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{{Top}}scientific|science (science) Both Freud and Lacan use the term ]]''|-|| [[German]]: 'science' in the[[Wissenschaft{{Bottom}}
=====Scientific Discourse=====Both [[Freud]] and [[Lacan]] use the term "[[science]]" in the [[singular]], thus implying that there is a specific [[unified]], homogeneous kind of[[discourse]] that can be called "[[science|scientific]]".
discourse that can be called 'scientific'. This [[discourse ]] begins, according to[[Lacan]], in the seventeenth century <ref>{{Ec}} p. 857</ref>, with the inauguration of modern physics.<ref>{{Ec}} p. 855</ref>.
Lacan, in the seventeenth century (Ec, 857)=====Sigmund Freud==========Science and Religion=====[[Freud]] regarded [[science]] as one of [[civilization]]'s highest achievements, with and opposed it to the inauguration reactionary forces of modern[[religion]].
physics (Ec, 855)=====Jacques Lacan=====[[Lacan]]'s attitude to [[science]] is more ambiguous.
Freud regarded On the one hand, he criticizes [[science (Ger|modern science]] for ignoring the [[symbolic]] [[dimension]] of [[human]] [[existence]] and thus encouraging modern man "to forget his [[subjectivity]]."<ref>{{E}} p. 70</ref>. Wissenschaft - a term with markedly different
connotations He also compares [[science|modern science]] to a "fully realised [[paranoia]]," in German) as one the [[sense]] that its totalizing constructions resemble the architecture of civilisation's highest achievements, anda [[delusion]].<ref>{{Ec}} p.874</ref>
opposed it to =====Positivist Model=====On the reactionary forces [[other]] hand, these criticisms are not levelled at [[science]] per se, but at the [[science|positivist model]] of RELIGION[[science]]. Lacan's attitude to science is
[[Lacan]] implies that [[science|positivism]] is actually a deviation from "[[science|true science]]", and his own [[model]] of [[science]] owes more ambiguous. On to the one hand[[science|rationalism]] of Koyré, he criticises modern Bachelard and Canguilhem than to [[science for ignoring|empiricism]].
the =====Formalization=====In other [[Symbolicwords]] dimension , for [[Lacan]], what marks a [[discourse]] as [[science|scientific]] is a high degree of human existence and thus encouraging modern man[[mathematical]] [[formalization]].
This is what lies behind [[Lacan]]'s attempts to forget his subjectivity' (E, 70)[[formalize]] [[psychoanalytic theory]] in [[terms]] of various [[mathematical]] [[algebra|formulae]]. He also compares modern science to a 'fully
These [[Realalgebra|formulae]] also encapsulate a further characteristic of [[science|scientific discourse]]ised paranoia', in the sense which is that its totalising constructions resemble theit should be transmissible.<ref>{{TV}} p. 60</ref>.
architecture of =====Truth=====[[Lacan]] argues that [[science]] is characterized by a delusion (Ec, 874)[[particular]] [[relationship]] to [[truth]].
On the one hand, it attempts to monopolize [[truth]] as its exclusive property <ref>{{Ec}} p. 79</ref>; and, on the other hand, these criticisms are not levelled at [[science per se, but at]] is in fact based on a [[foreclosure]] of the [[concept]] of [[truth]] as [[cause]].<ref>{{Ec}} p. 874</ref>.
=====Knowledge=====[[Science]] is also characterised by a particular relationship to [[knowledge]] (''[[knowledge|savoir]]''), in that [[science]] is based on the [[exclusion]] of any access to [[knowledge]] by recourse to intuition and thus forces all the [[search]] for [[knowledge]] to follow only the positivist model path of science[[reason]].<ref>{{Ec}} p. 831</ref>. Lacan implies that positivism is actually a
deviation from 'true ====="Subject of Science"=====The [[subject|modern subject]] is the "[[science', and his own model |subject of science owes more ]]" in the sense that this exclusively [[rational]] route to the[[knowledge]] is now a common presupposition.
rationalism In [[stating]] that [[psychoanalysis]] operates only the [[subject]] of KoyrÈ[[science]], Bachelard and Canguilhem than <ref>{{Ec}} p. 858</ref> [[Lacan]] is arguing that [[psychoanalysis]] is not based on any appeal to empiricisman ineffable [[experience]] or flash of intuition, but on a [[process]] of reasoned dialogue, even when reason confronts its [[limit]] in [[madness]]. In other
words=====Human And Natural Sciences=====Although the [[distinction]] between the [[science|human sciences]] and the [[science|natural sciences]] had become quite well-established by the end of the nineteenth century, for Lacan, what marks a discourse as scientific is a high degree ofit does not [[figure]] in [[Freud]]'s [[work]].
mathematical formalisation. This is what lies behind [[Lacan's attempts ]], on the other hand, pays great attention tothis distinction.
formalise psychoanalytic theory in terms However, rather than talking of various mathematical formulaethe "[[science|human sciences]]" and the "[[science|natural sciences]]", [[Lacan]] prefers instead to talk of the "[[science|conjectural sciences]]" and the "[[science|exact sciences]]."
(see MATHEMATICS=====Conjectural and Exact Sciences=====Whereas the [[science|exact sciences]] concern the field of phenomena in which there is no one who uses a [[signifier]], ALGEBRA)<ref>{{S3}} p. 186</ref> the [[science|conjectural sciences]] are fundamentally different because they concern beings who inhabit the [[symbolic]] [[order]]. These formulae also encapsulate a further
characteristic of scientific discourse (perhaps In 1965, however, [[Lacan]] problematizes the most fundamental one indistinction between [[science|conjectural]] and [[science|exact]] [[science]]s:
Lacan'<blockquote>The opposition between the [[science|exact sciences]] and the [[science|conjectural sciences]] can no longer be sustained from the [[moment]] when conjecture is susceptible to an exact calculation and when exactitude is based only on a formalism which separates axioms and [[law]]s view), which is that it should be transmissible (Lacan, 1973a: 60)of grouping [[symbol]]s.<ref>{{Ec}} p.863</ref></blockquote>
Lacan argues that Whereas in the last century physics provided a paradigm of exactitude for the [[science is characterised |exact sciences]] which made the [[science|conjectural sciences]] seem sloppy by a particular relationship tocomparison, the arrival on the [[scene]] of [[structuralism|structural]] [[linguistics]] redressed the imbalance by providing an equally exact paradigm for the [[science|conjectural sciences]].
TRUTH. On the one hand=====Natural Sciences=====When [[Freud]] borrowed terms from other [[science]]s, it attempts (illegitimately, thinks Lacan) to mono-was always from the [[science|natural sciences]] because these were the only [[science]]s around in [[Freud]]'s day that provided a model of rigorous investigation and [[thought]].
polise truth as its exclusive property (Ec[[Lacan]] differs from [[Freud]] by importing [[concepts]] mainly from the "[[science]]s of subjectivity, 79); " and, on by aligning [[psychoanalytic theory]] with these rather than with the other hand (as Lacan[[science|natural sciences]].
later [[Lacan]] argues), science that this paradigm shift is in fact based on a foreclosure implicit in [[Freud]]'s own reformulations of the concept of truth asconcepts that he borrowed from the [[science|natural sciences]].
cause (Ec=====Structural Linguistics=====In other words, 874)whenever [[Freud]] borrowed concepts from [[biology]] he reformulated those concepts so radically that he created a totally new paradigm which was quite [[alien]] to its [[biological]] origins.
Thus, according to [[ScienceLacan]] is also characterised by a particular relationship tO KNOWLEDGE, [[Freud]] anticipated the findings of modern [[structural]] [[linguists]] such as [[Saussure]], and his work can be better [[understood]] in the light of these [[linguistics|linguistic concepts]].
(savoir), =====Is Psychoanalysis a Science?=====[[Freud]] was quite [[explicit]] in that affirming the [[science is based on the exclusion |scientific status]] of any access to knowledge[[psychoanalysis]]:
by recourse to intuition and thus forces all <blockquote>"While it was originally the search for knowledge to followonly [[name]] of a particular therapeutic method [...] it has now also become the path name of reason (Ec, 831)a [[science]] - the [[science]] of [[unconscious]] [[mental]] [[processes]]. The modern subject is the "<ref>{{F}} ''subject [[Works ofSigmund Freud|An Autobiographical Study]]'', 1925a: [[SE]] XX, 70</ref></blockquote>
science' in However, he also insisted on the sense unique [[character]] of [[psychoanalysis]] that this exclusively rational route to knowledge issets it apart from the other [[science]]s:
now a common presupposition<blockquote>"Every [[science]] is based on observations and experiences arrived at through the medium of our [[psychical]] [[apparatus]]. In stating But since our [[science]] has as its subject that psychoanalysis operates onlyapparatus itself, the analogy ends here."<ref>{{F}} ''[[Works of Sigmund Freud|An Outline of Psycho-Analysis]]'', 1940a [1938]: [[SE]] XXIII, 159</ref></blockquote>
=====Jacques Lacan=====The question of the subject status of science (Ec, 858) Lacan is arguing that [[psychoanalysis ]] and its relationship with other disciplines is notalso one to which [[Lacan]] devotes much attention.
based on any appeal to an ineffable experience or flash In his pre-war writings, [[psychoanalysis]] is seen unreservedly in scientific terms.<ref>{{L}} "[[Work of intuitionJacques Lacan|Au-delà du 'principe de realité']]", but on a1936. {{E}} pp. 73-92</ref>
process of reasoned dialogueHowever, even when reason confronts its limit in madnessafter 1950 [[Lacan]]'s attitude to the question becomes much more [[complex]].
Although =====Art=====In 1953, he states that in the distinction between opposition [[science]] versus [[art]], [[psychoanalysis]] can be located on the human sciences side of [[art]], on condition that the term "[[art]]" is understood in the sense in which it was used in the Middle Ages, when the "[[liberal]] [[arts]]" included arithmetic, geometry, [[music]] and the natural sciencesgrammar.<ref>{{L}} "[[Works of Jacques Lacan|The Neurotic's Individual Myth]]," trans. Martha Evans, in L. Spurling (ed.), ''[[Sigmund Freud]]: Critical Assessments'', vol. II, ''The [[Theory]] and [[Practice]] of Psychoanalysis'', [[London]] and New York: Routledge, 1989, p. 224. [Originally published in ''[[Psychoanalytic]] Quaterly'', 48 (1979)].</ref>
had become quite well-established by =====Religion=====However, in the end of the nineteenth century (thanksopposition [[science]] versus [[religion]], [[Lacan]] follows [[Freud]] in arguing that [[psychoanalysis]] has more in common with [[science|scientific discourse]] than [[religion|religious discourse]]:
to the work of Dilthey), it does <blockquote>"Psychoanalysis is not figure in Freud's worka religion. Lacan, on It proceeds from the othersame status as [[science]] itself."<ref>{{S11}} p. 265</ref></blockquote>
hand=====Scientific Status=====If, pays great attention to this distinctionas [[Lacan]] argues, a [[science]] is only constituted as such by isolating and defining its particular object of enquiry,<ref>[[Lacan]] argues that [[psychoanalysis]] has actually set [[psychology]] on a scientific footing by providing it with a proper object of enquiry -- the [[imago]]; <ref>{{L}} "[[Work of Jacques Lacan|Propos sur la causalité psychique]]", in {{E}} [1946]. pp. 151-93</ref>; {{Ec}} p. However188</ref> then, rather than talking when in 1965 he isolates the ''[[objet petit a]]'' as the [[object]] of the[[psychoanalysis]], he is in effect claiming a [[science|scientific status]] for [[psychoanalysis]].<ref>{{Ec}} p. 863</ref>.
'human sciences' (However, from this point on [[Lacan]] comes increasingly to question this view of [[psychoanalysis]] as a term which Lacan dislikes intensely - see Ec, 859) and the[[science]].
In the same year he states that [[psychoanalysis]] is not a [[science]] but a "practice" ('natural sciences'pratique'') with a "[[science|scientific vocation]]", Lacan prefers instead to talk <ref>{{Ec}} p. 863</ref> though in the same year he also speaks of 'the 'conjectural sciences' (or[[science|psychoanalytic science]]."<ref>{{Ec}} p. 876</ref>.
sciences of subjectivity) and the 'exact sciences'. Whereas the exact sciencesBy 1977 he has become more categorical:
concern the field of phenomena in <blockquote>Psychoanalysis is not a [[science]]. It has no scientific status - it merely waits and hopes for it. Psychoanalysis is a delusion - a delusion which there is no one who uses expected to produce a [[science]]. . . . It is a scientific delusion, but this doesn't mean that [[analytic]] practice will ever produce a signifier (S3[[science]]. <ref>{{L}} ''[[Seminar XXIV| Le Séminaire. Livre XXIV. L'insu que sait de l'une bévue s'aile à mourre, 1976-77'', published in ''Ornicar?'', nos 12-18, 1977-9; [[Seminar]] of 11 January 1977; ''[[Ornicar?]]'',14: 4</ref></blockquote>
186)=====Linguistics and Mathematics=====However, even when [[Lacan]] makes such statements, he never abandons the conjectural sciences are fundamentally different because they concern[[project]] of [[formalizing]] [[psychoanalytic theory]] in [[linguistic]] and [[mathematical]] terms.
beings who inhabit Indeed, the tension between the [[Symbolicscience|scientific formalism]]of the [[matheme] order] and the semantic profusion of ''[[lalangue]]'' constitutes one of the most interesting features of [[Lacan]]'s later work. In 1965, however, Lacan problematises
the distinction between conjectural and exact sciences:==See Also=={{See}}* [[Algebra]]* [[Art]]* [[Biology]]||* [[Discourse]]* [[Knowledge]]* [[Linguistic]]||* [[Mathematics]]* [[Matheme]]* [[Nature]]||* [[Psychoanalysis]]* [[Psychology]]* [[Religion]]||* [[Subject]]* [[Treatment]]* [[Truth]]{{Also}}
The opposition between the exact sciences and the conjectural sciences can==References==<div style="font-size:11px" class="references-small"><references/></div>
no longer be sustained from the moment when conjecture is susceptible to an[[Category:Science]][[Category:Psychoanalysis]][[Category:Jacques Lacan]][[Category:Dictionary]][[Category:Concepts]][[Category:Terms]][[Category:Edit]]
exact calculation (probability) and when exactitude is based only on a  formalism which separates axioms and laws of grouping symbols.  (Ec, 863)  Whereas in the last century physics provided a paradigm of exactitude for the exact sciences which made the conjectural sciences seem sloppy by comparison, the arrival on the scene of structural linguistics redressed the imbalance by providing an equally exact paradigm for the conjectural scien- ces. When Freud borrowed terms from other sciences, it was always from the natural sciences (principally BIOLOGY, medicine and thermodynamics) because these were the only sciences around in Freud's day that provided a model of rigorous investigation and thought. Lacan differs from Freud by importing concepts mainly from the 'sciences of subjectivity' (principally LINGUISTICS), and by aligning psychoanalytic theory with these rather than with the natural sciences. Lacan argues that this paradigm shift is in fact implicit in Freud's own reformulations of the concepts that he borrowed from the natural sciences. In other words, whenever Freud borrowed concepts from biology he reformu- lated those concepts so radically that he created a totally new paradigm which was quite alien to its biological origins. Thus, according to Lacan, Freud anticipated the findings of modern structural linguists such as Saussure, and his work can be better understood in the light of these linguistic concepts.  Is psychoanalysis a science? Freud was quite explicit in affirming the scientific status of psychoanalysis: 'While it was originally the name of a particular therapeutic method,' he wrote in 1924, 'it has now also become the name of a science - the science of unconscious mental processes' (Freud, 1925a: SE XX, 70). However, he also insisted on the unique character of psychoanalysis that sets it apart from the other sciences; 'Every science is based on observations and experiences arrived at through the medium of our psychical apparatus. But since our science has as its subject that apparatus itself, the analogy ends here' (Freud, 1940a: SE XXIII, 159).The question of the status of psychoanalysis and its relationship with other disciplines is also one to which Lacan devotes much attention. In his pre-war writings, psycho- analysis is seen unreservedly in scientific terms (e.g. Lacan, 1936). However, after 1950 Lacan's attitude to the question becomes much more complex.  In 1953, he states that in the opposition science versus ART, psychoanalysis can be located on the side of art, on condition that the term 'art' is understood in the sense in which it was used in the Middle Ages, when the 'liberal arts' included arithmetic, geometry, music and grammar (Lacan: 1953b: 224). However, in the opposition science versus religion, Lacan follows Freud in arguing that psychoanalysis has more in common with scientific discourse than religious discourse: 'psychoanalysis is not a religion. It proceeds from the same status as [[Science]] itself (Sl1, 265).  If, as Lacan argues, a science is only constituted as such by isolating and defming its particular object of enquiry (see Lacan, 1946, where he argues that psychoanalysis has actually set psychology on a scientific footing by providing it with a proper object of enquiry - the imago - Ec, 188), then, when in 1965 he isolates the objet petit a as the object of psychoanalysis, he is in effect claiming a scientific status for psychoanalysis (Ec, 863).  However, from this point on Lacan comes increasingly to question this view of psychoanalysis as a science. In the same year he states that psychoanalysis is not a science but a 'practice' (pratique) with a 'scientific vocation' (Ec, 863), though in the same year he also speaks of 'the psychoanalytic science' (Ec, 876). By 1977 he has become more categorical:  Psychoanalysis is not a science. It has no scientific status - it merely waits  and hopes for it. Psychoanalysis is a delusion - a delusion which is expected  to produce a science. . . . It is a scientific delusion, but this doesn't mean that  analytic practice will ever produce a science.  (Lacan, 1976-7; seminar of 11 January 1977; Ornicar?, 14: 4)  However, even when Lacan makes such statements, he never abandons the project of formalising psychoanalytic theory in linguistic and mathematical terms. Indeed, the tension between the scientific formalism of the MATHEME and the semantic profusion of lalangue constitutes one of the most interesting features of Lacan's later work.__NOTOC__
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