Transference

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transference (transfert) The term 'transference' first emerged in

Freud's work as simply another term for the displacement of affect from

  one idea to another (see Freud, 1900a: SE V, 562). Later on, however, it
  came to refer to the patient's relationship to the analyst as it develops in the

treatment. This soon became the central meaning of the term, and is the sense

in which it is usually understood in psychoanalytic theory today.

     The use of a special term to denote the patient's relationship to the analyst is

justified by the peculiar character of this relationship. Freud was first struck by

the intensity of the patient's affective reactions to the doctor in Breuer's

  treatment of Anna O in 1882, which he argued             was due to the patient

transferring unconscious ideas onto the doctor (Freud, 1895d). As he devel-

oped the psychoanalytic method, Freud first regarded the transference exclu-

sively as a RESISTANCE which impedes the recall of repressed memories, an

obstacle to the treatment which must be 'destroyed' (Freud, 1905e: SE VII, 116).

Gradually, however, he modified this view, coming to see the transference also as

  a positive factor which helps the treatment to progress. The positive value of

transference lies in the fact that it provides a way for the analysand's history to be

confronted in the immediacy of the present relationship with the analyst; in the

  way he relates to the analyst, the analysand inevitably repeats earlier relationships

with other figures (especially those with the parents). This paradoxical nature of

transference, as both an obstacle to the treatment and that which drives the

treatment forward, perhaps helps to explain why there are so many different

  and opposing views of transference in psychoanalytic theory today.
      Lacan's thinking about transference goes through several stages. His first
  work to deal with the subject in any detail is 'An Intervention                   on the

Transference' (Lacan, 1951), in which he describes the transference in dialec-

tical terms borrowed from Hegel. He criticises ego-psychology for defming the

transference in terms of AFFECTs; 'Transference does not refer to any myster-

  lous property of affect, and even when it reveals itself under the appearance of

emotion, it only acquires meaning by virtue of the dialectical moment in which

  it is produced' (Ec, 225).
      In other words, Lacan argues that although transference often manifests

itself in the guise of particularly strong affects, such aS LOVE and hate, it

does not consist of such emotions but in the structure of an intersubjective

relationship. This structural definition of transference remains a constant

theme throughout the rest of Lacan's work; he consistently locates the essence

     of transference in the symbolic and not in the imaginary, although it clearly
     has powerful imaginary effects. Later on, Lacan will remark that if transfer-
     ence often manifests itself under the appearance of love, it is first and foremost
     the love of knowledge (savoir) that is concerned.
        Lacan returns to the subject of the transference in the seminar of 19534
     This time he conceives it not in terms borrowed from Hegelian dialectics but in
     terms borrowed from the anthropology of exchange (Mauss, LÈvi-Strauss).
     Transference is implicit in the speech act, which involves an exchange of signs
     that transforms the speaker and listener:


        In its essence, the efficacious transference which we're considering is quite
        simply the speech act. Each time a man speaks to another in an authentic and
        full manner, there is, in the true sense, transference, symbolic transference    -
        something which takes place which changes the nature of the two beings
        present.
                                                                                                                   (Sl, 109)
     In the seminar of the following year, he continues to elaborate on the symbolic
     nature of transference, which he identifies with the compulsion to repeat, the
     insistence of the symbolic determinants of the subject (S2, 210-11). This is to
     be distinguished from the imaginary aspect of transference, namely, the
     affective reactions of love and aggressivity. In this distinction between the
     symbolic and imaginary aspects of transference, Lacan provides a useful way
     of understanding the paradoxical function of the transference in psychoanalytic
     treatment; in its symbolic aspect (REPETITION) it helps the treatment progress by
     revealing the signifiers of the subject's history, while in its imaginary aspect
     (love and hate) it acts as a resistance (see S4, 135; S8, 204).
         Lacan's next approach to the subject of transference is in the eighth year of
     his seminar (Lacan, 1960-1), entitled simply 'The Transference'. Here he uses
     Plato's Symposium to illustrate the relationship between the analysand and the
     analyst. Alcibiades compares Socrates to a plain box which encloses a precious
     object (Grk agalma); just as Alcibiades attributes a hidden treasure to Socrates,
     so the analysand sees his object of desire in the analyst (see OBJETPETITA).
        In 1964, Lacan articulates the concept of transference with his concept of the
     SUBJECT SUPPOSED TO KNOw, which remains central to Lacan's view of the
     transference from then on; indeed, it is this view of the transference which
     has come to be seen as Lacan's most complete attempt to theorise the matter.
     According to this view, transference is the attribution of knowledge to the
     Other, the supposition that the Other is a subject who knows; 'As soon as the
     subject who is supposed to know exists somewhere       . . . there is transference'
     (Sll, 232).
        Although the existence of the transference is           a necessary condition of
     psychoanalytic treatment, it is not sufficient in itself; it is also necessary that
     the analyst deal with the transference in a unique way. It is this that differ-



   entiates psychoanalysis from SUGGESTION; although both    are based    on the
   transference, psychoanalysis differs from suggestion because the analyst
   refuses to use the power given to him by the transference (see E, 236).
       From quite early on in the history of psychoanalysis it became common to

distinguish between those aspects of the patient's relationship to the analyst

    which were 'adapted to reality' and those which were not. In the latter category
   fell all the patient's reactions which were caused by 'perceiving the analyst in
   a distorted way'. Some analysts used the term 'transference' to refer to all
   aspects of the analysand's relationship to the analyst, in which case they

distinguished the distorted 'neurotic transference' or 'transference neurosis'

   from the 'unobjectionable part of the transference' or 'therapeutic alliance'
   (Edward Bibring, Elizabeth Zeztel). Other analysts argued that the term
   'transference' should be restricted to the 'unrealistic' or 'irrational' reactions
   of the analysand (William Silverberg, Franz Alexander). However, the com-
   mon assumption underlying both of these positions was that the analyst could
   tell when the patient was not reacting to him on the basis of who he really was
    but rather on the basis of previous relationships with other people. The analyst
    was credited with this ability because he was supposed to be better 'adapted to
   reality' than the patient. Informed by his own correct perception of reality, the
   analyst could offer 'transference interpretations'; that is, he could point out the
   discrepancy between the real situation and the irrational way that the patient
    was reacting to it. It was argued that such transference interpretations helped
   the analysand to gain 'insight' into his own neurotic transference and thereby
   resolve it or 'liquidate' it.
       Some of Lacan's most incisive criticisms           are directed at this way of
   representing psychoanalytic treatment. These criticisms        are based     on the
   following arguinents:
       1. The whole idea of adaptation to reality is based on a naive empiricist

epistemology, involving an appeal to an unproblematic notion of 'reality' as an

   objective and self-evident given. This entirely neglects what psychoanalysis
    has discovered about the construction of reality by the ego on the basis of its
    own mÈconnaissance. Hence when the analyst          assumes that he is better
    adapted to reality than the patient he has no other recourse than 'to fall back
    on his own ego' since this is the only 'bit of reality he knows' (E, 231). The

healthy part of the patient's ego is then defmed simply as 'the part that thinks

    as we do' (E, 232). This reduces psychoanalytic treatment to             a form of
    suggestion in which the analyst simply 'imposes his own idea of reality' on
    the analysand (E, 232). Thus 'the inability [of the analyst] to sustain a praxis in
    an authentic  manner results,    as is usually the       case with mankind, in the
    exercise of power' (E, 226).


    b 2- The idea that the analysand's 'distorted perception of the analyst' could
      e liquidated by     means of interpretations is      a logical fallacy, since 'the
    transference is interpreted on the basis of, and with the instrument of, the

transference itself' (S8, 206). In other words, there is nO METALANGUAGE of the

transference, no vantage point outside the transference from which the analyst

could offer an interpretation, since any interpretation he offers 'will be received

  as coming from the person that the transference imputes him to be' (E, 231)
  Thus it is contradictory to claim that the transference can be dissolved by means
  of an interpretation when it is the transference itself which conditions the

analysand's acceptance of that interpretation; 'the emergence of the subject

  from the transference is thus postponed ad infinitum' (E, 231).
      Does this   mean that Lacanian analysts      never interpret the transference?

Certainly not; Lacan affirms that 'it is natural to interpret the transference'

(E, 271), but at the same time he harbours no illusions about the power of such

interpretations to dissolve the transference. Like any other interpretation, the

analyst must use all his art in deciding if and when to interpret the transfer-

  ence, and above all must avoid gearing his interpretations exclusively to

interpreting the transference. He must also know exactly what he is seeking

  to achieve by such an interpretation; not to rectify the patient's relationship to

reality, but to maintain the analytic dialogue. 'What does it mean, to interpret .

  the transference? Nothing else than to fill the void of this deadlock with a lure.
  But while it may be deceptive, this lure serves a purpose by setting off the
   whole process again' (Ec, 225).
      When describing the transference as 'positive' or 'negative', Lacan takes two
  different approaches. Following Freud, Lacan sometimes uses these adjectives
  to refer to the nature of the affects, 'positive transference' referring to loving
  affects and 'negative transference' referring to aggressive affects (Ec, 222).

Sometimes, however, Lacan takes the terms 'positive' and 'negative' to refer to

  the favourable or unfavourable effects of the transference on the treatment (see

E, 271, where Lacan argues that when the analysand's resistance opposes

suggestion, this resistance must be 'placed in the ranks of the positive trans-

  ference' on the grounds that it maintains the direction of the analysis).
      Although Lacan does speak occasionally of COUNTERTRANSFERENCE, he gen-

erally prefers not to use this term.

def

The displacement of one's unresolved conflicts, dependencies, and aggressions onto a substitute object (e.g. substituting a lover, spouse, etc. for one's parent). This operation can also occur in the psychoanalytical cure, when a patient transfers onto the analyst feelings that were previously directed to another object. By working through this transference of feelings onto the analyst, the patient can come to grips with the actual cause of his or her feelings.



References