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Chapter 9 The [[Subversion]] of the [[Subject]] and the [[Dialectic]] of [[Desire]] in the [[Freudian]] [[Unconscious]] OVERVIEW In this essay [[Lacan]] formally addresses a colloquium not of [[psychoanalysts]] but of [[philosophers]], gathered at Royaumont (September 1960), under the leadership of J ean Wahl, to discuss the theme "Dialectic." It is altogether appropriate, then, that Lacan take for his own theme the issue of "dialectic" in [[Freud]] and, indeed, the aspect most specific to the Freudian discovery, namely, the [[nature]] of the unconscious. For philosophers, dialectic . implies movement through a series of negations, each of which is followed by a [[sublation]] ([[Aufhebung]]), which assumes the negated [[moment]] into a higher [[synthesis]]. Since the basic dynamism of the subject for Lacan arises from [[desire,]] it is not surprising that he focuses attention on the "dialectic of desire," nor should it be surprising that [[negation]] and negativity come to playa crucial [[role]] in the [[discussion]]. As the essay develops one gets the impression that Lacan 355

356 LACAN AND LANGUAGE As the essay develops one gets the impression that Lacan has moved to a new level of [[reflection]] - not because the essay is probably the most enigmatic of this [[particular]] collection, but rather because over the years his [[thought]] has led him into deeper and deeper waters. We [[know]] that his [[doctoral dissertation]] (1932) [[left]] Lacan with a [[dual]] interest: in the role of [[image]] and the role of milieu in [[personality]] [[formation]]. The former interest is explored in the first two essays of this collection, "The [[Mirror]] [[Stage]]" (Chapter 1) and "[[Aggressivity]] in [[Psychoanalysis]]" (Chapter 2). The latter interest is developed in the essays that begin to elaborate Lacan's conception of the unconscious as "the [[Other]]" that is "[[structured]] like a [[language]]," namely, "The Function and Field of [[Speech]] and Language" (Chapter 3), "The Freudian [[Thing]]" (Chapter 4) and "The [[Agency]] of the [[Letter]] in the Unconscious" (Chapter 5). The discussion of the [[Schreber]] [[case]] in "On a Question Preliminary to Any Possible [[Treatment]] of [[Psychosis]]" (Chapter 6) raises in a general way the question [[about]] the relation between the subject and the unconscious insofar as this is conceived as the Law of the [[Father]] and what happens if the subject is somehow "[[foreclosed]]" from this Law. Here for the first [[time]] in these essays the importance of the [[phallus]] in the [[oedipal]] [[resolution]] becomes explicated. The next two essays in the collection, "The [[Direction of the Treatment]]" (Chapter 7) and "The [[Signification]] of the Phallus" (Chapter 8), both address with increasing subtlety the problems involved in the [[castration]] [[complex]]. In the [[present]] essay this issue receives a still further refinement on a new level of complexity, insofar as the role that the phallus plays in a [[dialectical]] assumption by the subject of his own desire now becomes thematized. Be that as it may, the obscurity of this essay almost defies paraphrase without support from a complementary [[text]], "[[Position]] de l'[[inconscient]]" (1966, pp. 829-850), delivered one month later at Bonneval, as well as from the text of the [[seminars]] (still unpublished) on which both papers are based. Without these supports we must [[content]] ourselves with a kind of make-do [[coherence]] which is [[forced]] to take its bearings from a few relatively clear points of reference that peek through the shifting clouds from time to time, but then must poke along as best it can through the long, foggy night.

SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 357 from time to time, but then must poke along as best it can through the long, foggy night. But the fog does not descend really until we put out to sea. At the beginning of the essay there is, so to [[speak]], only the babble of greetings and farewells along the dockside. Lacan greets his audience of philosophers with appropriate allusions to the [[philosophy]] of [[science]], to the dialectic of [[Hegel]], to the status of Freud as a [[scientist]] (at least of ambi tion). His "farewells" are to the "empiricist" conception of science (1977, p. 293/795), to Hegel's "immanentism" (the march of the [[conscious]] subject to [[complete]] [[identity]] with itself in [[total]] [[self]]-[[awareness]]) as an account of the vagaries of the [[history]] of science (1977, p. 296/798), to the alleged radicality of the so-called "Copernican [[revolution]]" that still left man conceiving of himself as a conscious subject, i.e., in the [[sense]] of the [[Cartesian]] [[cogito]]. Since these early passages may be taken as introductory, we shall not delay over [[them]]. Rather, let us disregard the [[order]] of the text and cull a few propositions that seem to us to articulate the [[essence]] of what Lacan is trying to say. "The praxis that we call psychoanalysis," he tells us, "is constituted by a [[structure]]" (1977, p. 292/793), so his fundamental question is: What is the nature of this structure that makes psychoanalysis possible? He chooses for special focus in this essay the structure of the subject, the traditional conception of which has been "subverted" by psychoanalysis. He will attempt to discuss this "subversion proper" and explain how radical it is. Fundamentally at issue is the subversion (i.e., the overthrow) of the Cartesian subject (i.e., the presumed identity of [[subjectivity]] and conscious thought). Freud's assault on man's conception of himself as subject was more radical than either the "revolution" of [[Copernicus]] (1977, p. 296/798) or that of [[Darwin]] (1977, p. 295/797). The overthrow took [[place]] through Freud's discovery of the unconscious as "a [[chain]] of [[signifiers]] that somewhere (on [[another]] stage, on another [[scene]], he wrote) is repeated, and insists on interfering in the breaks offered it by the effective [i.e., conscious] [[discourse]] and the cogitation that it in-

358 LACAN AND LANGUAGE forms" (1977, p. 297/799). Here "At the beginning of the crucial term essay there is the [[signifier]], brought back so to [[lifespeak]] from , only the ancient art ofrhetoric by modern [[linguistics]]" but unavailable as such to Freud because babble of greetings and farewells along the dislocations of historydockside. Nonetheless, "the mechanisms described by Freud as those Lacan greets his audience of 'philosophers with appropriate allusions to the primary [[processphilosophy]]', in which the unconscious assumes its role, correspond exactly to the functions that this of [[schoolscience]] [of linguistics] believes determines the most radical aspects of , to the effects dialectic of language, namely [[metaphorHegel]] and [[metonymy]]" (1977, pp. 297-298/799). The conception implied here to the status of Freud as a [[dividedscientist]] subject re<;:eived direct treatment in "The Agency (at least of [[the Letter]] in the U nconsciousambi tion). His " (see Chapter 5, pp. 167-168), where we saw that farewells"the place that I occupy as the subject of a signifier [is] ... excentric, in relation are to the place that I occupy as subject "empiricist" conception of the [[signified]]" science (1977, p. 165293/517795). Such a conception obviously is incompatible with that , to Hegel's "immanentism" (the march of any simplistic [[psychology]] that takes as its criterion the "[[unityconscious]] of the subject" or assumes that "the to [[psychicalcomplete]] had to obtain its credentials as a [[doubleidentity]] of the with itself in [[physicaltotal]] organism" (1977, p. 294/795). What is significant for Freud, then, is not any "[[stateself]]" of -[[mindawareness]] (1977, p. 294/795) or "some archetypal, or in any sense ineffable, as an account of the vagaries of the [[experiencehistory]]" of the subject science (1977, p. 295296/796798), even though such phenomena might offer some auxiliary "illumination." What really matters - even in to the case alleged radicality of the [[hysteric]] so- is not the "phenomena associated with [[hysteria]]called " but rather the Copernican [[patientrevolution]]'s "discourse" (1977, p. 294/795; italics added). An emphasis of this kind on the discourse of the subject in psychoanalysis leads us to the question that will polarize the [[remainder]] of the essay: "Once the structure of language has been recognized in the unconscious, what sort still left man conceiving of himself as a conscious subject can we conceive for it" (1977, pi. 298/800)? Lacan now makes his first assay at answering that questione. Whatever the answer turns out to be, it must take account of in the [[relationshipsense]] between the unconscious and the "I" who ~ speaks. Lacan begins with a certain "methodological rigor" by recalling what of the [[linguistsCartesian]] have said about "I" as a "[[shiftercogito]]," i.e.,

SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 359 a double structure that functions both Since these early passages may be taken as a signifier within the spoken discourse (henceintroductory, we shall not delay over [[them]]. Rather, as "subject of let us disregard the [[statementorder]]," of the "spoken I") text and as cull a designation of few propositions that seem to us to articulate the subject as "now [[speakingessence]]of what Lacan is trying to say. "The praxis that we call psychoanalysis," (1977he tells us, p. 298/800) "is constituted by a [[reasonstructure]] of what [[Barthes]] calls an "existential bond" (19641977, p. 22292/793) (hence, as "subject so his fundamental question is: What is the nature of this structure that makes psychoanalysis possible? He chooses for special focus in this essay the structure of the [[enunciation]]subject," the traditional conception of which has been "speaking Isubverted")by psychoanalysis. Now He will attempt to discuss this "subversion proper" and explain how radical it is obvious enough that the speaking subject may not be represented in the spoken discourse by any signifier . Fundamentally at all, or may be signified in only issue is the most subtle wayssubversion (i.e., as, for example, in the nuances overthrow) of the expletive ne Cartesian subject (1977, pi. 298/ 800)e. Fair enough, but the question we are pursuing is: " presumed identity of [[subjectivity]] and conscious thought). Freud'Who is speaking?s assault on man', when it is s conception of himself as subject was more radical than either the "revolution" of [[subject of the unconsciousCopernicus]] that is at issue" (1977, p. 299296/800798). The unconscious itself cannot answer if [[the subject of the unconscious]] "does not know what [it] is saying, or even if [it] is speaking, [which] the entire experience that of [[analysisDarwin]] has taught us" (1977, p. 299295/800797). This unconscious is both immanent and transcendent to The overthrow took [[individualplace]] [[subjects]], and marks through Freud's discovery of the frontier beyond which the traditional subject, presumed to be unconscious as "a [[transparentchain]]" to himself, loses the self-of [[transparencysignifiers]] and begins to "fade," with all the consequent effects that lead to those characteristic manifestations of unconscious somewhere (on [[processesanother]]stage, such as on another [[slips of the tonguescene]], witticismshe wrote) is repeated, etc. In more technical [[terms]], what happens here is that and insists on interfering in the breaks offered it by the "cut" (effective [[coupure]]) in the discourse, i.e., the bar between the signifier and signified - a fundamental conscious] [[principlediscourse]] of linguistics and basic ingredient of the law of cogitation that it informs" (1977, p. 297/799). Here "the language - begins to have its effect. The result crucial term is that the irruptions of unconscious processes into conscious discourse become more [[manifestsignifier]] - and these are the focus of psychoanalysis. Hence, "the brought back to [[paradoxlife]] of conceiving that from the discourse in an ancient art ofrhetoric by modern [[analyticlinguistics]] [[session]] is valuable only in so far " but unavailable as it stumbles or is interrupted" (1977, p. 299/801)such to Freud because of the dislocations of history. Paradox or notNonetheless, the fact remains: "If linguistics enables us to see the signifier mechanisms described by Freud as the determinant those of 'the signified, analysis reveals the primary [[truthprocess]] of this relation by making 'holes' , in which the unconscious assumes its role, correspond exactly to the functions that this [[meaningschool]] [of linguistics] believes determines the most radical aspects of the determinants effects of its discourse" (1977language, p. 299/801). In this context Lacan comes again to the familiar namely [[metaphor]] and [[wordsmetonymy]] of Freud: "Wo Es war, sol! Ich werden"(cf. 1977, pp. 128297-129298/417- 799).

360 LACAN AND LANGUAGE 418). He underlines the fact that the tense The conception implied here of Freud's war corresponds not to the a [[Frenchdivided]] subject received direct treatment in "The Agency of [[past]] historical tense but to the imperfect, designating an incomplete [[actionLetter]]/state-of-[[being]] in past time. The point is important and worth stressing. Lacan makes it again, and more clearly, in the complementary essay "Position de [[l'inconscient]]U nconscious" (1966see Chapter 5, pp. 829167-850168). There he is discussing the nature of the subject ([[barred]], of course) as definable only in terms of its relation to where we saw that "the [[signifying chain]] in which the signifier is [[understood]] essentially place that I occupy as that which "represents the subject for another of a signifier" (1966, p. 840; our [[translationis]]). Speaking of the subject in this sense, Lacan clarifies: "What [i.e.excentric, the subject who] was there ready in relation to speak [has] the double sense place that I occupy as subject of the imperfect tense in French gives to [the expression] there was." Here Lacan is referring "to the moment preceding (e. g., "he was here but is no longer") and to the moment following (e.g., "a little longer and he was there"). In other words, he adds, "what was there [[disappearssignified]] insofar as it is no longer anything but a signifier" (19661977, p. 840; our translation165/517). What Such a conception obviously is important here is not so much the conception of the subject incompatible with that is at stake (we shall [[return]] to this below) but Lacan's use of the double sense of the French imperfect to any simplistic [[interpretpsychology]] that takes as its criterion the "was" (war) in Freud's [[formula]]. In any case, the complementary text permits a better [[understandingunity]] of his remark in the essay we are presently considering: subject"There where it was just now, there where it was for a while, between an extinction or assumes that is still glowing and a "the [[birthpsychical]] that is retarded, I had to obtain its credentials as a [no [[quotesdouble]]] can come into being [as of the speaking subject] and [yet] [[disappearphysical]] from what I sayorganism" (1977, p. 300294/801795). This [[disappearance]] is what we take to be the "[[fading]]' of the subject. To illustrate what he has in mind, Lacan recalls a [[dream]] related by Freud: A man who had once nursed his father through a long and painful mortal [[illness]], told me that in the months following his father's [[death]] he had repeatedly dreamt that his father was alive once more and that he was talking to him in his usual way. But he felt it exceedingly pairiful that his father had really died, only without [[knowing]] it [1911a, p. 225].

SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 361 Now What is significant for LacanFreud, what the father did then, is not know was the fact any "that he'was [[deadstate]]" of [[mind]] (1977, p. 300294/802795). What life the father hador "some archetypal, thenor in any sense ineffable, was only in the signifying chain of the dreamer's [[psycheexperience]]. But does " of the dreaming/speaking subject fare any better? The dreaming subject(1977, toop. 295/796), withdraws from the signifying chain of his dream/discourseeven though such phenomena might offer some auxiliary "illumination. "[T]hat is how I as subject comes on What really matters - even in the scene, conjugated with case of the double aporia of a [[truehysteric]] survival that - is abolished by not the "phenomena associated with [[knowledgehysteria]] of itself, and by a discourse in which it is death [of " but rather the speaking subject in his [[withdrawalpatient]]] that sustains [[existence]] [in the 's "discourse]" (1977, p. 300294/802795; italics added). How does a subject conceived in An emphasis of this way compare with kind on the subject as conceived by Hegel? In fact the two conceptions are separated by a "gap" that can be seen most clearly if we compare them in terms discourse of the way the subject in each case relates psychoanalysis leads us to knowing ([[savoir]]). Traditionally and in the most general terms, knowing has always been considered to be some kind of union between one being (question that will polarize the knower) and another being (the known) that involves a "[[presenceremainder]]" of the known to the knower and reciprocal "awarenessessay: " in Once the knower structure of the known that is not purely physical, which often language has been called (for [[want]] of a better term) "intentiona1." Traditionally, too, knowledge is considered true if the awareness recognized in the knower corresponds to the [[object]] knownunconscious, and in that sense the knower depends on the object known as a standard to which the knowledge must conform in order to [[guarantee]] its truth. With [[Descartes]], however, truth came to be conceived not merely as conformity what sort of knower to known but as certitude in the knowing subject (i.e., can we conceive for it"knowing' that he [[knows]]). Henceforth, in order to be true the knowing depended not only on its [[objects]] but on its own assurance of itself. Now when a Hegel talks about knowledge as "absolute," this must be understood in the most radical sense of"absolute"-at least so one astute co~mentator (Martin [[Heidegger]] [19501977, p. 124]298/800), namely, suggests - in the [[Latin]] sense (ab-solvere) of "to loosen." In other words, if truth is conceived as stated here, then knowing is absolved (loosened) from its complete [[dependence]] on the object in the process of truth. The more the nature of self-assurance is ?

362 LACAN AND LANGUAGE explored, Lacan now makes his first assay at answering that question. Whatever the more the objectanswer turns out to be, if it remains part must take account of the process at all, becomes a matter of indifference. To the extent that knowing is released from dependence on [[relationship]] between the presentation of objects unconscious and becomes more aware of itself as knowing, the subject becomes "absoluteI" who speaks.Lacan begins with a certain " In any case, methodological rigor" by recalling what matters for Hegel is Knowing's knowing itselfthe [[linguists]] have said about "I" as a "[[shifter]], " i.e., a double structure that functions both as a signifier within the spoken discourse (hence, as absolute. The entire thrust "subject of Hegel's The the [[Phenomenologystatement]] of Mind (1807a) consists in the process by which Knowing comes to know itself. Initially, indeed, what " the subject knows is an object (an sich"spoken I"), say, and as a designation of sense the subject as "now [[perceptionspeaking]]" (1977, p. In a second moment, however, the subject becomes aware of itself as knowing the object (fur sich298/800), and then becomes aware by [[reason]] of its own role in constituting the object for itself (what [[Barthes]] calls an undfur sich), thereby "loosening' itself existential bond" (in whatever small degree1964, p. 22) from dependence on this object to assure itself of the truth of its knowledge. This(hence, then, is the basic movement as "subject of the dialectic. The knowing subject passes from an initial moment of "[[affirmationenunciation]]," of its object to an awareness of the inadequacy of this perception (hence, negation"speaking I") to a new moment of reconciliation of these two previous moments . Now it is obvious enough that the speaking subject may not be represented in a higher (the spoken discourse by any signifier at all, or deeper) view of may be signified in only the processmost subtle ways, which then becomes as, for example, in the starting point of a new cycle nuances of the dialecticexpletive ne (1977, p. 298/ 800). This movement of affirmation-negation-synthesis on Fair enough, but the question we are pursuing is: " 'Who is speaking?', when it is the part [[subject of the subject unconscious]] that is called at issue"mediation(1977," i.ep., the means by which the initial im-mediate experience (affirmation299/800) is processed through negation into synthesis. The initial, un-mediated moment of knowing is what we unconscious itself cannot answer if [[understandthe subject of the unconscious]] by knowledge-asconnaissance. Through the mediation "does not know what [it ] is assumed into the ongoing process of savoir coming to know itself. To the extent that the mediation is also a process of self-assurance on the part of the subjectsaying, or even if [it ] is also a moment of truthspeaking, [which, ] the entire experience of course[[analysis]] has taught us" (1977, yields to synthesis within a higher truth as the dialectic moves onp. What propels the dialectic for Hegel, however, is not some hidden thrust within knowing itself but fundamentally desire. Now for Freud, the relation between truth and savoir, as we find it in Hegel, is broken. There is indeed in Freud a desire, but it must be understood as desire of the Other299/800). If one wishes

SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 363 This unconscious is both immanent and transcendent to call this a desire of savoir, that may be possible, provided that one understands savoir in a very special sense, i.e., not as "knowledge" in any traditional sense of intentional union between knower and known but as a "knowing" that takes the [[formindividual]] [[subjects]] of an inscription in , and marks the discourse of frontier beyond which the traditional subject, presumed to be "of which[[transparent]]" to himself, like loses the 'messengerself-[[slavetransparency]]' of ancient usageand begins to "fade, " with all the subject who carries under his hair the codicil consequent effects that condemns him lead to death knows neither the meaning nor the text, nor in what language it is written, nor even that it had been tatooed on his shaven scalp as he slept" (1977, p. 302/803). Such a conception those characteristic manifestations of the unconscious has [[nothingprocesses]] to do, of course, with Freud's so-called such as [[biologismslips of the tongue]]. This does not gainsay the fact that this biologism, properly understoodwitticisms, plays an important role in Freud's thoughtetc. One form of it is the death In more technical [[instinctterms]], and what happens here is that the "cut"to ignore the ([[death instinctcoupure]] ) in his [[doctrine]] is to misunderstand that doctrine entirely" (1977the discourse, pi. 301/803)e. For example, the "return to bar between the inanimate" that characterizes the death instinct is signifier and signified - a metaphor for "that margin beyond life that language gives to the fundamental [[humanprinciple]] being by virtue of the fact that he speaks"another way linguistics and basic ingredient of talking about the Freudian unconscious savoir. Another form law of biologism is the role ascribed language - begins to the phallus in the dialectic of desire, as we shall see in more detail belowhave its effect. But to recognize The result is that the central role irruptions of biologism in Freud is not to correlate the unconscious with processes into conscious discourse become more [[physiologymanifest]], - and these are the translation focus of [[Trieb]] as "instinct" is very misleadingpsychoanalysis. A much better [[choice]] would be Hence, "the [[drive]]" ([[pulsionparadox]]). "Instinct" might imply "knowledge" ([[connaissance]]) of some sort, conceiving that the way a bird has "knowledge" of how to build a nest, but discourse in no way can "knowledge" of this type be an [[identifiedanalytic]] with savoir in the sense we have explained (1977, pp. 301-302/803). At this point Lacan begins his attempt to describe precisely how desire functions with [[regardsession]] to this subject who is "defined valuable only in his articulation by the signifierso far as it stumbles or is interrupted" (1977, p. 303299/805801) like . Paradox or not, the messenger-slave just alluded fact remains: "If linguistics enables us to. He does so by resorting to a series see the signifier as the determinant of the signified, analysis reveals the [[graphstruth]] that aim to map out "the most broadly of this relation by making 'holes' in [[practicalmeaning]] structure of the data determinants of our experienceits discourse" (1977, p. 303299/804-805801) .

364 LACAN AND LANGUAGE - and thereby takes us out In this context Lacan comes again to sea in heavy fog. [[Graph]] I is the "familiar [[elementary cellwords]]" of this series. We take it to be a kind of general statement of the nature of the subject Freud: "defined in his articulation by the signifierWo Es war, sol! Ich werden" (cf. 1977, ppp. 303128-129/805417-418). We He underlines the fact that the tense of Freud's war corresponds not to the [[recallFrench]] that for Lacan signifiers do not refer to any specific signified in a one-to-one correspondence [[past]] historical tense but rather to other signifiers so as to constitute a signifying chain. As a result we "are forced ... to accept the imperfect, designating an incomplete [[notionaction]] /state-of an incessant sliding -[[glissementJ of the signified under the signifier" (1977, pbeing]] in past time. 154/502)The point is important and worth stressing. But there are certain privileged moments when the signifying chain comes to fix itself to some signifiedLacan makes it again, and these are more clearly, in the complementary essay "anchoring points" (Position de [[points de capitonl'inconscient]]), "points like buttons on a mattress or intersections in quilting(1966, where there pp. 829-850). There he is a 'pinning down' discussing the nature of the subject (capitonnage) of meaning, not to an object but rather by 'reference back' to a [[symbolicbarred]] function" (Wilden, of course) as definable only in terms of its relation to the [[1968signifying chain]], p. 273). N ow Graph I in which the signifier is [[diagramsunderstood]] one of these anchoring points essentially as that which "by which represents the subject for another signifier stops the otherwise endless movement (glisse- - ment) of signification" (19771966, p. 303/805). The vector S.SI indi- cates the signifying chain posed by the speaking subject. We may 840; our [[thinktranslation]] ). Speaking of it the subject in both this sense, Lacan clarifies: "What [i.e., the subject who] was there ready to speak [diachronichas]] and the double sense that the imperfect tense in French gives to [[synchronicthe expression]] termsthere was. "The diachronic function of this [[anchoring point]] Here Lacan is referring "to be found in the [[sentence]]moment preceding (e. g., even if "he was here but is no longer") and to the sentence completes its signification only with its last term, each term being anticipated in the construc- moment following (tion of the [[others]]e.g., "a little longer andhe was there"). In other words, inverselyhe adds, sealing their meaning by its "what was there [[retroactivedisappears]] effectinsofar as it is no longer anything but a signifier" (19771966, p. 303/805840; our translation). In other words, the meaning~ed to the end of the sentence, must be read backwards into the preceding words once the sentence What is important here is finished. As for not so much the synchronic structure conception of the anchoring point, it subject that is less obvious. This consists in at stake (we shall [[the symbolicreturn]] order itself that in its most elemental form may be seen in to this below) but Lacan's use of the double sense of the primordial French imperfect to [[divisioninterpret]] of the phonemes. It is this basic pattern of the "was" (war) in Freud's [[symbolic orderformula]] that . In any case, the complementary text permits even a better [[childunderstanding]] to transpose of his remark in the bark of essay we are presently considering: "There where it was just now, there where it was for a while, between an extinction that is still glowing and a dog perceived as [[signbirth]] into a that is retarded, I [no [[phonemequotes]]]-signifier, utilizing can come into being [as the latter in the process of signification in the form of a nursery rhyme. We are taking the diagram to speaking subject] and [[suggestyet]], then, that in the progressive-[[regressivedisappear]] movement of the anchoring point in which signification emergesfrom what I say" (1977, p. 300/801).

SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 365 the vector S]t represents the progressive movement of the dia- , - chrony, and the vector A. S represents the regressive movement of contextualized meaning that is made possible by the This [[synchronydisappearance]] of the symbolic order. Graph II introduces several new elements into Graph I, principally a place in which is what we take to locate the Other. Given the [[interpretation]] we have offered of the synchronic structure of the anchoring point, it is perfectly understandable that the Other as "treasure of the signifier" be located precisely where the two vectors cross at the beginning of the reverse trajectory at point 0, and that the effect of the Other on the eventual signified be indicated there where a given assertion, ending on "its own scansion," receives its final [[punctuationfading]] at point s(O). The circularity of this process is evident. But who (and where) is the subject ' of it all? If the subject here means the individual, [[real]] subject, then . To illustrate what he "is constituted only by subtracting himself" (1977, p. 304/806) has in the fading of the "I" from the discourse as spoken. But if the Other is considered the subjectmind, it is "simply the pure subject of modern [[games]] [[theory]]" (1977, p. 304/ 806). Lacan adds that this Other as "locus of Speech, imposes itself no less as [[witness]] to the Truth" (1977, p. 305/807). The reason is that if, according to recalls a [[traditiondream]] at least as old as [[Aristotle]], the locus of truth is in the judgment and presupposes a correspondence between the judgment and what is affirmed in the judgment, then truth thus understood (as also falsehood) supposes the symbolic order. To be sure, there is a kind of "pretence to be found in physical combat and [[sexual]] display" that is essentially a matter of "[[imaginary]] [[capture]]," and we find this in animals, too. An [[animal]] "does not pretend to pretend," however, nor does he "make tracks whose [[deception]] lies in the fact that they will be taken as [[false]]." Pretense of this kind implies a passage to the order of the signifier, and "the signifier requires another locus-the locus of the [[Other, the]] Other witness, the witness Other than any of the partners - for the Speech that it supports to be capable oflying, that is to say, of presenting itself as Truth" (1977, p. 305/807). related by Freud:

366 LACAN AND LANGUAGE But if this much can be said about the subject of the discourse, what can be said about the ego? Recall what we know about Lacan's conception of the ego. As he tells us in A man who had once nursed his description of the "father through a long and painful mortal [[mirror stageillness]]," it is told me that in the "months following his father's [[speculardeath]] image" the child jubilantly assumes at the irifans stage, while still sunk he had repeatedly dreamt that his father was alive once more and that he was talking to him in his "motor incapacity and nursling dependenceusual way." Here the "I" is "precipitated in a primordial form" But he felt it exceedingly pairiful that "would have to be called the his father had really died, only without [[Idealknowing]]-I, if we wished to incorporate it into our usual [[register]1911a, p. 225]. Now for Lacan, in what the father did not know was the sense fact "that it will also be the source of secondary identifications, under which term [Lacan] would place the functions of he was [[libidinaldead]] normalization" (1977, p. 2300/94802). How What life the ego thus conceived is victimized by a "[[paranoiac]] [[alienation]]" (1977father had, p. 5/98) that affects all its knowledgethen, how it [[defends]] itself by "was only in the armour signifying chain of an the dreamer's [[alienatingpsyche]] identity" (1977, p. 4But does the dreaming/97)speaking subject fare any better? The dreaming subject, too, how its aggressivity is "a correlative tension withdraws from the signifying chain of [this] [[narcissistic]] structure" (1977, p. 22his dream/116)-all this we have seen alreadydiscourse. What Lacan seems to add here is the reminder that the ego thus conceived in its origins must now be dealt with by the (presumably ["[adultT]]) hat is how I as subject: "At this point comes on the ambiguity of a failure to recognize that is essential to knowing myself (un meconnaitre essentiel au me connaitre) is introduced. Forscene, in this 'rear view' (ritrovisee), all that conjugated with the subject can be certain double aporia of is the anticipated image coming to meet him that he catches of himself in [the] mirror" (1977, p. 306/808). This is the ego that Descartes discovered and that a [[Kanttrue]] survival that is abolished by [[analyzedknowledge]] in terms of a "[[transcendental]] egoitself," though the analysis was inevitably relativized and by the fact that there, too, the ego was "implicated ... in the [[meconnaissance]] a discourse in which the ego's identifications take root" (1977, p. 307/809). When all it is said and done, the emphasis since Descartes on death [[consciousness]] as essential to of the speaking subject is for Lacan "the deceptive accentuation of the transparency of the I in action his [en [[actewithdrawal]]] at the expense of the opacity of the signifier that determines sustains [[existence]] [in the Idiscourse]" (1977, p. 307300/809802), i.e., (as we understand it) the opacity of the symbolic order that, beyond the transparency of consciousness to itself, silently permeates all discourse. At this point Lacan digresses into Hegel (out of deference

SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 367 to his philosophy audienceHow does a subject conceived in this way compare with the subject as conceived by Hegel?). His [[intention]], it appears, is to suggest how In fact the early [[development]] two conceptions are separated by a "gap" that can be seen most clearly if we compare them in terms of the ego follows way the classical dialectical subject in each case relates to knowing ([[master]]-slave [[strugglesavoir]] ). Traditionally and in the most general terms, knowing has always been considered to be some kind of union between one being (the ego knower) and its another being (the known) that involves a "[[counterpartpresence]] that "is rightly called a struggle of pure prestige, the known to the knower and reciprocal "awareness" in the stake, life itself, is well suited to echo that [[danger]] knower of the generic pre [[maturation]] of birth" known that sets the stage is not purely physical, which often has been called (for the mirror [[phasewant]] (1977, p. 308/810of a better term)"intentional. He suggests" Traditionally, too, how knowledge is considered true if the same [[master-slave]] struggle offers an appropriate paradigm for understanding awareness in the [[neurotic]] patterns of knower corresponds to the [[obsessionalobject]]known, who simply waits out and in that sense the Master's death (1977, p. 309/811). Implicit here, of course, is knower depends on the supposition that object known as a standard to which the knowledge must conform in order to [[dynamicguarantee]] of this dialectical struggle is desire, hence the remonstrance that "philosophers should not make the mistake of its truth. With [[thinkingDescartes]] that they can take little account , however, truth came to be conceived not merely as conformity of knower to known but as certitude in the irruption that Freud's views on desire represented" knowing subject (1977, pi. 309/811)e. What, then, were Freud"knowing's views on desire? They are not to be understood in terms of familiar cliches about "that he [[repressedknows]] wishes). Henceforth," or discerned in the kind of aberration that, according to Lacan, passes for [[psychoanalytic]] [[practice]] today. Nor are they order to be grasped by overlooking true the subtleties that differentiate desire from knowing depended not only on its [[need]] and [[demandobjects]]but on its own assurance of itself. If the meaning of desire for Freud is to be sought under the guise of [[sexuality]]Now when a Hegel talks about knowledge as "absolute, then " this should must be done understood in terms the most radical sense of certain "absolute"-at least so one astute co~mentator (Martin [[structuralHeidegger]] elements" that transcend those common vagaries of sexuality that led Freud to admit that it "must bear the mark of some unnatural [[split]]" (19771950, p. 310/ 812124]). These "structural elements" are most clearly seen , namely, suggests - in the [[OedipusLatin]] complexsense (ab-solvere) of "to loosen. Central to the [[Oedipus complex]]" In other words, of courseif truth is conceived as stated here, then knowing is the role of the Father. Freud himself saw the paradigm for this in the dead Father of his own hypothetical absolved (loosened) from its complete [[myth]], but Lacan has [[interpreteddependence]] on the role object in terms the process of truth. The more the [[Name]]-nature ofself-the-Father. What assurance is at stake clearly is not explored, the real father but more the "[[paternal function]]object," which for Lacan is grounded in "the Other as the locus if it remains part of the signifier" (1977process at all, pbecomes a matter of indifference. 310/812-813). The Other here To the extent that knowing is Law released from dependence on the presentation of objects and, becomes more aware of itself as suchknowing, ultimate-the subject becomes "absolute."there In any case, what matters for Hegel is no [[Other of the Other]]" (1977Knowing's knowing itself, pi. 311/813)e. But the "fact that the Father may be regarded , as the original absolute.

368 LACAN AND LANGUAGE [[representative]] The entire thrust of [ the] Hegel's The [[authorityPhenomenology]] of Mind (1807a) consists in the Law requires us to specify process by what privileged mode of presence he is sustained beyond the subject who is actually led which Knowing comes to occupy the place of the Other, namely, the [[Mother]]" (1977, p. 311/813). This opens up new difficulties. \ The fundamental issue that now comes more and more into focus (however circuitously) is the relationship between desire and the Other (i.eknow itself.Initially, the Lawindeed, what the [[Name-of-the-Father]]). The difficulty of this issue will be compounded by the fact that the [[desiring]] subject knows is also related to the one who occupies the place of the Other in terms of need and demand. These are the parameters within which the play of the dialectic will be contained. Let us begin with what is already familiar. Just as we have been told that the unconscious is "the discourse of the Other," where "of" is to be understood in the sense of the Latin de an object (i.e., discourse "from" the Otheran sich), so, toosay, we have heard before (1977, p. 264/628) that "man's desire is the desire of the Other," i.e., "it is qua Other that he desires (which is what provides the true compass of human sense [[passionperception]])" (1977, p. 312/814). The [[subject's desire]]In a second moment, thenhowever, is in fact the Other's desire. That is why the question coming from the Other to the subject in the form becomes aware of "What do you want?" leads him more surely "to itself as knowing the path of his own desireobject (fur sich)," provided he is able to respond to it-and for this the [[help]] then becomes aware of a [[psychoanalyst]] may be necessary - not its own role in terms of "What do I want?" but rather "What does he [i.e., constituting the [[analyst]]] want of me?" object for itself (1977, p. 312/815an undfur sich). It is through collaboration with the analyst that he comes to recognize the [[otherness]] of desire and is able to [[invert]] the original question so as to ask of the Other, thereby "What do you want of me?" loosening' itself (1977, p. 335/908in whatever small degree). If the subject is able from dependence on this object to appreciate the sense of such a question, he may become aware of the alienation of which he has been the [[victim]] by reason assure itself of his own ego. Thus, quite possibly, "what he [as subject] desires presents itself to him as what he [as ego] does not want" (1977, p. 312/815). That leaves us with the delicate task truth of understanding the relationship between subject and ego, and this is where "[[fantasy]]" plays an important role in the processits knowledge.

SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 369 This, Laplanche and Pontalis define fantasy in then, is the following classical terms: "imaginary scene in which basic movement of the dialectic. The knowing subject is a protagonist, representing the fulfillment passes from an initial moment of a "[[wishaffirmation]] [i.e., desire] (in the last analysis, " of its object to an unconscious wish [desire]) in a manner that is distorted to a greater or less extent by defensive proces~es"; but they conclude their discussion more succinctly by saying that "the primary function awareness of fantasy [is] the [imaginary] miseen-scene inadequacy of desire" this perception (1967hence, pp. 314-318negation). Lacan here is more specific. We understand him to be saying something like this: When the subject becomes "barred" (g) at the a new moment of "[[primal]] [[repression]]" reconciliation of these two previous moments in a higher (i. e., "the [[splitting]] that [he] suffers from [his] subordination to the signifier"or deeper) and subsequently comes to expression only in the "fading" view of the speaking I from his spoken discourseprocess, he maintains an essential liaison with some imaginary "object" called "fantasy" (1977, p. 313/816). This imaginary object has as its fundamental paradigm which then becomes the starting point of a [[body]] image that is homologous with the image new cycle of the [[infant]] perceived by itself in [[the mirror stage]] and designated by Lacan as the egodialectic. This body image as paradigm movement of fantasy now serves as affirmation-negation-synthesis on the " 'stuff' part of that'!, that the subject is originally repressedcalled " (1977, p. 314/816)mediation, " i.e., the manner in means by which the speaking Iinitial immediate experience (affirmation) is processed through negation into synthesis. The initial, subject to desire, becomes manifest as it un-mediated moment of knowing is what we [[fadesunderstand]]by knowledge-asconnaissance. At any rate, this relationship between Through the split/repressed/barred subject and fantasy mediation it is expressed ( in assumed into the [[algorithm]] gOo, where ongoing process of savoir coming to know itself. To the 0 apparently expresses extent that the relationship between the barred subject and the Other, presumably as mediation is also a function process of desire and its "[[cause]]." The precise nature self-assurance on the part of this relationship is extremely difficult to articulate, for "the place that I occupy as subject , it is also a moment of the signifi•edtruth," i.e.which, as subordinate to the Other, is "excentric" to "the place that I occupy as ... subject of a signifier" (1977course, p. 165/ 517). Hence, it is difficult yields to designate the "subject of the unconscious" as "subject of synthesis within a statement, and therefore higher truth as the articulatordialectic moves on. What propels the dialectic for Hegel, when [the subject] does not even know that [it] is speaking" (1977however, p. 314/816). It is all the more difficult to speak of the subject of the unconscious in terms of not some hidden thrust within knowing itself but fundamentally desire. Perhaps this accounts for the fact that this subject often has been spoken of in terms of

370 LACAN AND LANGUAGE "driveNow for Freud, in which [it] is designated by an [[organic]]the relation between truth and savoir, [[oral]], [[anal]], etc. [[mapping]]," "inhabiting," as we find it werein Hegel, these organic functions (1977, pis broken. 314/816-817). But the drive isolates from the sheer metabolism of these functions certain "[[erogenous zones]]" that are marked by what Lacan calls a "cut (coupure), expressed There is indeed in the [[anatomical]] mark ([[trait]]) of Freud a margin or border-lips ... the rim of the anusdesire, the tip but it must be understood as desire of the [[penis]], [etcOther.]" (1977, p. 314/817). The [[full]] force If one wishes to call this a desire of "cut" here is for the moment not clear to ussavoir, though we recall that Lacan spoke earlier of the "cut in discoursemay be possible, the strongest being provided that which [[acts]] as one understands savoir in a bar between the signifier and signified" (1977very special sense, pi. 299/801)e. Perhaps the term is intended to suggest a sign of negativity (of discontinuity and therefore of [[lack]], not as basis for desire) "knowledge" in the human organism, the supreme form any traditional sense of which would be symbolic castration; perhaps, too, it is an [[anticipation]] on the level of the organism of the "bar intentional union between the signifier knower and signified" in the register of the symbolic order. Be that known but as it may, it is apparently organic parts such as these that coalesce to form the body [[schema]] serving as paradigm for the [[fantasies]] that become a "stuffknowing" through which that takes the speaking I manifests itself as it fades. The "[[partialform]] features" of these objects are rightly emphasized, an inscription in the discourse of coursethe subject, "not because [they] are part of a total objectwhich, like the body, but because they 'messenger-[[representslave]] only partially ' of ancient usage, the function subject who carries under his hair the codicil that produces them," i.e., condemns him to death knows neither the drive/desire of meaning nor the subject (1977text, p. 315/817). By now Lacan nor in what language it is well into the exposition of his Completed Graphwritten, which we shall not follow in detail. Let nor even that it suffice to say that had been tatooed on his shaven scalp as in Graph II he plotted the formulation of a meaningful statement in conscious discourse by "looping its significationslept" (1977, p. 316302/818803), so now he attempts to plot this "looping" of signification on the level of unconscious enunciation, presumably by the "subject of the unconscious." "If we are to expect [this looping] effect from the unconscious enunciation, it is to be found here in the S(Q'», and read as: signifier of a [[lack in the Other]], inherent in its very function as the treasure of the signifier." The shock of this formulation is Soon mitigated when we are

SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 371 told that Such a conception of the "lack referred to here is indeed that which I have alrea:dy formulated: that unconscious has [[there is no Other of the Othernothing]]" (1977to do, p. 316/818). This says nothing about the existence or nonexistence of some higher being as specified in any particular course, with Freud's so-called [[religionbiologism]] - all it says is . This does not gainsay the fact that the Other is not grounded this biologism, properly understood, plays an important role in any order of signifiers beyond itselfFreud's thought. Proceeding to explain this enigmatic formula, Lacan focuses directly on the signifier One form of it is the Other-as-Iacking. Taking it in death [[linguisticinstinct]] terms, he tells us: and "My definition of a signifier (there is no other) is as follows: a signifier is that which represents the . subject for another signifier" (1977, p. 316/819). In to ignore the case of ~~[[dingdeath instinct]] subject, for example, thi; subject is represented in its spoklfn discourse by a signifier that, in place of the speaking I, relates to other signifiers in the self-referential signifying chain. Here, however, there is question of the subject of the unconscious as such. Hence, the signifier in question, S(Q'» will be "the signifier for which all the other signifiers represent the sub- -ject: that is to say, in the his [[absencedoctrine]] of this signifier, all the other signifiers represent nothingis to misunderstand that doctrine entirely" (1977, p. 316301/819803). The [[whole]] battery of signifiersFor example, then, is complete and selfcontained. If this particular signifier is the "return to be distinguished among the rest, it will have to be by some mark inanimate" that will not [[separate]] it from the other signifiers, and Lacan chooses the sign - 1. If this signifier, with its corresponding signified, together yields characterizes the death instinct is a metaphor for "statement" (enonce) articulated by the subject of that margin beyond life that language gives to the unconscious, then a simple [[algebraichuman]] operation will yield being by virtue of the result: s (unconscious statement) equals J ~ i-an [[irrational]] [[number]] fact that is otherwise quite he speaks"inexpressible," even "unthinkable," if we try to _ think it on the level another way of talking about the conscious Cartesian cogitoFreudian unconscious savoir. If we are to 1 conceive it at all, it will have to be in terms Another form of biologism is the faded subject that, through its withdrawal, undergoes a kind of death and therefore resides in a place "from which a [[voice]] is heard clamouring 'role ascribed to the [[universe]] is a defect phallus in the purity dialectic of Non-Being' " (1977desire, pas we shall see in more detail below. 317/820). Apparently this place to which the speaking I withdraws is where it can experience a form of boundlessness that Lacan calls

372 LACAN AND LANGUAGE [[jouissance]]. The term, though it has appeared But to recognize the central role of biologism in previous essays, has Freud is not been thematized heretofore, and we have very little data to help us understand its nature. We are told thatjouissance is usually experienced as "correlate the unconscious with [[forbiddenphysiology]]" (1977, p. 317/820) - not because of "a bad arrangement and the translation of [[societyTrieb]]," nor because of some fault of the Other (as if it existed), nor because of a consequence of some "original sininstinct" (1977, p. 317/820). Rather,jouissance is limited by an interdiction imposed by the Lawvery misleading. We take this to mean that when the subject enters into the symbolic order, i.e., when the subject submits to the law of the signifier and becomes barred through A much better [[primal repressionchoice]], the subject must accept the consequences of his would be "[[finitudedrive]] that are never more " ([[apparentpulsion]] than in the limits imposed uponjouissance (1977, p. 319/821). In any case, this lets us see that the limitations ofjouissance are closely connected with the barring of the subject in primal repression. Since these are intimately connected with the "Instinct" might imply "knowledge" ([[castration complexconnaissance]]) of some sort, it would be [[impossible]] to exaggerate the importance of this complex as "structural of the subject" (1977, p. 318/ 820). With r~gard to it, Lacan suggests way a second meaning for the term "subversionbird has " of the subject. knowledge"In the castration complex we find the major mainspring of the very subversion that I am trying how to articulate here by means of its dialectic" (1977, p. 318/ 820). Castration involves build a sacrifice of the phallusnest, but in no way can "image of the penis.knowledge" We must distinguish, however, "between the principle of sacrifice, which is symbolic, and this type be [[the imaginaryidentified]] function that is devoted to that principle of sacrifice, but which, at with savoir in the same time, masks the fact that it [the imaginary function] gives it [the principle] its [[instrument]] [of sacrifice]" sense we have explained (1977, ppp. 319301-302/822). We take this to mean that Lacan wants to distinguish clearly between the phallus as symbolic (hereafter [[capital]] Phi [<P]) and as image (hereafter small phi [<t>]803). According to our understanding of the matter, the phallus as imaginary is (on the [[psychic]] level) the bond with the Source of All, which, like the umbilical cord, must be severed in order to enter into human existence in the symbolic order (though at the cost of the irreparable [[loss]] of

SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 373 joui~sance). As image, the phallus forms part of the body schema perceived in the [[specular imageGraph]] that, for Lacan as well as for Freud, "I is the channel taken by the transfusion of the body's "[[libidoelementary cell]] towards the object" and serves as paradigm for fantasy (1977, pof this series. 319/822). The detachability We take it to be a kind of general statement of the phallus may be understood in a broad sense, for insofar as nature of the phallus is erectile (hence also detumescent and in that way "detachable"), it may be experienced as "[[lacking]]" to, or "negativedsubject " defined in, his articulation by the body image signifier" (1977, ppp. 319-320303/822805). As a result of this We [[negativerecall]] quality, it bears that for Lacan signifiers do not refer to any specific signified in a certain affinity with the negativity of th,e signifier ( one-to- 1) one correspondence but rather to other signifiers so as with the nega~vity of its signification (,,';--=-1)to constitute a signifying chain. Since As a result we "the erectile [[organ]] come~ are forced ... to [[symbolize]] accept the place ofjouissance," there is a [[naturalnotion]] correlation between the phallus imagined as castratable and the limitation of jouissance, by reason an incessant sliding [glissementJ of which the erectile organ may be said to "[[bind]] [nouer] signified under the [[prohibition]] of jouissancesignifier" (1977, p. 320154/822502). The transformation of But there are certain privileged moments when the phallus as imaginary signifying chain comes to fix itself to some signified, and de- tachable ( - ¢) {implying a castration equally imaginary) into \ the phallus as symbolic (<P) is a step forward in the emergence of the subject and in that sense these are "positive,anchoring points" even though it may be correlated with the filling up of some lack (1977, p. 320/823) and, as signifier of the Other's desire, signifies the lack in the Other. However that may be, the castration of the phallus brings into play some kind of object on the level of fantasy that Lacan refers to as [[objetpoints de capiton]] a. How this may be understood admits of various [[interpretations]]. After scrutinizing relative [[texts]] in Lacan), Lemaire suggests two possible ways of understanding the [[objet "points like buttons on a]]: the first sense would be to take objet a as "the first image to fill in the crack of [[separation]]" from the mother, hence necessarily referring to the phallus "mattress or intersections in the symbolic sense of the hyphenquilting, par excellence, of the impossible unification" with her that in the separation where there is severed; a second 'pinning down' (broadercapitonnage) sense would take objet a as the "representative of the meaning, not to an object of lack," i.e., "the but rather by 'reference back' to a [[metonymicsymbolic]] function" (Wilden, [[object of desire1968]]" (1970, p. 174273). As a case in point, an example of objet a would be the "ines-

374 LACAN AND LANGUAGE SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 375 timable treasure" that in N ow Graph I [[Platodiagrams]]'s [[Symposium]] [[Alcibiades]] fantasizes as contained in hidden fashion within [[Socrates]]. Recall how Alcibiades had projected onto Socrates one of these anchoring points "by which the signifier stops the ideal otherwise endless movement (glisse- - ment) of the "perfect mastersignification" (1977, p. 323303/826805). Yet because Socrates refuses to respond to any of his advances, Alcibiades fantasies Socrates as deprived of The vector S.SI indicates the signifying chain posed by the speaking subject. We may [[imaginary phallusthink]] ( - 1» and of it in that sense as "both [[castrateddiachronic]]," hence, "ideal Master" or not, as "completely imaginarized." This does not make Socrates any less "the object of desire," however, for, like "the and [[womansynchronic]] concealed behind her terms. "The diachronic function of this [[veilanchoring point]], it is the absence of the penis that turns her into the phallus, the' object of desire" (1977, p. 322/825). We understand this to mean that be found in the [[absentsentence]] penis in the woman makes her desirable tothe subject, i.e., the object of the subject's desire, in the sense that, not having the phallus, she can now be the phallus for/to him, i.e., the object of his desire. Phallus in this case, however, is obviou"sly used in the symbolic sense (<I» as signifier of desire or oflack. Similarly, Socrates remains the "symbolic" phallus for Alcibiades, even though (or rather precisely because) he is castrated of if the imaginary phallus ( - 1». In all this, Lacan claims that Alcibiades (though he may well be a lecher and a lush) "is certainly not a neuroticsentence completes its signification only with its last term," for he is ''par excellence [one] who desires," i.e., is each term being anticipated in touch with his own desire. Socrates, "the precursor of psychoanalysis," is shrewd enough to discern the true focus of Alcibiades' desire, "object construction of the [[transferenceothers]]," i.e.and, inversely, sealing their meaning by its [[Agathonretroactive]] effect" (1977, p. 323303/825-826805). In other words, insofar as he matches (as [[homosexual]] object) the object in Alcibiades' unconscious fantasy, meaning~ed to the object marked by end of the - 1> "as castrated" (1977sentence, p. 323/825). For must be read backwards into the neurotic, preceding words once the same issue sentence is not so straightforwardfinished. When As for the synchronic structure of the subject anchoring point, it is split through less obvious. This consists in [[primary repressionthe symbolic]] (5), the neurotic's ego remains strong and, essentially imaginary order itself, functions that in its most elemental form may be seen in the primordial [[imaginary orderdivision]]of the phonemes. The phallus on It is this level, as also the castration basic pattern of it, is equally imaginary. The neurotic's relation to the Other is such that "he imagines that the Other [[demandssymbolic order]] his castration" (1977, p. 323/826). But in his imaginary struggle against an imaginary castration, the neurotic fails to appreciate the genuine role of the symbolic phallus and the need for symbolic castration as the price of any satisfactory relationship of the subject to the Other. We understand this satisfactory relationship to involve the dialectic of desire through reciprocal that permits even a [[recognitionchild]] to transpose the bark of:. subject and Other. In other words, it is a dog perceived as if the neurotic played out the scenario of the classic oedipal stereotype on the imaginary level and failed utterly to appreciate the symbolic [[significancesign]] of castration. In any case, what into a [[analytic experiencephoneme]] shows us is that-signifier, whether utilizing the latter in the normal or abnormal, castration is the "ondition for desire to become human. In that I' sense.it "governs" desire (1977, p. 32~/826). Reciprocally, it implies the forfeit ofjouissance process of primordial union, which can then /- ;~' pproached only on "signification in the inverted ladder ... form of the Law of desire, ia nursery rhyme. e., by overturning the Law governing We are taking the articulation of desir (1977, p. 324/827). But all this, along with the tantalizing allusions diagram to different kinds of [[neuroses]] ([[phobicsuggest]], obsessionalthen, that in the progressive-[[hysterical]]) ~nd to [[perversionregressive]]movement of the anchoring point in which signification emerges, suggests a [[clinical]the vector S] relevance to Lacan's reflections here .. that t represents the paucity progressive movement of clinical facts simply does not permit us to explicate further., In other words, we must be content with what few misty glimmers have been allowed us in the course of this longdiachrony, foggy night. MAP OF THE TEXjf I) Analytic practice rests on a structure. J) Philosophy claims to deal with what interests everyone without their knowing it. 1) This relation of and the subject to knowledge was mapped by Hegel, avector A. but it is an ambiguous relation, even in science. 2) The scientist is a subject who ought to know what he is doing, a) but he does not know what in S represents the impact regressive movement of science contextualized meaning that is of interest to everyone. 3) Thus we consider Hegel's made possible by the [[epistemologysynchrony]] regarding of the subject, symbolic order.

376 LACAN AND LANGUAGE Graph II introduces several new elements into Graph I, principally a) place in order which to show what psychoanalysis subverts in the question of locate the subjectOther. B) Our psychoanalytic experience qualifies us to proceed in this way, 1) in Given the face of gaps in theory and transmission, a) which consequently jeopardize practice, b. and nullify its [[scientificinterpretation]] status. 2) Its [[social]] basis is not at issue, a. not even its deviations in [[Britain]] and America. 3. It is subversion itself that we will try" to define. C) Science cannot be founded on [[empiricism]], 1) not even have offered of the so-called science synchronic structure of psychologythe anchoring point, a) since the Freudian subject disqualifies what lies at the root of academic psychology. 2) Psychology's criterion it is perfectly understandable that the presupposed unity of the subject, a) Other as a subject of knowledge or as a double "treasure of the physical organism. 3) We must take stock of the notion signifier"state of knowledge," a. insofar as it can be authenticated by a theory i. that relates knowing to connaturality. b) Hegel had no use for it, nor does modern science, c) except in plotting located precisely where the two vectors cross at the coordinates beginning of its objects. d) So-called depth psychology gets no direction from it. e) Freud himself took his distance from hypnoid statesthe reverse trajectory at point 0, i. preferring and that the discourse effect of the hysteric. D) [[People]] fail to see that when we question Other on the unconSCIOUSeventual signified be indicated there where a given assertion, 1) ending on "its reply is a discourse. 2) We lead the subject to decipher own scansion," receives its final [[logicpunctuation]], a. provided our voice enters at the [[right]] placepoint s(O).

SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 377 3At this point Lacan digresses into Hegel (out of deference to his philosophy audience?). Our His [[goalintention]] , it appears, is not some archetypal or mute experience. E) In this approach to suggest how the subject we see how Freud took a Copernican step. 1) With Copernicus, early [[development]] of the ego follows the classical dialectical [[master]]-slave [[struggle]] between the earth was dislodged from ego and its central place. a) But heliocentrism is no less a [[lurecounterpart]]that "is rightly called a struggle of pure prestige, b) and Darwinian man still believes he's the pick stake, life itself, is well suited to echo that [[danger]] of the basket. 2) A doctrine generic pre [[maturation]] of double truth still shelters our knowledge, a) birth" that sets the stage for science has closed the frontier of its knowledge from the Freudian fruthmirror [[phase]] (1977, p. b308/810) If we keep . He suggests, too, how the shifting history of science in view, psychoanalysis can still have same [[master-slave]] struggle offers an earth-shaking role. II. From this vantage point we reexamine what 'help we can expect from Hegel. A) Hegel's phenomenology ideally resolves appropriate paradigm for understanding the relation between truth and knowledge. 1) Truth emerges in knowledge by putting [[ignoranceneurotic]] to patterns of the [[workobsessional]], a) yielding a new symbolic form by resolving who simply waits out the ImagmaryMaster's death (1977, p. 2309/811) The dialectic leads to ah absolute knowing wherein . Implicit here, of course, is the real and supposition that the symbolic are conjoined, a) for the absolute subject [[dynamic]] of this dialectical struggle is complete and perfectdesire, hence the fully conscious self b) remonstrance that is "philosophers should not make the basic hypothesis mistake of [[thinking]] that they can take little account of the entire movement. 3) But the history of Western science shows detours irruption that are inconsistent with HegelFreud's dialecticviews on desire represented" (1977, p. a309/811) Creative physicists remind us that in scientific knowledge as well as in other areas the hour of truth strikes elsewhere than in consciousness. b) The consideration shown psychoanalysis by science indicates a wish for [[theoretical]] [[enlightenment]].

378 LACAN AND LANGUAGE 1) This has nothing What, then, were Freud's views on desire? They are not to do with the be understood in terms of familiar cliches about "[[categoriesrepressed]] of psychologywishes, whose fate is sealed. B) By thus referring to Hegel's absolute subject and " or discerned in the abolished subject kind of scienceaberration that, we shed light on Freud's dramatic entryaccording to Lacan, 1) the return of truth into the field of science, a) at the same time that it imposes itself on the field of practice. 2) Hegel's unhappy consciousness is basically just a suspension of knowing; a. it is far from Freud's malaise of passes for [[psychoanalytic]] [[civilizationpractice]], i) marked today. Nor are they to be grasped by overlooking the skewed relation separating the subject subtleties that differentiate desire from sexuality. 3) We cannot situate Freud in terms of a predictive psychology , a) nor in terms of a phenomenology that would reassure [[idealismneed]]. b) In the Freudian field consciousness cannot found the unconscious, c. nor can and [[affectdemand]] ground . If the subject. C) The unconscious, since meaning of desire for Freud, is a chain to be sought under the guise of signifiers, 1) which repeats itself "on another stage[[sexuality]]," a. and which interferes then this should be done in discourse and thought. 2) The notion terms of certain "signifier[[structural]] elements" that transcend those common vagaries of modern structural linguists was unavailable sexuality that led Freud to Freud, a) but his descriptions of primary-process mechanisms match exactly their description of admit that it "must bear the two poles mark of language some unnatural [[split]]" (metaphor and metonymy)1977, p. D310/ 812) Given the structure of language in the unconscious, what kind of subject can we conceive for the unconscious? 1) We can begin with the I as signifier, defined in linguistics a. These "structural elements" are most clearly seen in terms of its status as shifter. 2) The shifter indicates the speaking subject, a. but does not [[signifyOedipus]] itcomplex.

SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 379 III. 3) The subject does not always know what he is saying, or even fundamental issue that he now comes more and more into focus (however circuitously) is speaking, a) for the subject fades from discourse, b. a discourse marked by [[parapraxes]]. 4) As [[analysts]] we must return to the function of the gap in discourse, , a) the strongest being the bar that separates the signifier relationship between desire and the signifiedOther (i. 5) We thus arrive at the subject as bound 'to signification and thereby under the sign of the [[preconscious]]e. a) This leads us to , the. paradox of conceiving Law, the [[analytic discourse]] as Name-of- [[value]] only in its lapses and parapraxes. 6) The subject is therefore structured as discontinuity in the real, a) with holes in meaning as dete~minants of ana- lytic discourse. E) Freud's imperative, "Wo Es war, sol! Ich werden, )) emphasizes a presence as having-been. 1) From this presence I can come to being, a. but only to disappear in my discourse. 2) The [[Hegelian]] subject of [[absolute knowledge]] fails to see the vanity of its discourse, a. and thus risks [[madnessFather]]). 3) The Freudian subject, as being difficulty of non-being, is separated from Hegel's this issue will be compounded by an abyss. The subject's relation to knowledge has its roots in the dialectic of desire. A) In both Hegel and Freud desire is linked to knowledge. 1) Hegel's "fact that the [[cunning of reasondesiring]]" implies that the subject knows what he wants. 2) In Freud desire is tied also related to the desire one who occupies the place of the Otherin terms of need and demand. a. In this tie we find These are the desire to know. B) The biologism of Freud is far from parameters within which the [[psychoanalytic theory]] of instinct. 1) The tone play of Freud's [[biology]] is found only by [[living]] the death instinctdialectic will be contained.

380 LACAN AND LANGUAGE 2) The metaphor Let us begin with what is already familiar. Just as we have been told that the unconscious is "the discourse of the return Other," where "of" is to be understood in the inanimate shows sense of the Latin de (i.e., discourse "margin beyond lifefrom" that language gives to bemgthe Other), so, too, a) in the fact that there is speechwe have heard before (1977, bp. and body parts are engaged as signifiers. 3264/628) Freudthat "man's Trieb desire is incorrectly translated as the desire of the Other,"instincti.e., " a) Instinct it is a mode of awareness without knowledge. b) The Freudian discourse qua Other that he desires (which is a mode what provides the true compass of knowledge without awareness. chuman [[passion]]) The unconscious has little concern for physiology" (1977, d) while psychoanalysis has contributed nothing to physiologyp. C312/814) Psychoanalysis involves the real body and its imaginary schema. 1) The [[Psychosexualsubject's desire]] development provides symbolic elements, then, is in fact the Other's desire. a) The phallus holds a privileged place That is why the question coming from the Other to the subject in the dialectic form of "What do you want?" leads him more surely "to the unconscious. D) Hegel provides a basis for criticizing contemporary psychoanal ysis. 1) Yet it would be wrong to accuse me path of being lured by his dialectic of beingown desire, a) for I find desire " provided he is able to be irreducible respond to demand or need. 2) Precisely because desire is articulated it remains inarticulable. D) A simplified graph (I) illustrates -and for this the [[topologicalhelp]] structure showing how desire is related to of a subject defined by its articulation through [[psychoanalyst]] may be necessary - not in terms of "What do I want?" but rather "What does he [i.e., the signifier[[analyst]]] want of me?" (1977, p. E312/815) The graph's "elementary cell" shows . It is through collaboration with the anchoring point by which analyst that he comes to recognize the signifier stops the sliding [[otherness]] of signification. 1) The diachronic sentence which desire and is thus anchored completes its meaning able to [[retroactivelyinvert]]the original question so as to ask of the Other, "What do you want of me?" (1977, p. 335/908).

SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 381 2) The synchronic structure If the subject is able to appreciate the sense of metaphor is more hidden. such a) It is apparent in question, he may become aware of the child's song that raises sounds alienation of which serve as he has been the [[signsvictim]] to the level by reason of signifiershis own ego. B) The two points of intersection Thus, quite possibly, "what he [as subject] desires presents itself to him as what he [as ego] does not want" (on Graph II1977, p. 312/815) show . That leaves us with the role delicate task of understanding the Other. 1) The intersection point a relationship between subject and ego, and this is where "[[fantasy]]" plays an important role in the place of process. Laplanche and Pontalis define fantasy in the treasure of following classical terms: "imaginary scene in which the signifierssubject is a protagonist, a) representing the synchronic ensemble fulfillment of reciprocally opposed phonemesa [[wish]] [i.e. 2) The intersection point s, desire] (Oin the last analysis, an unconscious wish [desire]) can be designated in a manner that is distorted to a greater or less extent by defensive proceses"; but they conclude their discussion more succinctly by saying that "the punctuation whereby primary function of fantasy [is] the articulated' meaning' [imaginary] mise-en-scene of desire" (1967, pp. 314-318). Lacan here is completedmore specific. 3) Both participate in the gap in the realWe understand him to be saying something like this: a) When the first as a concealed hollow, bsubject becomes "barred" (g) at the second as moment of "boring-[[holeprimal]] [[repression]]" for escape (in articulation)i. e. C) The submission of , "the subject [[splitting]] that [he] suffers from [his] subordination to the signifier is shown ") and subsequently comes to expression only in the circular movement between these two points"fading" of the speaking I from his spoken discourse, he maintains an essential liaison with some imaginary "object" called "fantasy" (1977, p. 1313/816) Assertions are circular insofar . This imaginary object has as they cannot be grounded its fundamental paradigm a [[outsidebody]] image that is homologous with the image of themselves the [[infant]] perceived by itself in [[the certitude of an action. a. They refer only to their own anticipated meaning. 2) The subject rr;ust subtract himself from this circle mirror stage]] and function designated by Lacan as a lack a. while remaining dependent on itthe ego. D) The Other is This body image as paradigm of fantasy now serves as the pre-given "site 'stuff' of the pure subject of the signifierthat'!, that is originally repressed" (1977, p." 1314/816) It holds , i.e., the master positionmanner in which the speaking I, subject to desire, a) determining all becomes manifest as it [[codesfades]]. b) It is from here that At any rate, this relationship between the split/repressed/barred subject receives and fantasy is expressed ( in the [[messagealgorithm]] which he emits gOo, where the 0 apparently expresses the relationship between the barred subject and whereby he is constituted. 2) The the Other constitutes the place , presumably as a function of speech desire and is Truth's witnessits "[[cause]]. "

382 LACAN AND LANGUAGE a) Without The precise nature of this [[dimension]]relationship is extremely difficult to articulate, [[verbal]] deception could not be distinguished from for "the imaginary pretense place that I occupy as subject of animalsthe signifi•ed, " i. who can present e., as subordinate to the Other, is "excentric" to "the hunter with place that I occupy as ... subject of a false startsignifier" (1977, iip. but cannot pretend to pretend165/ 517). b) Speech Hence, it is possible only in difficult to designate the "subject of the unconscious" as "subject of a statement, and therefore as the signifying realmarticulator, beyond when [the subject] does not even know that [it] is speaking"pretense(1977, p." c314/816) This requires . It is all the more difficult to speak of the locus subject of the Other as thirdparty witness to unconscious in terms of desire. Perhaps this accounts for the speakersfact that this subject often has been spoken of in terms of "drive, in which [it] is designated by an [[organic]], [[oral]], [[anal]], ii. thus making lying possibleetc. 3) Truth draws its guarantee not from [[Realitymapping]] but from Speech," "inhabiting," as it were, these organic functions (1977, p. V314/816-817) The first words spoken are a decree conferring authority on the real other. W) The emblem But the drive isolates from the sheer metabolism of symbolic these functions certain "[[identificationerogenous zones]] is the "unbroken linethat are marked by what Lacan calls a " joining S to 1cut (coupure), expressed in the [[anatomical]] mark (0[[trait]])of a margin or border-lips ... the rim of the anus, the castrated subject to tip of the [[ego idealpenis]], [etc. 1]" (1977, p. 314/817) This line fills out . The [[full]] force of "cut" here is for the invisible mark moment not clear to us, though we recall that Lacan spoke earlier of the "cut in discourse, the subject receives from strongest being that which [[acts]] as a bar between the signifierand signified" (1977, p. 2299/801) This line separates . Perhaps the subject from himself in his ego ideal as first identification, term is intended to suggest a) for it establishes a retroactive effect by which he announces himself only in terms sign of negativity (of what he will have been, b) discontinuity and his self-therefore of [[certaintylack]] lies , as basis for desire) in meeting his anticipated the human organism, the supreme form of which would be symbolic castration; perhaps, too, it is an [[mirror imageanticipation]]. 3) This process installs on the level of the ambiguity organism of a misunderstanding that is an essential aspect the "bar between the signifier and signified" in the register of understanding myselfthe symbolic order. B) The ego Be that as originating in the mirror stage it may, it is counterposed apparently organic parts such as these that coalesce to form the American notion of body [[schema]] serving as paradigm for the "[[autonomousfantasies]] ego.that become "stuff" 1) The narcissistic mirror image tinges with hostility through which the objects reflected in the mirrorspeaking I manifests itself as it fades. 2) The mirror image becomes the idealized ego"[[partial]] features" of these objects are rightly emphasized, a) established as a function of course, "not because [[mastery]they]are part of a total object, martial bearingthe body, and but because they [[rivalryrepresent]]only partially the function that produces them," i.e., the drive/desire of the subject (1977, p. 315/817).

SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 383 3) In its alienating identifications By now Lacan is well into the ego's consciousness is based outside exposition of itselfhis Completed Graph, which we shall not follow in detail. 4) The ego achieves itself by being articulated not as the speaking I, but Let it suffice to say that as in Graph II he plotted the [[displacement]] formulation of a meaningful statement in conscious discourse by "looping its meanmgsignification" (1977, ap. 316/818) that is, only opaquely as shifterso now he attempts to plot this "looping" of signification on the level of unconscious enunciation, b) despite presumably by the deceptive emphasis on "subject of the unconscious." "If we are to expect [[self-consciousnessthis looping]] of effect from the acting I. 5) The ego unconscious enunciation, it is to be found here in the source of aggressivity toward oneS(Q's counterpart in the master-slave relation. C) The master-slave struggle is one of pure prestige. 1 .. Its stake», life itself, echoes 'the danger and read as: signifier of our specif!c a [[prematuritylack in the Other]] at birth, a. which is inherent in its very function as the dynamic basis treasure of specular capturethe signifier. 2) " The pact shock of this formulation is Soon mitigated when we are told that defines the relation of master and slave requires "lack referred to here is indeed that the loser not perish, a) thus showing which I have alrea:dy formulated: that the pact precedes the [[violencethere is no Other of the Other]]" (1977, bp. and that "the symbolic dominates the imaginary." 3316/818) [[Murder]] is not the absolute Master, a) for we must distinguish between physical death, b. and the death brought This says nothing about in language. 4) We have repressed the truth existence or nonexistence of the cunning of reason, a) whose lure makes us think the slave's work and renunci1ation of Jouissance through some higher being as specified in any particular [[fearreligion]] of death - all it says is his way to [[freedom]]. b) In fact that the slave's Jouissance lies in waiting for the master's death, c) for the obsessional installs himself Other is not grounded in the place any order of the Other. D) Philosophers must take seriously Freud's views on deSIresignifiers beyond itself. 1) They should not be misled by current psychoanalytic practice a) which wrongly emphasizes demand and [[frustration]]

384 LACAN AND LANGUAGE b) and reduces what Freud discovered Proceeding to repressed wishesexplain this enigmatic formula, Lacan focuses directly on the signifier of the Other-as-Iacking. 2) Demand introduces incompatibility into Taking it in [[needslinguistic]]terms, a) for every demand must he tells us: "[[pass]] through the defiles My definition of the a signifier." 3(there is no other) Man's dependence is maintained by as follows: a universe of languagesignifier is that which represents the . subject for another signifier" (1977, ap. 316/819) whereby needs have passed into . In the register case of desire. 4) Even the [[sexual functionding]] bears the mark of an unnatural split. VI. The coordinates of the Oedipus complex come down to the question: "What subject, for example, this subject is represented in its spoklfn discourse by a Father?" A) For Freud it is the dead Father. 1) Lacan considers this signifier that, in terms place of "The Name-of-theFatherthe speaking I," a) calling attention relates to other signifiers in the paternal functionself-referential signifying chain. Here, however, b) which there is not a [[cultural]]-anthropological notion, as some analysts believe. 2) We embark from question of the notion subject of the Other unconscious as the place of such. Hence, the signifier. a) No authoritative statement can find a guarantee outside of itself, b) and we look in vain for another signifier outside of this placequestion, for a S(Q'» will be "[[metalanguage]]," c. the signifier for "there is no Other of which all the other signifiers represent the Other." 3) The Law's authority subject: that is represented by the Father. a) We must specify how he becomes present beyond the Motherto say, who really occupies the place of in the Other. b) Rather than focusing on demand as a [[request]] for [[loveabsence]]of this signifier, we concentrate on desireall the other signifiers represent nothing" (1977, c) for man's desire finds form as desire of the Otherp. G316/819) By representing need, man's [[subjective]] opacity produces the substance of desire.

SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 385 A) Desire The [[whole]] battery of signifiers, then, is outlined in the margin where demand separates itself from needcomplete and self-contained. 1) Demand If this particular signifier is characterized by an unconditional ap- peal to be distinguished among the Otherrest, a) thereby introducing [[anxiety]] insofar as desire cannot it will have to be by some mark that will not [[satisfiedseparate]]it from the other signifiers, and Lacan chooses the sign - 1. If this signifier, with its corresponding signified, _ btogether yields the "statement" (enonce) as well as introducing articulated by the [[phantom]] subject of the Other's omnipotence. 2) This unconscious, then a simple [[phantasmalgebraic]] of operation will yield the Other'result: s omnipotence must be checked by the mediation of the Law. 3(unconscious statement) This mediation originaequals J ~es in desire's i-an [[reversalirrational]] of the unconditional demand for l<>ve, ~ a. which keeps the subject in subjection to the Other, \ b. and through this reversal desire instead becomes absolute and detached. I 4) [[Controlnumber]] over anxiety and detachment from the Other that is achieved by means of the transitional ob- ject. a) This object functions as an emblemotherwise quite "inexpressible, a "represen- tation of a [[representation]]even "unthinkable," b) with a place in if we try to _ think it on the unconscious structure level of the phantasm as [[cause of desire]]conscious Cartesian cogito. B) In relation If we are to desire1 conceive it at all, it is not so much will have to be in terms of the faded subject that man doesn't know what he demands, but where he desires. 1) The "unconscious is [ the] discourse of the Otherthrough its withdrawal," undergoes a. insofar kind of death and therefore resides in a, it is place "from the Other. 2) "Desire is ... the desire of the Other," which a. insofar as it [[voice]] is as Other that man desires. 3) The best path to heard clamouring 'the subject's own desire [[universe]] is the question of the Other, "What do you want?", a) provided he reformulates it defect in analysis as "What does the analyst want purity of me?Non-Being' " 4(1977, p. 317/820) The subject comes to see that what he desires is also what he denies. a) This negation reveals the meconnaissance whereby the subject transfers the permanence of his desire to an intermittent ego,

386 LACAN AND LANGUAGE ----\ b. and in turn protects himself from his desire by attributing Apparently this intermittent quality place to which the speaking I withdraws is where itcan experience a form of boundlessness that Lacan calls [[jouissance]]. C) In analysis The term, though it has appeared in previous essays, has not been thematized heretofore, and we link the structure of the fantasy have very little data to the condition of an objecthelp us understand its nature. 1) In the structure of the unconscious fantasy (~Oo) the subject We are told that jouissance is eclipsed. a) This usually experienced as "fading[[forbidden]]" is linked to the subject's condition as split by his subordination to the signifier(1977, p. 2317/820) The fantasy - not because of "a bad arrangement of [[structuressociety]] desire just as the image ," nor because of the body structures the ego. 3) The fantasy is the "stuff" some fault of the I Other (as primordially repressedif it existed), nor because of a) because in the consequence of some "original sin"fading' of discourse the I can only be indicated(1977, not signifiedp. D317/820) We now turn to . Rather, jouissance is limited by an interdiction imposed by the signifying chain in its unconscious statusLaw. 1) We have been asking about what supports take this to mean that when the subject of enters into the unconscioussymbolic order, a) since it is difficult to designate him as speaking subject of a statement i. e., when he doesn't even know that he speaks. 2) Hence arises the subject submits to the law of the signifier and becomes barred through [[conceptprimal repression]] of drive as an organic registration all , the more removed from speaking subject must accept the consequences of his [[finitude]] that are never more he speaks. 3) Drive (~OD) can be situated in relation to the treasure of the signifiers (S[q)[apparent]]) and linked with diachronic articulation than in demand. a) It is what comes to pass from demand when the subject vanishes there. 4) Demand too disappears but the cut limits imposed upon jouissance (coupure) remaIns1977, a) for the cut distinguishes the 'drive from the physical function it inhabitsp. b319/821) This cut is the drive's "[[grammatical]] artifice" as seen in the reversions of the drive's articulation to its source as to its objects.

SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 387 E) The "[[erogenous zone]]" is what In any case, this lets us see that the drive isolates from limitations of jouissance are closely connected with the metabolism barring of the organic functionsubject in primal repression. 1) The erogenous zone is delimited by a cut that is supported by the anatomical trait of a border-lip, rim, tip, etc. 2) This trait of a cut is also evidept in Since these are intimately connected with the [[part-objectscastration complex]] described in analytic theory, a. but they are partial i. not in relation to the whole body •ii. but to the function that produces them (the drive-fantasy that structures desire). /-~ 3. These objects have no it would be [[alterityimpossible]], \ 'a. that is, they can't be seen in to exaggerate the mirror as par- tial. b) This allows them to function importance of this complex as the "stuff" or lining structural of the subject of consciousness" (1977, c) who cannot arrive at himself by designating himself in his statementp. 4318/ 820) It is this "invisible" object that receives a shadowsubstance from the reflection in the mirror. VIII. The drive-fantasy that structures desire is an unconscious enunciation. A) This unconscious enunciation loops back on the signifier of With r~gard to it, Lacan suggests a lack in second meaning for the Other: S(q). 1) This lack is intrinsic to its function as term "subversion"treasure of the signifiersubject." 2) The Other must answer for In the castration complex we find the value major mainspring of this treas- ure, a) the very subversion that I am trying to articulate here by responding from means of its place in the lower dialectic" (verbal) chain1977, b) as well as in the unconscious signification constituting the upper chainp. 3) This lack is formulated as: "There is no Other of the Other." a318/ 820) This implies nothing about a transcendent Other of religion.

388 LACAN AND LANGUAGE B) The lack in Castration involves a sacrifice of the Other parallels a lack in phallus, "image of the Ipenis. 1) A signifier " We must distinguish, however, "between the principle of sacrifice, which is what represents symbolic, and [[the subject for another signifier. a) The signifier imaginary]] function that is devoted to that principle of the Other-as-Iacksacrifice, S((j)but which, thereforeat the same time, stands for masks the finite other to whom fact that it [the subject is represented by all other signifiers. b) Remove this signifier of imaginary function] gives it [the ensemble principle] its [[instrument]] [of the Other's treasuresacrifice]" (1977, and all the other signifiers would represent nothingp. c319/822) Since the ensemble of signifiers forms a complete battery, . We take this signifier cannot be outside to mean that Lacan wants to distinguish clearly between the ensemble but is only a line phallus as symbolic ( - 1hereafter [[capital]] Phi [<P]) inherent in the ensemble. dand as image (hereafter small phi [<t>]) Although this signifier cannot be pronounced, its effects are present whenever a proper noun is spoken. 2) An algebraic transformation According to our understanding of this signifier's role in discourse yields the algorithm of matter, the phallus as imaginary is (on the subject's lack in signification: 1-= 1 . a[[psychic]] level) This is the unthinkable aspect bond with the Source of All, which, like the subjectumbilical cord, b) present as "defective must be severed in order to enter into human existence in the sea symbolic order (though at the cost of proper nouns," c. and whose origin is problematic. 3 . We cannot question the subject as I for he does not know if he irreparable [[existsloss]]of jouissance). As image, a) since the phallus forms part of the body schema perceived in the [[wordspecular image]] "I" can designatethat, with equal rigorfor Lacan as well as for Freud, "is the channel taken by the transfusion of the dreamer or dead man dreamt. b) The Otherbody's existence, however, can be demonstrated in love. 4) The place of I is [[libido]] towards the place ofjouissanceobject" and serves as paradigm for fantasy (1977, a. whose constriction enervates Being, b, and whose absence makes everything emptyp. c319/822) Its lack makes the Other incomplete. d) We tend to believe it is usually forbidden to us because of the defect of the Other or because of original sin.

SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 389 IX .. What Freud teaches regarding the castration complex is no myth. A) In this complex lies the basis of the subversion that we are attempting to articulate. 1) Freud's discovery The detachability of the castration complex cannot phallus may be ignored by any thinking abo1J.t understood in a broad sense, for insofar as the subject. aphallus is erectile (hence also detumescent and in that way "detachable") Contemporary psychoanalysis, however, makes use of it may be experienced as "[[lacking]]" to avoid any thinking about it, b) and thereby has become subservient to general psychology . 2or "negatived" in, This bone of contention which structures the subject has been avoided by all thoughtbody image (1977, pp. This is why we lead our students over the disconcerting terrain of the disjunction between the imag319- inary and the symbolic320/822). B) The notion As a result of mana is not equivalent to this [[negative]] quality, it bears a certain affinity with the signifier negativity of the lack in the Other, Ssignifier ((j). - 1) This signifier is not founded in as with the inadequacy negavity of societyits signification (, a,';--=-1) nor is it equivalent to Levi-. Since "the erectile [[Straussorgan]]' notion of zero comes to [[symbolsymbolize]]. 2) It signifies, rather, what is lacking to this zero symbol, a) and can be written as ~- -= -1 , b. or as the "i" in the theory place of complex numbers. C) What we must hold to is that jouissance ," there is prohibited to the a [[speakernatural]] as such. 1) It can be spoken only correlation between the lines for one who is subject to phallus imagined as castratable and the Lawlimitation of jouissance, a) since by reason of which the Law grounds itself in this very prohibi- tion. 2. The Law itself does not bar the subject from jouis- ~3. '-- sance, a. but it does create a barred subject. 3) erectile organ may be said to "[[Concretebind]] [nouer] the [pleasure[prohibition]] sets limits to of jouissance" (1977, ap. 320/822) until pleasure, in turn, is structured by the laws of [[primary process]].

390 LACAN AND LANGUAGE 4) In his notion The transformation of the "[[pleasure principle]]" Freud was not merely echoing a traditional [[idea]], phallus as imaginary and detachable ( - ¢) {implying acastration equally imaginary) otherwise his notion of into \ the castration complex would not have been spurned. b. For this anomalous idea indicates phallus as symbolic (<P) is a step forward in the infinity emergence of jouissance the subject and in that comports sense "positive," even though it may be correlated with the mark filling up of its prohibitionsome lack (1977, cp. a mark that involves the sacrifice of the phallus. D320/823) The phallus is chosen and, as symbol signifier of this sacrificethe Other's desire, 1) because the image of signifies the penis as detachable denotes negativity lack in the specular imageOther. 2) We must distinguish between symbolic castration as principle of sacrificeHowever that may be, a. and the imaginary castration that veils it. E) The imaginary function presides over the narcissistic investment of objects. 1) The specular image is invested in this way by the transfusion phallus brings into play some kind of object on the body's libido, a) but part level of it remains focuse~ on the penis, b) giving rise fantasy that Lacan refers to the fantasy of its detachability, cas [[objet]] a. and How this may be understood admits of part-objectsvarious [[interpretations]]. F) The erect penis symbolizes the place After scrutinizing relative [[texts]] in Lacan, Lemaire suggests two possible ways of jouissance, 1) not as an image or physical organ, a. but as what understanding the desired image [[lacksobjet a]]. 2) Thus : the erectile organ is equivalent first sense would be to the algorithm )~ -1. 3) The erectile organ knots the prohibition of jouissance not take objet a as imaginary form but as symbolic structure, a) with "the consequence that lust is reduced first image to fill in the brevity crack of auto-[[eroticismseparation]]. 4) The lineaments " from the mother, hence necessarily referring to the phallus "in the symbolic sense of the body offer a path to wisdom for somehyphen, par excellence, of the impossible unification" with her that in the separation is severed; asecond (broader) but Freud does not promote sense would take objet a as the "representative of the object of lack," i.e., "the [[techniquemetonymic]] of the body. b) Otherwise analytic practice would not induce [[guiltobject of desire]]" (1970, p. 174).

SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 391 c) which appears As a case in point, an example of objet a would be the contrast between "inestimable treasure" that in [[Plato]]'s [[auto-eroticismSymposium]] [[Alcibiades]] fantasizes as contained in hidden fashion within [[Socrates]] and desire. G) The passage from Recall how Alcibiades had projected onto Socrates the imaginary to ideal of the symbolic is here indicated"perfect master" (1977, p. 1323/826). The Yet because Socrates refuses to respond to any of his advances, Alcibiades fantasies Socrates as deprived of the [[imaginary absent phallus ]] ( - ct» becomes the . /' symbolIc phallus (<1», a) signifier of the lack and in the Other b. which cannot be negated. X) The structure of unconscious fantasy sheds light on perversion and that sense as "[[neurosiscastrated]]," hence, "ideal Master" or not, as "completely imaginarized. Y) Perversion emphasizes " This does not make Socrates any less "the function object of desire in ," however, for, like "the man . . ~ 1. In[[woman]] concealed behind her [[veil]], it is the case absence of perversion in the man, dominance I / \ comes to occupy penis that turns her into the place of jouissancephallus, a) dominance over the ' object ° of the fantasy that he substitutes for the lack in the Other: Sdesire" (01977, p. 322/825). 2) Perversion adds We understand this to it mean that the imaginary phaVus (ct» which involves the Other [[absent]] penis in a particular way, a. whereby the woman makes her desirable tothe subject becomes the tool of the Oth- , i.e. er s )OUlSSance. B) In , the neurotic there is an identification of <I> and D, object of the Othersubject's lack and his demand. 1) Therefore desire, in the sense that, not having the demand of phallus, she can now be the Other takes on phallus for/to him, i.e., the function object of object his desire. Phallus in his fantasythis case, however, a. so that his fantasy is reduced to obviou"sly used in the drive symbolic sense (5 OD)<I» as signifier of desire or oflack. 2Similarly, Socrates remains the "symbolic" phallus for Alcibiades, even though (or rather precisely because) This emphasis given by the neurotic to demand hides his anxiety about the desire he is castrated of the Otherimaginary phallus ( - 1». In all this, Lacan claims that Alcibiades (though he may well be alecher and a lush) We see anxiety clearly when it "is certainly not a neurotic," for he is ''par excellence [one] who desires," i.e., is covered by the phobic objectin touch with his own desire. 3) If we understand Socrates, "the fantasy as desire precursor of psychoanalysis," is shrewd enough to discern the Other we can also understand the anxiety true focus of the hysteric and the obsessional. a) The obsessional denies the Alcibiades' desire , "object of the Other by [[structuringtransference]]," i.e., [[Agathon]] his fantasy so that (1977, p. 323/825-826), insofar as he emphasizes the matches (as [[impossibilityhomosexual]] of vanishing as subject. bobject) The obsessional has a basic need to stand the object in Alcibiades' unconscious fantasy, the place of object marked by the Other- 1> "as castrated" (1977, p. 323/825). ''

392 LACAN AND LANGUAGE SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 393 b) In the case of the hysteric, desire is maintained by the [[dissatisfaction]] introduced when he conceals himself as object, i. ,as evidenced in the [[denial]] present in hysterical intrigue. C) The neurotic's fantasy includes the idealized Father as Image. 1) He stands beyond the Mother, the real Other of demand, a) for the subject wishes she would abate her desire, b. and wants a Father who can ignore desire. 2) This fantasy calls attention to the Father's true function, a) which is not to oppose but to unite a desire with the Law. 3) The Father sought by For the neurotic is therefore the dead Father, a) who would perfectly master his desire, b. for this is what the subject~seeks. 4) The analyst must show a calculated variability in his [[neutrality]], a) and preserve the [[imaginary dimension]] of his necessary imperfection through his ignorance of the case, b. or else the transference may be interminable. D) In perversion the subject imagines he is the Other to guarantee his Jouissance. 1) But in perversion desire is a [[defense]] setting a [[limit]] on )OUlSSance. 2) The neurotic imagines himself to be a [[pervert]] to make sure of the existence of the Other. a) This pretended perversion lies in the neurotic's unconscious as fantasy of the Other. V) The structure of the fantasy (S 00) contains the imaginary function of castration ( - ¢). 1) This function same issue is hidden and alternatively makes imaginary one or the other of the terms of the unconscious fantasy. 2) A woman's clothing, veiling the absence of the penis, transforms her into the phallus, the object of desire. 3) Because Socrates does not show his penis to Alcibiades, he becomes castrated in fantasy, a) and thereby can be the phallus. b) But Socrates sees that Alcibiades perceives his desired object as castrated, and so directs the fo- ~ eus to the handsome Agathon. / F.\ In the neurotic the - ¢ slips under the S of the uncon- ( scious fantasy. 1) This, reinforces the [[imagination]] proper to it, that of the ego, a) for the neurotic's lifelong imaginary castration supports this strong ego. b) It is beneath this ego that the neurotic covers the castration that he denies but clings to. 2) The neurotic refuses to sacrifice his castration to the Jouissance of the Other who, he thinks, would be served by it. a) He wants to preserve his [[difference]] as a wantto-be, b) while imagining that the Other demands his castration. G) Castration in all cases regulates desire - normal or abnormal. 1) By oscillating between the Sand 0 of the fantasy, castration turns it into a supple unconscious chain, a) whose fantasized object guarantees the Jouissance of the Other, b. which transmits this chain to me in the Law. 2) To confront the Other is to experience not only his demand but his willstraightforward. ~

394 LACAN AND LANGUAGE a) In response one can become an object or a mummy, b) Or one can fulfill When the will to castration inscribed in the Other. c) The extreme form of this subject is the hero's narcissistic death for a lost cause. 3. Castration means that jouissance must be denied. NOTES TO THE TEXT 293c1794 The phrase, "a subject of science" (un split through [[sujetprimary repression]] de la science) refers to the scientist. 293e1794 Instead of "while presenting no danger to the praxis itself," we translate "while not being without danger for the practice itself" (pour netre sans danger pour la praxis elle-mbne5). 293i1795 "At a second stage" (De second [[temps]]) suggests that general psychology is an offshoot of the broader field of general science just discuss,ed. 294c/795 Rather than "We must take as our standard here the idea" for Il faut ici prendre etalon de l'idee, we translate: "We must here take stock of the idea." Lacan goes on to show that the notion of "state of knowledge" is not a standard for thought. 294e1795 Hegelneurotic's Aufhebung was briefly defined earlier (see note 46f)• For an extended discussion, the reader is referred to Lauer's treatment of negation (1976, pp. 29, 35ff.) and to Hyppolite (1946, pp. 13-15). The word "noophoric" implies bearing or begetting understanding. 294h1795 A simple misprint in the [[English]] has "hynoid" instead of "hypnoid" (hypnoi'des). The meaning of "fruitful moments" is unclear; it may have to do with the way the ego in paranoiac knowledge projects its own attributes onto things (as discussed earlier [1977, p. 17/111]).  295a1796 295e1796 295]1796 295g1797 ~ ~1797 296e1798 297e1799 SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 395 The phrase "it says why" (il dise pourquoi) suggests the familiar discourse of the child. Freud's reference to Copernicus was discussed earlier (see note 165d/516). After Copernicus the privilege is not "consigned to it," referring back to "our subject" of the preceding paragraph, but is, on the confrary, "excluded" from it (retegue), namely, the privilege of having the earth in the central place. The ecliptic is the circle cut out by the plane containing the orbit of the earth around the sun, which is inclined to the plane of the equator by an angle of approximately 23°. The title of Copernicus' famous work is De revolutionibus orbium coelestium ("On the Revolutions of Heavenly Spheres"). The "ellipse" suggests the shape of the graphs that follow in Lacan's text. The doctrine of double truth was a theological vehicle aimed at preserving the "truth" of a literal [[reading]] of the scriptures while acknowledging the "truth" of . the findings of the science of [[astronomy]]. The Scholastic "[[antinomy]]" is unclear; perhaps it has to do with the relationship between esse remains strong and essentia, the principle of "existence" whereby a being exists and that of "essence" whereby it has a determinate structure. Lacan interprets Hegel as viewing such a [[distinction]] as spurious. Rather than "the suspension of a corpus of knowledgeessentially imaginary itself," we translate suspension d'un savoir as "the suspension of knowing," a mere interruption on the dialectical path to absolute knowing. The allusion to Freud's title, with single quotation marks functions in the English highlighting "discontents of civilization," varies from the French which has simply malaise de la civilization ("the discontentment of civilization") without quotation marks. /  396 LACAN AND LANGUAGE 297]/799 The "judicial [[astrologyimaginary order]] in which the [[psychologist]] dabbles" appears to refer to a predictive psychology that makes judgments of people. Lacan's reference to Aquinas is puzzling, for Aquinas, as far as we know, does not use the word inconscius. He does speak, from time to time, about one who is not conscious (non conscius) of something and about beings that lack cognition (non cognoscentia), but such usage simply denotes the negation of conscious knowledge. The "protopathic" is related to cutaneous sensory reception that is responsive only to gross stimuli. 297 g/799 The French for "breaks" is coupures ("cuts"), a word that will receive repeated emphasis in the essay. 298a/799 Geneva and Petrograd refer, respectively, to the work of [[Saussure]] and J akobson. For a succinct and remarkably lucid history of modern linguistics, see [[Jakobson]] (1973). 299a/800 The example of equivocatioh involved here was used earlier by Lacan (1977, p. 269/634). The French for "from which I eye them" is dont je les toise, continuing the play of words. 299d/801 In Heidegger Being'spresencing comes to pass through [[Dasein]]'s [[openness]] to the Being of beings. 29ge/801 Rather than "There the subject that interests us is surprised," we translate "There the subject who is of interest to us catches himself" ("La se surprend Ie sujet qui nous interesse"). The "sign of the pre-conscious" appears to refer to the way [[latent]] significations appear in homophonic resonances (as exemplified in the example of tue). Rather than "if the session itself were not instituted" for si la seance elle-meme ne s'instituait, we take the ne not as a negative but as denoting emphasis (in the mode Lacan has just exemplified phallus on p. 298e/800)  SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 397 and therefore translate, "if the session itself were instituted." [[Mallarme]]'s metaphor of the worn coin was alluded to in the "Discourse at Rome" (1977, p. 43g/ 251). 299]/801 Instead of "by making 'holes' in the meaning of the determinants of its discourse," the translation should read "by making holes in meaning the determinants of its discourse" ("a faire des trous du sens les determinants de son [[discours]]"). 300cl801 For the double sense of the imperfect tense in French, ~ see Guillaume (1968). It should be remarked that I Lacan's tortured version of the [[future]] sense of the imperfect (ily etait d'avoir puy hre [1966, p. 840]) admits of rio convenient counterpart in English. Colloquial English would accept a future imperfect such as "another minute and I was dead," but this is at best a hasty abbreviation of what in [[formal]] English would be " ... I would have been dead." This raises the question as to whether Freud's [[German]] war has any more flexibility than the English "was," and if not, whether Lacan is [[interpreting]] Freud here by saying (however ingeniously) what Freud did not say, perhaps could not say. If this turned out to be the case, the implications for Lacan's entire hermeneutic of Freud would be far-reaching. The French does not have quotes around 1. Freud's relevant text in German reads: "das der Vater doch schon gestorben war und es nur nicht wusste" (1911b, p. 238). Lacan's sentence, "He did not know that he was deadlevel," is therefore a paraphrase of the text in Freud (1911a), which presents the dream as follows: "his father was alive once more and he was talking to him in his usual way. But he felt it exceedingly painful that his father had really died, only without knowing it" (p. 225). Freud interpolates "that 300e-i/ 802  398 LACAN AND LANGUAGE his father had really died" (as also the dreamer wished) and "without knowing it" (that the dreamer wished it). Lacan is comparing the status castration of the father as dead subject with the status of the dreamer as subject of the unconscious. The dead father achieves presence in the words of the dreamer while the "I" of the dreamer necessarily recedes from the dream's discourse and therefore undergoes a kind of death "there where it was" (la au c'etait); between the place of unconscious desire (for the death of the father) and the enunciation of the dream, 1 fade. 301b/802 This sentence should read: "And to show that there is no firmer root [for the distinction between the Freudian and Hegelian subjects and their relation to knowing] than the modes in which the dialectic of desire becomes conspicuous" ("Et qu'il n'en est pas de plus sure racine que les modes dont s'y distingue la [[dialectique]] du desir"). 301h/803 The "margin beyond life" assured by language (Ie [[langage]]) would seem to refer to~the way the symbolic order dominates and structures human existence, from the name and kinship relation present before birth to the gravesite, legends, and judgments that follow one after death. The theme is a repeated one (1977, p. 68/279), but here specific attention is drawn to the way in which body parts can serve as signifiers (that is, go beyond their function in the living body), with the phallus as preeminent signifier with which the body as a whole comes to be identified and which also functions "as that in which being is at stake" (comme enjeu de l'etre). 301 i/803 The French word derive means "drift" or "leeway" and is related to derivation, literally a "de-banking," which was discussed earlier (in note 259h/623). 302d/804 To be more precise, the French text reads "the real of the body and of the equally imaginary of its [[mental]] schema"  SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 399 ("Ie reel du [[corps]] et de l'[[imaginaire]] de son schema mental"). 303b/805 We do not pretend to have an exact comprehension of these graphs as they grow in complexity. What begins here as a relatively intelligible presentation of the structure of the speaking subject becomes multileveled, as Lacan introduces the discoursing ego (p. 306/808), the unconscious fantasy (p. 313/815), and the discourse of drive in neurosis (p. 315/817). The many arrows and shifts in direction suggest how the subjectneurotic' is channeled in criss-cross fashion among these many levels and between the various poles at ~ach level (ego [e] and specular image [i(o)], diachroI ny [s(O)] and synchrony [0], the unconscious fantasy [S 00] and desire [d], the Other as lacking [S( (]»)] and drive [SOD]). We shall attempt to say something about each of these terms as they come up in the text, though here, even more than elsewhere, a satisfactory explanation of their import must await the publication of the seminars in which these [[formulas]] were developed. The reader's attention is called to the comments of the French editor on these graphs (1977, pp. 334-335/907-908). With respect to the symbol (~), Pontalis (1958) describes it as "that by which the human subject, in its essence as problematic subject, is situated in a certain relationship with the signifier" (p. 253). 303c1805 Wilden (1968, p. 275) argues that this "retroactive effect" is what Lacan means by the subject receiving his own message back from the Other in inverted form. Lacan seems relation to confirm this: "it is from the Other that the subject receives even the message that he emits" (1977, p. 305b/807). 304b/806 The "four-cornered [[game]]" echoes the earlier use of bridge to illustrate the relation of subject to analyst (1977, p. 229-230/589-590) and also echoes the structure of schemas L (p. 193/548) and R (p. 197/ 553). This raises the question whether we have to in-  400 LACAN AND LANGUAGE elude in these graphs a dialogue in process (i.e., between two subjects) "if the subsequent [[construction]] must be dependent on it." 304c1806 Since the signifier's treasure appears to lie in its phonemic structure as reciprocally distinctive features, and the [[code]] is limited to "the univocal correspondence of a sign with something," it seems inappropriate to speak of "the code's treasure"; the French text allows us to translate instead "the locus of the signifier's treasure, which does not mean [the locus] of the code" ("Ie lieu du tresor du [[signifiant]], ce qui ne veut pas [[dire]] du code"). 304e/806 Lacan elsewhere (1959) speaks of the "hole in the real" caused by the death of another (pp. 37-38). We recall, again, that language is "the murder of [[the thing]]" (1977, p. 104/319), since the brute facticity of objects is negated by words where objects come to have a presence in absence, a presence that is hidden in the synchronic ensemble of the storehouse of language, but is expressed in articulated diachronic speech in which desire is channeled from lack to [[substitute]] objects. 304g-h/ Lacan seems to be saying that the previous [[topology]] 806 of the square, in which subject is related to the Other, must be modified ("such a squaring is impossible"), since we must subtract the subject from his discourse and therefore the more appropriate notation is "the barred subject" (55), while the emphasis shifts to the structure of the self-referential discourse (expressed in the various loops of the graphs). 305a/807 Rather than "and to make it function as a lack" for et ny faire [[fonction]] que de [[manque]], we translate "and to only function there as a lack," referring to the subject's role in the signifying battery. 305b/807 Hegel uses the phrase "the absolute Master" when discussing the slave's experience of the fear of death: "denn es hat die Furcht des Todes, des absoluten SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 401   305c1807 305d/807 306b307c1 808-809 Herrn, empfunden" (1807b, p. 148; 1807a, p. 237). In coming close to death, the slave experiences the true nature of self-consciousness as absolute negativity. Lacan here puts the symbolic order, as affording a "margin beyond life" (see the earlier note 301h/803), in a place prior to death and operative in death. The symbolic order as Other is not reducible to a code and is the foundation for the message which constitutes the subject. The English is misleading: rather than "in the message, since it is from this code that the subject is constituted," we translate "in the message, since it is from it he imagines that the subject is constituted" ("dans Ie message, puisque c'est de lui que Ie sujet se constitue"). The notation "0" would then represent the Other as synchronic [[system]], while "s(O)" would be the articulated, diachronic message, with the arrows in Graph II (1977, p. 306/808) suggesting the circular movement between them, i.e., that articulated sentences borrow words from the storehouse of Janguage and "that it is from the Other that the subject receives even the message that he emits." The dominant position of the symbolic order is emphasized again when Lacan goes on to discuss the master-slave dialectic in more detail (p. 308/810). The reference is to Lacan's earlier essay on Schreber (1977, pp. 184-187/537-540). Pretending to pretend is illustrated by Freud's [[jokedemands]], mentioned by Lacan (1977, p. 173b/525). In grappling with this passage, we can try to make tentative sense in the following way. Just as the child's first words in the Fort! Da! moment lead to separation from the mother, the "first words spoken" here appear to be the mother's words conferring a sym- bolic identification upon the infant through naming. The trait una ire we take to be a scratch mark or line observed on prehistoric artifacts, which functions as an inchoative signifier opening up all the potentiali-  402 307d/809 LACAN AND LANGUAGE ties of the symbolic order, making possible primary repression, and differentiating the subject from objects by mediating his relationships to them. (In a later [[seminar]] [1964] Lacan refers to notch marks used to count kills [po 141 D. The mother's act of naming achieves inchoative differentiation of mother and child and puts in place the ego ideal as the primary [[symbolic identification]]. Since all naming and symbolic identification is a function of the [[Law of the Father]] (the law oflanguage), this earliest moment in which the "first words" are spoken involves an eventual barring of the subject, and acknowledgment of a lack in both mother and infant, and a kind of anticipated castration (see the discussion of the "[[paternal metaphor]]" in Chapter 6, specifically note 199i/557). The trait [[unaire]], then, would be a foreshadowing of symbolic castration (trait is repeated later in the context of the Other-as-lacking [1977, p. 316f-g323/819D. It is the observable mark that "fills out" (cambler826), i.e., gives form to, "the invisi~le mark the subject derives from the signifier," i.e., the mark of primary represSIOn. Once the mirror stage is entered, the ego ideal (taken here to refer to primary symbolic identification) is overlaid by the [[ideal ego]] (mai ideal), that "function of mastery" that develops from the narcissistic identification with the reflected specular image (as discussed earlier But in Chapters 1 and 2). Lacan now adds to the graph the structure of the discoursing ego. The [[his imaginary identification]] with the image of the other (i[ aD leads to the development of the ego (e), and this process of ego development is "doubly articulated" - first in struggle against an aborted manner (the "short circuit" from S to 1[0], pertaining to the primary symbolic identification), second as excluded from articulated speech (the relation between dia-  308b/810 308d-e/ 810 308f/ 810-811 SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 403 chrony [s(O)] and synchrony [0]). The ego is not present in articulated speech as the I who speaks but rather is associated to the I who speaks by a kind of displacement, hence as the "metonymy of its signification." Earlier the ego was called "the metonymy of desire" (see note 274g/640), which is channeled in signification. The work of Damourette and Pichon (19111940) is an exhaustive study of the expression of negation in French. Rather than "this initial enslavement ... of the 'roads to freedom,' "we prefer to translate, "[T]his enslavement ushering in the ways of freedom" ("Cette servitude inaugurale des chemins de la liberte'). The irony suggested by the translator's use of single quotes does not appear warranted in our text. The structuring of the imaginary order appears quite necessary before full entrance into the symbolic order is possible. The scenario for the master-slave dialectic, the reciprocal roles of master and slave, is prescripted in the symbolic order, which has a dominant function over the imaginary struggle. We must therefore distinguish between physical death "which is brought by life" and the symbolic death "which brings life." The signifier is the murder of the thing; hence symbolic death is the symbolic castration requisite for [[participation]] in the symbolic order. Hegel (1807a) writes: In the master, the bondsman feels self-existence neurotic fails to be something [[external]], an [[objective]] fact; [bu t] in fear [of death] self-existence is present within himself [i.e., in appreciate the slave]; in fashioning the thing [in work], self-existence comes to be felt explicitly as his own proper being, and he attains the consciousness that he himself exists in its own right and on its own account [po 239].  404 30ge/811 310f/813 310g/813 311a/813 311g-k/ 814 LACAN AND LANGUAGE The obsessional, who toils in anticipation genuine role of the master's death, does not achieve liberation in this way, for he installs himself in the master's place (in imagination), assumes a kind of immortality through outlasting him, and lives and works not in the present but in that anticipated future moment. The French text does not say "repressed desires," but rather "repressed wishes" (des envies rentrees). Rather than translating "artificially inseminating [[women]] who have broken the [[phallic]] bounds," we translate "artificially inseminating women in [by or through] rupturing the phallic order" ("d'inseminer artificiellement les femmes en rupture du ban phallique"). [[Tragedy]] assumes a universe in which there is some kind of underlying [[harmony]] or order. In "[[Some Reflections on the Ego]]" (1951), Lacan wrote: It may well be that the oedipus complex, the cornerstone of analysis, which plays so essential a part in normal p'sycho-social development, , represents in our [[culture]] the vestigial relics of the relationships by means of which earlier communities were able for centuries to ensure the [[psychological]] mutual interdependence essential to the [[happiness]] of their members [po 17] . The "gap" referred to in the English is that there is no Other of the Other; no one can presume to stand outside the symbolic order phallus and have authority over it. Once again, a very tentative reformulation: Demand becomes separated from need in the margin of the "defiles of the signifier" (1977, p. 309/811), i.e., as articulated. In this margin desire takes .form as channeled and structured by the laws of language operative in the concrete statement of a demand. Demand is an appeal for unconditional love from the  SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 405 Other. Embedded in this appeal is the articulation of desire, which has no [[universal]] object of [[satisfaction]] - and this condition of impossible satisfaction is called anxiety. Since the Other is addressed as capable of providing this satisfaction, the Other takes on a fantasized omnipotence vis-a.-vis the subject, which sets up the [[necessity]] (la necessite, woefully translated in this context as "the need") for its curbing by the Law. The function of the Law ( of language) as mediation between subject and the omnipotent Other originates in desire (for desire presupposes the structure of primary repression, symbolic castration, and as the "cut" or differentiating [[power]] price of symbolic articulation). Desire then enables the subject to transcend "the unconditional nature any satisfactory relationship of the demand for love, in which the subject remains in subjection to the Other" (as omnipotent) by raising . We understand this unconditional nature satisfactory relationship to involve the power dialectic of an "absolute" condition, that is, a de- \~tached and differentiate? status. In its root meaning "absolute" (ab-solvere, "to loosen or to free") implies "detachment." Desire, then, comports a differentiation from the Other, initially achieved in the Fort.' Da.' moment (for the moment "in which desire becomes human is also that in which the child is [[born]] into language" [1977, p. 103/319]) bu~ prefigured by the [[transitional object]], an object that is on its way toward becoming a signifier. 31~815 We are told that the «eke vuoi?" is taken from Diable amoureux (1772), a novel by the French through reciprocal [[authorrecognition]], Jacques Cazotte (1719-1792). 313c-d/ The English translation is misleading. Lacan com815-816 pletes the structure of the fantasy not by linking it to the condition of an object, but rather by linking in it the moment of a "fading" to the condition of an object: y liant ... a la condition d'un objet ... le moment d'un fading. The fading or barred subject is tied to an ob-  406 LACAN AND LANGUAGE ject in fantasy (SOo), and this appears to serve as substitute object inciting desire (d)Other. In other words, but incapable of [[satisfying]] it. Regarding the sign (0) in the formula, Lacan comments on its meaning elsewhere (1977, p. 280, n. 26/634, n. 1). Clement (1981, pp. 206-207) provides a helpful interpretation of the poinfon (Lacan's symbol 0 that [[links]] the barred subject to the [[object a]] [0] and to demand [D]). She makes two points: first, that the poinfon ("stamp"), not unlike the mark on French coins that guarantees authenticity, is that feature of the subject's implication in his or her unconscious fantasy that marks it as his or her own, that "authenticates" if the fantasy as mine. Second, she sees neurotic played out the symbol as a combination scenario of the [[mathematical]] [[symbols]] for "less than" «) and "greater than" (> ); such a combination, of course, is contradictory \ and thus the fantasy is marked as impossible. \ 313e1816 The French has a (for [[autre]]) in the formula. In terms of "the phonematic element," we wonder about a play classic oedipal stereotype on the letter a as first letter of the alphabet, as element of the Fort! DaI, etc. 314b/816 The graph indicates parallel levels, both participating in the [[imaginary register]], wherein the specular image structures the ego in miconnaissance, i(o)-e, with a homologous relation wherein desire is regulated and disguised in the fantasy, d-(SOo). This completes the structure of the imaginary, "there where [not "and where"] the unconscious was itself' ("la ou s'etait l'inconscient"). 314c1816 Rather than "the grammatical 'I,' " the French text has "the grammatical ego" (Ie moi grammatical). In addition, there are no single quotes around the following I (de ceJe) that is primordially repressed (Primordialement reJoule). 314d/816 Our attention is now drawn to the unconscious signi-  SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 407 fying chain (structured not by the imaginary but by the symbolic order): this is the uppermost level, S(0)- (80 D), paralleling the level of conscious discourse, s(O)-O. 314J- The following is, once more, highly tentative: The 316a/817- formula for drive (pulsion) expresses a relationship 818 between the barred subject and demand (SOD). For the neurotic, Lacan tells us later (1977, p. 321/823), demand is identified with the lack in the Other; the signifier of this lack, taken abstractly, is S (0) while its concrete expression is CP, the symbolic phallus as signifier of the desire (hence lack) of the Other. The movement expressed in the topmost level of the com- p!eted graph would then seem failed utterly to be, in the neurotic: first, jouissance is necessarily lost when the signifier of the lack in the Other is installed in appreciate the symbolic order (unconscious to be sure) - that is, the Other is accepted as castrated and the jouissance of imaginary symbiosis as impossible - and then this lack is assumed to be a demand in which the subject is impli" cated in fantasy, S(0)-(5; 0 D). For the neurotic, "the demand of the Other assumes the function of an object in his [[phantasysignificance]]" - we recall the formula for fantasy is (5; 00) - and his fantasy, therefore, is "reduced to the drive (S 0 D)" (pof castration. 321/823). Since demand is a diachronic articulationIn any case, it has a what [[temporalanalytic experience]] duration and "disappears." In saying, "I want, I must have ... " the neurotic shows us is saying this in identification with the assumed lack in the Other (he is saying this in the place of the Other), and for him this demand is bound up with a [[part-object]] related to a [[bodily]] function. When Lacan states that "the cut remains," we take this to mean that the unconscious content of the drive whether in relation to body-part with which the subject is implicated remains structured ) /  408 LACAN AND LANGUAGE 316b-c1 818 [[linguistically]]normal or abnormal, i.e., in an unconscious signifying manner. This castration is not to say that the part-object in the drive is a signifier (the signifiers are in the demand which expresses the drive), "ondition for it remains related desire to a bodily functionbecome human. But the kind of bodily function relevant to drive, Lacan appears to be saying, is of a particular sort: it is marked by a cut, a pattern of opening and closing, a rhythmical discontinuity analogous to the gap In that differentiates signifiers. It is this "cut" that "distinguishes the drive from the organic function it inhabits" and opens a place for the advent of a signifier. Conceived in this way (albeit vague to us at the present time), the part-object involves a lack which has "no specular image," i.e., is not governed by the processes of reflection indigenous to the imaginary order. The lack, moreover, is camouflaged by the image returned by the mirror, which serves to buttress the ego in a fictional manner. The reference to Freud appears to be to his [[Three]] Essays on the Theory oj Sexuality (1905c), and to the variability among source, aim, and object in which "[[active]]" and "[[passive]]" modes are evident. Since we have been translating repondre de as "answer for," we do not read "the Other is required ... to respond to the value of this treasure," but rather "the Other is required ... to answer for the value of this treasure" ("lI'Autre est requis sense... de repondre de la valeur de ce tresor"). An alternative reading is that the Other is required to respond from the value of it "this treasure,governs" i.e., from the place of the signifiers. We have seen that the Other (0), on the level of conscious articulation, is the ensemble of phonematic features desire (1977, p. 304/806); at the level of unconscious signification, the Other is also barred, correlatively with the lack inherent in symbolic castration that makes symbolic [[exchange]] possible, and is desig-  \ SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 409 / nated by the signifier of a lack in the Other: S(0). The Other without a lack is the fantasized complete Other present in psychosis or symbiotic Jouissance. The Other "answers for" the value of its treasure (the storehouse of language) by responding (de repondre) from its place not only in the conscious chain, but also in the chain of unconscious signification that structures drive. In specifying the lack in the Other as "there is no Other of the Other," no [[claim]] is made about [[religious]] [[belief]], for as analysts "We have to answer for no ultimate truth" ("Nous n'avons a repondre d'aucune verite derniere"). ) 316j- It is striking that the transposition into English of 317b/819 'Lacan's algorithm for the barred Other, S(32~), should yield the symbol that in mathematical [[set theory]] represents the "empty"/"null" set: S(0826), i.e., a set which contains no members. Lacan's intention seems to be to designate a signifier for the universal set of signifiers that should itself be included within the set, because it is a signifier, and therefore cannot be taken out of the set to signify it lest the universal set thereby continue to expand. Such a signifierReciprocally, then, must be somehow [[inside]] the universal set and conceived of as a lack ( - 1) within it. In this sense it is implies the complement forfeit ofjouissance of the universal set, i.e.primordial union, an "empty," or "null," set. While we cannot explore mathematical group theory here, the algebraic transformation is fairly straightforward. The statement (s) is equal to signifi- er over signified ~ . Let S = - 1 (the signifier of lack in the ensemble) in the case of a proper noun (the designator of symbolic identification which presupposes symbolic castration). By multiplying both sides of the equation by ~ and cancelling, we get  410 317d-f/ 819 317hcan then /820 318e/820 318g-h/ 821 LACAN AND LANGUAGE s = ..J;~ (whose denotation is i, an irrational or imaginary number). But what does this mean? It suggests to us that there is an unspeakable dimension inherent in the use of a proper name (as well as in the use of "I") such that it functions ' pproached only by pointing or designating, not by reference to a meaning outside of itself: "Its statement equals its signification." Thus the speaking I, when speaking of itself, is never present in discourse as a substantive entity spoken about (in this sense it "fades" from the discourse). For additional commentary on the phrase "a signifier is that which represents the subject for another signifier," see the section "The [[Primacy of the Signifier]]" in the linguistic [[dictionary]] by Ducrot and Todorov (1972, pp. 351-356). The English translation's use of single quotes around I is absent in the French text, which repeatsJe [italics added]inverted ladder . The French text's a se garder, translated as "by protecting itself," includes the sense of "restricting itself." The English "insubstantial" translates the French inconsistant, which has tHe sense of lacking in solidity or compactness. The meaning appears to be that contrary to the Other in psychosis that is unbarred, complete, and implicated in the Jouissance of symbiosis, the Other in the absence ofJouissance is not compact, full, whole, but marked by a lack - the barred Other. The question Law of the Other's existence ("if he existed") would appear then to refer to the fantasizeddesire, whole, and omnipotent Other. Rather than "would spoil the [[secret]]," we translate ferait tomber le secret as "would push down the secret," i.e., render it inaccessible. Regarding mana, Mehlman (1972a) writes: [[Levi-Strauss]]'s paradox is that whereas the linguistic [[totality]] (of meaning) must have'come in-  \ / ) 319b-cI 821 319d/821 SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 411 to existence ( as structure) all at once, that which we know has been acquired progressively. With the irruption of language, the whole [[world]] began to take on meaning all at once, before anyone could know (connaitre) what the meaning was. "But, from the preceding analysis, it follows that it (the world) meant (a signifie), from the beginning, the totality of what humanity could expect to know of it." This dissymmetry between the synchronic (structural) nature of the meant and the diachronic nature of the known results in the existence of "an overabundance of signifier (signifiant) in relation to the signifies to which it might apply." And it is this "[[floating]] signifier," this "semantic function whose role is to allow symbolic thought to operate despite the [[contradiction]] inherent in it" which Levi-Strauss sees, in this elusive essay, as the reality of mana. It is "a symbol in the pure state," thus apt to be charged with any symbolic content: "symbolic value zero" [po 23]. Lacan appears to be saying that S(0) signifies the lack inherent in mana or the zero symbol ("mais c'est plutot du signifiant du manque de ce [[symbole]] zero qu'il nous paralt s'agir en notre cas"). The Jouissance is "no more than understood" as innuendo (sous-entendue), that is, as heard "between the lines." The symbolic castration that is prerequisite for entrance into the symbolic order makes direct access to Jouissance impossible. Therefore by overturning the Law can be said to be "grounded in this very prohibition" ("1 a Loi se fonde de cette interdiction me me") in the sense that it "founds itself" there where its impact appears. "Pleasure" is taken to mean the concrete (and therefore delimited) satisfaction found in bodily (or other) functioning of the living being. Pleasure sets limits  412 LACAN AND LANGUAGE on jouissance but in turn pleasure is subjected to the regulation of the laws governing primary process, which are the laws articulation of language desir (as Lacan has told us earlier [1977, p. 298324/799]827). 31ge/821 Thorndike's Law of Effect may be an example of the kind of course being pursued in Freud's time. 319f/822 The heteroclite (deviant or anomalous) nature of the castration complex which checked Freud gives an indication of the un-boundedness ofjouissance (not "of' but "in" [dans] its infinitude) which calls for (qui comporte) its own interdiction. 319g/822 The image of the penis is not "negativity" but "negatived" (negative) "in its place in the specular image." We take But all this to mean that the penis is imagined to be detachable from the image of the body (in imagina~. castration). The later reference to "phantasy of d crepitude" ([[fantasme]] de caducite) suggests the transitor detumescence that lends support to this detachability. The phallus, therefore, comes "to embody jouissance in the dialectic of desire" by representing what is [[missing]], and therefore what is capable of completmg. 320a/822 One way to read this dense paragraph is to see the erectile organ, the part lacking in the desired image, as functioning like the lack present in signification (-)--=1) correlative along with the fading of the subject, and like the lack inherent in the ensemble of signifiers ( - 1). The erectile organ promises a [[wholeness]] that would restore jouissance on the level of image as well as on the level of discourse - both impossible. 320b/822 The erectile organ's role is tantalizing allusions to [[knot]] (nouer) the interdiction of jouissance because as desired object that is lacking it comes to represent symbolic castration. It does this not for "these reasons different kinds of form" (ces raisons de forme), i.e., not on the level of the desired image, the imaginary level, but insofar as these forms are super-  SUBVERSION OF SUBJECT AND DIALECTIC OF DESIRE 413 ) seded by symbolic structures. Once symbolic differentiation and exchange are established, jouissance that is lusted after (jouissance convoitee, misleadingly translated as "desired jouissancd') is reduced to an auto-[[eroticneuroses]] moment (presumably as in [[masturbationphobic]], suggested by the reference to the hand). [[Autoeroticism]] is then, in analysis, seen to be inadequate to desire (for desire presupposes the symbolic order, while auto-eroticism is a kind of turning away from it) and this inadequacy is referred to as guilt. 320e/823 The English "negated" translates the French negativer, the same verb used earlier which we translated as "negatived" (note 319g/822). The point seems to be that the symbolic phallus cannot be "detached" in the same way the image of the penis can be from the specular image: symbolic castration and imaginary castration are different. 320]/823 The French text suggests that the pervert sets up dominance concerning or with regard to the object a of his fantasy (dominance ... de ['objet a du fantasme). 321d/824 Instead of "conceals its anxiety from the desire of the Otherobsessional," we translate "conceals his anxiety concerning the desire of the Other" (cache son [[angoissehysterical]] du desir de ['Autre). 322d/825 The imaginary castration ( - cf» "imaginarizes" either the barred subject (S) or the object (0) when either of them is imagined to be castrated in the fantasy (S 00). "A complex number has the form (a + ib), where a, b are real numbers and i = .J~= I. It thus consists of a real part a and a pure imaginary part ib" (Considine, 1976, p. 632). 322e/825 The Greek word &yaAp..a has the meaning of "glory, delight, honour," or "pleasing [[gift]]" or "image," or "statue" as "an object of worship" (Liddell and Scott, 1897, p. 5). In Plato's Symposium Alcibiades says: "Agathon,  414 LACAN AND LANGUAGE ~. give me back some of those ribbons, will you? I want to crown Socrates' head as well- and a most extraordinary head it is" (p. 565). Later, he tries nd to [[seduceperversion]] Socrates: So I got up, and, without giving him suggests a [[chanceclinical]] relevance to say a word, I wrapped my own cloak around him-for this was in the winter-and, creeping under his shabby old mantle, I took him in my arms and lay there all night with this godlike and extraordinary man - you can't deny that, either, Socrates. And after that he had the insolence, the infernal arrogance, to laugh at my youthful beauty and jeer at the one thing I was really proud of, gentlemen of the jury - I say )ury' because thatLacan's what you're reflections here for, to try ( the man Socrates on that the charge paucity of arroganceand believe it, gentlemen, or believe it clinical facts simply does not, when I got up next morning I had no more slept with Socrates, within the meaning of the act, than if he'd been my father or an elder brother [po 570]. 323e/826 The neurotic may be said permit us to be someone without a name (un Sans-Nom) because he attempts to deny symbolic castration (the prerequisite for symbolic identification) by focusing on imaginary castration. It would be more consistent to translate si explicate further... il existait, il en jouirait not "if. .. it did [[exist]]" but rather "if ... he did exist [i.e., the fantasized uncastrated Other ofjouissance], he [this Other] would [[enjoy]] it [one's own castration]." 323i/826  Afterword Well, a rebus is a rebus is a rebus. What we have seen in these pages is a selection of texts, chosen by Lacan himself to introduce the English-speaking reader to his thought. Or should we not rather say to his style? For they convey, at least to us, less clearly an impression of what Lacan thinks than how. Allegedly, he is sharing with us through his [[Ecrits]] his own experience of how the unconscious works, and we are left with the task of interpreting these writings more or less as we would a dream, searching for a signification that insists in the web of signifiers he has spun rather than consists in any particular thing he has said. In other words, these ecrits offer us, like [[dreams]] for Freud, essentially a rebus. This means that understanding them is not exactly guesswork but, nonetheless, a highly precarious business, and sharing our impressions we must be content with the reading [[public]] may be utter folly. After all, it exposes what few misty glimmers have been allowed us to in the embarrassment course of being told how wrong we arethis long, especially when the master's many disciples are there to say, "that's not what he meant at allfoggy night." Yet we take this risk, for we feel that with the publication of this translation the 415