Difference between revisions of "Truth"
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| − | + | Truth (vÈritÈ) is one of the most central, and yet most complex terms in Lacan's discourse. A few basic points are clear and constant in Lacan's concept of truth; truth always refers to truth about desire, and the aim of psychoanalytic treatment is to lead the analysand to articulate this truth. | |
| − | + | Truth does not await, in some preformed state of fullness, to be revealed to the analysand by the analyst; on the contrary, it is gradually constructed in the dialectical movement of the treatment itself.<ref>Ec, 144</ref> | |
| − | + | Lacan argues, in opposition to the traditions of classical philosophy, that truth is not beautiful<ref>S7, 217</ref> and that it is not necessarily beneficial to learn the truth.<ref>Sl7, 122</ref> | |
| − | + | While Lacan always speaks about 'truth' in the singular, this is not a single universal truth, but an absolutely particular truth, unique to each subject.<ref>see S7, 24</ref> | |
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| − | + | However, beyond these few simple points, it is impossible to give a univocal definition of the way Lacan uses the term, since it functions in multiple contexts simultaneously, in opposition to a wide variety of terrns. | |
| − | + | All that will be attempted here, therefore, is a general indication of some of the contexts in which it functions. | |
| − | + | ==Truth versus exactitude== | |
| + | Exactitude is a question of 'introducing measurement into the real',<ref>E, 74</ref> and constitutes the aim of the exact sciences. | ||
| − | + | Truth, however, concerns desire, which is not a matter for the exact sciences but for the sciences of subjectivity. | |
| − | + | Therefore truth is only a meaningful concept in the context of language: 'It is with the appearance of language that the dimension of truth emerges.'<ref>E, 172</ref> | |
| − | + | Psychoanalytic treatment is based on the fundamental premise that speech is the only means of revealing the truth about desire. | |
| − | + | 'Truth hollows its way into the real thanks to the dimension of speech. There is neither true nor false prior to speech.'<ref>Sl, 228</ref> | |
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| − | + | ==Truth and [[Science]]== | |
| + | From Lacan's earliest writings, the term 'truth' has metaphysical, even mystical, nuances which problematise any attempt to articulate truth and science. | ||
| − | + | It is not that Lacan denies that science aims to know the truth, but simply that science cannot claim to monopolise truth as its exclusive property.<ref>Ec, 79</ref> | |
| + | Lacan later argues that science is in fact based on a foreclosure of the concept of truth as cause.<ref>Ec, 874</ref> | ||
| + | The concept of truth is essential for understanding madness, and modern science renders madness meaningless by ignoring the concept of truth.<ref>Ec, 153-4</ref> | ||
| − | + | ==Truth, lies and deception== | |
| + | Truth is intimately connected with deception, since lies can often reveal the truth about desire more eloquently than honest statements. | ||
| − | + | Deception and lies are not the opposite of truth: on the contrary, they are inscribed in the text of truth. | |
| − | + | The analyst's role is to reveal the truth inscribed in the deception of the analysand's speech. | |
| − | + | Although the analysand may in effect be saying to the analyst 'I am deceiving you', the analyst says to the analysand 'In this I am deceiving to you, what you are sending as message is what I express to you, and in doing so you are telling the truth.<ref>(S11, | |
| + | 139-40; see S4, 107-8)</ref> | ||
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| + | ==Truth versus false appearances== | ||
| + | The false appearances presented by the analysand are not merely obstacles that the analyst must expose and discard in order to discover the truth; on the contrary, the analyst must take them into account (see [[semblance]]). | ||
| + | ==Truth, error and mistakes== | ||
| + | Psychoanalysis has shown that the truth | ||
| + | about desire is often revealed by mistakes (parapraxes).<ref>see [[Act]]</ref> | ||
| + | The complex relations between truth, mistakes, error and deception are evoked by Lacan in a typically elusive phrase when he describes 'the structuration of speech in search of truth' as 'error taking flight in deception and recaptured by mistake.'<ref>Sl, 273</ref> | ||
| + | ==Truth and fiction== | ||
| + | Lacan does not use the term 'fiction' in the sense of 'a falsehood', but in the sense of a scientific construct (Lacan takes his cue here from Bentham).<ref>see S7, 12</ref> | ||
| + | Thus Lacan's term 'fiction' corresponds to Freud's term Konvention, convention,<ref>see S11, 163</ref> and has more in common with truth than falsehood. | ||
| + | Indeed, Lacan states that truth is structured like a fiction.<ref>E, 306; Ec, 808</ref> | ||
| + | ==Truth and the real== | ||
| + | The opposition which Lacan draws between truth and the real dates back to his pre-war writings,<ref>e.g. Ec, 75</ref> and is taken up at various points; 'We are used to the real. The truth we repress.'<ref>E, 169</ref> | ||
| + | However, Lacan also points out that truth is similar to the real; it is impossible to articulate the whole truth, and '[p]recisely because of this impossibility, truth aspires to the real.'<ref>Lacan, 1973a: 83</ref> | ||
== References == | == References == | ||
Revision as of 00:38, 6 May 2006
Truth (vÈritÈ) is one of the most central, and yet most complex terms in Lacan's discourse. A few basic points are clear and constant in Lacan's concept of truth; truth always refers to truth about desire, and the aim of psychoanalytic treatment is to lead the analysand to articulate this truth.
Truth does not await, in some preformed state of fullness, to be revealed to the analysand by the analyst; on the contrary, it is gradually constructed in the dialectical movement of the treatment itself.[1]
Lacan argues, in opposition to the traditions of classical philosophy, that truth is not beautiful[2] and that it is not necessarily beneficial to learn the truth.[3]
While Lacan always speaks about 'truth' in the singular, this is not a single universal truth, but an absolutely particular truth, unique to each subject.[4]
However, beyond these few simple points, it is impossible to give a univocal definition of the way Lacan uses the term, since it functions in multiple contexts simultaneously, in opposition to a wide variety of terrns.
All that will be attempted here, therefore, is a general indication of some of the contexts in which it functions.
Contents
Truth versus exactitude
Exactitude is a question of 'introducing measurement into the real',[5] and constitutes the aim of the exact sciences.
Truth, however, concerns desire, which is not a matter for the exact sciences but for the sciences of subjectivity.
Therefore truth is only a meaningful concept in the context of language: 'It is with the appearance of language that the dimension of truth emerges.'[6]
Psychoanalytic treatment is based on the fundamental premise that speech is the only means of revealing the truth about desire.
'Truth hollows its way into the real thanks to the dimension of speech. There is neither true nor false prior to speech.'[7]
Truth and Science
From Lacan's earliest writings, the term 'truth' has metaphysical, even mystical, nuances which problematise any attempt to articulate truth and science.
It is not that Lacan denies that science aims to know the truth, but simply that science cannot claim to monopolise truth as its exclusive property.[8]
Lacan later argues that science is in fact based on a foreclosure of the concept of truth as cause.[9]
The concept of truth is essential for understanding madness, and modern science renders madness meaningless by ignoring the concept of truth.[10]
Truth, lies and deception
Truth is intimately connected with deception, since lies can often reveal the truth about desire more eloquently than honest statements.
Deception and lies are not the opposite of truth: on the contrary, they are inscribed in the text of truth.
The analyst's role is to reveal the truth inscribed in the deception of the analysand's speech.
Although the analysand may in effect be saying to the analyst 'I am deceiving you', the analyst says to the analysand 'In this I am deceiving to you, what you are sending as message is what I express to you, and in doing so you are telling the truth.[11]
Truth versus false appearances
The false appearances presented by the analysand are not merely obstacles that the analyst must expose and discard in order to discover the truth; on the contrary, the analyst must take them into account (see semblance).
Truth, error and mistakes
Psychoanalysis has shown that the truth about desire is often revealed by mistakes (parapraxes).[12] The complex relations between truth, mistakes, error and deception are evoked by Lacan in a typically elusive phrase when he describes 'the structuration of speech in search of truth' as 'error taking flight in deception and recaptured by mistake.'[13]
Truth and fiction
Lacan does not use the term 'fiction' in the sense of 'a falsehood', but in the sense of a scientific construct (Lacan takes his cue here from Bentham).[14] Thus Lacan's term 'fiction' corresponds to Freud's term Konvention, convention,[15] and has more in common with truth than falsehood. Indeed, Lacan states that truth is structured like a fiction.[16]
Truth and the real
The opposition which Lacan draws between truth and the real dates back to his pre-war writings,[17] and is taken up at various points; 'We are used to the real. The truth we repress.'[18] However, Lacan also points out that truth is similar to the real; it is impossible to articulate the whole truth, and '[p]recisely because of this impossibility, truth aspires to the real.'[19]
