Difference between revisions of "Subject supposed to know"
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| − | + | The term '[[sujet supposé savoir]]' can be translated as the '[[subject supposed to know]]' or as the 'supposed subject of knowledge.' | |
| + | The [[illusion]] of a [[self-consciousness]] which is [[transparent]] to itself in its [[act]] of [[knowing]], constituted in the [[mirror stage]], is put into question by [[psychoanalysis]]. | ||
| + | [[Psycho[[analysis]]]] demonstrates that [[knowledge]] (''savoir'') is not located in any particular [[subject]] but is, in fact, [[intersubjective]].<ref>Lacan, 1961-2: seminar of 15 November 1961</ref> | ||
| − | + | In 1964, [[Lacan]] defines [[transference]] as the attribution of [[knowledge]] to a [[subject]]. | |
| + | "As soon as the subject who is supposed to know exists somewhere there is transference."<ref>Sll, 232</ref> | ||
| − | + | It is the [[[[analysand]]]]'s supposition of a [[subject]] who [[knows]] that initiates the [[analytic]] [[process]] rather than the [[knowledge]] actually possessed by the [[[[analyst]]]]. | |
| − | + | The term '[[subject supposed to know]]' does not designate the [[[[analyst]]]], but rather a function which the [[[[analyst]]]] may come to embody in the [[treatment]]. | |
| + | It is only when the [[analyst]] is perceived by the [[analysand]] to embody this function that the transference can besaid to be established.<ref>{{Sll}} p.233</ref> | ||
| + | When this occurs, what kind of knowledge is it that the [[analyst]] is presumed to possess? | ||
| − | + | "He is supposed to know that from which no one can escape, as soon as he formulates it - quite simply, signification."<ref>{{Sll}} p.253</ref> | |
| − | + | In other words, the [[analyst]] is often thought to know the [[secret]] [[meaning]] of the [[analysand]]'s words, the [[signification]]s of [[speech]] of which even the speaker is unaware. | |
| − | + | This supposition alone (the supposition that the [[analyst]] is one who knows) causes otherwise insignificant details (chance gestures, ambiguous remarks) to acquire retroactively a special [[meaning]] for the [[patient]] who 'supposes'. | |
| − | It | + | It may happen that the [[patient]] supposes the [[analyst]] to be a subject who knows from the very first [[treatment]], or even before, but it often takes some time for the [[transference]] to become established. |
| − | + | In the latter case, "when the subject enters the [[analysis]], he is far from giving the [[analyst]] this place of the [[subject supposed to know]]."<ref>{{Sll}} p.233</ref> | |
| − | + | The [[analysand]] may initially regard the [[analyst]] as a buffoon, or may withold information from him in order to maintain his ignorance.<ref>{{S11}} p.137</ref> | |
| − | + | However, "even the [[psychoanalyst]] put in question is credited at some point with a certain infallibility."<ref>{{S11}} p.234</ref> | |
| − | + | Sooner or later some chance gesture of the [[analyst]] is taken by the [[analysand]] as a [[sign]] of some secret intention, some hidden [[knowledge]]. | |
| − | + | At this point the [[analyst]] has come to embody the [[subject supposed to know]]; the [[transference]] is established. | |
| − | + | The [[end of analysis]] comes when the [[analysand]] de-supposes the [[analyst]] of [[knowledge]], so that the [[analyst]] falls from the position of the [[subject supposed to know]]. | |
| − | + | The term '[[subject supposed to know]]' also emphasises the fact that it is a particular relationship to [[knowledge]] that constitutes the unique position of the [[analyst]]; the [[analyst]] is aware that there is a [[split]] between him and the [[knowledge]] attributed to him. | |
| − | + | In other words, the [[analyst]] must realise that he only occupies the position of one who is presumed (by the [[analysand]]) to know, without fooling himself that he really does possess the [[knowledge]] attributed to him. | |
| − | The | + | The [[analyst]] must realise that, of the [[knowledge]] attributed to him by the [[analysand]], he knows nothing.<ref>Lacan, 1967: 20</ref> |
| − | + | However, the fact that it is a supposed [[knowledge]] that is the mainstay of the analytic process, rather than the [[knowledge]] actually possessed by the [[analyst]], does not mean that the [[analyst]] can therefore be content with knowing nothing; on the contrary, [[Lacan]] argues that [[analyst]]s should emulate [[Freud]] in becoming experts in [[cultural]], [[literary]] and [[linguistic]] matters. | |
| − | + | [[Lacan]] also remarks that, for the [[analyst]], the [[analysand]] is a [[subject supposed to know]]. | |
| − | + | When the [[analyst]] explains the [[fundamental rule]] of [[free association]] to the [[analysand]], he is effectively saying; "Come on, say anything, it will all be marvellous."<ref>{{Sl7}} p.59</ref> | |
| − | + | In other words, the [[analyst]] tells the [[analysand]] to behave as if he knew what it was all about, thereby instituting him as a [[subject supposed to know]]. | |
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| − | In other words, the analyst tells the analysand to behave as if he knew what it was all about, thereby instituting him as | ||
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| − | [[Category:Lacan]] | + | [[Category:Jacques Lacan]] |
[[Category:Terms]] | [[Category:Terms]] | ||
| + | [[Category:Dictionary]] | ||
| + | [[Category:New]] | ||
[[Category:Concepts]] | [[Category:Concepts]] | ||
[[Category:Psychoanalysis]] | [[Category:Psychoanalysis]] | ||
| + | [[Category:Subject]] | ||
| + | [[Category:People]] | ||
Revision as of 04:14, 24 June 2006
The term 'sujet supposé savoir' can be translated as the 'subject supposed to know' or as the 'supposed subject of knowledge.'
The illusion of a self-consciousness which is transparent to itself in its act of knowing, constituted in the mirror stage, is put into question by psychoanalysis.
[[Psychoanalysis]] demonstrates that knowledge (savoir) is not located in any particular subject but is, in fact, intersubjective.[1]
In 1964, Lacan defines transference as the attribution of knowledge to a subject. "As soon as the subject who is supposed to know exists somewhere there is transference."[2]
It is the [[analysand]]'s supposition of a subject who knows that initiates the analytic process rather than the knowledge actually possessed by the [[analyst]].
The term 'subject supposed to know' does not designate the [[analyst]], but rather a function which the [[analyst]] may come to embody in the treatment.
It is only when the analyst is perceived by the analysand to embody this function that the transference can besaid to be established.[3]
When this occurs, what kind of knowledge is it that the analyst is presumed to possess?
"He is supposed to know that from which no one can escape, as soon as he formulates it - quite simply, signification."[4]
In other words, the analyst is often thought to know the secret meaning of the analysand's words, the significations of speech of which even the speaker is unaware.
This supposition alone (the supposition that the analyst is one who knows) causes otherwise insignificant details (chance gestures, ambiguous remarks) to acquire retroactively a special meaning for the patient who 'supposes'.
It may happen that the patient supposes the analyst to be a subject who knows from the very first treatment, or even before, but it often takes some time for the transference to become established.
In the latter case, "when the subject enters the analysis, he is far from giving the analyst this place of the subject supposed to know."[5]
The analysand may initially regard the analyst as a buffoon, or may withold information from him in order to maintain his ignorance.[6]
However, "even the psychoanalyst put in question is credited at some point with a certain infallibility."[7]
Sooner or later some chance gesture of the analyst is taken by the analysand as a sign of some secret intention, some hidden knowledge.
At this point the analyst has come to embody the subject supposed to know; the transference is established.
The end of analysis comes when the analysand de-supposes the analyst of knowledge, so that the analyst falls from the position of the subject supposed to know.
The term 'subject supposed to know' also emphasises the fact that it is a particular relationship to knowledge that constitutes the unique position of the analyst; the analyst is aware that there is a split between him and the knowledge attributed to him.
In other words, the analyst must realise that he only occupies the position of one who is presumed (by the analysand) to know, without fooling himself that he really does possess the knowledge attributed to him.
The analyst must realise that, of the knowledge attributed to him by the analysand, he knows nothing.[8]
However, the fact that it is a supposed knowledge that is the mainstay of the analytic process, rather than the knowledge actually possessed by the analyst, does not mean that the analyst can therefore be content with knowing nothing; on the contrary, Lacan argues that analysts should emulate Freud in becoming experts in cultural, literary and linguistic matters.
Lacan also remarks that, for the analyst, the analysand is a subject supposed to know.
When the analyst explains the fundamental rule of free association to the analysand, he is effectively saying; "Come on, say anything, it will all be marvellous."[9]
In other words, the analyst tells the analysand to behave as if he knew what it was all about, thereby instituting him as a subject supposed to know.
References
- ↑ Lacan, 1961-2: seminar of 15 November 1961
- ↑ Sll, 232
- ↑ Template:Sll p.233
- ↑ Template:Sll p.253
- ↑ Template:Sll p.233
- ↑ Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1977. p.137
- ↑ Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1977. p.234
- ↑ Lacan, 1967: 20
- ↑ Template:Sl7 p.59
