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truth (vÈritÈ) Truth is one of the most central, and yet most complex
terms in Lacan's discourse. A few basic points are clear and constant in
Lacan's concept of truth; truth always refers to truth about desire, and the
aim of psychoanalytic treatment is to lead the analysand to articulate this truth.
Truth does not await, in some preformed state of fullness, to be revealed to the
analysand by the analyst; on the contrary, it is gradually constructed in the
dialectical movement of the treatment itself (Ec, 144). Lacan argues, in
oPposition to the traditions of classical philosophy, that truth is not beautiful
(S7, 217) and that it is not necessarily beneficial to learn the truth (Sl7, 122).
While Lacan always speaks about 'truth' in the singular, this is not a single
universal truth, but an absolutely particular truth, unique to each subject (see
S7, 24). However, beyond these few simple points, it is impossible to give a
univocal definition of the way Lacan uses the term, since it functions in
multiple contexts simultaneously, in opposition to a wide variety of terrns.
All that will be attempted here, therefore, is a general indication of some of the
contexts in which it functions.
e Truth versus exactitude Exactitude is a question of 'introducing mea-
surement into the real' (E, 74), and constitutes the aim of the exact sciences.
Truth, however, concerns desire, which is not a matter for the exact sciences
but for the sciences of subjectivity. Therefore truth is only a meaningful
concept in the context of language: 'It is with the appearance of language
that the dimension of truth emerges' (E, 172). Psychoanalytic treatment is
based on the fundamental premise that speech is the only means of revealing
the truth about desire. 'Truth hollows its way into the real thanks to the
dimension of speech. There is neither true nor false prior to speech' (Sl, 228).
e Truth and scIENCE From Lacan's earliest writings, the term 'truth' has
metaphysical, even mystical, nuances which problematise any attempt to
articulate truth and science. It is not that Lacan denies that science aims to
know the truth, but simply that science cannot claim to monopolise truth as its
exclusive property (Ec, 79). Lacan later argues that science is in fact based on
a foreclosure of the concept of truth as cause (Ec, 874). The concept of truth is
essential for understanding madness, and modern science renders madness
meaningless by ignoring the concept of truth (Ec, 153-4).
e Truth, lies and deception Truth is intimately connected with deception,
since lies can often reveal the truth about desire more eloquently than honest
statements. Deception and lies are not the opposite of truth: on the contrary,
they are inscribed in the text of truth. The analyst's role is to reveal the truth
inscribed in the deception of the analysand's speech. Although the analysand
may in effect be saying to the analyst 'I am deceiving you', the analyst says to
the analysand 'In this I am deceiving to you, what you are sending as message
is what I express to you, and in doing so you are telling the truth' (S11,
139-40; see S4, 107-8).
e Truth versus false appearances The false appearances presented by the
analysand are not merely obstacles that the analyst must expose and discard in
order to discover the truth; on the contrary, the analyst must take them into
account (see SEMBLANCE).
e Truth, error and mistakes Psychoanalysis has shown that the truth
about desire is often revealed by mistakes (parapraxes; see AcT). The complex
relations between truth, mistakes, error and deception are evoked by Lacan in a
typically elusive phrase when he describes 'the structuration of speech in
search of truth' as 'error taking flight in deception and recaptured by mis-
take' (Sl, 273).
e Truth and fiction Lacan does not use the term 'fiction' in the sense of 'a
falsehood', but in the sense of a scientific construct (Lacan takes his cue here
from Bentham - see S7, 12). Thus Lacan's term 'fiction' corresponds to
Freud's term Konvention, convention (see S11, 163), and has more in com-
mon with truth than falsehood. Indeed, Lacan states that truth is structured like
a fiction (E, 306; Ec, 808).
, Truth and the REAL The opposition which Lacan draws between truth
and the real dates back to his pre-war writings (e.g. Ec, 75), and is taken up at
various points; 'We are used to the real. The truth we repress' (E, 169).
However, Lacan also points out that truth is similar to the real; it is impossible
to articulate the whole truth, and '[p]recisely because of this impossibility,
truth aspires to the real' (Lacan, 1973a: 83).
== References ==
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[[Category:Lacan]]
[[Category:Terms]]
[[Category:Concepts]]
[[Category:Psychoanalysis]]
