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Many [[Europe]]ans wonder how [[Bush]] could have won, with the [[intellectual ]] and pop-[[cultural ]] [[elite ]] against him. They must now finally confront the underrated mobilizing [[power]] of American [[Christian fundamentalism]]. Because of its [[self]]-evident imbecility, it is a much more [[paradox]]ical, properly [[postmodern]] phenomenon than it appears.

Take the [[literary ]] bestsellers of [[U.S.]] [[Christian fundamentalism]], Tim F. LaHaye and Jerry B. Jenkins’s “[[Left Behind]]” series of 12 novels on the upcoming end of the [[world ]] that have sold more than 60 million copies. The [[Left ]] Behind story begins with the sudden, inexplicable [[disappearance ]] of millions of [[people ]] — the saved souls whom [[God]] calls to himself in [[order ]] to spare [[them ]] the horrors of [[Armageddon]]. The [[Anti-Christ]] then appears, a young, slick and charismatic Romanian politician named Nicolae Carpathia, who, after [[being ]] elected general secretary of the [[United Nations]], moves U.N. headquarters to Babylon where he imposes an anti-American world [[government]] that disarms all [[nation-state]]s. This ridiculous plot unfolds until the final battle when all non-[[Christians]] — [[Jews]], [[Muslim]]s, et al — are consumed in a cataclysmic fire. Imagine the outcry in the [[West]]ern [[liberal]] [[media]] if a similar story written from the [[Muslim]] standpoint had become a bestseller in the Arab countries! It is not the poverty and primitivism of these novels that is breathtaking, but rather the strange overlap between the “serious” [[religion|religious]] [[message ]] and the trashiest conventions of pop [[culture]] commercialism.

My next [[reflection ]] concerns the basic [[paradox]] of [[democracy]] as revealed in <i>The [[History ]] of the VKP(b)</i> — the [[Stalinism|Stalinist]] bible. [[Stalin]] (who [[ghost]]-wrote the book) describes the vote at a party congress in the late ’20s: “With a large majority, the delegates unanimously approved the [[resolution ]] proposed by the Central Committee.” If the vote was unanimous, where then did the minority [[disappear]]? Far from betraying some [[perverse]] “[[totalitarian]]” twist, this [[paradox]] is built into the very [[structure ]] of [[democracy]]. [[Democracy]] is based on a [[short-circuit]] between the majority and the “[[All]].” In it, the winner takes all and the majority counts as [[All]], obtaining all the [[power]], even if this majority is merely a couple hundred votes among millions.

“[[Democracy]]” is not merely the “power of, by and for the people.” It is not enough to [[claim ]] that in a democracy the majority’s will and interests (the two do not automatically coincide) determine state decisions. Today, democracy is above all [[about ]] [[formal legalism]] — the unconditional adherence to a set of [[formal ]] [[rules]] that [[guarantee ]] society’s [[antagonism]]s are fully absorbed into the [[political ]] arena. “Democracy” means that whatever electoral manipulation takes [[place ]] all politicians will unconditionally respect the results. In this [[sense]], the 2000 U.S. presidential election was effectively “democratic”: In spite of obvious electoral manipulations and the patent meaninglessness of the fact that several hundred votes in Florida decided who would be president of the entire [[nation]], the Democratic candidate accepted his defeat. In the weeks of uncertainty after the election, [[Bill Clinton]] made an appropriate acerbic comment: “The American people have spoken; we just don’t [[know ]] what they said.” This comment should be taken more seriously than it was meant. To this day, we still don’t know what they said—perhaps because there was no “message” behind the result at all.

Those old enough still [[remember ]] the boring attempts of “[[democratic socialism|democratic socialists]]” to oppose the miserable “[[really-existing socialism]]” by holding up the vision of authentic [[socialism]]. To such attempts, the standard [[Hegelianism|Hegelian]] answer provides the sufficient response: The failure of [[reality]] to live up to its [[notion ]] bears witness to the inherent [[weakness]] of the notion itself. Why shouldn’t the same hold for [[democracy]]? Isn’t it too simple to oppose the “really-existing” [[liberal capitalist]]-[[democracy]] to a more [[true ]] radical democracy?

This is not to imply that [[Bush]]’s victory was an accidental mistake, a result of fraud or manipulation. [[Hegel]] wrote apropos [[Napoleon]] that he had to lose two [[times]]: Only after Waterloo did it become clear to him that his defeat was not a military accident but the expression of a deeper historical shift. The same goes for Bush: He had to win two times in order for [[liberals]] to perceive that we are all entering a new era.

On [[September 11, 2001]], the Twin Towers were hit. Twelve years earlier, on November 9, 1989, the [[Berlin Wall]] fell. November 9 announced the “happy ‘90s,” the [[Francis Fukuyama]] [[dream]] of the “[[end of history]],” the [[belief]] that [[liberal democracy]] had, in [[principle]], won, and that the only obstacles to this ultra-Hollywood happy ending were merely local pockets of [[resistance ]] where the [[leader]]s did not yet grasp that their [[time ]] was over. In contrast, [[9/11]] symbolizes the end of the [[Clinton]]ite happy ‘90s, heralding an era of new walls — between [[Israel]] and the [[Palestine|West Bank]], around the [[European Union]], on the [[U.S.]]-[[Mexico]] border.

In their [[recent ]] <i>The War Over Iraq</i>, William Kristol and Lawrence F. Kaplan wrote, “The mission begins in Baghdad, but it does not end there … We stand at the cusp of a new historical era … This is a decisive [[moment ]] … It is so clearly about more than Iraq. It is about more even than the [[future ]] of the [[Middle East ]] and the war on [[terror]]. It is about what sort of [[role ]] the United States intends to play in the twenty-first century.” One cannot but agree with them. It is effectively the future of the international [[community ]] that is at stake now — the new [[rules]] that will regulate it, what the [[new world order]] will be.

A new vision of the [[New World Order]] is thus emerging as the effective framework of recent U.S. [[politics]]: After [[September 11]], America basically wrote off the rest of the world as a reliable partner. The ultimate [[goal ]] was no longer the [[Fukuyama]] [[utopia]] of expanding [[universal ]] [[liberal democracy]], but the transformation of the [[United States]] into “Fortress America,” a lone superpower isolated from the rest of the world, protecting its vital [[economic ]] interests and securing its safety through its new military power. This new military not only includes forces for rapid deployment anywhere on the globe, but also the [[development ]] of [[space ]] weapons that enable the Pentagon to [[control ]] the global surface from above. This strategy throws a new light on the recent conflicts between the [[United States]] and [[Europe]]: It is not [[Europe]] that is “betraying” the [[United States]]. The United States no longer [[needs ]] to rely on its exclusive partnership with Europe. In short, [[Bush]]’s America pretends to be a new global [[empire]] but it is not. Rather, it remains a [[nation-state]] ruthlessly pursuing its interests. It is as if U.S. politics is now being guided by a weird [[reversal ]] of the [[ecology|ecologists]]’ well-known motto: [[Act globally, think locally]].

Within these coordinates, every progressive who <i>thinks</i> should be glad for Bush’s victory. It is [[good ]] for the entire world because the contours of the confrontations to come will now be drawn in a much starker way. A [[Kerry]] victory would have been a kind of historical anomaly, blurring the true lines of [[division]]. After all, Kerry did not have a [[global]] [[vision]] that would [[present ]] a feasible alternative to Bush’s politics. Further, Bush’s victory is paradoxically better for both the [[Europe]]an and [[Latin America]]n [[economy|economies]]: In order to get [[trade unionism|trade union]] backing, Kerry promised to support [[protectionism|protectionist]] measures.

However, the main advantage involves international politics. If Kerry had won, it would have [[forced ]] [[liberals]] to face the consequences of the [[Iraq]] [[war]], allowing the [[Bush]] camp to blame [[Democrats]] for the results of their own catastrophic decisions. In her famous 1979 <i>Commentary</i> essay, “Dictators and [[Double ]] Standards,” [[Jeanne Kirkpatrick]] elaborated on the [[distinction ]] between “[[authoritarian]]” and “[[totalitarian]]" [[regimes]] in order to justify the U.S. policy of collaborating with [[Right]]ist [[dictator]]s, while actively subverting [[Communist]] [[regimes]]. [[Authoritarian]] [[dictator]]s are pragmatic rulers concerned with [[power]] and wealth and indifferent towards [[ideological]] issues, even if they pay lip service to some big [[cause]]. In contrast, [[totalitarian leader]]s are selfless, [[ideology]] driven fanatics who put everything at stake for their ideals. So while one can deal with authoritarian rulers who react rationally and predictably to [[material ]] and military [[threats]], totalitarian leaders are more dangerous and must be directly confronted. The irony is that this distinction encapsulates perfectly what went wrong with the U.S. occupation of [[Iraq]]. [[Saddam]] was a corrupt [[authoritarian dictator]] striving for [[power]] and guided by brutal pragmatic considerations (which led him to collaborate with the [[United States]] throughout the ’80s). But in removing him, the U.S. [[intervention ]] has led to the creation of a “[[fundamentalist]]” opposition that precludes any pragmatic compromises.</p>

[[Bush]]’s victory will dispel the illusions about the [[solidarity ]] of interests among the developed [[West]]ern countries. It will give a new impetus to the painful but necessary [[process ]] of strengthening new alliances like the [[European Union]] or Mercosur in [[Latin America]]. It is a journalistic cliché to praise the “[[postmodern]]” [[dynamic ]] of [[U.S.]] [[capitalism]] against the “[[old Europe]]” stuck in its regulatory [[Welfare]] [[State]] [[illusion]]s. However, in the [[domain ]] of political organization, [[Europe]] is now going much further than the [[United States]] has toward constituting itself as an unprecedented, properly “post-modern,” trans-state collective able to provide a place for anyone, independent of [[geography ]] or [[culture]].

No [[reason ]] to despair, then. The prospects may be dark today, but remember one of the great Bushisms: “The future will be better tomorrow.”

* [[The Liberal Waterloo]]. ''[[In These Times]]''. November 5, 2004. <http://www.inthesetimes.com/site/main/article/1662/> Also listed on ''[[Lacan]].com''. <http://www.lacan.com/zizekwaterloo.htm>.