any other

social institution. How are other social ingtitutions transmitted?

This more general question includes the question of immutability.

We must first determine the greater or lesser amounts of [[freedom]] that the other institutions [[enjoy]]; in each instance it will be seen that a different proportion [[exists ]] between fixed [[tradition ]] and the free [[action ]] of society. The next step is to discover why in a given [[category]], the forces of the first type carry more weight or less

weight than those of the second. Finally, coming back to language,

There are many possible answers to the question. For example,

one might point to the fact that succeeding generations are not

superimposed on one [[another ]] like the drawers of a piece of furni-

ture, but fuse and interpenetrate, each generation embracing in-

dividuals of all ages‹with the result that modifications of language

are not tied to the succession of generations. One might also [[recall]]

the sum of the efforts required for learning the [[mother ]] language and conclude that a general change would be [[impossible]]. Again, it might be added that [[reflection ]] does not enter into the [[active ]] use of an idiom‹speakers are largely [[unconscious ]] of the laws of lan-

guage; and if they are unaware of them, how could they modify

them? Even if they were aware of these laws, we may be sure that

their awareness would seldom lead to criticism, for [[people ]] are

generally satisfied with the language they have received.

1) The arbitrary nature of the sign. Above, we had to accept the

[[theoretical ]] possibility of change; further reflection suggests that

the arbitrary nature of the sign is really what protects language

from any attempt to modify it. Even if people were more [[conscious]]

of language than they are, they would still not know how to discuss

it. The [[reason ]] is simply that any subject in order to be discussed

must have a reasonable basis. It is possible, for instance, to discuss

whether the monogamous form of [[marriage ]] is more reasonable than

the polygamous form and to advance arguments to support either

side. One could also argue [[about ]] a system of [[symbols]], for the sym- bol has a [[rational ]] [[relationship ]] with [[the thing ]] signified (see p. 68); but language is a system of arbitrary signs and [[lacks ]] the necessary basis, the solid ground for [[discussion]]. There is no reason for

preferring soeur to sister, Ochs to boeuf, etc.

system. In this one respect (as we shall see later) language is not

completely arbitrary but is ruled to some extent by [[logic]]; it is

here also, however, that the inability of the masses to transform

it becomes apparcnt. The system is a complex mechanism that can

be grasped only through reflection; the very ones who use it daily

are ignorant of it. We can conceive of a change only through the

[[intervention ]] of specialists, grammarians, logicians, etc.; but ex-

perience shows us that all such meddlings have failed.

4) Collective inertia toward innovation. Language‹and this con-

sideration surpasses all the others‹is at every moment every-

[[body]]'s concern; spread throughout society and manipulated by it,

language is something used daily by all. Here we are unable to set

up any comparison between it and other institutions- The pre-

scriptions of [[codes]], [[religious ]] rites, nautical signals, etc., involve

only a certain number of individuals simultaneously and then only

during a limited period of time; in language, on the contrary, every-

one participates at all times, and that is why it is constantly [[being]] influenced by all. This [[capital ]] fact suffices to show the [[impossibility]] of [[revolution]]. Of all [[social institutions]], language is least amenable

to initiative. It blends with the life of society, and the latter, inert

by nature, is a prime [[conservative ]] force.

But to say that language is a product of social forces does not

suffice to show clearly that it is unfree; [[remembering ]] that it is

always the heritage of the preceding period, we must add that these

social forces are linked with time. Language is checked not only by

the weight of the collectivity but also by time. These two are in-

separable. At every moment [[solidarity ]] with the [[past ]] checks free-

dom of choice. We say man and dog. This does not prevent the

existence in the [[total ]] phenomenon of a bond between the two

antithetical forces‹arbitrary convention by virtue of which choice

into detail, let us see what things need to be delineated.

First, let there be no mistake about the meaning that we attach

to the word change. One might [[think ]] that it deals especially with

phonetic changes undergone by the signifier, or perhaps changes in

meaning which [[affect ]] the signified concept. That view would be

inadequate. Regardless of what the forces of change are, whether

in [[isolation ]] or in combination, they always result in a shift in the

relationship between the signified and the signifer.

in French. Both the gound-image and the concept changed; but it

is useless to [[separate ]] the two parts of the phenomenon; it is

sufficient to state with respect to the whole that the bond between

the idea and the sign was loosened, and that there was a shift in

ship was changed in two ways: the signifier was changed not only

in its material aspect but also in its [[grammatical ]] form; the idea of

Teil 'part' is no longer implied; Drittel is a simple word. In one way

or another there is always a shift in the relationship.

Unlike language, other human institutions‹customs, laws, etc.

‹are all based in varying degrees on the natural relations of things;

all have of [[necessity ]] adapted the means employed to the ends

pursued. Even fashion in dress is not entirely arbitrary; we can

deviate only slightly from the [[conditions ]] dictated by the [[human]] body. Language is limited by [[nothing ]] in the choice of means, for

apparently nothing would prevent the associating of any idea

whatsoever with just any sequence of sounds.

Mutability is so inescapable that it even holds true for artificial

languages. Whoever creates a language controls it only so long as

it is not in [[circulation]]; from the moment when it fulfills its mission

and becomes the property of everyone, control is lost. Take Es-

law? Once launched, it is quite likely that Esperanto will enter

upon a fully semiological life; it will be transmitted according to

laws which have nothing in common with those of its [[logical ]] cre-

ation, and there will be no turning backwards. A man proposing

a fixed language that posterity would have to accept for what it is

But what supports the necessity for change? I might be re-

proached for not having been as [[explicit ]] on this point as on the

principle of immutability. This is because I failed to distinguish

between the different forces of change. We must consider their

great variety in order to [[understand ]] the extent to which they are

necessary.

The causes of continuity are a priori within the scope of the

[[observer]], but the causes of change in time are not. It is better not

to attempt giving an exact account at this point, but to restrict

discussion to the shifting of relationships in general. Time changes

of linguistic habits which allow an individual to understand and

to be [[understood]].

2) But this definition still leaves language outside its social con-

[[text]]; it makes language something artificial since it includes only

the individual part of reality; for the realization of language, a

community of speakers [masse parlante] is necessary. Contrary to

for it is a semiological phenomenon. Its social nature is one of its

inner characteristics. Its [[complete ]] definition confronts us with two

inseparable entities, as shown in this drawing:

nature, considered independently, does not definitely rule out this

viewpoint. Doubtless it is not on a purely logical basis that group

[[psychology ]] operates; one must consider everything that deflects

reason in actual contacts between individuals. But the thing which

If we congidered language in time, without the community of

speakers--imagine an isolated individual [[living ]] for several cen-

turies‹we probably would notice no change; time would not

influence language. Conversely, if we considered the community

of speakers without considering time, we would not see the effect

of the social forces that influence language. To [[represent ]] the actual

facts, we must then add to our first drawing a sign to indicate

passage of time:

Language is no longer free, for time will allow the social forces

at [[work ]] on it to carry out their effects. This brings us back to the

principle of continuity, which cancels freedom. But continuity

necessarily implies change, varying degrees of shifts in the relation

(from Saussure's Course in

General Linguistics (Phil [[Library]], 1966) pp. 65-78.)

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