Semblance

semblance (semblant)

Running throughout Lacan's work is the idea that appearances are deceptive, an idea that is closely connected to the classical philosophical opposition between appearance and essence (see Sll, 103ff.). The very distinction between the Imaginary and the Symbolic implies this opposition between appearance and essence. The Imaginary is the Realm of observable phenomena which act as. bres, while the Symbolic is the realm of underlying structures which cannot be observed but which must be deduced.

This opposition informs all scientific enquiry, a basic presupposition of which is that the scientist must attennpt to penetrate through false appearance into the hidden Reality. Similatrly, in psychoanalysis, as in science, 'only he who escapes from false appearances can achieve truth' (S7, 310).

However, false appearance in psychoanalysis is different from false appearance in the natural sciences. For the natural scientist, the false appearance (e.g. a straight stick that appears to be bent when half submerged in water) lacks the dimension of deliberate deception, which is why Lacan states that the axiom of natural science is the belief in an honest, non-deceitful God (S3, 64). However, in the conjectural sciences, and in psychoanalysis, there is always the problem that the falsity of the appearance may be due to deception,.

Lacan uses two terms to refer to fal se appearances. The term apparence is that used in philosophical discussions of the distinc:ion between essence and appearance. The term semblant is less technical, but acquires a growing importance in Lacan's work over tire years. It appears as early as 1957 (e.g. Ec, 435; S4, 207), and is used several times in the seminar of 1964 (S11, 107), but it is not until the early 1970s that the term comes to occupy an important place in Lacan's theoreti.cal vocabulary. At first Lacan uses the term to refer to such issues as feminine sexuality, which is characterised by a dimension of masquerade (see RiviËre, 1929). Later on, Lacan uses the term to characterise general features of the Symbolic order and its relations to the Imaginary and the Real. Thus Lacari devotes his 1970-1 seminar to 'a discourse that would not be semblance", in which he argues that truth is not simply the opposite of appearance, but is in fact continuous with it; truth and appearance are like the two sides of a moebius strip, which are in fact only one side. In the seminar of 1972-3, Lacan goes on to state that objet petit a is a 'semblance of being' (S20, 84), that love is addressed to a ' semblance (S20, 85), and that jouiss.ance is only evoked or elaborated on the basis of a semblance (S20, 85).