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The term "[[transference]]" first emerged in [[Freud]]'s [[work ]] as simply [[another ]] term for the [[displacement]] of [[affect]] from one [[idea ]] to another.<ref>{{F}} ''[[The Interpretation of Dreams]]''. 1900a: [[SE]] V, 562</ref>

Later on, however, it came to refer to the [[patient]]'s [[relationship ]] to the [[analyst]] as it develops in the [[treatment]].

This soon became the central [[meaning ]] of the term, and is the [[sense ]] in which it is usually [[understood ]] in [[psychoanalytic theory]] today.

The use of a special term to denote the [[patient]]'s relationship to the [[analyst]] is justified by the peculiar [[character ]] of this relationship.

[[Freud]] was first struck by the intensity of the [[patient]]'s [[affect]]ive reactions to the doctor in [[Breuer]]'s [[treatment]] of [[Anna O]] in 1882, which he argued was due to the [[patient]] transferring [[unconscious]] [[ideas ]] onto the doctor.<ref>{{F}} (1895d) With Josef Breuer. ''[[Sigmund Freud|Bibliography|Studies on Hysteria]]''. [[SE]] II.</ref>

As he developed the [[psychoanalytic ]] method, [[Freud]] first regarded the [[transference]] exclusively as a [[resistance]] which impedes the [[recall ]] of [[repression|repressed]] [[memories]], an obstacle to the [[treatment]] which must be "destroyed".<ref>{{F}} (1905e [1901]) "[[Sigmund Freud:Bibliography|Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria]]." [[SE]] VII, 3: 116</ref>

The positive [[value ]] of [[transference]] lies in the fact that it provides a way for the [[analysand]]'s history to be confronted in the immediacy of the [[present ]] relationship with the [[analyst]]; in the way he relates to the [[analyst]], the [[analysand]] inevitably repeats earlier relationships with other [[figures ]] (especially those with the [[parents]]).

This paradoxical [[nature ]] of [[transference]], as both an obstacle to the [[treatment]] and that which [[drives ]] the [[treatment]] forward, perhaps helps to explain why there are so many different and opposing views of [[transference]] in [[psychoanalytic theory]] today.

[[Lacan]]'s [[thinking ]] [[about ]] [[transference]] goes through several [[development|stages]].

His first work to deal with the subject in any detail is '''[[Jacques Lacan:Bibliography|An Intervention on the Transference]]'',<ref>{{L}} (1951) "[[Intervention sur le transfert]]." ''[[Écrits]]''. [[Paris]]: Seuil, 1966: 215-26 ["[[Intervention sur le transfert|Intervention on the transference]]." Trans. [[Jacqueline Rose]]. Eds. Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose. ''[[Feminine ]] [[Sexuality]]: [[Jacques Lacan ]] and the école freudienne''. [[London]]: Macmillan, 1982; New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1982: 61-­73].</ref> in which he describes the [[transference]] in [[dialectic]]al [[terms ]] borrowed from [[Hegel]].

<blockquote>"Transference does not refer to any mysterious property of affect, and even when it reveals itself under the [[appearance ]] of [[emotion]], it only acquires meaning by virtue of the [[dialectical ]] [[moment ]] in which it is produced."<ref>{{Ec}} p. 225</ref></blockquote>

In other [[words]], [[Lacan]] argues that although [[transference]] often manifests itself in the guise of particularly strong [[affect]]s, such as [[love]] and [[hate]], it does not consist of such emotions but in the [[structure]] of an [[intersubjectivity|intersubjective relationship]].

This [[structural]] definition of [[transference]] remains a constant theme throughout the rest of [[Lacan]]'s work; he consistently locates the [[essence ]] of [[transference]] in the [[symbolic]] and not in the [[imaginary]], although it clearly has powerful imaginary effects.

This [[time ]] he conceives it not in terms borrowed from [[dialectic|Hegelian dialectic]]s but in terms borrowed from the [[anthropology]] of [[exchange]].

[[Transference]] is implicit in the [[speech act]], which involves an exchange of [[sign]]s that transforms the [[speaker ]] and listener: In its essence, the efficacious [[transference]] which we're considering is quite simply the [[speech]] [[act]].

Each time a man speaks to another in an authentic and [[full ]] manner, there is, in the [[true ]] sense, [[transference]], [[symbolic]] [[transference]] - something which takes [[place ]] which changes the nature of the two beings present.<ref>{{S1}} p. 109</ref>

In the [[seminar]] of the following year, he continues to elaborate on the [[symbolic]] nature of [[transference]], which he [[identifies]] with the [[compulsion to repeat]], the [[insistence]] of [[the symbolic ]] determinants of the [[subject]].<ref>{{S2}} p. 210-11</ref>

In this [[distinction ]] between the [[symbolic]] and [[imaginary]] aspects of [[transference]], [[Lacan]] provides a useful way of [[understanding ]] the paradoxical function of the [[transference]] in [[psychoanalytic treatment]]; in its symbolic aspect ([[repetition]]) it helps the [[treatment]] [[progress]] by revealing the [[signifiers]] of the subject's [[history]], while in its [[imaginary]] aspect ([[love]] and [[hate]]) it [[acts ]] as a [[resistance]].<ref>{{S4}} p. 135; {{S8}} p. 204</ref>

[[Alcibiades ]] compares [[Socrates ]] to a plain box which encloses a precious [[object ]] (Grk ''[[agalma]]''); just as Alcibiades attributes a hidden treasure to Socrates, so the [[analysand]] sees his object of [[desire]] in the [[analyst]] (see [[objet petit a]]).

In 1964, [[Lacan]] articulates the [[concept ]] of [[transference]] with his concept of the [[subject supposed to know]], which remains central to [[Lacan]]'s view of the [[transference]] from then on; indeed, it is this view of the [[transference]] which has come to be seen as [[Lacan]]'s most [[complete ]] attempt to theorise the matter.

According to this view, [[transference]] is the [[attribution ]] of [[knowledge]] to the [[Other]], the supposition that the [[Other]] is a [[subject supposed to know|subject who knows]]:

<blockquote>"As soon as the subject who is supposed to [[know ]] [[exists ]] somewhere . . . there is transference."<ref>{{S11}} p. 232</ref></blockquote>

It is this that differentiates [[psychoanalysis]] from [[suggestion]]; although both are based on the [[transference]], [[psychoanalysis]] differs from [[suggestion]] because the [[analyst]] refuses to use the [[power ]] given to him by the [[transference]].<ref>{{E}} p. 236</ref>

In the latter [[category ]] fell all the [[patient]]'s reactions which were caused by "perceiving the analyst in a distorted way".

Some [[analyst]]s used the term "[[transference]]" to refer to all aspects of the [[analysand]]'s relationship to the [[analyst]], in which [[case ]] they distinguished the distorted "[[transference|neurotic transference]]" or "[[transference|transference neurosis]]" from the "unobjectionable part of the transference" or "therapeutic alliance."<ref>Edward Bibring, Elizabeth Zeztel</ref>

Other [[analysts ]] argued that the term "[[transference]]" should be restricted to the "unrealistic" or "[[irrational]]" reactions of the [[analysand]] (William Silverberg, Franz Alexander).

However, the common assumption underlying both of these positions was that the [[analyst]] could tell when the [[patient]] was not reacting to him on the basis of who he really was but rather on the basis of previous relationships with other [[people]].

Informed by his own correct [[perception ]] of [[reality]], the [[analyst]] could offer "transference [[interpretations]]"; that is, he could point out the discrepancy between the [[real ]] [[situation ]] and the irrational way that the [[patient]] was reacting to it.

1. The [[whole ]] idea of [[adaptation]] to [[reality]] is based on a naive empiricist [[epistemology]], involving an appeal to an unproblematic [[notion ]] of "[[reality]]" as an [[objective ]] and [[self]]-evident given.

This entirely neglects what [[psychoanalysis]] has discovered about the [[construction ]] of [[reality]] by the [[ego]] on the basis of its own [[méconnaissance]].

Hence when the [[analyst]] assumes that he is better adapted to [[reality]] than the [[patient]] he has no other recourse than "to fall back on his own ego" since this is the only "bit of reality he [[knows]]".<ref>{{E}} p. 231</ref>

This reduces [[psychoanalytic treatment]] to a [[form ]] of [[suggestion]] in which the [[analyst]] simply "imposes his own idea of reality" on the [[analysand]].<ref>{{E}} p. 232</ref>

2. The idea that the [[analysand]]'s "distorted perception of the analyst" could be liquidated by means of [[interpretation]]s is a [[logical ]] fallacy, since the [[transference]] is [[interpretation|interpreted]] on the basis of, and with the [[instrument ]] of, the [[transference]] itself.<ref>{{S8}} p. 206</ref>

In other words, there is no [[metalanguage]] of the [[transference]], no vantage point [[outside ]] the [[transference]] from which the [[analyst]] could offer an [[interpretation]], since any [[interpretation]] he offers "will be received as coming from the person that the transference imputes him to be."<ref>{{E}} p. 231</ref>

Thus it is contradictory to [[claim ]] that the [[transference]] can be dissolved by means of an [[interpretation]] when it is the [[transference]] itself which [[conditions ]] the [[analysand]]'s acceptance of that [[interpretation]]:

Certainly not; [[Lacan]] affirms that "it is [[natural ]] to interpret the transference,"<ref>{{E}} p. 271</ref> but at the same time he harbours no [[illusion]]s about the power of such [[interpretation]]s to dissolve the [[transference]].

<blockquote>"What does it mean, to interpret the transference? [[Nothing ]] else than to fill the [[void ]] of this deadlock with a [[lure]]. But while it may be deceptive, this lure serves a [[purpose ]] by setting off the whole [[process ]] again."<ref>{{Ec}} p. 225</ref></blockquote>

When describing the [[transference]] as "positive" or "[[negative]]", [[Lacan]] takes two different approaches.

Although [[Lacan]] does [[speak ]] occasionally of [[countertransference]], he generally prefers not to use this term.