Changes

The Obscenity anxious expectation that nothing will happen, that capitalism will go on indefinitely, the desperate demand to do something, to revolutionize capitalism, is a fake. The will to revolutionary change emerges as an urge, as an "I cannot do it otherwise," or it is worthless. With regard to Bernard Williams's distinction between Ought and Must, an authentic revolution is by definition performed as a Must - it is not something we "ought to do" as an ideal we are striving for, but something we cannot but to, since we cannot do it otherwise. Which is why today's worry of Human Rights:<br>Violence the Leftists that revolution will not occur, that global capitalism will just go on indefinitely, is false insofar as Symptomit turns revolution into a moral obligation, into something we ought to do while we fight the inertia of the capitalist present.

The anxious expectation that nothing will happen, that capitalism will go on indefinitely, the desperate demand to do something, to revolutionize capitalism, is a fake. The will to revolutionary change emerges as an urge, as an "I cannot do it otherwise," or it is worthless. With regard to Bernard Williams's distinction between Ought and Must, an authentic revolution is by definition performed as a Must - it is not something we "ought to do" as an ideal we are striving for, but something we cannot but to, since we cannot do it otherwise. Which is why today's worry of the Leftists that revolution will not occur, that global capitalism will just go on indefinitely, is false insofar as it turns revolution into a moral obligation, into something we ought to do while we fight the inertia of the capitalist present.<br> <br> However, the ultimate argument against "big" political interventions which aim at a global transformation is, of course, the terrifying experience of the catastrophes of the XXth century, catastrophes which unleashed unheard-of modes of violence. There are three main versions of theorizing these catastrophes: (1) the one epitomized by the name of [[Habermas]]: [[Enlightenment ]] is in itself a positive emancipatory process with no inherent "[[totalitarian]]" potentials, these catastrophies are merely an indicator that it remained an unfinished project, so our task should be to bring this project to completion; (2) the one associated with [[Adorno]]'s and [[Horkheimer]]'s "[[dialectic of Enlightenment]]," as well as, today, with [[Agamben]]: the "totalitarian" potentials of the Enlightenment are inherent and crucial, the "[[administered world]]" is the truth of Enlightenment, the XXth century concentration camps and genocides are a kind of negative-teleological endpoint of the entire history of the West; (3) the third one, developed, among others, in the works of [[Etienne Balibar]]: modernity opens up a field of new freedoms[[freedom]]s, but at the same time of new dangers, and there is no ultimate [[teleology|teleological ]] guarantee of the outcome, the battle is open, undecided.<br> <br> The starting point of Balibar's remarkable entry on "Violence" <tt><b><a name="1x"></a><a href="#1">1</a></b></tt> is the insufficiency of the standard Hegelian-Marxist notion of "converting" violence into an instrument of historical Reason, a force which begets a new social formation: the "irrational" brutality of violence is thus <i>aufgehoben</i>, "sublated" in the strict Hegelian sense, reduced to a particular stain that contributes to the overall harmony of the historical progress. The XXth century confronted us with catastrophies, some of them directed against Marxist political forces and some of them generated by the Marxist political engagement itself, which cannot be "rationalized" in this way: their instrumentalization into the tools of the Cunning of Reason is not only ethically inacceptable, but also theoretically wrong, ideological in the strongest sense of the term. In his close reading of Marx, Balibar nonetheless discern in his texts an oscillation between this teleological "conversion"-theory of violence and a much more interesting notion of history as an open-undecided process of antagonistic struggles whose final "positive" outcome is not guaranteed by any encompassing historical Necessity (the future society will be communism or barbarism, etc.).<br>

The starting point of Balibar's remarkable entry on "Violence"<brref> Etienne Balibar thinks that, for necessary structural reasons"Gewalt, Marxism " in <i>Historisch-Kritisches Wüsrterbuch des Marxismus</i>, forthcoming </ref> is unable to think the excess insufficiency of violence that cannot be integrated into the narrative of historical Progress standard [[Hegel]]ian- more specifically, that it cannot provide an adequate theory [[Marx]]ist notion of Fascism and Stalinism and their "extremeconverting" outcomes, shoah and gulag. Our task is therefore double: to deploy a theory violence into an instrument of historical violence as something which cannot be mastered/instrumentalized by any political agentReason, a force which threatens to engulf this agent itself into begets a self-destructive vicious cycle, and - new social formation: the other side of the same task - to pose the question "civilizingirrational" revolution, brutality of how to make the revolutionary process itself a "civilizing" force. Recall the infamous St Bartholomew's Day Massacre - what went wrong there? Catherine de Medici's goal was limited and precise: hers was a Macchiavellian plot to have Admiral de Coligny, a powerful Protestant pushing for war with Spain in the Netherlands, assassinated, and let the blame fall on the Guise family, the over-mighty Catholic family. In this way, Catherine hoped that the final outcome will be the fall of both houses that posed a menace to the unity of the French state. But this ingenious plan to play off her enemies against each other degenerated into an uncontrolled frenzy of blood: in her ruthless pragmatism, Catherine was blind for the passion with which men clung to their beliefs.violence is thus <bri> aufgehoben<br/i> Hannah Arendt's insights are also crucial here: she emphasized the distinction between political power and the mere exercise of (social) violence: organizations run by direct non-political authority - by an order of command that is not politically grounded authority (Army, Church, school) - represent examples of violence (Gewalt), not of political Power "sublated" in the strict Hegelian sense of the term. Here, however, it would be productive reduced to a particular stain that contributes to introduce the distinction between the public symbolic Law and its obscene supplement: the notion overall harmony of the obscene superego double-supplement of Power implies that there is no Power without violencehistorical progress. Power always has to rely on an obscene stain of violence The XXth century confronted us with catastrophies, political space is never "pure" but always involves some kind of reliance on "pre-them directed against Marxist political" violence. Of course, the relationship between political power forces and pre-political violence is one some of mutual implication: not only is violence them generated by the necessary supplement of power, (Marxist political) power engagement itself is always-already at the roots of every apparently , which cannot be "non-politicalrationalized" relationship in this way: their instrumentalization into the tools of violence. The accepted violence and direct relationship the Cunning of subordination in the ArmyReason is not only ethically inacceptable, Churchbut also theoretically wrong, family and other "non-political" social forms is ideological in itself the "reification" strongest sense of a certain ethico-political struggle and decision - what a critical analysis should do is to discern the hidden political process that sustains all these "non-" or "pre-political" relationshipsterm. In human society, the political is the encompassing structuring principle, so that every neutralization of some partial content as "non-political" is a political gesture par excellence.<br> <br> This acceptance his close reading of violenceMarx, Balibar nonetheless discerns in his texts an oscillation between this teleological "political suspension of the ethical," is the limit of that which even the most conversion"tolerant" liberal stance is unable to trespass - witness the uneasiness of "radical" post-colonialist Afro-American studies apropos of Frantz Fanon's fundamental insight into the unavoidability theory of violence in the process and a much more interesting <b>notion of effective decolonization. One should recall here Fredric Jameson's idea that violence plays in a revolutionary process the same role history as worldly wealth in the Calvinist logic of predestination: although it has no intrinsic value, it is a sign of the authenticity of the revolutionary an open-undecided process, of the fact that this process is effectively disturbing the existing power relations. In other words, the dream of the revolution without violence is precisely the dream of a antagonistic struggles whose final "revolution without revolutionpositive"outcome is not guaranteed by any encompassing historical Necessity</b> (Robespierre). On the other handfuture society will be communism or barbarism, the role of the Fascist spectacle of violence is exactly opposite: it is a violence whose aim is to PREVENT the true change - something spectacular should happen all the time so that, precisely, nothing would really happenetc.).<br> <br>

ButBalibar thinks that, againfor necessary structural reasons, the ultimate argument against this perspective Marxism is unable to think the simple encounter excess of excessive suffering generated by political violence. Sometimes, one that cannot but be shocked by integrated into the excessive indifference towards sufferingnarrative of historical Progress - more specifically, even that it cannot provide an adequate theory of [[Fascism]] and especially when this suffering is widely reported in the media [[Stalinism]] and condemnedtheir "extreme" outcomes, [[shoah]] and [[gulag]]. Our task is therefore double: to deploy a theory of historical violence as if it is the very outrage at suffering something which cannot be mastered/instrumentalized by any political agent, which turns us threatens to engulf this agent itself into its immobilized fascinated spectators. Recalla self-destructive vicious cycle, in and - the early 1990s, other side of the threesame task -years-long siege of Sarajevo, with to pose the population starvingquestion "civilizing" [[revolution]], exposed of how to permanent shelling and snipers' firemake the revolutionary process itself a "civilizing" force. The big enigma here is: although all Recall the media were full of pictures infamous St Bartholomew's Day Massacre - what went wrong there? Catherine de Medici's goal was limited and reportsprecise: hers was a Macchiavellian plot to have Admiral de Coligny, why did not a powerful Protestant pushing for war with Spain in the UN forcesNetherlands, NATO or the US accomplish just a small act of breaking the siege of Sarajevoassassinated, of imposing a corridor through which people and provisions could circulate freely? It would have cost nothing: with a little bit of serious pressure let the blame fall on the Serb forcesGuise family, the prolonged spectacle of encircled Sarajevo exposed to ridiculous terror would have been over-mighty Catholic family. There is only one answer to In this enigmaway, Catherine hoped that the final outcome will be the one proposed by Rony Brauman himself who, on behalf fall of the Red Cross, coordinated the help both houses that posed a menace to Sarajevo: the very presentation unity of the crisis of Sarajevo as "humanitarian," the very recasting of the political-military conflict French state. But this ingenious plan to play off her enemies against each other degenerated into the humanitarian terms, was sustained by an eminently political choice, that uncontrolled frenzy ofblood: in her ruthless pragmatism, basically, taking Catherine was blind for the Serb side in passion with which men clung to their beliefs.[[Hannah Arendt]]'s insights are also crucial here: she emphasized the conflict. Especially ominous distinction between political power and manipulative was here the role mere exercise of Mitterand(social) violence:</font></p><font color="#000000" face="DIDOT" size="4"> </font><blockquote><font color="#000000" face="DIDOT" size="4"> </font><p align="justify"><font color="#000000" face="DIDOT" size="4"><font size="3">The celebration organizations run by direct non-political authority - by an order of 'humanitarian intervention' in Yugoslavia took the place of a political discourse, disqualifying in advance all conflicting debate. /.../ It was apparently command that is not possiblepolitically grounded authority (Army, for Francois MitterandChurch, to express his analysis school) - represent examples of the war in Yugoslavia. With the strictly humanitarian responseviolence (Gewalt), he discovered an unexpected source not of communication or, more precisely, of cosmetics, which is a little bit the same thing. /.../ Mitterand remained political Power in favor of the maintenance strict sense of Yugoslavia within its borders and was persuaded that only a strong Serbian power was in the position term. Here, however, it would be productive to guarantee a certain stability in this explosive region. This position rapidly became unacceptable in introduce the eyes of distinction between the French people. All the bustling activity public symbolic Law and its obscene supplement: the humanitarian discourse permitted him to reaffirm the unfailing commitment notion of France to the Rights obscene superego double-supplement of Man in the end, and Power implies that there is no Power without violence. Power always has to mimic rely on an opposition to Greater Serbian fascismobscene stain of violence, all in giving it free rein. <tt><b><a name=political space is never "2xpure"></a><a href=but always involves some kind of reliance on "#2pre-political">2</a></b></tt></font></font></p><font color="#000000" face="DIDOT" size="4"><font size="3"> </font></font></blockquote><font color="#000000" face="DIDOT" size="4"> </font><p align="justify"><font color="#000000" face="DIDOT" size="4"><font size="4">From this specific insightviolence. Of course, one should make the move to the general level relationship between political power and render problematic pre-political violence is one of mutual implication: not only is violence the very depoliticized humanitarian politics necessary supplement of "Human Rights" as power, (political) power itself is always-already at the ideology roots of military interventionism serving specific economicoevery apparently "non-political purposes. As Wendy Brown develops apropos Michael Ignatieff, such humanitarianism "presents itself as something relationship of an antipolitics - a pure defense of the innocent violence. The accepted violence and the powerless against power, a pure defense direct relationship of subordination in the individual against immense and potentially cruel or despotic machineries of culture, state, war, ethnic conflict, tribalismArmy, patriarchyChurch, family and other mobilizations or instantiations of collective power against individuals." <tt><b><a name=non-political"3xsocial forms is in itself the "></a><a href=reification"#3">3</of a></b></tt> However, the question is: "certain ethico-political struggle and decision - what kind of politicization /those who intervene on behalf of human rights/ set in motion against the powers they oppose. Do they stand for a different formulation of justice or critical analysis should do they stand in opposition is to collective justice projects?discern the hidden political process that sustains all these " <tt><b><a name=non-"4xor "></a><a href=pre-political"#4">4</a></b></tt> Sayrelationships. In human society, it the political is clear that the US overthrowing of Saddam Hussein, legitimized in the terms of ending the suffering of the Iraqi peopleencompassing structuring principle, not only was motivated by other politico-economic interests (oil), but also relied on a determinate idea of the political and economic conditions so that should open up the perspective every neutralization of freedom to the Iraqi people (Western liberal democracy, guarantee of private property, the inclusion into the global market economy, etc.). The purely humanitarian antisome partial content as "non-political politics of merely preventing suffering thus effectively amounts to the implicit prohibition of elaborating " is a positive collective project of socio-political transformationgesture par excellence.<br>

<br> AndThis acceptance of violence, at an even more general level, one should problematize the very opposition between the universal (pre-political) Human Rights which belong to every human being this "as such," and specific political rights suspension of a citizenthe ethical, member of a particular political community; in this sense, Balibar argues for " is the "reversal limit of that which even the historical and theoretical relationship between 'man' and 'citizen'most " which proceeds by tolerant"explaining how man liberal stance is made by citizenship and not citizenship by man.unable to trespass - witness the uneasiness of " <tt><b><a name=radical"5x"></a><a href="#5">5</a></b></tt> Balibar refers here to Hannah Arendtpost-colonialist Afro-American studies apropos of [[Frantz Fanon]]'s fundamental insight apropos he XXth century phenomenon of refugees:</font></font></p><font color="#000000" face="DIDOT" size="4"> </font><blockquote><font color="#000000" face="DIDOT" size="4"> </font><p align="justify"><font color="#000000" face="DIDOT" size="4"><font size="3">The conception of human rights based upon into the assumed existence unavoidability of a human being as such, broke down at the very moment when those who professed to believe violence in it were for the first time confronted with people who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships - except that they were still humanprocess of effective decolonization. <tt><b><a name="6x"></a><a href="#6">6</a></b></tt></font></font></p><font color="#000000" face="DIDOT" size="4"><font size="3"> </font></font></blockquote><font color="#000000" face="DIDOT" size="4"> </font><p align="justify"><font color="#000000" face="DIDOT" size="4"><font size="4">This line, of course, leads straight to AgambenOne should recall here [[Fredric Jameso]]n's notion of homo sacer idea that violence plays in a revolutionary process the same role as a human being reduced to "bare life": worldly wealth in a properly Hegelian paradoxical dialectics the Calvinist logic of universal and particular[[predestination]]: although it has no intrinsic value, it is precisely when a human being is deprived sign of the authenticity of his particular socio-political identity which accounts for his determinate citizenshipthe revolutionary process, of the fact that he, in one and this process is effectively disturbing the same move, is no longer recognized and/or treated as humanexisting power relations. In shortother words, the paradox dream of the revolution without violence is that one is deprived precisely the dream of human rights precisely when one is effectively, in one's social reality, reduced to a human being "in general,revolution without revolution" without citizenship, profession, etc(Robespierre).On the other hand, that the role of the Fascist spectacle of violence is exactly opposite: it is a violence whose aim is to sayPREVENT the true change - something spectacular should happen all the time so that, precisely when one effectively becomes the ideal BEARER of "universal human rights" (which belong to me "independently of" my profession, sex, citizenship, religion, ethnic identity...)nothing would really happen.<br>

<br> We thus arrived at a standard "postmodernBut," "anti-essentialist" positionagain, a kind of political version of Foucault's notion of sex as generated by a multitude of the practices of sexuality: "man," ultimate argument against this perspective is the bearer simple encounter of Human Rights, is excessive suffering generated by a set of political practices which materialize citizenship - isviolence. Sometimes, howeverone cannot but be shocked by the excessive indifference towards suffering, even and especially when this enough? Jacques Ranciere <tt><b><a name="7x"></a><a href="#7">7</a></b></tt> proposed a very elegant suffering is widely reported in the media and precise solution of the antinomy between Human Rights (belonging to "man condemned, as such") and if it is the politicization of citizens: while Human Rights cannot be posited as an unhistorical "essentialist" Beyond with regard to very outrage at suffering which turns us into its immobilized fascinated spectators. Recall, in the contingent sphere of political strugglesearly 1990s, as universal "natural rights the three-years-long siege of man" exempted from historySarajevo, they also should not be dismissed as a reified fetish which is a product of concrete historical processes of with the politicization of citizenspopulation starving, exposed to permanent shelling and snipers' fire. The gap between big enigma here is: although all the universality media were full of Human Rights pictures and the political rights of citizens is thus reports, why did not a gap between the universality of man and a specific political sphere; itUN forces, rather, "separates NATO or the whole US accomplish just a small act of breaking the community from itselfsiege of Sarajevo," as Ranciere put it in of imposing a precise Hegelian way. <tt><b><corridor through which people and provisions could circulate freely? It would have cost nothing: with a name="8x"></a><a href="#8">8</a></b></tt> Far from being pre-political, "universal Human Rights" designate the precise space little bit of politicization proper: what they amount to is serious pressure on the right to universality as suchSerb forces, the right prolonged spectacle of a political agent encircled Sarajevo exposed to assert its radical non-coincidence with itself (in its particular identity), iridiculous terror would have been over.e., to posit itself - precisely insofar as it There is the "surnumerary" only oneanswer to this enigma, the "part with no partone proposed by Rony Brauman himself who," the one without a proper place in the social edifice - as an agent of universality on behalf of the Social as such. The paradox is thus a very precise oneRed Cross, and symmetrical to the paradox of universal human rights as coordinated the rights of those reduced help to inhumanitySarajevo: at the very moment when we try to conceive political rights presentation of citizens without the reference to universal crisis of Sarajevo as "meta-political" Human Rights, we lose politics itselfhumanitarian, i.e., we reduce politics to a "post-political" play of negotiation of particular interests. - What, then, happens to Human Rights when they are reduced to the rights very recasting of homo sacer, of those excluded from the political community, reduced to "bare life" - i.e.military conflict into the humanitarian terms, when they become of no usewas sustained by an eminently political choice, since they are the rights that of those who, preciselybasically, have no rights, are treated as inhuman? Ranciere proposes here an extremely salient dialectical reversal:</font></font></p><font color="#000000" face="DIDOT" size="4"> </font><blockquote><font color="#000000" face="DIDOT" size="4"> </font><p align="justify"><font color="#000000" face="DIDOT" size="4"><font size="3">/.../ when they are of no use, you do taking the Serb side in the same as charitable persons do with their old clothesconflict. You give them to Especially ominous and manipulative was here the poorrole of Mitterand. Those rights that appear to be useless The celebration of 'humanitarian intervention' in their Yugoslavia took the place are sent abroad, along with medicine and clothes, to people deprived of medicinea political discourse, clothes, and rightsdisqualifying in advance all conflicting debate. /... / It is in this way, as the result of this processwas apparently not possible, that the Rights of Man become the rights of those who have no rightsfor Francois Mitterand, the rights of bare human beings subjected to inhuman repression and inhuman conditions express his analysis of existencethe war in Yugoslavia. They become With the strictly humanitarian rightsresponse, the rights he discovered an unexpected source of those who cannot enact themcommunication or, more precisely, the victims of the absolute denial of right. For all thiscosmetics, they are not void. Political names and political places never become merely void. The void which is filled by somebody or something elsea little bit the same thing. /.../ if those who suffer inhuman repression are unable to enact Human Rights Mitterand remained in favor of the maintenance of Yugoslavia within its borders and was persuaded that are their last recourse, then somebody else has to inherit their rights only a strong Serbian power was in order the position to enact them guarantee a certain stability in their placethis explosive region. This is what is called position rapidly became unacceptable in the eyes of the "right to humanitarian interference" - a right that some nations assume to French people. All the supposed benefit of victimized populations, bustling activity and very often against the advice of the humanitarian organizations themselves. The "right discourse permitted him to humanitarian interference" might be described as a sort reaffirm the unfailing commitment of "return France to sender": the disused rights that had been send Rights of Man in the end, and to the rightless are sent back mimic an opposition to the sendersGreater Serbian fascism, all in giving it free rein. <ttref><b><a name=Rony Bauman, "9xFrom Philantropy to Humanitarianism,">in </ai><a href="#9">9South Atlantic Quaterly</ai><2/b></tt></font></font>3, Spring 2004</pref>

<font color="#000000" face="DIDOT" size="4"><font size="3"> </font></font></blockquote><font color="#000000" face="DIDOT" size="4"> </font><p align="justify"><font color="#000000" face="DIDOT" size="4"><font size="4">SoFrom this specific insight, one should make the move to put it in the Leninist way: what today, in the predominant Western discourse, general level and render problematic the very depoliticized humanitarian politics of "Human Rights of the Third World suffering victims" effectively mean is as the right ideology of the Western powers themselves to intervene military interventionism serving specific economico- politicallypolitical purposes. As [[Wendy Brown]] develops apropos [[Michael Ignatieff]], economically, culturally, militarily such humanitarianism "presents itself as something of an antipolitics - in a pure defense of the Third World countries of their choice on behalf of innocent and the powerless against power, a pure defense of Human Rights. The reference to Lacan's formula the individual against immense and potentially cruel or despotic machineries of communication (in which the sender gets back from the receiver-addressee his own message in its invertedculture, state, war, i.e. trueethnic conflict, form) is here up to the point: in the reigning discourse of humanitarian interventionismtribalism, the developed West is effectively getting back from the victimized Third World its own message in its true form. And the moment Human Rights are thus depoliticizedpatriarchy, the discourse dealing with them has to change to ethics: reference to the pre-political opposition and other mobilizations or instantiations of Good and Evil has to be mobilizedcollective power against individuals. Today's "new reign of Ethics," <ttref><b><a name=Wendy Brown, "10xHuman Rights as the Politics Of. Fatalism,">in </a><a href="#10"i>10South Atlantic Quaterly</ai><2/b>3, Spring 2004.</ttref> clearly discernible in, say, Michael Ignatieff's workHowever, thus relies on a violent gesture of depoliticization, of denying to the victimized other political subjectivization. And, as Ranciere pointed out, liberal humanitarianism a la Ignatieff unexpectedly meets the "radical" position of Foucault or Agamben with regard to this depoliticizationquestion is: the Foucauldian-Agambenian notion of "biopolitics" as the culmination of the entire Western thought ends up getting caught in a what kind of "ontological trap" in which concentration camps appear as a kind politicization /those who intervene on behalf of "ontological destiny: each of us would be human rights/ set in motion against the situation powers they oppose. Do they stand for a different formulation of the refugee justice or do they stand in a camp. Any difference grows faint between democracy and totalitarianism and any political practice proves opposition to be already ensnared in the biopolitical trap.collective justice projects?" <tt><b><a name="11x"ref>Ibid</aref><a href="#11">11</a></b></tt><br> <br> When Say, in a shift from Foucaultit is clear that the US overthrowing of Saddam Hussein, Agamben identifies sovereign power and biopolitics (legitimized in today's generalized state the terms of exception, ending the two overlap), he thus precludes the very possibility suffering of the emergence of political subjectivity. Iraqi people, not only was motivated by other politico- Howevereconomic interests (oil), the rise of political subjectivity takes place against the background of but also relied on a certain limit determinate idea of the "inhuman," so political and economic conditions that one should continue to endorse open up the paradox perspective of freedom to the inhumanity of human being deprived of citizenshipIraqi people (Western liberal democracy, and posit the "inhuman" pure man as a necessary excess of humanity over itself, its "indivisible remainder," a kind guarantee of Kantian limit-concept of the phenomenal notion of humanity? So thatprivate property, in exactly the same way in Kant's philosophy inclusion into the sublime Noumenalglobal market economy, when we come too close to it, appears as pure horror, man "as such," deprived of all phenomenal qualifications, appears as an inhuman monster, something like Kafka's odradeketc.). The problem with human rights humanism is that it covers up this monstrosity of the "human as such," presenting it as a sublime human essence.<br> <br> What, then, is the way out of this deadlock? Balibar ends with an ambiguous reference to Mahatma Gandhi. It is true that Gandhi's formula "Be yourself the change you would like to see in the world" encapsulates perfectly the basic attitude of emancipatory change: do not wait for the "objective process" to generate the expected/desired change, since if you just wait for it, it will never come; instead, throw YOURSELF into it, BE this change, take upon yourself the risk of enacting it directly. However, is not the ultimate limitation of Gandhi's strategy that it only works against a liberal-democratic regime which refers to certain minimal ethicopurely humanitarian anti-political standards, i.e., in which, to put it in pathetic terms, those in power still "have conscience." Recall Gandhi's reply, in the late 1930s, politics of merely preventing suffering thus effectively amounts to the question implicit prohibition of what should the Jews in Germany do against Hitler: they should commit elaborating a positive collective suicide and thus arouse the conscience project of the worldsocio-political transformation... One can easily imagine what the Nazi reaction to it would have been: OK, we will help you, where do you want the poison to be delivered to you?<br>

And, at an even more general level, one should problematize the very opposition between the universal (pre-political) Human Rights which belong to every human being "as such," and specific political rights of a citizen, member of a particular political community; in this sense, Balibar argues for the "reversal of the historical and theoretical relationship between 'man' and 'citizen'" which proceeds by "explaining how man is made by citizenship and not citizenship by man."<ref> Etienne Balibar, "Is a Philosophy Of. Human Rights Possible," in <i>South Atlantic Quaterly</i> 2/3, Spring 2004</ref> Balibar refers here to Hannah Arendt's insight apropos he XXth century phenomenon of refugees:<blockquote>The conception of human rights based upon the assumed existence of a human being as such, broke down at the very moment when those who professed to believe in it were for the first time confronted with people who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships - except that they were still human.<ref>Hannah Arendt, <i>i.e. Origins Of. Totalitarianism</i>, New York: Meridian, 1958.</ref></blockquote> This line, of course, leads straight to Agamben's notion of [[homo sacer]] as a human being reduced to "bare life": in a properly Hegelian paradoxical [[dialectic]]s of [[universal]] and [[particular]], it is precisely when a human being is deprived of his particular socio-political identity which accounts for his determinate citizenship, that he, in one and the same move, is no longer recognized and/or treated as human. In short, the paradox is that one is deprived of human rights precisely when one is effectively, in one's social reality, reduced to a human being "in general," without citizenship, profession, etc., that is to say, precisely when one effectively becomes the ideal BEARER of "universal human rights" (which belong to me "independently of" my profession, sex, citizenship, religion, ethnic identity...). We thus arrived at a standard "postmodern," "anti-essentialist" position, a kind of political version of [[Foucault]]'s notion of sex as generated by a multitude of the practices of sexuality: "man," the bearer of Human Rights, is generated by a set of political practices which materialize citizenship - is, however, this enough? Jacques Ranciere<ref> Jacques Rancière, "Who is the Subject of Human Rights," in <i>South Atlantic Quaterly</i> 2/3, Spring 2004</ref> proposed a very elegant and precise solution of the antinomy between Human Rights (belonging to "man as such") and the politicization of citizens: while Human Rights cannot be posited as an unhistorical "essentialist" Beyond with regard to the contingent sphere of political struggles, as universal "natural rights of man" exempted from history, they also should not be dismissed as a reified fetish which is a product of concrete historical processes of the politicization of citizens. The gap between the universality of Human Rights and the political rights of citizens is thus not a gap between the universality of man and a specific political sphere; it, rather, "separates the whole of the community from itself," as Ranciere put it in a precise Hegelian way.<ref>Ibid.</ref> Far from being pre-political, "universal Human Rights" designate the precise space of politicization proper: what they amount to is the right to universality as such, the right of a political agent to assert its radical non-coincidence with itself (in its particular identity), i.e., to posit itself - precisely insofar as it is the "surnumerary" one, the "part with no part," the one without a proper place in the social edifice - as an agent of universality of the Social as such. The paradox is thus a very precise one, and symmetrical to the paradox of universal human rights as the rights of those reduced to inhumanity: at the very moment when we try to conceive political rights of citizens without the reference to universal "meta-political" Human Rights, we lose politics itself, i.e., we reduce politics to a "post-political" play of negotiation of particular interests. - What, then, happens to Human Rights when they are reduced to the rights of homo sacer, of those excluded from the political community, reduced to "bare life" - i.e., when they become of no use, since they are the rights of those who, precisely, have no rights, are treated as inhuman? Ranciere proposes here an extremely salient dialectical reversal /.../ when they are of no use, you do the same as charitable persons do with their old clothes. You give them to the poor. Those rights that appear to be useless in their place are sent abroad, along with medicine and clothes, to people deprived of medicine, clothes, and rights. It is in this way, as the result of this process, that the Rights of Man become the rights of those who have no rights, the rights of bare human beings subjected to inhuman repression and inhuman conditions of existence. They become humanitarian rights, the rights of those who cannot enact them, the victims of the absolute denial of right. For all this, they are not void. Political names and political places never become merely void. The void is filled by somebody or something else. /.../ if those who suffer inhuman repression are unable to enact Human Rights that are their last recourse, then somebody else has to inherit their rights in order to enact them in their place. This is what is called the "right to humanitarian interference" - a right that some nations assume to the supposed benefit of victimized populations, and very often against the advice of the humanitarian organizations themselves. The "right to humanitarian interference" might be described as a sort of "return to sender": the disused rights that had been send to the rightless are sent back to the senders. <ref>Ibid.</ref> So, to put it in the Leninist way: what today, in the predominant Western discourse, the "Human Rights of the Third World suffering victims" effectively mean is the right of the Western powers themselves to intervene - politically, economically, culturally, militarily - in the Third World countries of their choice on behalf of the defense of Human Rights. The reference to Lacan's formula of communication (in which the sender gets back from the receiver-addressee his own message in its inverted, i.e. true, form) is here up to the point: in the reigning discourse of humanitarian interventionism, the developed West is effectively getting back from the victimized Third World its own message in its true form. And the moment Human Rights are thus depoliticized, the discourse dealing with them has to change to ethics: reference to the pre-political opposition of Good and Evil has to be mobilized. Today's "new reign of Ethics," <ref>Ibid.</ref> clearly discernible in, say, Michael Ignatieff's work, thus relies on a violent gesture of depoliticization, of denying to the victimized other political subjectivization. And, as Ranciere pointed out, liberal humanitarianism a la Ignatieff unexpectedly meets the "radical" position of Foucault or Agamben with regard to this depoliticization: the Foucauldian-Agambenian notion of "biopolitics" as the culmination of the entire Western thought ends up getting caught in a kind of "ontological trap" in which concentration camps appear as a kind of "ontological destiny: each of us would be in the situation of the refugee in a camp. Any difference grows faint between democracy and totalitarianism and any political practice proves to be already ensnared in the biopolitical trap."<ref>Ibid.<br/ref> When, in a shift from Foucault, Agamben identifies sovereign power and biopolitics (in today's generalized state of exception, the two overlap), he thus precludes the very possibility of the emergence of political subjectivity. - However, the rise of political subjectivity takes place against the background of a certain limit of the "inhuman," so that one should continue to endorse the paradox of the inhumanity of human being deprived of citizenship, and posit the "inhuman" pure man as a necessary excess of humanity over itself, its "indivisible remainder," a kind of Kantian limit-concept of the phenomenal notion of humanity? So that, in exactly the same way in Kant's philosophy the sublime Noumenal, when we come too close to it, appears as pure horror, man "as such," deprived of all phenomenal qualifications, appears as an inhuman monster, something like Kafka's odradek. The problem with human rights humanism is that it covers up this monstrosity of the "human as such," presenting it as a sublime human essence. What, then, is the way out of this deadlock? Balibar ends with an ambiguous reference to Mahatma Gandhi. It is true that Gandhi's formula "Be yourself the change you would like to see in the world" encapsulates perfectly the basic attitude of emancipatory change: do not wait for the "objective process" to generate the expected/desired change, since if you just wait for it, it will never come; instead, throw YOURSELF into it, BE this change, take upon yourself the risk of enacting it directly. However, is not the ultimate limitation of Gandhi's strategy that it only works against a liberal-democratic regime which refers to certain minimal ethico-political standards, i.e., in which, to put it in pathetic terms, those in power still "have conscience." Recall Gandhi's reply, in the late 1930s, to the question of what should the Jews in Germany do against Hitler: they should commit a collective suicide and thus arouse the conscience of the world... One can easily imagine what the Nazi reaction to it would have been: OK, we will help you, where do you want the poison to be delivered to you? There is, however, another way in which Balibar's plea for renouncing violence can be given a specific twist - that of what one is tempted to call the Bartleby-politics. Recall the two symmetrically opposed modes of the "living dead," of finding oneself in the uncanny place "between the two deaths": one is either biologically dead while symbolically alive (surviving one's biological death as a spectral apparition or symbolic authority of the Name), or symbolically dead while biologically alive (those excluded from the socio-symbolic order, from Antigone to today's homo sacer). And what if we apply the same logic to the opposition of violence and non-violence, identifying two modes of their intersection? We all know the pop-psychological notion of the "passive-aggressive behavior," usually applied to a housewife who, instead of actively opposing her husband, passively sabotages him. And this brings us back to our beginning: perhaps, one should assert this attitude of passive aggressivity as a proper radical political gesture, in contrast to aggressive passivity, the standard "interpassive" mode of our participation in socio-ideological life in which we are active all the time in order to make it sure that nothing will happen, that nothing will really change . In such a constellation, the first truly critical ("aggressive," violent) step is to WITHDRAW into passivity, to refuse to participate - Bartleby's "I would prefer not to" is the necessary first step which as it were clears the ground for a true activity, for an act that will effectively change the coordinates of the constellation.<br> <br> <b>Notes</b>:<br> <br> <tt><b><a name="1"></a><a href="#1x">1</a></b></tt>. Etienne Balibar, "Gewalt," in <i>Historisch-Kritisches Wüsrterbuch des Marxismus</i>, forthcoming.<br>

<tt><b><a name="3"></a><a href="#3x">3</a></b></tt>. Wendy BrownBauman, "Human Rights as the Politics Of. FatalismFrom Philantropy to Humanitarianism," in <i>South Atlantic Quaterly</i> 2/3, Spring 2004.<br> <tt><b><a name="4"></a><a href="#4x">4</a></b></tt>. <i>ibid</i><br>  <tt><b><a name="5"></a><a href="#5x">5</a></b></tt>. Etienne Balibar, "Is a Philosophy Of. Human Rights Possible," in <i>South Atlantic Quaterly</i> 2/3, Spring 2004.<br> <tt><b><a name="6"></a><a href="#6x">6</a></b></tt>. Hannah Arendt, <i>i.e. Origins Of. Totalitarianism</i>, New York: Meridian, 1958.<br> <tt><b><a name="7"></a><a href="#7x">7</a></b></tt>. Jacques Rancière, "Who is the Subject of Human Rights," in <i>South Atlantic Quaterly</i> 2/3, Spring 2004.<br>