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subject suppposed ==Jacques Lacan=====Translation===The term [[Subject supposed to know (|sujet supposÈ supposé savoir) The term]] can be translated as the "[[subject supposed to know]]" or as the "[[Subject supposed to know|supposed subject of knowledge]]".

sujet supposÈ savoir (often abbreviated <!--==Self-Consciousness==The [[illusion]] of a [[self-consciousness]] which is [[transparent]] to S.s.S.) itself in its [[act]] of [[knowledge|knowing]], constituted in the [[mirror stage]], is difficult to translate put intoquestion by [[psychoanalysis]].

English==Symbolic Knowledge==[[Psychoanalysis]] demonstrates that [[knowledge]] (''[[savoir]]'') is not located in any [[particular]] [[subject]] but is, in fact, [[intersubjective]].<ref>{{L}} [[Seminar IX|Le Séminaire. Sheridan translates it as Livre IX. L'identification, 1961-62]]'subject suppposed to know', and this is unpublished. [[Seminar]] of 15 November 1961.</ref>-->===Transference===In 1964, [[Lacan]] defines [[transference]] as the[[attribution]] of [[knowledge]] to a [[subject]].

translation adopted in most English works on Lacan<blockquote>"As soon as the subject who is supposed to [[know]] [[exists]] somewhere there is transference. However, Schneiderman"<ref>{{S11}} p. 232</ref></blockquote>

suggests It is the alternative translation [[analysand]]'supposed s ''supposition'' of a subject of who [[knows]] that initiates the [[analytic]] [[process]] rather than the knowledge'actually possessed by the [[analyst]]. The term [[subject supposed to know]] does not designate the analyst, on but rather a function which the analyst may come to embody in the [[treatment]]. It is only when the analyst is perceived by the analysand to embody this function that thetransference can be said to be established.<ref>{{S11}} p. 233</ref>

grounds ===Signification===When this occurs, what kind of knowledge is it that it is the subject, not just the knowledge, which analyst is supposedpresumed to possess?

(Schneiderman<blockquote>"He is supposed to know that from which no one can escape, 1980: vii)as soon as he formulates it - quite simply, signification."<ref>{{S11}} p.253</ref></blockquote>

The phrase In [[other]] [[words]], the analyst is often [[thought]] to know the [[secret]] [[meaning]] of the analysand's [[word]]s, the [[signification]]s of [[speech]] of which even the [[speaker]] is unaware. This supposition alone (the supposition that the analyst is introduced by Lacan in 1961 in order one who knows) causes otherwise insignificant details (chance gestures, ambiguous remarks) to designate acquire [[retroactively]] a special [[meaning]] for the illusion[[patient]] who "supposes".

of a self-consciousness (Ger. Selbstbewufltsein) which is transparent to itself in its act of knowing (see CONSCIOUSNEss). This illusion, which is born in the mirror stage, is put into question by psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis demon-  strates that KNOWLEDGE (savoir) cannot be located in any particular subject but is, in fact, intersubjective (Lacan, 1961-2: seminar of 15 November 1961).  In 1964, Lacan takes up the phrase in his definition of TRANSFERENCE as the  attribution of knowledge to asubject; 'As soon as the subject who is supposed  to know exists somewhere there is transference' (Sll, 232). This definition emphasises that it is the analysand's supposition of a subject who knows that  initiates the analytic process.rather than the knowledge actually possessed by===Practice=== the analyst.  The term 'subject supposed to know' does not designate the analyst himself,  but a function which the analyst may come to embody in the treatment. It is only when the analyst is perceived by the analysand to embody this function  that the transference can besaid to be established (Sll, 233). When this  occurs, what kind of knowledge is it that the analyst is presumed to pos-  sess? 'He is supposed to know that from which no one can escape, as soon as  he formulates it - quite simply, signification' (Sll, 253). In other words, the analyst is often thought to know the secret meaning of the analysand's words,  the significations of speech of which even the speaker is unaware. This supposition alone (the supposition that the analyst is one who knows) causes  otherwise insignificant details (chance gestures, ambiguous remarks) to acquire retroactively a special meaning for the patient who 'supposes'.  It may happen that the [[patient ]] supposes the [[analyst ]] to be a subject who  knows from the very first meinent of the treatment, or even before, but it often  takes some [[time ]] for the transference to become established. In the latter [[case]],  '"when the subject enters tlie analsysisthe [[analysis]], he is far from giving the analyst this  [[place []] of the [[subject supposed to know]' (Sll, ]."<ref>{{S11}} p. 233); the </ref> The analysand may initially [[regard ]] the analyst as a buffoon, or may withold withhold information from  him in [[order ]] to maintain his [[ignorance (]].<ref>{{S11, }} p. 137). </ref> However, '"even the [[psychoanalyst ]] put in question is credited at some point with a certain infall- ibility' (Sl 1, 234); sooner orlater some chance gestiire of the analyst's is taken by the analysand as a sign of some secret intention, some hidden knowledgeinfallibility.  At this point the analyst has come to embody the subject supposed to know; the  transference is established"<ref>{{S11}} p.  The end of analysis comes when the analysand de-supposes the analyst of knowledge, so that the analyst falls from the position of the subject supposed  to know.  The term 'subject supposed to know' also emphasises the fact that it is a  particular relationship to knowledge that constitutes the unique position of the analyst; the analyst is awarethat there is a split between him and the knowl- edge attributed to him. In ´her words. the analyst must realise that he only occupies the position of ome who is presumed (by the analysand) to know,  without fooling himself that he really does possess the knowledge attributed to  him. The analyst must realise that, of the knowledge attributed to him by the analysand, he knows nothing (Lacan, 1967: 20). However, the fact that it is a supposed knowledge that is the mainstay of the analytic process, rather than the knowledge actually possessed by the analyst, does not mean that the analyst can therefore be content with knowing nothing; on the contrary, Lacan  argues that analysts should emulate Freud in becoming experts in cultural, literary and linguistic matters.  Lacan also remarks that, for the analyst, the analysand is a subject supposed  to know. When the analyst explains the fundamental rule of free association to  the analysand, he is effectively saying; 'Come on, say anything, it will all be  marvellous' (Sl7, 59). In other words, the analyst tells the analysand to behave  as if he knew what it was all about, thereby instituting him as 234</ref> a subject supposed to know.

<div style="font-size:11px" class="references-small"><references/></div>[[Category:Jacques Lacan]]