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Here, then, we have We all [[remember]] the first practical demonstration of what does old [[joke]] [[about]] the Bush doctrine of preventive strikes means, a doctrine now publicly declared as the official American "philosophy" of international politics (borrowed kettle which [[Freud]] [[quotes]] in the thirty-one page paper entitled "The National Security Strategy," issued by the White House on September 20, 2002)? Its main points are: American military might should remain "beyond challenge" in the foreseeable future; since the main enemy today is an "irrational" fundamentalist who, in contrast [[order]] to Communists, lacks even render the elementary sense of survival and respect strange [[logic]] of his own people[[dreams]], America has namely the right enumeration of mutually exclusive answers to preemptive strikes a reproach (i.e., that I returned to attack countries which do not already pose a clear threat to the U.S., but MIGHT pose such friend a threat in the foreseeable futurebroken kettle): (1)I never borrowed a kettle from you; while the U.S. should seek ad hoc international coalitions for such attacks, (2) I returned it should reserve to you unbroken; (3) the right to act independently if kettle was already broken when I got it does not get sufficient international supportfrom you. SoFor Freud, while the U.S. presents its domination over other sovereign states as grounded in a benevolent paternalism which takes into account the interests such an enumeration of inconsistent arguments of other nations and their people, course confirms <i>per negationem</i> what it reserves for itself the ultimate right endeavors to DEFINE its allies' "true" interestsdeny - that I returned you a broken kettle. The logic is thus clearly formulated: even the pretense of a neutral international law is abandoned, since, when the U.S. perceives a potential threatNow, they formally ask their allies to support themin June 2003, but the allies' agreement is optional. The underlying message is always "we will do it with or without you" (i.e., you are free to agree with uswhen, but not free to disagree). The old paradox after hundreds of investigators were [[looking]] after the forced choice is reproduced here: the freedom to make a choice on condition that one makes the right choice. The "Bush doctrine" relies on the violent assertion of the paranoiac logic of total control over FUTURE threats, justifying preemptive strikes against these supposed threats. The ineptness of such an approach for today's universeWMD, in which knowledge circulates freelynone were found, is patent. The loop between the present and answer to the future is closed: critics who ask the prospect of a breathtaking terrorist act is evoked in order to justify incessant preemptive strikes now. This closed loop was perfectly formulated in a TV debate in February 2002elementary question "If there are no WMD, when the actor and ex-Congressman Fred Thompson said, in defense of President Bush's Iraq politics: "When anti-war protesters say 'But what why then did we attack [[Iraq effectively DO ]]? Did you lie to the USus? It did not attack us!'", one should answer it with is [[structured]] precisely like the question 'And what did argument about the terrorists who destroyed borrowed kettle: (1) We DID find [[them]] (the Twin Towers effectively DO to the Utwo mobile labs..S. before September 11? They also did nothing!'" So); (2) OK, in short: in the same way thatthese two labs do not really prove anything, if we had known of the plans for 9/11but give us more [[time]], and we would have been fully justified in attacking the terrorists before the actwill find them, we now have the right there HAVE to attack be some WMD in Iraq... The problem with this logic is that it presupposes that we can treat the future as something that, ; (3) even if there are no WMD in a way, already took place.<br><br>The ultimate paradox is that the very strategy of preemptive strikes will contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. When US attacked Iraq and not North Korea, the underlying logic this was clear: once a "rogue" state crosses the critical limit and already acquires substantial nuclear weapons, one cannot simply attack it because one risks a nuclear backlash killing millions on our side. This, precisely, was the lesson North Korea drew from the attack on Iraq: the regime sees nuclear weapons as not the only guarantee of its survival; in their view[[reason]] we went to war, the mistake of Iraq was there are also [[other]] [[good]] reasons to accept in the first place the collaboration with the UN topple a brutal dictator and the presence of international inspectorsaggressor like [[Saddam]].<br><br>

Before the war, the same [[inconsistency]] characterized the general justification of the attack on Iraq: (1) there is a link between Saddam's [[regime]] and [[al-Qaeda]], so Saddam should be punished as part of the revenge for 9/11: Saddam's regime is a really bad one, a [[threat]] to its neighbors, and we should liberate the Iraqi [[people]]; (2) of course there are many bad regimes, but what makes Saddam special is the possession of the Weapons of Mass [[Destruction]] which Saddam is ready to use; (3) and what is so bad in going to war for oil? The US has a legitimate strategic interest in the [[Middle East]] oil reserves... The problem, again, was that there were TOO MANY reasons for the attack. And one is tempted to [[claim]] that there were also [[three]] REAL reasons for the attack: (1) the "sincere" [[ideological]] [[belief]] that the US are bringing to other nations [[democracy]] and prosperity; (2) the urge to brutally assert and [[signal]] the unconditional US [[hegemony]]; (3) the [[control]] of the Iraqi oil reserves. And it seems as if these three "[[real]]" reasons are the "[[truth]]" of the three [[official]] reasons (the [[need]] to destroy Iraq's WMD is evoked to justify the brutal need to assert the US hegemony), with the last term in each of the two series [[being]] the same - oil (in each of the two series, this term is given a different ideologico-[[political]] twist: first the "normal" need to maintain international trade, then the ruthless determination to control other countries' resources).<br><br>And, incidentally, opponents of the war seemed to [[repeat]] the same inconsistent logic: (1) it is all really about the control of oil and American hegemony - the [[true]] rogue [[state]] which terrorizes [[others]] are the US themselves; (2) even if it is not only about oil and hegemony and the attack is justified, since Saddam is a murderer and torturer, and his regime a criminal catastrophe, it will be counterproductive - it will give a big boost to a new wave of the anti-American [[terrorism]]; (3) even iof successful, the attack on Iraq destined to overthrow Saddam will cost too much, and the [[money]] could be better spend elsewhere...<br><br>The problem with the basic refrain ("Iraq is a big country, Saddam had lots of time to hide the WMD, so give us more time and we will definitely find them!") is that its [[structure]] is the same as that of a judge who first punishes the accused and then, when [[forced]] to admit that he has no proof the crime has effectively been committed, he says: "Give me more time and I promised you that I will find [[material]] proofs that will justify my [[punishment]]!" So first you punish, and then you look for proofs of the crime... Not to mention the fact that this, precisely, was what before the war the UN weapons inspectors were asking for - more time - and were scathingly dismissed by the US.<br><br> Here, then, we have the first [[practical]] demonstration of what does the [[Bush]] [[doctrine]] of preventive strikes means, a doctrine now publicly declared as the official American "[[philosophy]]" of international [[politics]] (in the thirty-one page paper entitled "The National Security Strategy," issued by the White House on September 20, 2002)? Its main points are: American military might should remain "beyond challenge" in the foreseeable [[future]]; since the main [[enemy]] today is an "[[irrational]]" fundamentalist who, in contrast to Communists, [[lacks]] even the elementary [[sense]] of survival and respect of his own people, America has the [[right]] to preemptive strikes (i.e., to attack countries which do not already pose a clear threat to the U.S., but MIGHT pose such a threat in the foreseeable future); while the U.S. should seek ad hoc international coalitions for such attacks, it should reserve the right to act independently if it does not get sufficient international support. So, while the U.S. presents its domination over other sovereign states as grounded in a benevolent paternalism which takes into account the interests of other nations and their people, it reserves for itself the ultimate right to DEFINE its allies' "true" interests. The logic is thus clearly formulated: even the pretense of a neutral [[international law]] is abandoned, since, when the U.S. perceives a potential threat, they formally ask their allies to support them, but the allies' agreement is optional. The underlying [[message]] is always "we will do it with or without you" (i.e., you are free to agree with us, but not free to disagree). The old [[paradox]] of the forced [[choice]] is reproduced here: the [[freedom]] to make a choice on condition that one makes the right choice. The "Bush doctrine" relies on the violent assertion of the [[paranoiac]] logic of [[total]] control over FUTURE [[threats]], justifying preemptive strikes against these supposed threats. The ineptness of such an approach for today's [[universe]], in which [[knowledge]] circulates freely, is patent. The loop between the [[present]] and the future is closed: the prospect of a breathtaking terrorist act is evoked in order to justify incessant preemptive strikes now. This closed loop was perfectly formulated in a TV debate in February 2002, when the actor and ex-Congressman Fred Thompson said, in [[defense]] of President Bush's Iraq politics: "When anti-war protesters say 'But what did Iraq effectively DO to the US? It did not attack us!', one should answer it with the question 'And what did the terrorists who destroyed the Twin Towers effectively DO to the U.S. before [[September 11]]? They also did [[nothing]]!'" So, in short: in the same way that, if we had known of the plans for 9/11, we would have been fully justified in attacking the terrorists before the act, we now have the right to attack Iraq... The problem with this logic is that it presupposes that we can treat the future as something that, in a way, already took [[place]].<br><br>The ultimate paradox is that the very strategy of preemptive strikes will contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. When US attacked Iraq and not North Korea, the underlying logic was clear: once a "rogue" state crosses the critical [[limit]] and already acquires substantial nuclear weapons, one cannot simply attack it because one risks a nuclear backlash killing millions on our side. This, precisely, was the lesson North Korea drew from the attack on Iraq: the regime sees nuclear weapons as the only [[guarantee]] of its survival; in their view, the mistake of Iraq was to accept in the first place the collaboration with the UN and the [[presence]] of international inspectors.<br><br> This, then, is what the Bush doctrine effectively means: first you attack, then you look for reasons to justify it. The problem with today's US is not that it is a new [[global ]] [[Empire]], but that it is NOT, i.e., that, while pretending to be, it continues to act as a [[Nation]]-State, ruthlessly pursuing its interests. And this fact also provides the background that the above-mentioned inconsistent argumentation conceals and, simultaneously, cannot but point towards. What were the actual ideological and political stakes of the attack on Iraq? Here, one is tempted to propose the hypothesis that the US-Iraq war was, as to its actual socio-political [[content]], "the first war between the US and [[Europe]]." Today, the united Europe is the main obstacle to the New [[World ]] Order the Us [[want ]] to impose, and the reasons that move the US are again triple: (1) naive [[ideology ]] (the sincere believe that the US are ready to act, to fight for democracy and [[human ]] rights, while Europe is caught in the old Munich 38 syndrome of indefinite postponement); (2) the need to brutally impose the US hegemony; (3) [[economic ]] interests (the safe access to oil supply is the condition for the US to win in the forthcoming competition with the united Europe).

* [[The Iraqi Borrowed Kettle]] ''[[Lacan]].com''. 2004. <http://www.lacan.com/zizekkettle.htm>.

[[Category:ZizekSlavoj Žižek]]