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The Interpassive Subject

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The Interpassive SubjectSlavoj Zizek. {{BSZ}}
==Fetish between structure and humanism==
Fetish According to the classic Althusserian criticism of the [[Marxist]] problematic of [[commodity]] [[fetishism]], this [[notion]] relies on the [[humanist]] [[ideological]] opposition of "[[human]] persons" versus "things." Is it not one of [[Marx]]'s standard determinations of fetishism that, in it, we are dealing with "relations between things (commodities)" instead of direct "relations between [[people]]," i.e. that, in the [[fetishist]] [[universe]], people (mis)perceive their [[social]] relations in the guise of relations between things? Althusserians are fully justified in emphasizing how, beneath this "ideological" problematic, there is [[another]], entirely different — [[structural]] — [[concept]] of fetishism already at [[work]] in Marx: at this level, "fetishism" designates the short-circuit between the [[formal]]/differential [[structure ]] (which is by definition "[[absent]]," i.e. it is never given "as such" in our experiential [[reality]]) and humanisma positive element of this structure. When we are victims of the "fetishist" [[illusion]], we (mis)perceive as the immediate/"[[natural]]" property of the [[object]]-[[fetish]] that which is conferred upon this object on account of its [[place]] within the structure. The fact that [[money]] enables us to buy things on the [[market]], is not a direct property of the object-money, but results from the structural place of money within the [[complex]] structure of socio-[[economic]] relations; we do not relate to a certain person as to a "king" because this person is "in himself" (on account of his charismatic [[character]] or something similar) a king, but because he occupies the place of a king within the set of socio-[[symbolic]] relations; etc.etc.
According to Our point, however, is that these two levels of the notion of fetishism are necessarily connected: they [[form]] the classic Althusserian criticism two constitutive sides of the Marxist problematic very concept of commodity fetishism; which is why one cannot simply devalue the first as ideological, in contrast to the second as properly [[theoretical]] (or "[[scientific]]"). To make this notion relies on point clear, one should reformulate the first feature in a much more radical way. Beneath the apparently humanist -ideological opposition of "human personsbeings" versus and "things.," there lurks another, much more productive notion, that of the mystery of [[substitution]] and/or [[displacement]]: how is it ontologically possible that the innermost "relations between people" can be [[displaced]] onto (or substituted by) "relations between things" Is ? That is to say, is it not one a basic feature of the Marxian notion of [[commodity fetishism]] that "things believe instead of us, in the place of us"? The point worth [[repeating]] again and again is that, in Marx's standard determinations notion of fetishism that, the place of the fetishist [[inversion]] is not in what people [[think]] they are doing, but in their social [[activity]] itself: a typical bourgeois [[subject]] is, in [[terms]] of his [[conscious]] attitude, an utilitarian nominalist — itis in his social activity, we in [[exchange]] on the market, that he [[acts]] as if commodities were not simple [[objects]], but objects endowed with special powers, [[full]] of "theological whimsies." In [[other]] [[words]], people are dealing with well aware how things really stand, they [[know]] very well that the commodity-money is [[nothing]] but a reified form of the [[appearance]] of social relations, i.e. that, beneath the "relations between things (commodities)," instead of direct there are "relations between people," i.e. — the [[paradox]] is that, in their social activity, they act as if they do not know this, and follow the fetishist universeillusion. The fetishist [[belief]], people (mis)perceive their the fetishist inversion, is displaced onto things, it is embodied in what Marx calls "social relations in the guise of relations between things? Althusserians are fully justified in emphasizing how." And the crucial mistake to be avoided here, beneath this is the properly "ideologicalhumanist" problematicnotion that this belief, embodied in things, displaced onto things, there is another, entirely different — structural — concept nothing but a reified form of fetishism already at work in Marxdirect human belief: at this level, "fetishism" designates the short-circuit between task of the [[phenomenological]] reconstitution of the formal/differential structure (which is by definition genesis of "absent[[reification]]," i.e. it is never given then to demonstrate how original human belief was transposed onto things… The paradox to be maintained is that displacement is original and constitutive: there is no immediate, [[self]]-[[present]] [[living]] [[subjectivity]] to whom the belief embodied in "as suchsocial things" in our experiential reality) can be attributed, and a positive element who is then dispossesed of this structureit. When we There are victims of some beliefs, the "fetishist" illusionmost fundamental ones, we (mis)perceive as which are from the immediate/very outset "naturaldecentered," property beliefs of the object-fetish that which is conferred upon this object on account Other; the phenomenon of its place within the structure. The fact that money enables us "subject supposed to buy things on the marketbelieve, " is not a direct property of thus [[universal]] and structurally necessary. From the object-moneyvery outset, but results from the structural place [[speaking]] subject displaces his belief onto the [[big Other]] qua the [[order]] of money within pure [[semblance]], so that the complex structure of socio-economic relationssubject never "really believed in it"; we do not relate from the very beginning, the subject refers to some decentered other to a certain person as whom he imputes this belief. All [[concrete]] versions of this "subject supposed to a believe"king(from small [[children]] for whose sake [[parents]] pretend to believe in Santa Claus, to the " because this person is ordinary [[working]] people"for whose sake [[Communist]] intellectuals pretend to believe in himself" (on account of his charismatic character or something similar[[Socialism]]) are stand-ins for [[the big Other]]. So, what one should answer to the [[conservative]] platitude according to which every honest man has a kingprofound [[need]] to believe in something, but because he occupies the place of is that every honest man has a king within the set of socio-symbolic relations; etc.etc.profound need to find another subject who would believe in his place…
Our point, however, is that these two levels of the notion of fetishism are necessarily connected: they form the two constitutive sides of the very concept of fetishism; which is why one cannot simply devalue the first as ideological, in contrast to the second as properly theoretical (or "scientific"). To make this point clear, one should reformulate the first feature in a much more radical way. Beneath the apparently humanist-ideological opposition of "human beings" and "things," there lurks another, much more productive notion, that of the mystery of substitution and/or displacement: how is it ontologically possible that the innermost "relations between people" can be displaced onto (or substituted by) "relations between things"? That is to say, is it not a basic feature of the Marxian notion of commodity fetishism that "things believe instead of us, in the place of us"? The point worth repeating again and again is that, in Marx's notion of fetishism, the place of the fetishist inversion is not in what people think they are doing, but in their social activity itself: a typical bourgeois subject is, in terms of his conscious attitude, an utilitarian nominalist — it is in his social activity, in exchange on the market, that he acts as if commodities were not simple objects, but objects endowed with special powers, full of "theological whimsies." In other words, people are well aware how things really stand, they know very well that the commodity-money is nothing but a reified form of the appearance of social relations, i.e. that, beneath the "relations between things," there are "relations between people" — the paradox is that, in their social activity, they act as if they do not know this, and follow the fetishist illusion. The fetishist belief, the fetishist inversion, is displaced onto things, it is embodied in what Marx calls "social relations between things." And the crucial mistake to be avoided here, is the properly "humanist" notion that this belief, embodied in things, displaced onto things, is nothing but a reified form of direct human belief: the task of the phenomenological reconstitution of the genesis of "reification," is then to demonstrate how original human belief was transposed onto things… ==The paradox to be maintained is that displacement is original and constitutive: there is no immediate, self-present living subjectivity to whom the belief embodied in "social things" can be attributed, and who is then dispossesed of it. There are some beliefs, the most fundamental ones, which are from the very outset "decentered," beliefs of the Other; the phenomenon of the "subject supposed to believe," is thus universal and structurally necessary. From the very outset, the speaking subject displaces his belief onto the big Other qua the order of pure semblance, so that the subject never "really believed in it"; from the very beginning, the subject refers to some decentered other to whom he imputes this belief. All concrete versions of this "subject supposed to believe" (from small children for whose sake parents pretend to believe in Santa Claus, to the "ordinary working people" for whose sake Communist intellectuals pretend to believe in Socialism) are stand-ins for the big Other. So, what one should answer to the conservative platitude according to which every honest man has a profound need to believe in something, is that every honest man has a profound need to find another subject who would believe in his place…==
In order to properly determine the scope of this notion of the subject supposed to believe as the fundamental, constitutive feature of [[the symbolic]] order, one should oppose it to another, better known, notion, that of the [[subject supposed to know]]: when [[Lacan]] speaks of [[the subject supposed to know]], one usually fails to notice how this notion is not the standard, but the exception, which gains its [[value]] in contrast to the subject supposed to believe as the standard feature of the [[symbolic order]]. So, what is the "subject supposed to know"? In the TV-series Columbo, the crime (the act of [[murder]]) is shown in detail in advance, so that the enigma to be resolved is not that of "whodunit?", but of how the detective will establish the link between the deceitful surface (the "[[manifest]] [[content]]" of the crime [[scene]]) and the [[truth]] [[about]] the crime (its "[[latent]] [[thought]]"), how he will prove to the culprit his or her [[guilt]]. The success of Columbo thus attests to the fact that the [[true]] source of interest in the detective's work, is the [[process]] of deciphering itself, not its result (the triumphant final revelation "And the murderer is…" is completely [[lacking]] here, since we know this from the very outset). Even more crucial than this feature is the fact that not only do we, the spectators, know in advance who did it (since we directly see it), but, inexplicably, the detective Columbo himself immediately [[knows]] it: the [[moment]] he visits the scene of the crime and encounters the culprit, he is absolutely certain, he simply knows that the culprit did it. His subsequent effort thus concerns, not the enigma "who did it?", but how should he prove this to the culprit. This [[reversal]] of the "normal" order has clear theological connotations: the same as in true [[religion]] where I first believe in God and then, on the ground of my belief, become susceptible to the proofs of the truth of my [[faith]]; here also, Columbo first knows with a mysterious, but nonetheless absolutely infallible [[certainty]], who did it, and then, on the basis of this inexplicable [[knowledge]], proceeds to gather proofs… And, in a slightly different way, this is what the [[analyst]] qua "subject supposed to believeknow" is about: when the [[analysand]] enters into a transferential [[relationship]] with the analyst, he has the same absolute certainty that the analyst knows his [[secret]] (which only means that the [[patient]] is a priori "[[guilty]]", that there is a secret [[meaning]] to be drawn from his acts). The analyst is thus not an empiricist, probing the patient with different hypotheses, searching for proofs, etc.; he embodies the absolute certainty (which Lacan compares with the certainty of [[Descartes]]' [[cogito]] ergo sum) of the analysand's "guilt," i.e. of his [[unconscious]] [[desire]].
In order to properly determine the scope of this notion The two notions, that of the subject supposed to believe as the fundamental, constitutive feature of the symbolic order, one should oppose it to another, better known, notion, and that of the subject supposed to know: when Lacan speaks of the subject supposed to know, one usually fails to notice how this notion is are not symmetrical since belief and knowledge themselves are not the standard, but the exceptionsymmetrical: at its most radical, which gains its value in contrast to the subject supposed to believe as the standard feature status of the ([[Lacanian]]) big Other qua symbolic order. Soinstitution, what is the "subject supposed to know"? In the TV-series Columbo, the crime that of belief (the act of murdertrust) is shown in detail in advance, so that the enigma to be resolved is not that of "whodunit?"knowledge, but of how the detective will establish the link between the deceitful surface since belief is symbolic and knowledge is [[real]] (the "manifest content" of the crime scene) big Other involves, and the truth about the crime (its relies on, a fundamental "latent thoughttrust"), how he will prove to the culprit his or her guilt. The success of Columbo two [[subjects]] are thus attests to the fact that the true source of interest in the detective's work, is the process of deciphering itself, not its result (the triumphant final revelation "And the murderer is…" is completely lacking here, symmetrical since we know this from the very outset). Even more crucial than this feature is the fact that belief and knowledge themselves are not only do we, the spectators, know in advance who did it (since we directly see it), but, inexplicably, the detective Columbo himself immediately knows itsymmetrical: the moment he visits the scene of the crime and encounters the culprit, he belief is absolutely certain, he simply knows that the culprit did it. His subsequent effort thus concernsalways minimally "reflective, not the enigma "who did it?a ", but how should he prove this to belief in the culprit. This reversal belief of the other"normal(" order has clear theological connotations: the same as in true religion where I first still believe in God and then, on [[Communism]]" is the ground equivalent of my belief, become susceptible to the proofs of the truth of my faith; here also, Columbo first knows with a mysterious, but nonetheless absolutely infallible certainty, saying "I believe there are still people who did itbelieve in Communism"), and then, on the basis of this inexplicable while knowledge, proceeds to gather proofs… And, in a slightly different way, this is what the analyst qua "subject supposed to know" is precisely not knowledge about: when the analysand enters into a transferential relationship with the analyst, he has the same absolute certainty fact that the analyst there is another who knows his secret (which only means that . For this [[reason]], I can BELIEVE through the patient is a priori "guilty"other, that there but I cannot KNOW through the other. That is a secret meaning to be drawn from his acts). The analyst is thus not an empiricistsay, probing due to the patient with different hypothesesinherent reflectivity of belief, searching for proofswhen another believes in my place, etc.I myself believe through him; he embodies knowledge is not reflective in the absolute certainty (which Lacan compares with the certainty of Descartes' cogito ergo sum) of the analysand's "guiltsame way," i.e. of his unconscious desirewhen the other is supposed to know, I do not know through him.
The two notionsAccording to a well-known anthropological anecdote, that of the subject supposed "primitives" to believe and whom one attributed certain "superstitious beliefs," when directly asked about [[them]], answered that of the subject supposed to know"some people believe…", immediately displacing their belief, transferring it onto another. And, again, are we not symmetrical doing the same with our children: we go through the [[ritual]] of Santa Claus, since belief our children (are supposed to) believe in it and knowledge themselves are we do not [[want]] to disappoint them. Is this not symmetrical: at its most radical, also the status usual excuse of the [[mythical]] crooked or cynical politician who turns honest? — "I cannot disappoint them (Lacanianthe mythical "ordinary people") who believe in it (or in me) big Other qua symbolic institution." And, furthermore, is this need to find another who "really believes," also not that which propels us in our need to stigmatize the Other as a ([[religious]] or ethnic) "fundamentalist"? In an [[uncanny]] way, belief always seems to function in the guise of such a "belief (trust)at a distance": in order for the belief to function, not that there has to be some ultimate [[guarantor]] of knowledgeit, yet this guarantor is always deferred, since displaced, never present in persona. How, then, is belief possible? How is symbolic and knowledge this [[vicious cycle]] of deferred belief cut short? The point, of course, is real (that the big Other involves, and relies onsubject who directly believes, a fundamental "trust"). The two subjects are thus [[needs]] not symmetrical since [[exist]] for the belief and knowledge themselves are not symmetricalto be operative: belief it is enough precisely to presuppose its [[existence]], i.e. to believe in it, either in the guise of the mythological founding [[figure]] who is always minimally "reflectivenot part of our experiential reality," a "belief or in the belief guise of the otherimpersonal "one" ("I still believe in Communismone believes…" ). The crucial mistake to be avoided here is , again, the equivalent of saying properly "I believe there are still people who believe in Communismhumanist"), while knowledge is precisely not knowledge about the fact notion that there is another who knows. For this reasonbelief embodied in things, I can BELIEVE through the otherdisplaced onto things, is nothing but I cannot KNOW through a reified form of a direct human belief, in which [[case]] the task of the phenomenological reconstitution of the other. That is to say, due genesis of "reification" would be to demonstrate how the inherent reflectivity of original human beliefwas transposed onto things… The paradox to be maintained, when another believes in my placecontrast to such attempts at phenomenological genesis, I myself believe through him; knowledge is not reflective in the same waythat displacement is original and constitutive: there is no immediate, i.e. when self-present living subjectivity to whom the other belief embodied in "social things" can be attributed and who is supposed to know, I do not know through himthen dispossessed of it.
According to a well-known anthropological anecdoteJe sais bien, mais quand meme… /I believe/: therein resides the dilemma — either we play the Jungian obscurantist [[game]] of "primitiveslet's not focus on our superficial [[rational]] knowledge, let's embrace the profound archetypal beliefs which form the foundation of our [[being]]," or we embark on a difficult road to whom one attributed certain "superstitious give an account of these beliefs," when directly asked about them, answered that "some people believe…", immediately displacing their belief, transferring it onto anotherin knowledge. And, again, are we not doing It was already [[Kierkegaard]] who rendered the same with our childrenultimate paradox of belief: we go through he emphasized that the apostle preaches the ritual of Santa Claus, since our children (are supposed need to) believe in it and asks that we do not want accept his belief upon his [[word]]; he never offers "hard proofs" destined to disappoint themconvince non-believers. Is For this not also reason, the usual excuse reluctance of the mythical crooked [[Church]] in facing [[material]] which may prove or cynical politician who turns honest? — "I cannot disappoint them (the mythical "ordinary people") who believe in disprove its claims, is more ambiguous than it (or in me)may appear." AndIn the case of the Turin shroud which allegedly contains the contours of the crucified [[Jesus]], furthermoreand thus his almost photographic portrait, it is this need too simple to find another who "really believes," also not read the Church's reluctance as expressing the [[fear]] that which propels us in our need to stigmatize the Other as a (religious or ethnic) "fundamentalist"? In an uncanny way, belief always seems shroud will turn out to function in the guise of such be a "belief at fake from a distance": in order for later period — perhaps, it would be even more horrifying if the belief to function, there has shroud were proven to be some ultimate guarantor of itauthentic, yet since this guarantor is always deferred, displaced, never present in persona. How, then, is belief possible? How is this vicious cycle of deferred belief cut short? The point, positivist "verification" of course, is that the subject who directly believes, needs not exist for the belief to be operative: would undermine its status and deprive it is enough precisely to presuppose of its existence, icharisma.eBelief can only thrive in the shadowy [[domain]] between outright [[falsity]] and positive truth. The Jansenist notion of miracle bears [[witness]] to believe in it, either in the guise fact that they were fully aware of this paradox: for them, miracle is an [[event]] which has the mythological founding figure who is not part quality of our experiential reality, or a miracle only in the guise eyes of the impersonal "one" ("one believes…"). The crucial mistake believer — to be avoided here is, again, the properly "humanist" notion that this belief embodied in things, displaced onto thingscommonsense eyes of an infidel, it appears as a purely natural coincidence. It is nothing but a reified form thus far too simple to read this reluctance of a direct human belief, in which case the task of Church as an attempt to avoid the phenomenological reconstitution [[objective]] testing of the genesis truth of "reification" would be to demonstrate how a miracle: the original human belief was transposed onto things… The paradox to be maintained, in contrast to such attempts at phenomenological genesis, point is rather that displacement the miracle is original and constitutive: inherently linked to the fact of belief — there is no immediateneutral miracle to convince cynical infidels. Or, self-present living subjectivity to whom put it in another way, the belief embodied in "social things" can be attributed and who fact that the miracle appears as such only to believers, is then dispossessed a [[sign]] of it.God's [[power]], not of His impotence…
Je sais bien, mais quand meme… /I believe/: therein resides the dilemma — either we play the Jungian obscurantist game of "let's not focus on our superficial rational knowledge, let's embrace the profound archetypal beliefs which form the foundation of our being," or we embark on a difficult road to give an account of these beliefs in knowledge. It was already Kierkegaard who rendered the ultimate paradox of belief: he emphasized that the apostle preaches the need to believe and asks that we accept his belief upon his word; he never offers "hard proofs" destined to convince non-believers. For this reason, the reluctance of the Church in facing material which may prove or disprove its claims, is more ambiguous than it may appear. In the case of the Turin shroud which allegedly contains the contours of the crucified Jesus, and thus his almost photographic portrait, it is too simple to read the Church's reluctance as expressing the fear that the shroud will turn out to be a fake from a later period — perhaps, it would be even more horrifying if the shroud were proven to be authentic, since this positivist "verification" of the belief would undermine its status and deprive it of its charisma. Belief can only thrive in the shadowy domain between outright falsity and positive truth. ==The Jansenist notion of miracle bears witness to the fact that they were fully aware of this paradox: for them, miracle is an event which has the quality of a miracle only in the eyes of the believer — to the commonsense eyes of an infidel, it appears as a purely natural coincidence. It is thus far too simple to read this reluctance of the Church as an attempt to avoid the objective testing of the truth of a miracle: the point is rather that the miracle is inherently linked to the fact of belief — there is no neutral miracle to convince cynical infidels. Or, to put it in another way, the fact that the miracle appears as such only to believers, is a sign of God's power, not of His impotence…primordial substitution==
The primordial This relationship of substitutionis not limited to beliefs: the same goes for every one of the subject's innermost [[feelings]] and attitudes, inclusive of crying and laughing. Suffice it to [[recall]] the old enigma of transposed/displaced emotions at work from the so-called "weepers" ([[women]] hired to cry at funerals) in "[[primitive]]" societies, to the "canned [[laughter]]" on a TV-[[screen]], and to adopting a screen persona in [[cyberspace]]. When I [[construct]] a "[[false]]" [[image]] of myself which stands for me in a [[virtual]] [[community]] in which I participate (in [[sexual]] [[games]], for example, a shy man often assumes the screen persona of an attractive promiscuous [[woman]]), the emotions I feel and "feign" as part of my screen persona are not simply false: although (what I [[experience]] as) my "true self" does not feel them, they are nonetheless in a [[sense]] "true" — the same as with watching a TV mini-series with canned laughter where, even if I do not laugh, but simply stare at the screen, tired after a hard days work, I nonetheless feel relieved after the show… This is what the Lacanian notion of "decentrement," of the decentered subject, aims at: my most intimate feelings can be radically externalized, I can literally "laugh and cry through another."
This relationship And is the primordial version of this substitution is by means of which "somebody else does it for me," not limited to beliefs: the same goes very substitution of a [[signifier]] for every one of the subject's innermost feelings and attitudes? In such a substitution resides the basic, inclusive constitutive feature of crying and laughingthe symbolic order: a signifier is precisely an object-[[thing]] which substitutes me, which acts in my place. Suffice it to recall the old enigma of transposed/displaced emotions at work from the The so-called "weepers" primitive [[religions]] in which another human being can take upon himself my [[suffering]], my [[punishment]] (women hired to cry at funeralsbut also my laughter, my enjoyment…) , i.e. in "primitive" societies, which one can suffer and pay the price for a sin through the Other (up to prayer wheels which do the praying for you), are not as stupid and "canned laughterprimitive" on as they may seem — they harbor a TV-screenmomentous liberating potential. By way of surrendering my innermost content, inclusive of my [[dreams]] and [[anxieties]], to adopting the Other, a screen persona [[space]] opens up in cyberspace. When which I am free to breathe: when the Other laughs for me, I construct am free to take a "false" image rest; when the Other is sacrificed instead of me, I am free to go on living with the [[awareness]] that I did pay for my guilt; etc.etc. The efficiency of this operation of substitution resides in the [[Hegelian]] reflective reversal: when the Other is sacrificed for me, I sacrifice myself which stands through the Other; when the Other acts for me, I myself act through the Other; when the Other [[enjoys]] for me , I myself [[enjoy]] through the Other. Like, in a virtual community the [[good]] old [[joke]] about the [[difference]] between Soviet-style bureaucratic Socialism and the Yugoslav self-management Socialism: in which I participate ([[Russia]], members of the [[nomenklatura]], the representatives of the ordinary people, [[drive]] themselves in sexual gamesexpensive limousines, for examplewhile in [[Yugoslavia]], a shy man often assumes ordinary people themselves ride in limousines through their representatives. This liberating potential of mechanical [[rituals]] is also clearly discernible in our modern experience: every [[intellectual]] knows of the screen persona redeeming value of an attractive promiscuous woman)being temporarily subjected to the military drill, to the emotions I feel and "feign" as part requirements of my screen persona are not simply false: although (what I experience as) my a "true selfprimitive" does not feel them[[physical]] job, they are nonetheless in a sense "true" or to some similar externally regulated labour — the same as with watching a TV mini-series with canned laughter wherevery awareness that the Other regulates the process in which I participate, sets my [[mind]] free to roam, even if since I do know I am not laugh, but simply stare at involved. The Foucauldian motif of the screen, tired after interconnection between [[discipline]] and [[subjective]] [[freedom]] thus appears in a hard days workdifferent light: by submitting myself to some disciplinatory [[machine]], I nonetheless feel relieved after , as it were, transfer to the show… This is what Other the [[responsibility]] to maintain the Lacanian notion smooth run of "decentrementthings," of and thus gain the decentered subject, aims at: precious space in which to exercise my most intimate feelings can be radically externalized, I can literally "laugh and cry through another."freedom…
And is the primordial version of this substitution by means of which The one who originally "somebody else does it for me" is the signifier itself in its [[external]] materiality,from the " not canned prayer" in the very substitution of a signifier for Tibetan prayer wheel to the subject? In such a substitution resides "canned laughter" on our TV: the basic, constitutive feature of the symbolic order: qua "big Other," is that it is never simply a signifier is precisely an object-thing which substitutes metool or means of [[communication]], which acts in my place. The so-called primitive religions in which another human being can take upon himself my suffering, my punishment (but also my laughter, my enjoyment…)since it "decenters" the subject from within, i.e. in which one can suffer and pay the price sense of accomplishing his act for a sin through him. This gap between the subject and the Other (up to prayer wheels signifier which do the praying "does it for you)him, are not as stupid and "primitive" as they may seem — they harbor a momentous liberating potential. By way of surrendering my innermost content, inclusive of my dreams and anxieties, to the Other, a space opens up is clearly discernible in which I am free to breathecommon everyday experience: when the Other laughs for mea person slips, I am free another person standing next to take a rest; when him and merely observing the Other is sacrificed instead of meaccident, I am free to go on living can accompany it with the awareness that I did pay for my guilt; etc.etc"Oops!" or something similar. The efficiency mystery of this operation of substitution resides in the Hegelian reflective reversal: everyday occurrence is that, when the Other is sacrificed other does it for me, I sacrifice myself through the Other; when the Other acts for instead of me, I myself act through the Other; when symbolic efficiency of it is exactly the Other enjoys for me, I myself enjoy through same as in the Othercase of my doing it directly. Like, in Therein resides the good old joke about paradox of the difference between Soviet-style bureaucratic Socialism and notion of the Yugoslav self-management Socialism"[[performative]]," or [[speech]] act: in Russiathe very gesture of accomplishing an act by way of uttering words, members I am deprived of the nomenklaturaauthorship, the representatives of "big Other" (the ordinary people, drive themselves in expensive limousines, while in Yugoslavia, ordinary people themselves ride in limousines symbolic institution) speaks through their representativesme. This liberating potential of mechanical rituals It is no wonder then, that there is something puppet-like about the persons whose professional function is also clearly discernible in our modern experiencetessentially performative (judges, kings…): every intellectual knows they are reduced to a living embodiment of the redeeming value of being temporarily subjected to the military drillsymbolic institution, i.e. their sole [[duty]] is to "dot the requirements of a i's"primitive" physical jobmechanically, or to confer on some similar externally regulated labour — content elaborated by [[others]], the very awareness that the Other regulates the process in which I participate, sets my mind free to roam, since I know I am not involvedinstitutional cachet. The Foucauldian motif of later Lacan is fully justified in reserving the interconnection between discipline term "act" for something much more suicidal and subjective freedom thus appears in real than a different light: by submitting myself to some disciplinatory machine, I, as it were, transfer to the Other the responsibility to maintain the smooth run of things, and thus gain the precious space in which to exercise my freedom…[[speech act]].
The one who originally "does it for me" is the signifier itself in its external materiality, from the "canned prayer" in the Tibetan prayer wheel to the "canned laughter" on our TV: the basic feature This mystery of the symbolic order qua "big Other," is that it is never simply a tool or means of communication, since it "decenters" the subject from within, in exemplified by the sense enigmatic status of accomplishing his act for him. This gap between the subject and the signifier which what we call "does it for him,politeness" is clearly discernible in common everyday experience: when a person slips, another person standing next to him and merely observing the accidentupon meeting an acquaintance, can accompany it with I say "OopsGlad to see you!How are you today?" or something similar. The mystery of this everyday occurrence is that, when the other does it for me, instead of me, the symbolic efficiency of it is exactly the same as in the case clear to both of my doing it directly. Therein resides the paradox of the notion of the "performativeus that," or speech act: in the very gesture of accomplishing an act by a way of uttering words, I am deprived of authorship, the "big Otherdo not mean it seriously" (the symbolic institution) speaks through if my partner suspects that I am really interested, he may even be unpleasantly surprised, as though I were aiming at something too intimate and of no concern to me. It is no wonder then— or, that there is something puppet-like about to paraphrase the persons whose professional function is tessentially performative (judgesold [[Freudian]] joke, kings…): they "Why are reduced you saying you're glad to a living embodiment of the symbolic institutionsee me, iwhen you're really glad to see me!?").e. their sole duty is However, it would nonetheless be wrong to designate my act as simply "dot the i'shypocritical," mechanicallysince, to confer on some content elaborated by othersin another way, I do mean it: the polite exchange does establish a kind of pact between the institutional cachet. The later Lacan is fully justified two of us; in reserving the term same sense as I do "sincerely" laugh through the canned laughter (the proof of it being the fact that I effectively do "actfeel relieved" for something much more suicidal and real than a speech actafterwards).
This mystery If we radicalize in this way the relationship of substitution (i.e. the symbolic order is exemplified by first aspect of the enigmatic status notion of what we call fetishism), then the connection between the two aspects, the opposition "politeness": when, upon meeting an acquaintancepersons versus things, I say "Glad to see you! How are you today?their relation of substitution ("things instead of people, it is clear to both " or one person instead of us thatanother, in or a waysignifier instead of the signified…), I and the opposition "do not mean it seriouslystructure versus one of its elements," (becomes clear: the differential/formal structure occluded by the element-fetish, can only emerge if my partner suspects that I am really interestedthe gesture of substitution has already occurred. In other words, he may even be unpleasantly surprisedthe structure is always, as though I were aiming at something too intimate and by definition, a signifying structure, a structure of [[signifiers]] which are substituted for the [[signified]] content, not a structure of no concern the signified. For the differential/formal structure to me — oremerge, the real has to paraphrase redouble itself in the old Freudian jokesymbolic [[register]]; a reduplicatio has to occur, on account of which things no longer count as what they directly "Why are you saying you're glad to see me, when you're really glad " but only with [[regard]] to see me!?")their symbolic place. HoweverThis primordial substitution of the big [[Other, it would nonetheless be wrong to designate my act as simply "hypocriticalthe]] Symbolic Order," since, in another way, I do mean it: for [[the polite exchange does establish a kind Real]] of pact between the two immediate [[life]]-substance (in Lacanian terms: of us; in A — le grand [[Autre]] — for J — [[jouissance]]), gives rise to $, to the same sense as I do "sincerely[[barred]] subject" who is then "represented" laugh through by the canned laughter (the proof of it being the fact that I effectively do signifiers, i.e. on whose behalf signifiers "feel relievedact," afterwards).who acts through signifiers…
If we radicalize in this way the relationship of substitution (i.e. the first aspect of the notion of fetishism), then the connection between the two aspects, the opposition "persons versus things," their relation of substitution ("things instead of people," or one person instead of another, or a signifier instead of the signified…), and the opposition "structure versus one of its elements," becomes clear: the differential/formal structure occluded by the element-fetish, can only emerge if the gesture of substitution has already occurred. In other words, the structure is always, by definition, a signifying structure, a structure of signifiers which are substituted for the signified content, not a structure of the signified. For the differential/formal structure to emerge, the real has to redouble itself in the symbolic register; a reduplicatio has to occur, on account of which things no longer count as what they directly "are," but only with regard to their symbolic place. This primordial substitution of the big Other, the Symbolic Order, for the Real of the immediate life-substance (in Lacanian terms: of A — le grand Autre — for J — jouissance), gives rise to $, to the "barred subject" who is then "represented" by the signifiers, i.e. on whose behalf signifiers "act," who acts through signifiers…==Interpassivity==
InterpassivityAgainst this background, one is tempted to [[supplement]] the fashionable notion of "interactivity," with its shadowy and much more uncanny supplement/double, the notion of "interpassivity." That is to say, it is commonplace to emphasize how, with new electronic [[media]], the [[passive]] consumption of a [[text]] or a work of art is over: I no longer merely stare at the screen, I increasingly interact with it, entering into a dialogic relationship with it (from choosing the programs, through participating in debates in a Virtual Community, to directly determining the outcome of the plot in so-called "interactive narratives"). Those who praise the democratic potential of new media, generally focus on precisely these features: on how cyberspace opens up the possibility for the large majority of people to break out of the [[role]] of the passive [[observer]] following the [[spectacle]] staged by others, and to participate actively not only in the spectacle, but more and more in establishing the very rules of the spectacle… Is, however, the other side of this interactivity not interpassivity? Is the necessary obverse of my interacting with the object instead of just passively following the show, not the [[situation]] in which the object itself takes from me, deprives me of, my own passive reaction of [[satisfaction]] (or [[mourning]] or laughter), so that is is the object itself which "enjoys the show" instead of me, relieving me of the [[superego]] duty to enjoy myself… Do we not witness "interpassivity" in a great [[number]] of today's publicity spots or posters which, as it were, passively enjoy the product instead of us ? (Coke cans containing the inscription "Ooh!Ooh! What taste!", emulate in advance the [[ideal]] customer's reaction.) Another strange phenomenon brings us closer to the heart of the matter: almost every VCR aficionado who compulsively records hundreds of movies (myself among them), is well aware that the immediate effect of owning a VCR, is that one effectively watches less [[films]] than in the good old days of a simple TV set without a VCR; one never has [[time]] for TV, so, instead of losing a precious evening, one simply tapes the [[film]] and stores it for a [[future]] viewing (for which, of course, there is almost never time…). So, although I do not actually watch films, the very awareness that the films I [[love]] are stored in my video [[library]] gives me a profound satisfaction and, occasionally, enables me to simply relax and indulge in the exquisite art of far'niente — as if the VCR is in a way watching them for me, in my place… VCR stands here for the "big Other," for the medium of symbolic registration.
Against this backgroundIs the Western [[liberal]] academic's [[obsession]] with the suffering in Bosnia not the outstanding [[recent]] example of interpassive suffering? One can authentically suffer through reports on rapes and mass killings in Bosnia, while calmly pursuing one 's academic career… Another standard example of interpassivity is tempted to supplement provided by the fashionable notion role of "interactivity," with its shadowy and much more uncanny supplement/double, the notion of "interpassivity.madman" That is to within a pathologically distorted [[intersubjective]] link (say, it is commonplace to emphasize how, with new electronic media, a [[family]] whose [[repressed]] traumas explode in the passive consumption [[mental]] breakdown of a text or a work one of art is overits members): I no longer merely stare at the screen, I increasingly interact with it, entering into when a dialogic relationship with it (from choosing the programs, through participating in debates in group produces a Virtual Communitymadman, do they not shift upon him the [[necessity]] to directly determining passively endure the outcome suffering which belongs to all of them? Furthermore, is the ultimate example of interpassivity not the plot in so-called "interactive narrativesabsolute example"([[Hegel]]). Those itself, that of [[Christ]] who praise took upon himself the democratic potential (deserved) suffering of new mediahumanity? Christ redeemed us all not by acting for us, generally focus on precisely these features: on how cyberspace opens up the possibility for but by assuming the large majority of people to break out of the role burden of the ultimate passive observer following the spectacle staged by others, experience. (The difference between activity and to participate actively not only in the spectacle[[passivity]], but more and more in establishing the very rules of the spectacle… Iscourse, however, the other side is often blurred: weeping as an act of this interactivity [[public]] mourning is not interpassivity? Is the necessary obverse of my interacting with the object instead of just passively following the showsimply passive, not the situation in which it is passivity transformed into an [[active]] ritualized symbolic [[practice]].) In the object itself takes from me[[political]] domain, deprives me one of, my own passive reaction the recent outstanding examples of satisfaction (or mourning or laughter)"interpassivity, so that is " is the object itself which multiculturalist [[Leftist]] intellectual's "apprehension"enjoys about how even the show" instead Muslims, the great victims of methe Yugoslav war, relieving me are now renouncing the multi-ethnic pluralist [[vision]] of Bosnia and conceding to the superego duty to enjoy myself… Do we not witness "interpassivity" in a great number fact that, if Serbs and Croats want their clearly defined ethnic units, they too want an ethnic space of todaytheir own. This Leftist's publicity spots or posters which, "regret" is multiculturalist [[racism]] at its worst: as it if Bosnians were, passively enjoy not literally pushed into creating their own ethnic enclave by the product instead of us ? (Coke cans containing way that the inscription "Ooh!Ooh! What taste!liberal", emulate West has threated them in advance the ideal customer's reactionlast five years.) Another strange phenomenon brings However, what interests us closer to here is how the "multi-ethnic Bosnia" is only the latest in the heart series of mythical [[figures]] of the matterOther through which Western Leftist intellectuals have acted out their ideological [[fantasies]]: almost every VCR aficionado who compulsively records hundreds this intellectual is "multi-ethnic" through Bosnians, breaks out of movies (myself among them)the [[Cartesian]] paradigm by admiring Native American wisdom, etc., the same way as in [[past]] decades, when they were revolutionaries by admiring Cuba, is well aware that or "democratic socialists" by endorsing the immediate effect [[myth]] of owning Yugoslav "self-management" socialist as "something special," a VCRgenuine democratic breakthrough… In all of these cases, is that one effectively watches less films than in they have continued to lead their undisturbed upper-middle-[[class]] academic existence, while doing their progressive duty through the good old days Other. — This paradox of a simple TV set without a VCR; one never has time for TVinterpassivity, soof believing or enjoying through the other, instead of losing also opens up a new approach to [[aggressivity]]: what sets aggressivity in motion in a precious eveningsubject, one simply tapes is when the film and stores it for a future viewing (for other subject, through whichthe first subject believed or enjoyed, does something which disturbs the functioning of course, there is almost never time…)this [[transference]]. SoSee, although I do not actually watch filmsfor example, the very awareness attitude of some Western Leftist academics towards the disintegration of Yugoslavia: since the fact that the films I love are stored in my video library gives me a profound satisfaction and, occasionally, enables me to simply relax and indulge in people of ex-Yugoslavia rejected ("betrayed") Socialism disturbed the exquisite art belief of far'niente — as if the VCR is these academics, i.e. prevented them from persisting in a way watching them for me, their belief in my place… VCR stands here for "authentic" self-management Socialism through the "big Otherwhich realizes it," for the medium of symbolic registrationeveryone who does not share their Yugo-nostalgic attitude was dismissed as a [[proto-Fascist]] nationalist.
Is the Western liberal academic's obsession with the suffering in Bosnia not the outstanding recent example of interpassive suffering? One can authentically suffer through reports on rapes and mass killings in Bosnia, while calmly pursuing one's academic career… Another standard example of interpassivity is provided by the role of the "madman" within a pathologically distorted intersubjective link (say, a family whose repressed traumas explode in the mental breakdown of one of its members): when a group produces a madman, do they not shift upon him the necessity to passively endure the suffering which belongs to all of them? Furthermore, is the ultimate example of interpassivity not the "absolute example" (Hegel) itself, that of Christ who took upon himself the (deserved) suffering of humanity? Christ redeemed us all not by acting for us, but by assuming the burden of the ultimate passive experience. (==The difference between activity and passivity, of course, is often blurred: weeping as an act of public mourning is not simply passive, it is passivity transformed into an active ritualized symbolic practice.) In the political domain, one of the recent outstanding examples of "interpassivity," is the multiculturalist Leftist intellectual's "apprehension" about how even the Muslims, the great victims of the Yugoslav war, are now renouncing the multi-ethnic pluralist vision of Bosnia and conceding to the fact that, if Serbs and Croats want their clearly defined ethnic units, they too want an ethnic space of their own. This Leftist's "regret" is multiculturalist racism at its worst: as if Bosnians were not literally pushed into creating their own ethnic enclave by the way that the "liberal" West has threated them in the last five years. However, what interests us here is how the "multi-ethnic Bosnia" is only the latest in the series of mythical figures of the Other through which Western Leftist intellectuals have acted out their ideological fantasies: this intellectual is "multi-ethnic" through Bosnians, breaks out of the Cartesian paradigm by admiring Native American wisdom, etc., the same way as in past decades, when they were revolutionaries by admiring Cuba, or "democratic socialists" by endorsing the myth of Yugoslav "self-management" socialist as "something special," a genuine democratic breakthrough… In all of these cases, they have continued to lead their undisturbed upper-middle-class academic existence, while doing their progressive duty through the Other. — This paradox of interpassivity, of believing or enjoying through the other, also opens up a new approach subject supposed to aggressivity: what sets aggressivity in motion in a subject, is when the other subject, through which the first subject believed or enjoyed, does something which disturbs the functioning of this transference. See, for example, the attitude of some Western Leftist academics towards the disintegration of Yugoslavia: since the fact that the people of ex-Yugoslavia rejected ("betrayed") Socialism disturbed the belief of these academics, i.e. prevented them from persisting in their belief in "authentic" self-management Socialism through the Other which realizes it, everyone who does not share their Yugo-nostalgic attitude was dismissed as a proto-Fascist nationalist.enjoy==
Did we not, however, confuse different phenomena under the same title of interpassivity? Is there not a crucial [[distinction]] between the Other taking over from me the "dull" mechanical aspect of routine duties, and the Other taking over from me and thus depriving me of [[enjoyment]]? Is "to be relieved of one's enjoyment" not a meaningless paradox, at best a euphemisn for simply being deprived of it? Is enjoyment not something that, precisely, cannot be done through the Other? Already at the level of elementary [[psychological]] observation, one can answer to this by recalling the deep satisfaction a subject (a parent, for example) can obtain from the awareness that his or her [[beloved]] daughter or son is really enjoying something; a loving parent can literally enjoy through the Other's enjoyment… However, there is a much more uncanny phenomenon at work here: the only way really to account for the satisfaction and liberating potential of being able to enjoy through the Other, i.e. of being relieved of one's enjoyment and displacing it onto the Other, is to accept that enjoyment itself is not an immediate spontaneous [[state]], but is sustained by a superego-imperative: as Lacan emphasized again and again, the ultimate content of the superego-[[injunction]] is "Enjoy!". In order to properly grasp this paradox, one should first elucidate the opposition between the (public symbolic) Law and the superego. The public Law "between the lines" silently tolerates, incites even, what its [[explicit]] text prohibits (say, adultery), while the superego injunction which ordains jouissance, through the very directness of its order, hinders the subject supposed 's access to it much more efficiently than any [[prohibition]]. Let us recall the figure of the [[father]] who advises his son on sexual exploits: if the father warns him against it, formally prohibits him from dating girls, etc., he, of course, between the lines only propels the son to do it, i.e. to find satisfaction in violating the paternal prohibition; if, on the contrary, the father in an [[obscene]] way directly pushes him to "behave like a man" and [[seduce]] girls, the actual effect of this will probably be the opposite (the son's [[withdrawal]], [[shame]] of the obscene father, [[impotence]] even…). Perhaps, the briefest way to render the superego paradox is the injunction "Like it or not, enjoyyourself!". Suffice it to recall a father who works hard to organize a family holiday and, after a series of postponements, tired of it all, shouts at his children: "Now you better enjoy it!" On a holiday trip, it is quite common to feel a superego [[compulsion]] to enjoy, one "must have fun" — one feels guilty if one doesn't enjoy it. (In the Eisenhower era of "happy 50's," this compulsion was elevated to the everyday patriotic duty, or, as one of the public ideologues put it: "Not to be happy today is un-American.") The Japanese have perhaps found a unique way out of this deadlock of the superego: to bravely confront the paradox by way of directly organizing "fun" as part of your everyday duty, so that, when the [[official]], organized fun activity is over, you are relieved of your duty and are finally free to really have fun, to really relax and enjoy… Another attempt to resolve this same deadlock is the typical [[hysterical]] strategy of changing (suspending) the symbolic link while pretending that nothing has changed in reality: a husband, say, who divorces his wife and then continues to regularly visit her house and kids as if nothing had happened, [[feeling]] not only as at home as before, but even more relaxed; since the symbolic obligation to the family is undone, now he can really take it easy and enjoy it… like the Japanese who can enjoy once the injunction to enjoy is over. Against this background, it is easy to discern the liberating potential of being relieved of enjoyment: in this way, one is relieved of the monstruous duty to enjoy. — In a closer [[analysis]], one would thus have to distinguish between two types of "the Other doing (or, rather, enduring) it for me":
Did we not, however, confuse different phenomena under the same title of interpassivity? Is there not a crucial distinction between the Other taking over from me the "dull" mechanical aspect of routine duties, and the Other taking over from me and thus depriving me of enjoyment? Is "to be relieved of one's enjoyment" not a meaningless paradox, at best a euphemisn for simply being deprived of it? Is enjoyment not something that, precisely, cannot be done through the Other? Already at the level of elementary psychological observation, one can answer to this by recalling the deep satisfaction a subject (a parent, for example) can obtain from the awareness that his or her beloved daughter or son is really enjoying something; a loving parent can literally enjoy through the Other's enjoyment… However, there is a much more uncanny phenomenon at work here: the only way really to account for the satisfaction and liberating potential of being able to enjoy through the Other, i.e. of being relieved of one's enjoyment and displacing it onto the Other, is to accept that enjoyment itself is not an immediate spontaneous state, but is sustained by a superego-imperative: as Lacan emphasized again and again, the ultimate content of the superego-injunction is "Enjoy!". In order to properly grasp this paradox, one should first elucidate the opposition between the (public symbolic) Law and the superego. The public Law "between the lines" silently tolerates, incites even, what its explicit text prohibits (say, adultery), while the superego injunction which ordains jouissance, through the very directness of its order, hinders the subject's access to it much more efficiently than any prohibition. Let us recall the figure of the father who advises his son on sexual exploits: if the father warns him against it, formally prohibits him from dating girls, etc., he, of course, between the lines only propels the son to do it, i.e. to find satisfaction in violating the paternal prohibition; if, on the contrary, the father in an obscene way directly pushes him to "behave like a man" and seduce girls, the actual effect of this will probably be the opposite (the son's withdrawal, shame of the obscene father, impotence even…). Perhaps, the briefest way to render the superego paradox is the injunction "Like it or not, enjoy yourself!". Suffice it to recall a father who works hard to organize a family holiday and, after a series of postponements, tired of it all, shouts at his children: "Now you better enjoy it!" On a holiday trip, it is quite common to feel a superego compulsion to enjoy, one "must have fun" — one feels guilty if one doesn't enjoy it. (In the Eisenhower era of "happy 50's," this compulsion was elevated to the everyday patriotic duty, or, as one of the public ideologues put it: "Not to be happy today is un-American.") The Japanese have perhaps found a unique way out of this deadlock of the superego: to bravely confront the paradox by way of directly organizing "fun" as part of your everyday duty, so that, when the official, organized fun activity is over, you are relieved of your duty and are finally free to really have fun, to really relax and enjoy… Another attempt to resolve this same deadlock is the typical hysterical strategy of changing (suspending) the symbolic link while pretending that nothing has changed in reality: a husband, say, who divorces his wife and then continues to regularly visit her house and kids as if nothing had happened, feeling not only as at home as before, but even more relaxed; since the symbolic obligation to the family is undone, now he can really take it easy and enjoy it… like the Japanese who can enjoy once the injunction to enjoy is over. Against this background, it is easy to discern the liberating potential of being relieved of enjoyment: in this way, one is relieved of the monstruous duty to enjoy. — In a closer analysis, one would thus have to distinguish between two types of "the Other doing (or, rather, enduring) it for me": — in the case of commodity fetishism, our belief is deposed onto the Other: I think I do not believe, but I believe through the Other. The gesture of criticism here consists in the assertion of [[identity]]: no, it is YOU who believes through the Other (in the theological whimsies of commodities, in Santa Claus…).
— in the case of a video-recorder viewing and enjoying a film for me (or of the canned laughter, or of the weepers who cry and mourn for you, or of the Tibetan prayer wheel) the situation is the obverse: you think you enjoyed the show, but the Other did it for you. The gesture of criticism here is that, no, it was NOT YOU who laughed, it was the Other (the TV set) who did it.
Is the key to this distinction not that we are dealing here with the opposition between belief and jouissance, between [[the Symbolic ]] and the Real? In the case of (symbolic) belief, you [[disavow ]] the identity (you do not recognize yourself in the belief which is yours); in the case of (real) jouissance, you misrecognize the decenterment in what you (mis)perceive as "your own" jouissance. — Perhaps, the fundamental attitude which defines the subject is neither that of passivity nor that of [[autonomous ]] activity, but precisely that of interpassivity. This interpassivity is to be opposed to the Hegelian [[List ]] der Vernunft ("[[cunning of Reason]]"): in the case of the "cunning of Reason," I am active through the other, i.e. I can remain passive, while the Other does it for me (like the Hegelian [[Idea ]] which remains [[outside ]] of the [[conflict]], letting human passions do the work for it); in the case of interpassivity, I am passive through the other, i.e. I accede to the other the passive aspect (of enjoying), while I can remain actively engaged (I can continue to work in the evening, while the VCR passively enjoys for me; I can make financial arrangements for the deceased's fortune while the weepers mourn for me). This allows us to propose the notion of false activity: you think you are active, while your true [[position]], as it is embodied in the fetish, is passive… Do we not [[encounter ]] something akin to this false activity in the paradox of [[Predestination ]] (the very fact that things are decided in advance, i.e. that our attitude to Fate is that of a passive [[victim]], instigates us to engage ourselves in incessant frenetic activity), as well as in the typical strategy of the [[obsessional ]] [[neurotic ]] which also involves a "false activity": he is frantically active in order to prevent the real thing from happening (in a group situation in which some tension threatens to explode, the obsessional talks all the time, tells [[jokes]], etc., in order to prevent the awkward moment of [[silence ]] which would make the participants aware of the underlying tension).
The object which gives [[body ]] to the [[surplus]]-enjoyment fascinates the subject, it reduces him to a passive [[gaze ]] impotently gaping at the object; this relationship, of course, is experienced by the subject as something shameful, unworthy. Being directly transfixed by the object, passively submitting to its power of [[fascination]], is something ultimately unbearable: the open display of the passive attitude of "enjoying it," somehow deprives the subject of his dignity. Interpassivity is therefore to be conceived as the primordial form of the subject's [[defense ]] against jouissance: I defer jouissance to the Other who passively endures it (laughs, suffers, enjoys…) on my behalf. In this precise sense, the effect of the subject supposed to enjoy, i.e. the gesture of transposing one's jouissance to the Other, is perhaps even more primordial than that of the "subject supposed to know," or the "subject supposed to believe." Therein resides the [[libidinal ]] strategy of a [[pervert ]] who assumes the position of the pure [[instrument ]] of the Other's jouissance: for the ([[male]]) pervert, the sexual act (coitus) involves a clear [[division ]] of labour in which he reduces himself to a pure tool of her enjoyment; he is doing the hard work, accomplishing the active gestures, while the woman, transported in ecstasy, passively endures it and stares into the air… In the course of the [[psychoanalytic ]] [[treatment]], the subject has to learn to assume directly his relationship to the object which gives body to his jouissance, bypassing the proxy who enjoys at his place, instead of him. The disavowed fundamental passivity of my being is [[structured ]] in the fundamental [[fantasy ]] which, although a priori inaccessible to me, regulates the way I relate to jouissance. For that precise reason, it is [[impossible ]] for the subject to assume his [[fundamental fantasy ]] without undergoing the radical experience of "[[subjective destitution]]": in assuming my fundamental fantasy, I take upon myself the passive kernel of my being, i.e. the kernel the distance towards which sustains my subjective activity.
The substitution of the object for the subject is thus in a way even more primordial than the substitution of the signifier for the subject: if the signifier is the form of "being active through another," the object is the form of "being passive through another," i.e. the object is primordially that which suffers, endures it, for me, in my place — in short, that which enjoys for me. So what is unbearable in my encounter with the object is that in it, I see myself in the guise of a suffering object: what reduces me to a fascinated passive observer is the scene of myself passively enduring it… Far from being an excessive phenomenon which occurs only in extreme "pathological" situations, interpassivity, in its opposition to interactivity (not in the standard sense of interacting with the medium, but in the sense of another doing it for me, in my place), is thus the feature which defines the most elementary level, the necessary minimum, of subjectivity: in order to be an active subject, I have to get rid of — and transpose onto the other — the inert passivity which contains the density of my substantial being. In this precise sense, the opposition signifier/object overlaps with the opposition interactivity/interpassivity: signifier is interactive, it is active on my behalf, at my place, while object is interpassive, it suffers for me. Transposing onto another my very passive experience is a much more uncanny phenomenon than that of being active through another: in interpassivity, I am decentered in a much more radical way than in interactivity, since interpassivity deprives me of the very kernel of my substantial identity.
Consequently, the basic [[matrix ]] of interpassivity follows from the very notion of subject as the pure activity of (self)positing, as the fluidity of pure Becoming, devoid of any positive, firm Being: if I am to function as pure activity, I have to externalize my (passive) Being — in short: I have to be passive through another. This inert object which "is" my Being, in which my inert Being is externalized, is the Lacanian [[objet ]] [[petit a]]. Insofar as the elementary, constitutive structure of subjectivity is hysterical, i.e. insofar as [[hysteria ]] is defined by the question "What am I for an object (in the eyes of the Other, for the Other's desire)?", it confronts us with interpassivity at its purest: what the hysterical subject is unable to accept, what gives rise to an unbearable [[anxiety ]] in him, is the presentiment that the Other(s) perceive him in the passivity of his Being, as an object to be exchanged, enjoyed or otherwise "manipulated." Therein lies the "[[ontological ]] axiom" of Lacanian subjectivity: the more I am active, the more I must be passive at another place, i.e. the more there must be another object which is passive in my place, on my behalf. (This axiom is realized in its utmost simplicity in the proverbial high manager who, from time to time, feels compelled to visit prostitutes to be exposed to [[masochist ]] rituals and "treated as a mere object.") The theoretical problem which arises here, is the one formulated long ago by [[Adorno ]] (and to which he proposed his solution of "angstlose Passivitaet /passivity without anxiety/": is it possible for the subject to be passive towards the domain of objects, to acknowledge the "primacy of the object," without falling prey to fetishism? In Lacanian terms, the same problem should be reformulated as: does [[objet petit a ]] always and necessarily function as a fetishist object, as the object whose fascinating [[presence ]] covers up the [[lack ]] of [[castration ]] (the small a over minus phi of castration, in Lacan's [[mathemes]])?
==Sexual difference==
Crucial here is the reflective reversal of "the Other does it for me, instead of me, in the place of me," into "I myself am doing it through the Other": this reversal renders the minimal condition of subjectivity, i.e. the attitude which constitutes subjectivity is not "I am the active autonomous [[agent ]] who is doing it," but "when another is doing it for me, I myself am doing it through him" (a woman who is doing it through her man, etc.). This reversal is repeatedly at work in the Hegelian [[dialectical ]] process, in the guise of the reversal of determining [[reflection ]] into reflective determination. As is known, determining reflection is the dialectical [[unity ]] of positing and external reflection. At the level of the subject's activity, "positing reflection" occurs when I am directly active; in "external reflection," the Other is active and I merely passively observe it. When the Other does it for me, instead of me, when he acts as my proxy, my relationship towards him becomes that of determining reflection, i.e. external and positing reflection already overlap in it (the very act of observing the Other doing it for me, the moment of external reflection, makes me aware that he is doing it for me, that, in this sense, I myself "posited" his activity, that his activity is "mediated" by my [[subjective position]]); it is only when I posit direct identity between the Other's and my activity, i.e. when I conceive of myself as the truly active party, as the one who is doing it through the Other, that we [[pass ]] from determining reflection to reflective determination (since, at this level, the Other' activity is not only determined by my reflection, but directly posited as my reflective determination). Or, to refer again to the Yugoslav joke: we are dealing here with the shift from "representatives of the people who drive limousines in the place of the ordinary people" to "ordinary people themselves who drive limousines through their representatives"… In the domain of jouissance, this shift is a shift from the Other enjoying it instead of me, at my place, to myself enjoying it through the Other.
This paradox also allows us to throw some new light on [[sexual difference]]. When, at the outset of his argumentation for distributive justice, John Rawls states that his hypothesis excludes the presence of [[envy ]] in rational subjects, he thereby excludes desire itself in its constitutive mediation with the Other's desire. However, the [[logic ]] of "envy" is not the same for both [[sexes]]. How, then, does "desire is the desire of the Other" differ in the case of men and women? The [[masculine ]] version is, to put it simply, that of competition/envy: "I want it because you want it, insofar as you want it," i.e. what confers the value of desirability on an object is that it is already desired by another. The aim here is the ultimate [[destruction ]] of the Other, which, of course, then renders the object worthless — therein resides the paradox of the male [[dialectic ]] of desire. The [[feminine ]] version, on the contrary, is that of "I desire through the Other," in both senses of "let the Other do it (possess and enjoy the object, etc.) for me" (let my husband, my son… succeed for me), as well as "I only desire what he desires, I only want to fulfill his desire" ([[Antigone ]] who only wants to fulfill the desire of the Other in accomplishing the proper burial of her brother).
The [[thesis ]] that a man tends to act directly and to assume his act, while a woman prefers to act by proxy, letting another (or manipulating another into) doing it for her, may sound like the worst cliche, which gives rise to the [[notorious ]] image of the woman as a natural schemer hiding behind man's back. However, what if this cliche nevertheless points towards the feminine status of the subject? What if the "original" subjective gesture, the gesture constitutive of subjectivity, is not that of autonomously "doing something," but rather that of the primordial substitution, of withdrawing and letting another do it for me, in my place. Women, much more than men, are able to enjoy by proxy, to find deep satisfaction in the awareness that their beloved partner enjoys (or succeeds or in any other way has attained his or her [[goal]]). In this precise sense, the Hegelian "Cunning of Reason" bears witness to the resolutely feminine [[nature ]] of what Hegel calls "Reason": "Look for the hidden Reason (which realizes itself in the [[apparent ]] confusion of egotistic direct motifs and acts)!", is Hegel's version of the notorious Cherchez la [[femme]]!. This, then, is how reference to interpassivity allows us to complicate the standard opposition of man versus woman as active versus passive: sexual difference is inscribed into the very core of the relationship of substitution — woman can remain passive while being active through her other, man can be active while suffering through his other.
==The "objectively subjective"==
The ontological paradox, scandal even, of these phenomena (whose psychoanalytic [[name]], of course, is fantasy) resides in the fact that they subvert the standard opposition of "subjective" and "objective": of course, fantasy is by definition not "objective" (in the naive sense of "existing independently of the subject's perceptions); however, it is also not "subjective" (in the sense of being reducible to the subject's consciously experienced intuitions). Fantasy rather belongs to the "bizarre [[category ]] of the objectively subjective — the way things actually, objectively seem to you even if they don't seem that way to you." When for example, the subject actually experiences a series of [[fantasmatic ]] [[formations ]] which interrelate as so many permutations of each other, this series is never [[complete]]: it is always as if the actually experienced series presents so many variations of some underlying "fundamental" fantasy which is never actually experienced by the subject. (In [[Freud]]'s "A [[Child ]] Is Being Beaten", the two consciously experienced fantasies presuppose and thus relate to a [[third ]] one, "My father is beating me," which was never actually experienced and can only be [[retroactively ]] reconstructed as the presupposed reference of — or, in this case, the intermediate term between — the other two fantasies.) One can even go further and [[claim ]] that, in this sense, the Freudian unconscious itself is "objectively subjective": when, for example, we claim that someone who is consciously well disposed towards [[Jews]], nonetheless harbors profound anti-Semitic prejudices he is not consciously aware of, do we not claim that (insofar as these prejudices do not render the way Jews really are, but the way they appear to him) he is not aware how Jews really seem to him? — And this brings us back to the mystery of "fetishism": when, by means of a fetish, the subject "believes through the other" (i.e. when the fetish-thing believes for him, in the place of him), we also encounter this "bizarre category of the objectively subjective": what the fetish objectivizes is "my true belief," the way things "truly seem to me," although I never effectively experience them this way; apropos of commodity fetishism, Marx himself uses the term "objectively-necessary appearance". So, when a critical Marxist encounters a bourgeois subject immersed in commodity fetishism, the Marxist's reproach to him is not "Commodity may seem to you a magical object endowed with special powers, but it really is just a reified expression of relations between people"; the actual Marxist's reproach is rather "You may think that the commodity appears to you as a simple embodiment of social relations (that, for example, money is just a kind of voucher entitling you to a part of the social product), but this is not how things really seem to you — in your [[social reality]], by means of your [[participation ]] in social exchange, you bear witness to the uncanny fact that a commodity really appears to you as a magical object endowed with special powers"…
And, at a more general level, is this not a characteristic of the symbolic order as such? When I encounter a bearer of symbolic [[authority ]] (a father, a judge…), my subjective experience of him can be that of a corrupted weakling, yet I nonetheless treat him with due respect because this is how he "objectively appears to me." Another example: in Communist regimes, the semblance according to which people supported the Party and enthusiastically constructed socialism, was not a simple subjective semblance (nobody really believed in it), but rather a kind of "objective semblance," a semblance materialized in the actual social functioning of the [[regime]], in the way the ruling [[ideology ]] was materialized in ideological rituals and apparatuses. Or, to put it in Hegelian terms: the notion of the "objectively subjective," of the semblance conceived in the "objective" sense, designates the moment when the difference between objective reality and subjective semblance is reflected within the domain of the subjective semblance itself. What we obtain in this reflection-into-semblance of the opposition between reality and semblance is precisely the paradoxical notion of objective semblance, of "how things really seem to me." Therein resides the dialectical [[synthesis ]] between the realm of the Objective and the realm of the Subjective: not simply in the notion of subjective appearance as the mediated expression of objective reality, but in the notion of a semblance which objectivizes itself and starts to function as a "real semblance" (the semblance sustained by the big Other, the symbolic institution) against the mere subjective semblance of actual individuals. This is also one of the ways in which to specify the meaning of Lacan's assertion of the subject's constitutive "decenterment": its point is not that my subjective experience is regulated by objective unconscious mechanisms which are "decentered" with regard to my self-experience and, as such, beyond my [[control ]] (a point asserted by every [[materialist]]), but rather something much more unsettling — I am deprived of even my most intimate "subjective" experience, the way things "really seem to me," that of the fundamental fantasy which constitutes and guarantees the kernel of my being, since I can never consciously experience it and assume it… According to the standard view, the [[dimension ]] which is constitutive of subjectivity is that of the phenomenal (self)experience — I am a subject the moment I can say to myself: "No matter what unknown [[mechanism ]] governs my acts, perceptions and [[thoughts]], nobody can take from me what I see and feel now." Lacan turns around this standard view: the "subject of the signifier" emerges only when a key aspect of the subject's phenomenal (self)experience (his "fundamental fantasy"), becomes inaccessible to him, i.e. is "primordially repressed". At its most radical, the Unconscious is the inaccessible phenomenon, not the objective mechanism which regulates my phenomenal experience.
The prima facie [[philosophical ]] observation apropos of this paradox, of course, would be that modern [[philosophy ]] long ago elaborated such a notion of "objectively subjective." Therein resides the [[whole ]] point of the Kantian notion of the "[[transcendental]]" which precisely designates objectivity, insofar as it is "subjectively" mediated/constituted: [[Kant ]] again and again emphasizes that his transcendental [[idealism ]] has nothing to do with the simple subjective phenomenalism, i.e. his point is not that there is no objective reality, that only subjective appearances are accessible to us. There definitely is a line which separates objective reality from mere subjective impressions, and Kant's problem is precisely, how do we pass from the mere [[multitude ]] of subjective impressions to objective reality: his answer, of course, is through transcendental [[constitution]], i.e. through the subject's synthetic activity. The difference between objective reality and mere subjective impressions, is thus [[internal ]] to subjectivity, it is the difference between merely subjective and objectively subjective… This, however, is not what the Lacanian notion of fantasy aims at. To grasp this difference, one should introduce here the seemingly hair-[[splitting]], but nonetheless crucial distinction between "subjectively objective" and "objectively subjective": the Kantian transcendentally constituted reality is subjectively objective (it stands for objectivity which is subjectively constituted/mediated), while fantasy is objectively subjective (it designates an innermost subjective content, a product of fantasizing, which, paradoxically, is "desubjectivized," rendered inaccessible to the subject's immediate experience).
However, it would be a crucial misunderstanding to read this radical decentrement involved in the notion of fetishism (I am deprived of my innermost beliefs, fantasies, etc.) as "the end of Cartesian subjectivity." What this [[deprivation ]] (i.e. the fact that a phenomenological reconstitution which would generate "reified" belief out of the presupposed "first-person" belief necessarily fails, the fact that substitution is original, the fact that even in the cases of the most intimate beliefs, fantasies, etc., the big Other can "do it for me") effectively undermines, is the standard notion of the so-called "Cartesian Theater," the notion of a central Screen of [[Consciousness ]] which forms the focus of subjectivity, and where (at a phenomenal level) "things really happen." In clear contrast to it, the Lacanian subject qua $, the [[void ]] of self-referential negativity, is strictly correlative to the primordial decentrement: the very fact that I can be deprived of even my innermost [[psychic ]] ("mental") content, that the big Other (or fetish) can laugh for me, believe for me, etc., is what makes me $, the "barred" subject, the pure void with no positive substantial content. The Lacanian subject is thus empty in the radical sense of being deprived of even the minimal phenomenological support: there is no wealth of experiences to fill in its void. And Lacan's wager is that the Cartesian reduction of the subject to pure cogito already implies such a reduction of every substantial content, inclusive of my innermost "mental" attitudes — the notion of "Cartesian Theater" as the original locus of subjectivity is already a "reification" of the subject qua $, the pure void of negativity.Available: http://www2.centrepompidou.fr/traverses/numero3/textes/zizeke.html.
==Source==
* [[The Interpassive Subject]]. ''Centre Georges Pompidou''. [[Paris]], Traverses. 1998. <http://www2.centrepompidou.fr/traverses/numero3/textes/zizeke.html>. Also listed on ''[[Lacan.com]]''. <http://www.lacan.com/zizek-pompidou.htm>
[[Category:Articles by Slavoj Žižek]][[Category:ZizekSlavoj Žižek]]
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