The Leninist Freedom by Karl MarxSlavoj Zizek.On Belief (2001). The Leninist FreedomHow, then, do things stand with [[freedom]]? Here is how [[Lenin]] stated his [[position]] in a polemic against the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionaries’ critique of Bolshevik [[power]] in 1922:
HowIndeed, then, do things stand with freedom? Here is how Lenin stated his position in a polemic against the Menshevik sermons which … the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries’ critique of Bolshevik power Revolutionaries preach express their [[true]] [[nature]]: “The [[revolution]] has gone too far What you are saying now we have been saying at[ the [[time]], permit us to say it again.” But we say in 1922reply:“Permit us to put you before a firing squad for saying that. Either you refrain from expressing your views, or, if you insist on expressing your [[political]] views publicly in the [[present]] circumstances, when our position is far more difficult than it was when the white guards were directly attacking us, then you will have only yourselves to blame if we treat you as the worst and most pernicious white guard elements."”
IndeedThis Leninist freedom of [[choice]] — not “[[Life]] or [[money]]!” but “Life or critique!” — combined with Lenin’s dismissive attitude towards the “liberal” [[notion]] of freedom, accounts for his bad reputation among [[liberals]]. Their [[case]] largely rests upon their [[rejection]] of the standard [[Marxist]]-Leninist opposition of “formal” and “actual” freedom: as even [[Leftist]] liberals like Claude [[Lefort]] emphasize again and again, freedom is in its very notion “[[formal]],” so that “actual freedom” equals the [[lack]] of freedom.” That is to say, with [[regard]] to freedom, Lenin is best remembered for his famous retort “Freedom yes, but for WHOM? To do WHAT?” — for him, in the sermons which … case of the Mensheviks quoted above, their “freedom” to criticize the Bolshevik [[government]] effectively amounted to “freedom” to undermine the workers’ and Socialistpeasants’ government on behalf of the counter-Revolutionaries preach express their true nature: “The revolution has gone too far What … Today, is it not obvious after the terrifying [[experience]] of Really Existing [[Socialism]], where the fault of this reasoning resides? First, it reduces a historical constellation to a closed, fully contextualized, [[situation]] in which the “objective” consequences of one’s [[acts]] are fully determined (“independently of your intentions, what you are saying doing now we have been saying atobjectively serves . . . “); second, the position of [[ enunciation]] of such statements usurps the time[[right]] to decide what your acts “objectively mean, permit us to say it again.” But we say in replyso that their [[apparent]] 11 objectivism” (the focus on “[[objective]] meaning”) is the [[form]] of [[appearance]] of its opposite, the thorough subjectivism: “Permit us to put you before a firing squad for saying that. Either you refrain from expressing I decide what your viewsacts objectively mean, orsince I define the context of a situation (say, if you insist on expressing your political views publicly in I conceive of my power as the immediate equivalent/expression of the power of the present circumstances[[working]] [[class]], when our position then everyone who opposes me is far more difficult than it was when “objectively” an [[enemy]] of the white guards were directly attacking us[[working class]]). Against this [[full]] contextualization, then you will have one should emphasize that freedom is “actual” precisely and only yourselves as the capacity to blame if we treat you “transcend” the coordinates of a given situation, to “posit the presuppositions” of one’s [[activity]] (as [[Hegel]] would have put it), i.e. to redefine the worst and most pernicious white guard elementsvery situation within which one is [[active]]."Furthermore, as many a critic pointed out, the very term “Really Existing Socialism,”although it was coined in [[order]] to assert Socialism’s success, is in itself a proof of Socialism’s utter failure, i.e. of the failure of the attempt to legitimize Socialist regimes — the term “Really Existing Socialism” popped up at the historical [[moment]] when the only legitimizing [[reason]] for Socialism was a mere fact that it [[exists]] . . . “
This Leninist Is this, however, the [[whole]] story? How does freedom effectively function in [[liberal]] democracies themselves? Although Clinton’s presidency epitomizes the [[Third]] Way of choice — not “Life or money!” but “Life or critique!” — combined with Lenin’s dismissive attitude towards today’s (ex-)[[Left]] succumbing to the “liberal” notion of freedomRightist [[ideological]] [[blackmail]], accounts for his bad reputation among liberals. Their case largely rests upon their rejection of the standard Marxisthealth-Leninist opposition care reform program would nonetheless amount to a kind of “formal” and “actual” freedom: as even Leftist liberals like Claude Lefort emphasize again and againact, freedom is at least in its very notion “formaltoday’s [[conditions]],” so that “actual freedom” equals since it would have been based on the lack rejection of freedom.” That is to say, with regard to freedom, Lenin is best remembered for his famous retort “Freedom yes, but for WHOM? To do WHAT?” — for him, in the case hegemonic notions of the Mensheviks quoted above, their “freedom” [[need]] to criticize the Bolshevik government effectively amounted to “freedom” to undermine the workers’ curtail Big [[State]] expenditure and peasants’ government on behalf of the counter-revolution … Todayadministration — in a way, is it not obvious after would “do the terrifying experience of Really Existing Socialism[[impossible]].” No wonder, where the fault of this reasoning resides? Firstthen, that it reduces a historical constellation to a closedfailed: its failure — perhaps the only significant, fully contextualizedalthough [[negative]], situation in which [[event]] of Clinton’s presidency bears [[witness]] to the “objective” consequences [[material]] force of one’s acts are fully determined (“independently the ideological notion of your intentions, what you are doing now objectively serves “free choice. . . “); second” That is to say, although the position large majority of enunciation of such statements usurps the right to decide what your acts “objectively mean,” so that their apparent 11 objectivism” (the focus on “objective meaning”) is the form of appearance of its opposite, -called “ordinary people” were not properly acquainted with the thorough subjectivism: I decide what your acts objectively meanreform program, since I define the context of a situation medical lobby (say, if I conceive of my power twice as strong as the immediate equivalent/expression of infamous [[defense]] lobby!) succeeded in imposing on the power of [[public]] the working classfundamental [[idea]] that, then everyone who opposes me is “objectively” an enemy of the working classwith [[universal]] health-care free choice (in matters concerning [[medicine]]). Against will be somehow threatened — against this full contextualization, one should emphasize that freedom is “actual” precisely and only as the capacity purely fictional reference to “transcend” the coordinates of a given situation“free choice”, to “posit the presuppositions” all enumeration of one’s activity “hard facts” (as Hegel would have put it)in Canada, i.e. to redefine the very situation within which one health-care is active. Furthermoreless expensive and more effective, as many a critic pointed out, the very term “Really Existing Socialismwith no less free choice,” although it was coined in order to assert Socialism’s success, is in itself a proof of Socialism’s utter failure, i.e. of the failure of the attempt to legitimize Socialist regimes — the term “Really Existing Socialism” popped up at the historical moment when the only legitimizing reason for Socialism was a mere fact that it exists . etc. ) proved ineffective. “
Is this, however, Here we are at the very nerve center of the whole story? How does liberal [[ideology]]: freedom effectively function of choice, grounded in liberal democracies themselves? Although Clinton’s presidency epitomizes the Third Way notion of today’s (ex-)Left succumbing the “psychological” [[subject]] endowed with propensities he or she strives to realize. This especially holds today, in the Rightist ideological blackmailera of what sociologists like Ulrich Beck call “risk [[society]], his health-care reform program would nonetheless amount ” when the ruling ideology endeavors to a kind sell us the insecurity caused by the [[dismantling]] of actthe [[Welfare]] State as the opportunity for new freedoms: you have to [[change]] jobs every year, at least in today’s conditions, since relying on short-term contracts instead of a long-term [[stable]] appointment. Why not see it would have been based on as the rejection of liberation from the hegemonic notions constraints of a fixed job, as the need [[chance]] to curtail Big State expenditure reinvent yourself again and administration — in a wayagain, it would “do to become aware of and realize hidden potentials of your [[personality]]? You can no longer rely on the impossible.” No wonder, thenstandard health insurance and retirement plan, so that you have to opt for additional coverage for which you have to pay. Why not perceive it failedas an additional opportunity to choose: its failure — perhaps either better life now or long-term security? And if this predicament causes you [[anxiety]], the only significant, although negative[[postmodern]] or “second modernity” ideologist will immediately accuse you of [[being]] unable to assume full freedom, event of Clinton’s presidency bears witness to the material force “escape from freedom,” of the ideological notion of “free choice.” That is immature sticking to sayold stable forms … Even better, although when this is inscribed into the large majority ideology of the so-called “ordinary people” were not properly acquainted subject as the [[psychological]] [[individual]] pregnant with the reform program[[natural]] abilities and tendencies, the medical lobby (twice then 1 as strong it were automatically [[interpret]] all these changes as the infamous defense lobby!) succeeded in imposing on results of my personality, not as the public the fundamental idea that, with universal health-care free choice (in matters concerning medicine) will be somehow threatened — against this purely fictional reference to “free choice”, all enumeration result of “hard facts” (in Canada, health-care is less expensive and more effective, with no less free choice, etc.) proved ineffectiveme being thrown around by [[market]] forces.
Here we are at Phenomena like these make it all the more necessary today to REASSERT the very nerve center opposition of the liberal ideology: “formal” and “actual” freedom of choicein a new, more precise, grounded in the notion of the “psychological” subject endowed with propensities he or she strives to realize[[sense]]. This especially holds What we need today, in the era of what sociologists like Ulrich Beck call “risk societyliberal [[hegemony]], is a “Leninist” traité de la servitude libérale,” when the ruling ideology endeavors to sell us the insecurity caused by the dismantling a new version of la Boétie’s Traiti de la servitude volontaire that would fully justify the Welfare State as the opportunity for new freedoms: you have to change jobs every yearapparent oxymoron “liberal [[totalitarianism]].” In experimental [[psychology]], relying on shortJean-term contracts instead of a long-term stable appointment. Why not see it as Léon Beauvois took the liberation from the constraints first step in this direction with his precise exploration of a fixed job, as the chance to reinvent yourself again and again, to become aware paradoxes of and realize hidden potentials of your personality? You can no longer rely conferring on the standard health insurance and retirement plan, so that you have subject the freedom to opt for additional coverage for which you have to paychoose. Why not perceive it as an additional opportunity to chooseRepeated experiments established the following [[paradox]]: either better life now or long-term security? And if this predicament causes you anxiety, AFTER getting from two groups of volunteers the postmodern or “second modernity” ideologist will immediately accuse you of being unable agreement to assume full freedomparticipate in an experiment, of one informs [[them]] that the “escape from freedomexperiment will involve something unpleasant, against their [[ethics]] even,” of the immature sticking to old stable forms … Even betterand if, when at this is inscribed into point, one reminds the ideology of first group that they have the subject as free choice to say no, and says [[nothing]] to the psychological individual pregnant with natural abilities and tendencies[[other]] group, in BOTH groups, then 1 as it were automatically interpret all these changes as the results of my personality, not as SAME (very high) percentage will agree to continue their [[participation]] in the result of me being thrown around by market forcesexperiment.
Phenomena like these What this means is that conferring the formal freedom of choice does not make it all any [[difference]]: those given the more necessary today to REASSERT freedom will do the opposition of “formal” and “actual” freedom in a new, more precise, sensesame [[thing]] as those (implicitly) denied it. What we need todayThis, in the era of liberal hegemony, is a “Leninist” traité de la servitude libéralehowever, a new version of la Boétie’s Traiti de la servitude volontaire does not mean that would fully justify the apparent oxymoron “liberal totalitarianism.” In experimental psychology, Jean-Léon Beauvois took the first step in this direction with his precise exploration reminder/bestowal of the paradoxes freedom of conferring on the subject choice does not make any difference: those given the freedom to choose. Repeated experiments established will not only tend to choose the following paradox: if, AFTER getting from two groups of volunteers the agreement same as those denied it; they will tend to “rationalize” their “free” decision to continue to participate in an the experiment, one informs them — unable to endure the so-called cognitive dissonance (their [[awareness]] that the experiment will involve something unpleasant, they FREELY acted against their ethics eveninterests, and ifpropensities, at this pointtastes or norms), one reminds the first group that they have the free choice to say no, and says nothing to the other group, in BOTH groups, the SAME (very high) percentage will agree tend to continue change their participation in opinion [[about]] the experimentact they were asked to accomplish.
What this means Let us say that an individual is first asked to participate in an experiment that conferring concerns changing eating habits in order to fight against famine; then, after agreeing to do it, at the formal freedom of choice does not make any difference: those given first [[encounter]] in the freedom laboratory, he will do be asked to swallow a [[living]] worm, with the same thing as those (implicitly) denied it. This[[explicit]] reminder that, if he finds this act repulsive, howeverhe can, does not mean that the reminder/bestowal of course, say no, since he has the [[complete]] freedom to choose. In most cases, he will do it, and then rationalize it by way of choice does not make any differencesaying to himself something like: those given the freedom “What I am asked to choose do IS disgusting, but I am not a coward, 1 should display some courage and [[self]]-[[control]], otherwise scientists will not only tend to choose perceive me as a weak person who pulls out at the same as those denied first minor obstacle! Furthermore, a worm does have a lot of proteins and it; they will tend could effectively be used to “rationalize” their “free” decision feed the poor who am 1 to continue to participate in the hinder such an important experiment — unable to endure the so-called cognitive dissonance (their awareness that they FREELY acted against their interestsbecause of my petty sensitivity? And, propensitiesfinally, tastes or norms)maybe my disgust of worms is just a prejudice, they maybe a worm is not so bad — and would tasting it not be a new and daring experience? What if it will tend enable me to change their opinion about the act they were asked to accomplish.discover an unexpected, slightly [[perverse]], [[dimension]] of myself that 1 was hitherto unaware of?”
Let us say that an individual is first asked Beauvois enumerates [[three]] modes of what brings [[people]] to participate in accomplish such an experiment that concerns changing eating habits in order to fight act which runs against famine; thentheir perceived propensities and/or interests: authoritarian (the pure command “You should do it because I say so, after agreeing to do without questioning it!”, at sustained by the first encounter in reward if the laboratory, he will be asked to swallow a living worm, with subject does it and the explicit reminder that, [[punishment]] if he finds this act repulsive, he can, of course, say nodoes not do it), since he has totalitarian (the complete freedom reference to choose. In most cases, he will some higher [[Cause]] or common [[Good]] which is larger than the subject’s perceived interest: “You should do itbecause, and then rationalize even if it by way of saying to himself something like: “What I am asked to do IS disgustingis unpleasant, but I am not a cowardit serves our [[Nation]], 1 should display some courage and self-controlParty, otherwise scientists will perceive me as a weak person who pulls out at the first minor obstacleHumanity! Furthermore”), a worm does have a lot of proteins and it could effectively be used liberal (the reference to feed the poor who am 1 to hinder such an important experiment because subject’s inner nature itself. “What is asked of my petty sensitivity? Andyou may appear repulsive, finally, maybe my disgust of worms is just a prejudice, maybe a worm is not so bad — but look deep into yourself and would tasting you will discover that it’s in your true nature to do it not be a new and daring experience? What if , you will find it attractive, you will enable me to discover an become aware of new, unexpected, slightly perverse, dimension dimensions of myself that 1 was hitherto unaware of?your personality!”).
At this point, Beauvois enumerates three modes of what brings people should be corrected: a direct [[authoritarianism]] is practically nonexistent — even the most oppressive [[regime]] publicly legitimizes its reign with the reference to accomplish such an act which runs against their perceived propensities some Higher Good, and/or interests: authoritarian (the pure command “You should do it fact that, ultimately, “you have to obey because I say soso” reverberates only as its [[obscene]] [[supplement]] discernible between the lines. It is rather the specificity of the standard authoritarianism to refer to some higher Good (“whatever your inclinations are, without questioning ityou have to follow my order for the sake of the higher Good!”), sustained by the reward if while totalitarianism, like [[liberalism]], interpellates the subject does it and on behalf of HIS OWN good (“what may appear to you as an [[external]] pressure, is really the punishment if he does not do expression of your objective interests, of what you REALLY WANT without being aware of it! “), totalitarian (. The difference between the two resides elsewhere: totalitarianism” imposes on the reference to some higher Cause subject his or common Good which is larger than the subject’s perceived interest: “You should do it becauseher own good, even if it is unpleasantagainst his or her will — [[recall]] King Charles’ (in)famous [[statement]]: “If any shall be so foolishly unnatural s to oppose their king, their country and their own good, it serves our Nationwe will make them happy, Partyby God’s blessing — even against their wills. “ (Charles I to the Earl of Essex, Humanity!”6 August 1 644. )Here we encounter the later Jacobin theme of [[happiness]] as a political factor, and liberal as well as the Saint-Justian idea of forcing people to be happy … Liberalism tries to avoid (or, rather, cover up) this paradox by way of clinging to the reference end to the [[fiction]] of the subject’s inner nature itself. “What is asked of immediate free self-[[perception]] (“I don’t [[claim]] to [[know]] better than you what you may appear repulsive, but [[want]] — just look deep into yourself and decide freely what you will discover that it’s in your true nature to do it, you will find it attractive, you will become aware of new, unexpected, dimensions of your personalitywant!”).
At The reason for this point, Beauvois should be corrected: a direct authoritarianism fault in Beauvois’s line of argumentation is practically nonexistent — even the most oppressive regime publicly legitimizes its reign with the reference that he fails to some Higher Good, and recognize how the fact that, ultimately, “you have to obey abyssal tautological [[authority]] (“It is so because I 1 say so” reverberates so!” of the [[Master]]) does not [[work]] only as its obscene supplement discernible between because of the linessanctions (punishment/reward) it implicitly or explicitly evokes. It That is to say, what, effectively, makes a subject freely choose what is rather imposed on him against his interests and/or propensities? Here, the specificity of the standard authoritarianism to refer to some higher Good empirical inquiry into “pathological” (“whatever your inclinations are, you have to follow my order for in the sake Kantian sense of the higher Good!”term), while totalitarianism, like liberalism, interpellates motivations is not sufficient: the subject enunciation of an [[injunction]] that imposes on behalf its addressee a [[symbolic]] engagement/ commitment evinces an inherent force of HIS OWN good (“what its own, so that what seduces us into obeying it is the very feature that may appear to you as be an external pressure, is really obstacle — the expression [[absence]] of your objective interestsa “why.” Here, [[Lacan]] can be of what you REALLY WANT without being aware some [[help]]: the [[Lacanian]] “Master-Signifier” designates precisely this hypnotic force of it! “). The difference between [[the two resides elsewhere: totalitarianism” imposes symbolic]] injunction which relies only on the subject his or her its own good, even if act of enunciation — it is against his or her will — recall King Charles’ here that we encounter “symbolic efficiency” at its purest. The three ways of legitimizing the exercise of authority (in)famous statement: “If any shall be so foolishly unnatural s to oppose their king“authoritarian, their country and their own good” “totalitarian, we will make them happy” “liberal”) are nothing but three ways of covering up, by God’s blessing — even against their wills. “ (Charles I of blinding us to the Earl [[seductive]] power of Essex, 6 August 1 644. ) Here we encounter the later Jacobin theme abyss of happiness as this empty call. In a political factorway, as well as liberalism is here even the Saint-Justian idea worst of forcing people to be happy … Liberalism tries to avoid (orthe three, rather, cover up) this paradox by way of clinging to since it NATURALIZES the end to reasons for obedience into the fiction of subject’s [[internal]] psychological [[structure]]. So the subject’s immediate paradox is that “liberal” [[subjects]] are in a way those least free self-: they change the very opinion/perception (“I don’t claim to know better than you of themselves, accepting what you want was IMPOSED on them as originating in their “nature” — just look deep into yourself and decide freely what you want!”)they are even no longer AWARE of their subordination.
The reason for this fault Let us take the situation in the Eastern European countries around 1990, when Really Existing Socialism was falling apart: all of a sudden, people were thrown into a situation of the “freedom of political choice” — however, were they REALLY at any point asked the fundamental question of what kind of new order they actually wanted? Is it not that they found themselves in Beauvois’s line the exact situation of argumentation is the subject-[[victim]] of a Beauvois experiment? They were first told that he fails to recognize how they were entering the abyssal tautological authority (“It is so because 1 say so!” promised land of political freedom; then, soon afterwards, they were informed that this freedom involved wild privatization, the Master) does not work only because dismantling of the sanctions (punishment/reward) it implicitly or explicitly evokes[[system]] of [[social]] security, etc. etc. That is — they still have the freedom to saychoose, whatso if they want, effectivelythey can step out; but, makes a subject freely choose what is imposed on him against his interests and/or propensities? Hereno, our heroic Eastern Europeans didn’t want to disappoint their Western mentors, the empirical inquiry into “pathological” (they stoically persisted in the Kantian sense of the term) motivations choice they never made, convincing themselves that they should behave as mature subjects who are aware that freedom has its price … This is not sufficient: why the enunciation notion of an injunction that imposes on the psychological subject endowed with natural propensities, who has to realize its addressee a symbolic engagement/ commitment evinces an inherent force of true Self and its ownpotentials, and who is, consequently, ultimately [[responsible]] for his failure or success, so that what seduces us into obeying it is the very feature that may appear to be an obstacle — the absence key ingredient of a “whyliberal freedom.” Here, Lacan can be And here one should risk reintroducing the Leninist opposition of some help“formal” and “actual” freedom: in an act of actual freedom, one dares precisely to BREAK the Lacanian “Master-Signifier” designates precisely this hypnotic force seductive power of symbolic efficiency. Therein resides the symbolic injunction which relies only on its own act moment of enunciation — it is here that we encounter “symbolic efficiency” at its purest. The three ways [[truth]] of legitimizing Lenin’s acerbic retort to his Menshevik critics: the exercise truly free choice is a choice in which I do not merely choose between two or more options WITHIN a pre-given set of authority (“authoritarian,” “totalitariancoordinates,” “liberal”) are nothing but three ways I choose to change this set of covering up, coordinates itself The catch of blinding us the “transition” from Really Existing Socialism to [[capitalism]] was that people never had the seductive power of chance to choose the abyss ad quem of this empty call. In transition — all of a waysudden, they were (almost literally) “thrown” into a new situation in which they were presented with a new set of given choices (pure liberalism is here even the worst of the three, since it NATURALIZES the reasons for obedience into the subject’s internal psychological structurenationalist conservatism … ). So the paradox What this means is that “liberal” subjects are in a way those least free: they change the very opinion/perception “actual freedom” as the act of themselvesconsciously changing this set occurs only when, accepting what was IMPOSED on them as originating in their “nature” — they are even no longer AWARE the situation of their subordinationa [[forced]] choice, one ACTS AS IF THE CHOICE IS NOT FORCED and “chooses the impossible.”
Let us take the situation in the Eastern European countries around 1990, when Really Existing Socialism was falling apart: all of a sudden, people were thrown into a situation of the “freedom of political choice” — however, were they REALLY at any point asked the fundamental question of This is what kind of new order they actually wanted? Is it not that they found themselves in the exact situation of the subject-victim of a Beauvois experiment? They were first told that they were entering the promised land of political Lenin’s obsessive tirades against “formal” freedom; thenare about, soon afterwards, they were informed therein resides their “[[rational]] kernel” which is worth saving today: when he emphasizes that this freedom involved wild privatization, the dismantling of the system of social security, etc. etc. — they still have the freedom to choose, so if they want, they can step out; but, there is no“pure” [[democracy]], our heroic Eastern Europeans didn’t want to disappoint their Western mentors, they stoically persisted in the choice they never made, convincing themselves that they we should behave as mature subjects always ask who are aware that does a freedom has under consideration serve, which is its price … This is why [[role]] in the notion of the psychological subject endowed with natural propensitiesclass [[struggle]], who has to realize its true Self and its potentials, and who is, consequently, ultimately responsible for his failure or success, point is precisely to maintain the key ingredient possibility of liberal freedomthe TRUE radical choice. And here one should risk reintroducing This is what the Leninist opposition of [[distinction]] between “formal” and “actual” freedomultimately amounts to: in an act of actual “formal” freedom, one dares precisely to BREAK is the seductive power freedom of symbolic efficiency. Therein resides choice WITHIN the moment coordinates of truth the existing power relations, while “actual” freedom designates the site of an [[intervention]] which undermines these very coordinates. In short, Lenin’s acerbic retort to his Menshevik critics: the truly free choice point is a choice in which I do not merely choose between two or more options WITHIN a pre-given set to [[limit]] freedom of coordinateschoice, but I choose to change this set of coordinates itself The catch of maintain the “transition” from Really Existing Socialism to capitalism was that people never had fundamental Choice — when Lenin asks about the chance to choose the ad quem of this transition — all role of a suddenfreedom within the [[class struggle]], they were (almost literally) “thrown” into a new situation in which they were presented with a new set of given choices (pure liberalism, nationalist conservatism … ). What this means what he is asking is that the “actual freedom” as the act of consciously changing precisely: “Does this set occurs only when, in freedom contribute to or constrain the situation of a forced choice, one ACTS AS IF THE CHOICE IS NOT FORCED and “chooses the impossible.fundamental revolutionary Choice?”
This The most popular TV show of the fall of 2000 in [[France]], with the viewer rating two [[times]] higher than that of the [[notorious]] “Big Brother” [[reality]] soaps, was “C'est mon choix” (“It is my choice”) on France 3, the talk show whose guest is what Lenin’s obsessive tirades against “formal” freedom are aboutan ordinary (or, exceptionally, therein resides their “rational kernel” a well-known) person who made a peculiar choice which is worth saving todaydetermined his or her entire life-style: when he emphasizes that there one of them decided never to wear underwear, [[another]] tries to find a more appropriate [[sexual]] partner for his [[father]] and [[mother]] — extravagance is no “pure” democracyallowed, that we should always ask who does a freedom under consideration servesolicited even, but with the explicit [[exclusion]] of the choices which is its role in may disturb the class strugglepublic (for example, his point a person whose choice is precisely to maintain be and act as a racist, is a priori excluded). Can one imagine a better predicament of what the possibility “freedom of choice” effectively amounts to in our liberal societies? We can go on making our small choices, “reinvesting ourselves” thoroughly, on condition that these choices do not seriously disturb the social and ideological [[balance]]. For “C'est mon [[choix]],” the TRUE truly radical thing would have been to focus precisely on the “disturbing” choices: to invite as guests people like dedicated racists, i.e. people whose choice(whose difference) DOES make a difference. This , also, is what the distinction between “formal” reason why, today, “democracy” is more and “actual” freedom ultimately amounts more a [[false]] issue, a notion so discredited by its predominant use that, perhaps, one should take the risk of abandoning it to: “formal” freedom is the freedom of choice WITHIN enemy. Where, how, by whom are the coordinates of key decisions concerning [[global]] social issues made? Are they made in the existing power relationspublic [[space]], while “actual” freedom designates through the site engaged participation of an intervention which undermines these very coordinates. In shortthe majority? If the answer is yes, Lenin’s point it is not to limit freedom of choice, but to maintain secondary importance if the fundamental Choice — when Lenin asks about the role of state has a freedom within one-party system, etc. If the class struggleanswer is no, what he it is asking is precisely: “Does this of secondary importance if we have parliamentary democracy and freedom contribute to or constrain the fundamental revolutionary Choice?”of individual choice.
The most popular TV show Did something homologous to the invention of the fall of 2000 liberal psychological individual not take [[place]] in the [[Soviet Union]] in France, with the viewer rating two times higher than that late 1920s and early 1930s? The Russian avant-garde art of the notorious “Big Brother” reality soapsearly 1920s (futurism, was “C'est mon choix” (“It is my choice”constructivism) on France 3not only zealously endorsed industrialization, it even endeavored to reinvent a new industrial man — no longer the talk show whose guest is an ordinary (orold man of sentimental passions and roots in traditions, exceptionally, a well-known) person but the new man who made gladly accepts his role as a peculiar choice which determined his bolt or her entire lifescrew in the gigantic coordinated industrial [[Machine]]. As such, it was subversive in its very “ultra-style: one of them decided never to wear underwearorthodoxy, another tries to find a more appropriate sexual partner for his father and mother — extravagance is allowed, solicited even, but ” i.e. in its over-[[identification]] with the explicit exclusion core of the choices which may disturb [[official]] ideology: the public (for example[[image]] of man that we get in Eisenstein, Meyerhold, a person whose choice is to be and act as a racistconstructivist paintings, is a priori excluded)etc. Can one imagine a better predicament , emphasizes the beauty of what his/her mechanical movements, his/her thorough depsychologization. What was perceived in the West as the “freedom ultimate [[nightmare]] of choice” effectively amounts to in our liberal societies? We can go on making our small choicesindividualism, “reinvesting ourselves” thoroughly, on condition that these choices do not seriously disturb as the social and ideological balance. For “C'est mon choixcounterpoint to “Taylorization,” the truly radical thing would have been to focus precisely on Fordist ribbon-work, was in [[Russia]] hailed as the “disturbing” choices[[utopian]] prospect of liberation: recall how Meyerhold violently asserted the “behaviorist” approach to invite as guests people like dedicated racistsacting — no longer emphatic familiarization with the person the actor is playing, but ruthless [[bodily]] [[training]] aimed at cold bodily [[discipline]], iat the ability of the actor to perform a series of mechanized movements .e. people whose choice (whose difference) DOES make a difference. This, also, ” THIS is what was unbearable to AND IN the reason whyofficial Stalinist ideology, today, “democracy” is more and more so that the Stalinist “socialist realism” effectively WAS an attempt to reassert a false issue, “Socialism with a notion so discredited by its predominant use that[[human]] face, perhaps, one should take ” i.e. to reinscribe the risk [[process]] of abandoning it to industrialization within the enemy. Where, how, by whom are constraints of the key decisions concerning global social issues made? Are they made traditional psychological individual: in the public spaceSocialist Realist [[texts]], through the engaged participation of the majority? If the answer is yespaintings and [[films]], it is individuals are no longer rendered as parts of secondary importance if the state has a one-party systemglobal Machine, etc. If the answer is nobut as warm, it is of secondary importance if we have parliamentary democracy and freedom of individual choicepassionate persons.
Did something homologous to The obvious reproach that imposes itself here is, of course: is the invention basic characteristic of the liberal psychological individual today’s “postmodern” subject not take place in the Soviet Union in the late 1920s and early 1930s? The Russian avant-garde art exact opposite of the early 1920s (futurismfree subject who experienced himself as ultimately responsible for his fate, constructivism) not only zealously endorsed industrialization, it even endeavored to reinvent namely the subject who grounds the authority of his [[speech]] on his status of a new industrial man — no longer the old man victim of sentimental passions and roots in traditions, but the new man who gladly accepts circumstances beyond his role control? Every contact with another human being is experienced as a bolt or screw in potential [[threat]] — if the gigantic coordinated industrial Machine. As suchother smokes, if he casts a covetous glance at me, it was subversive in its very “ultra-orthodoxyhe already hurts me; this [[logic]] of [[victimization]] is today universalized,” i.e. in its over-identification with reaching well beyond the core standard cases of sexual or racist harassment — recall the official ideology: the image growing financial industry of man that we get in Eisensteinpaying damage claims, Meyerhold, constructivist paintings, etc., emphasizes from the beauty of his/her mechanical movements, his/her thorough depsychologization. What was perceived tobacco industry deal in the West as USA and the ultimate nightmare financial claims of liberal individualismthe [[Holocaust]] victims and forced laborers in [[Nazi]] [[Germany]], as and the idea that the USA should pay the ideological counterpoint African-Americans hundreds of billions of dollars for all they were deprived of due to “Taylorization,” to Fordist ribbon-work, was in Russia hailed their [[past]] slavery … This notion of the subject as an irresponsible victim involves the utopian prospect of liberation: recall how Meyerhold violently asserted extreme [[Narcissistic]] perspective from which every encounter with the “behaviorist” approach Other appears as a potential threat to acting — no longer emphatic familiarization with the person subject’s precarious [[imaginary]] balance; as such, it is not the actor is playingopposite, but ruthless bodily training aimed at cold bodily discipline, at rather, the ability inherent supplement of the actor to perform a series liberal free subject: in today’s predominant form of mechanized movements . . .” THIS is what was unbearable to AND IN the official Stalinist ideologyindividuality, so that the Stalinist “socialist realism” effectively WAS an attempt to reassert a “Socialism with a human face,” i.e. to reinscribe the process self-centered assertion of industrialization within the constraints of the traditional psychological individual: in subject paradoxically overlaps with the Socialist Realist texts, paintings and films, individuals are no longer rendered perception of oneself as parts a victim of the global Machine, but as warm, passionate personscircumstances.
The obvious reproach that imposes itself here is, of course: is the basic characteristic of today’s “postmodern” subject not the exact opposite of the free subject who experienced himself as ultimately responsible for his fate, namely the subject who grounds the authority of his speech on his status of a victim of circumstances beyond his control? Every contact with another human being is experienced as a potential threat — if the other smokes, if he casts a covetous glance at me, he already hurts me; this logic of victimization is today universalized, reaching well beyond the standard cases of sexual or racist harassment — recall the growing financial industry of paying damage claims, from the tobacco industry deal in the USA and the financial claims of the Holocaust victims and forced laborers in Nazi Germany, and the idea that the USA should pay the African-Americans hundreds of billions of dollars for all they were deprived of due ''pp 113 to their past slavery … This notion of the subject as an irresponsible victim involves the extreme Narcissistic perspective 124 reproduced from which every encounter with the Other appears as a potential threat to the subject’s precarious imaginary balance; as such, it is not the opposite, but, rather, the inherent supplement of the liberal free subject: in today’s predominant form of individuality, the self-centered assertion of the psychological subject paradoxically overlaps with the perception of oneself as a victim of circumstancesOn [[Belief]].''
pp 113 to 124 reproduced from ==Source==* [[The Leninist Freedom]]. [[On Belief]]. 2001.<http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ot/zizek.htm>
From[[Category: Articles by Slavoj Zizek’s On Belief (2001)Available: http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ot/zizek.htm Žižek]][[Category:ZizekSlavoj Žižek]]
[[Category:Works]]
[[Category:Essays]]
