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At the root of the [[ethics ]] is [[desire]], but a [[desire ]] marked by the "fault". [[Analysis]]' only promise is austere: it is "the entrance into-the-I," ''l'entrée-en-Je''. "[[I ]] must come to the place where the ''[[Id]]'' was," where the [[analysand ]] discovers, in its absolute nakedness, the [[truth ]] of his [[desire]]. The [[end ]] of the [[cure ]] is then the purification of [[desire]]. [[Lacan ]] makes three statements: one is only guilty of "having given in on one's desire"; "the hero is the one who can be betrayed with impunity"; goods exist, but "there is no other good than the one that can pay the price of the access to [[desire]]," a [[desire ]] that is only valid insofar as it is [[desire ]] to [[know]]. [[Lacan laudes ]] lauds [[Oedipus ]] at Colonus who calls down curses before dying, and he associates him with Antigone, walled up alive, who has not given in at all. Both have rejected the right to live in order to enter the "in-between-two-deaths," - ''entre-deux-morts'' - that is immortality.<br>

Since ''[[Le désir et son intépretation]]'', the [[analysis ]] of the son's passion ([[subject]]) has become more pressing. Who is the [[Father]]? Here is the terrible [[Father ]] of the [[primal horde ]] (Freud's ''[[Totem and Taboo]]''); Luther's [[God ]] with "his eternal hatred against men, a hatred that existed even before the world was born"; the [[father ]] of the [[law ]] who, as to [[Saint Paul]], leads to temptation: "For me, the very commandment - Thou shall not covet - which should lead to life has proved to be death to me. For sin, finding opportunity in the commandment, seduced me and by it killed me." [[Lacan ]] adds, "I have put the [[Thing ]] in the place of sin," denouncing the complicity between the [[law ]] and the [[Thing]], "which is called [[Evil]]." But what is the [[Thing ]] against which the [[Father ]] cannot or does not know how to defend himself? It has nothing to do with the [[object]], which is created by words[[word]]s. It is the outside [[signifier ]] and also the hostile outside [[signified]]: a mute reality prior to primal [[repression ]] that puts in its place the pure signifying [[signify]]ing web without being able to hide it. It is the center of the [[unconscious ]] but it is excluded; it is the [[Real ]] but always represented by an emptiness, the nonthing, ''l'a chose'', the nothing, a hole in the [[Real ]] from which the [[Word]], the [[Signifier]], creates the world. It is the place of deadly ''[[jouissance]]'' sanctioned by the [[prohibition ]] of [[incest]]. It is associated with the [[mother ]] who represents it by her manifest carnality, and with [[woman ]] who, idealized in [[courtly love]], speaks [[speak]]s the [[truth]]: "I am nothing but the emptiness which is in my cloaca." The idea of a distorted [[sexuality ]] meets the 70s mantra: "[[There is no such thing as a sexual rapport]]." [[Woman]], who is the other, bears the burden of the curse, although the [[Thing ]] is settled at the heart of all subjects [[subject]]s who have to recognize it. Who am I? "You are the waste that falls in the world through the devil's anus." However, salvation holds on by a thread: the theme of the exquisiteness of the son's love for the [[father ]] would be amplified in ''D'un Autre à l'autre''. This [[father ]] is a [[symbolic ]] [[Father]], he is all the more [[present ]] for [[being ]] [[absent]], a [[Father ]] without a [[body ]] or the glorious [[body ]] of signifiers[[signifier]]s, a [[father ]] who can only be the [[object ]] of an [[act ]] of faith, for: [[there is no Other of the Other]]" to guarantee him. [[Sublimation ]] is an attempt to confront the [[Thing]]: [[true ]] [[love ]] for one's neighbor consists in recognizing in him, as in oneself, the place and the wound of the [[Thing]]. As for disbelief, by rejecting the [[Thing ]] it makes it reappear in the [[Real]], which is the Lacanian [[Lacan]]ian definition of [[psychosis]].<br>If ethical thought "is at the centre of our work as analysts," then, in the cure, ethics converges from two sides. On the side of the analysand is the problem of guilt and the pathogenic nature of civilised morality. Freud conceives of a basic conflict between the demands of civilised morality and the essentially amoral sexual drives of the patient. If morality takes the upper hand and the drives are too intense to be sublimated, sexuality is either expressed in perverse forms or repressed. Freud further develops this idea in his theory of an unconscious sense of guilt and in his concept of the superego, that interior moral agency which becomes crueler to the extent that the ego submits to its demands. The analyst, on the other hand, has to deal with the pathogenic morality and unconscious guilt of the patient and with the ethical problems that arise in the cure.<br>Lacan addresses the issue of how the analyst will respond to the patient's sense of guilt by arguing that he must take it seriously, for whenever the patient feels guilty it is because he has given way to his desire: "the only thing of which one can be guilty is of having given ground relative to one's desire." As to the pathogenic morality acting through the superego, Lacan asserts that psychoanalysis is not a libertine ethos. The ethical position of the analyst is revealed by the way that he formulates the goal of the cure. Ego-psychology, for instance, proposes a normative ethics in the adaptaion of the ego to reality. Lacan opposes this stance and devises an ethics relating action to desire: "Have you acted in conformity with the desire that is in you?"<br>

Traditional ethics (Aristotle, Kant) revolves around If ethical thought "is at the concept centre of the Good, where different goods compete for the position of Supreme Good. Lacanian ethics see the Good our work as an obstacle in the path of desire[[analyst]]s, thus "a repudiation of then, in the idea of Good is necessary." It also rejects ideals[[cure]], such as health and happiness[[ethics]] converges from two sides. Traditional ethics tends to link On the good to pleasure: moral thought has "developed along the paths side of an hedonistic problematic." Lacan does not take such an approach because psychoanalytic experience has revealed the duplicity of pleasure: there is a limit to pleasure, and when it is transgressed, it becomes pain. ''Jouissance'' [[analysand]] is the paradoxical satisfaction that the subject derives from his symptom, the suffering he derives from his satisfaction. Finally traditional ethics puts work and a safe, ordered existence before questions problem of desire by telling people to make their desires wait. Lacan forces the subject to confront the relation between his actions guilt and his desire in the immediacy pathogenic nature of the present[[culture|civilised]] [[morality]].<br>Lacan introduces the notion [[Freud]] conceives of ''das Ding'', the Thing, via the opposition a basic conflict between the pleasure principle [[demand]]s of [[culture|civilised]] [[morality]] and the principle of reality, this opposition, however, is deluding since the latter is but a modification essentially amoral sexual [[drive]]s of the formerpatient. Two are If morality takes the contexts where ''das Ding'' operates. Firstly there is Freud's distinction between ''Wortvorstellungen'', word-presentations, upper hand and ''Sachvorstellungen'', thing-presentations. The two types are bound together in the preconscious-conscious system, whereas in the unconscious only thing-presentations drives are found. This seems too intense to contradict the linguistic nature of the unconscious. Lacan counters the objection by pointing out that there are two words be [[sublimation|sublimated]], [[sexuality]] is either expressed in German for "thing": ''das Ding'' and ''die Sache''[[perversion|perverse]] forms or [[repression|repressed]]. [[Freud employs the latter to refer to the thing-presentations ]] further develops this idea in the his theory of an unconscious, sense of [[guilt]] and if at one level ''Sachvorstellungen'' and ''Wortvorstellungen'' are opposed, on the symbolic level they go together. ''Die Sache'' is the representation in his concept of a thing in the symbolic, whereas ''das Ding'' is the thing in the realsuperego, that interior moral [[agency]] which is "becomes crueler to the beyond-of-extent that the-signifiedego submits to its [[demand]]s." Thing-presentations found in The [[analyst]], on the unconscious are of linguistic natureother hand, as opposed has to ''das Ding'', which is outside language deal with the pathogenic [[morality]] and outside [[unconscious]] [[guilt]] of the unconscious. "The Thing is characterized by [[patient]] and with the fact ethical problems that it is impossible for us to imagine itarise in the [[cure]]."<br>

[[Lacan]] addresses the issue of how the [[analyst]] will respond to the [[patient]]'s sense of [[guilt]] by arguing that he must take it seriously, for whenever the [[patient]] feels [[guilty]] it is because he has given way to his [[desire]]: "the only thing of which one can be guilty is of having given ground relative to one's [[desire]]." As to the pathogenic morality acting through the [[superego]], [[Lacan]] asserts that [[psychoanalysis]] is not a libertine ethos. The ethical position of the [[analyst]] is revealed by the way that he formulates the goal of the [[cure]]. [[Ego-psychology]], for instance, proposes a normative [[ethics]] in the [[adaptation]] of the [[ego]] to [[reality]]. [[Lacan]] opposes this stance and devises an [[ethics]] relating [[action]] to [[desire]]: "Have you acted in conformity with the [[desire]] that is in you?" Traditional [[ethics]] ([[Aristotle]], [[Kant]]) revolves around the concept of the [[Good]], where different goods compete for the position of Supreme Good. Lacanian [[ethics]] see the [[Good]] as an obstacle in the path of [[desire]], thus "a repudiation of the idea of Good is necessary." It also rejects ideals, such as health and happiness. Traditional [[ethics]] tends to link the [[good]] to [[pleasure]]: moral thought has "developed along the paths of an hedonistic problematic." [[Lacan]] does not take such an approach because psychoanalytic experience has revealed the duplicity of [[pleasure]]: there is a limit to [[pleasure]], and when it is [[transgression|transgressed]], it becomes pain. ''[[Jouissance]]'' is the paradoxical [[satisfaction]] that the [[subject]] derives from his [[symptom]], the suffering he derives from his [[satisfaction]]. Finally traditional [[ethics]] puts work and a safe, ordered [[existence]] before questions of [[desire]] by telling people to make their [[desire]]s wait. [[Lacan]] forces the [[subject]] to confront the relation between his actions and his [[desire]] in the immediacy of the present. [[Lacan]] introduces the notion of ''[[das Ding]]'', the [[Thing]], via the opposition between the [[pleasure principle]] and the principle of [[reality]], this opposition, however, is deluding since the latter is but a modification of the former. Two are the contexts where ''[[das Ding]]'' operates. Firstly there is Freud's [[distinction]] between ''Wortvorstellungen'', word-presentations, and ''Sachvorstellungen'', thing-presentations. The two types are bound together in the preconscious-conscious system, whereas in the unconscious only thing-presentations are found. This seems to contradict the linguistic nature of the unconscious. [[Lacan]] counters the objection by pointing out that there are two words in [[German]] for "[[thing]]": ''[[das Ding]]'' and ''die Sache''. [[Freud]] employs the latter to refer to the thing-presentations in the unconscious, and if at one level ''Sachvorstellungen'' and ''Wortvorstellungen'' are opposed, on the [[symbolic]] level they go together. ''Die Sache'' is the representation of a [[thing]] in the [[symbolic]], whereas ''[[das Ding]]'' is the [[thing]] in the [[real]], which is "the beyond-of-the-signified." Thing-presentations found in the unconscious are of linguistic nature, as opposed to ''[[das Ding]]'', which is outside language and outside the unconscious. "The [[Thing]] is characterized by the fact that it is impossible for us to imagine it."  Yet,in relation to ''[[jouissance]]'', as well as being the object of [[language]], ''[[das Ding]]'' is the [[object of desire]]. It is the [[lost object ]] which must be continually looked for, the unforgettable Other, the [[prohibition|forbidden ]] [[object ]] of incestuous [[incest]]uous [[desire]], the [[mother]]. The [[Thing ]] appears to the subject as the Supreme Good, but if the [[subject ]] [[transgression|trangresses ]] the [[pleasure principle ]] and attains it, it is experienced as suffering or/and [[evil ]] because the [[subject ]] "cannot stand the extreme good that ''[[das Ding]]'' may bring on him." It would seem then fortunately that the [[Thing ]] is usually inaccessible.