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{{Top}}scientific|science]]''; |-|| [[German]]: ''[[Wissenschaft{{Bottom}}

Both [[Freud]] and [[Lacan]] use the term "[[science]]" in the [[singular]], thus implying that there is a specific [[unified]], homogeneous kind of [[discourse]] that can be called "[[science|scientific]]".

On the one hand, he criticizes [[science|modern science]] for ignoring the [[symbolic]] [[dimension ]] of [[human]] [[existence]] and thus encouraging modern man "to forget his [[subjectivity]]."<ref>{{E}} p. 70</ref>.

He also compares [[science|modern science]] to a "fully realised [[paranoia]]," in the [[sense ]] that its totalizing constructions resemble the architecture of a [[delusion]].<ref>{{Ec}} p.874</ref>

On the [[other ]] hand, these criticisms are not levelled at [[science]] per se, but at the [[science|positivist model]] of [[science]].

[[Lacan]] implies that [[science|positivism]] is actually a deviation from "[[science|true science]]", and his own [[model ]] of [[science]] owes more to the [[science|rationalism]] of Koyré, Bachelard and Canguilhem than to [[science|empiricism]].

In other [[words]], for [[Lacan]], what marks a [[discourse]] as [[science|scientific]] is a high degree of [[mathematical]] [[formalization]].

This is what lies behind [[Lacan]]'s attempts to [[formalize]] [[psychoanalytic theory]] in [[terms ]] of various [[mathematical]] [[algebra|formulae]].

[[Lacan]] argues that [[science]] is characterized by a [[particular ]] [[relationship ]] to [[truth]].

On the one hand, it attempts to monopolize [[truth]] as its exclusive property <ref>{{Ec}} p. 79</ref>; and, on the other hand, [[science]] is in fact based on a [[foreclosure]] of the [[concept ]] of [[truth]] as [[cause]].<ref>{{Ec}} p. 874</ref>.

[[Science]] is also characterised by a particular relationship to [[knowledge]] (''[[knowledge|savoir]]''), in that [[science]] is based on the [[exclusion ]] of any access to [[knowledge]] by recourse to intuition and thus forces all the [[search ]] for [[knowledge]] to follow only the path of [[reason]].<ref>{{Ec}} p. 831</ref>.

The [[subject|modern subject]] is the "[[science|subject of science]]" in the sense that this exclusively [[rational ]] route to [[knowledge]] is now a common presupposition.

In [[stating ]] that [[psychoanalysis]] operates only the [[subject]] of [[science]],<ref>{{Ec}} p. 858</ref> [[Lacan]] is arguing that [[psychoanalysis]] is not based on any appeal to an ineffable [[experience ]] or flash of intuition, but on a [[process ]] of reasoned dialogue, even when reason confronts its [[limit ]] in [[madness]].

Although the [[distinction ]] between the [[science|human sciences]] and the [[science|natural sciences]] had become quite well-established by the end of the nineteenth century, it does not [[figure ]] in [[Freud]]'s [[work]].

<blockquote>The opposition between the [[science|exact sciences]] and the [[science|conjectural sciences]] can no longer be sustained from the [[moment ]] when conjecture is susceptible to an exact calculation and when exactitude is based only on a formalism which separates axioms and [[law]]s of grouping [[symbol]]s.<ref>{{Ec}} p. 863</ref></blockquote>

Whereas in the last century physics provided a paradigm of exactitude for the [[science|exact sciences]] which made the [[science|conjectural sciences]] seem sloppy by comparison, the arrival on the [[scene ]] of [[structuralism|structural]] [[linguistics]] redressed the imbalance by providing an equally exact paradigm for the [[science|conjectural sciences]].

When [[Freud]] borrowed terms from other [[science]]s, it was always from the [[science|natural sciences]] because these were the only [[science]]s around in [[Freud]]'s day that provided a model of rigorous investigation and [[thought]].

[[Lacan]] differs from [[Freud]] by importing [[concepts ]] mainly from the "[[science]]s of subjectivity," and by aligning [[psychoanalytic theory]] with these rather than with the [[science|natural sciences]].

In other words, whenever [[Freud]] borrowed concepts from [[biology]] he reformulated those concepts so radically that he created a totally new paradigm which was quite [[alien ]] to its [[biological]] origins.

Thus, according to [[Lacan]], [[Freud]] anticipated the findings of modern [[structural]] [[linguists]] such as [[Saussure]], and his work can be better [[understood ]] in the light of these [[linguistics|linguistic concepts]].

[[Freud]] was quite [[explicit ]] in affirming the [[science|scientific status]] of [[psychoanalysis]]:

<blockquote>"While it was originally the [[name ]] of a particular therapeutic method [...] it has now also become the name of a [[science]] - the [[science]] of [[unconscious ]] [[mental ]] [[processes]]."<ref>{{F}} ''[[Works of Sigmund Freud|An Autobiographical Study]]'', 1925a: [[SE]] XX, 70</ref></blockquote>

However, he also insisted on the unique [[character ]] of [[psychoanalysis]] that sets it apart from the other [[science]]s:

<blockquote>"Every [[science]] is based on observations and experiences arrived at through the medium of our [[psychical ]] [[apparatus]]. But since our [[science]] has as its subject that apparatus itself, the analogy ends here."<ref>{{F}} ''[[Works of Sigmund Freud|An Outline of Psycho-Analysis]]'', 1940a [1938]: [[SE]] XXIII, 159</ref></blockquote>

In his pre-war writings, [[psychoanalysis]] is seen unreservedly in scientific terms.<ref>{{L}} "[[Work of Jacques Lacan|Au-delà du 'principe de realité']]", 1936. {{E}} pp. 73-92</ref>.

However, after 1950 [[Lacan]]'s attitude to the question becomes much more [[complex]].

In 1953, he states that in the opposition [[science]] versus [[art]], [[psychoanalysis]] can be located on the side of [[art]], on condition that the term "[[art]]" is understood in the sense in which it was used in the Middle Ages, when the "[[liberal ]] [[arts]]" included arithmetic, geometry, [[music ]] and grammar.<ref>{{L}} 1953b"[[Works of Jacques Lacan|The Neurotic's Individual Myth]]," trans. Martha Evans, in L. Spurling (ed.), ''[[Sigmund Freud]]: Critical Assessments'', vol. II, ''The [[Theory]] and [[Practice]] of Psychoanalysis'', [[London]] and New York: Routledge, 1989, p. 224. [Originally published in ''[[Psychoanalytic]] Quaterly'', 48 (1979)].</ref>

However, in the opposition [[science]] versus [[religion]], [[Lacan]] follows [[Freud]] in arguing that [[psychoanalysis]] has more in common with [[science|scientific discourse ]] than [[religion|religious discourse]]:

If, as [[Lacan]] argues, a [[science]] is only constituted as such by isolating and defining its particular object of enquiry,<ref>[[Lacan]] argues that [[psychoanalysis]] has actually set [[psychology]] on a scientific footing by providing it with a proper object of enquiry -- the [[imago]]; <ref>{{L}} "[[Work of Jacques Lacan|Propos sur la causalité psychique]]", in {{E}} [1946]. pp. 151-93</ref>; {{Ec}} p. 188</ref> then, when in 1965 he isolates the ''[[objet petit a]]'' as the [[object]] of [[psychoanalysis]], he is in effect claiming a [[science|scientific status]] for [[psychoanalysis]].<ref>{{Ec}} p.863</ref>. ---

<blockquote>Psychoanalysis is not a [[science]]. It has no scientific status - it merely waits and hopes for it. Psychoanalysis is a delusion - a delusion which is expected to produce a [[science]]. . . . It is a scientific delusion, but this doesn't mean that [[analytic ]] practice will ever produce a [[science]]. <ref>{{L}} ''[[Seminar XXIV| Le Séminaire. Livre XXIV. L'insu que sait de l'une bévue s'aile à mourre, 1976-777'', published in ''Ornicar?'', nos 12-18, 1977-9; seminar [[Seminar]] of 11 January 1977; ''[[Ornicar?]]'', 14: 4</ref></blockquote>

However, even when [[Lacan]] makes such statements, he never abandons the [[project ]] of [[formalizing]] [[psychoanalytic theory]] in [[linguistic]] and [[mathematical]] terms.

Indeed, the tension between the [[science|scientific formalism]] of the [[matheme]] and the semantic profusion of ''[[lalangue]]'' constitutes one of the most interesting features of [[Lacan]]'s later work.