The position of the [[analyst]] in [[Lacan]]'s account of the [[discourse of the analyst]].
In [[Lacanian]] [[psychoanalytic theory|theory]] the [[analyst]] stands in the place of "[[objet (petit) a|object a]]", or [[objet (petit) a|object cause of desire]].
This is an [[imaginary|imaginary object]] that both sets [[desire]] in motion and represents its impossibility as the
[[jouissance|excess]] or [[lack|deficit]] produced by coming under the [[Symbolic]].
[[Bruce Fink|Fink]] writes,
<blockquote>The analyst plays the part of pure desirousness (pure desiring subject), and interrogates the subject
in his or her division [i.e., between the conscious and unconscious]. . . . The patient in a sense
“coughs up” a master signifier that has not yet been brought into relation with any other signifier.<ref>[[Bruce Fink|Fink, Bruce]]. 1998. p. 37</ref></blockquote>
=====Socrates=====
In the dialogues, [[Socrates]] is essentially in the position of the [[object a]], barren, bringing
forth what is, in effect, the [[signifier]] of the [[subject]].
[[Socrates]] can be read as the pure [[desire|desiring]] [[subject]].
Indeed, this is the force of [[Lacan]]’s (1991) account of [[Alcibaides]], [[Socrates]]’s enamored student.
[[Lacan]] says that [[Socrates]] refuses [[Alcibaides]] because "for [Socrates] there is
nothing in himself worthy of love. His essence was that of ''ouden'', emptiness, hollowness."<ref>Cited in Salecl. 1998. p. 28</ref>
Like the proper response of the [[analyst]], [[Socrates]] does not reciprocate, thus maintaining his emptiness.
In both [[Socrates]] and [[Lacan]], there are two critical dimensions of their position, the fundamental
