Sigmund Freud's notion of truth evolved from a factual conception into a relativistic method where the true and the false are defined both in relation to a conventional and bounded space (that of the cure) and the dynamic effects that "plausible" constructions might have on the psyche. Truth as an objective no longer remains "the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis" (1914g, pp. 147, 150). It inclines towards the notion of reality testing that demands that the subject partially abandon their illusions. Truth as an ideal is inseparable from psychoanalytic inquiry and is unattainable, except partially in the "nuclei" of truth present within individual and collective distortions.{{Top}}vérité{{Bottom}}
The search for factors that cause psychic suffering can be confused with the search for truth inasmuch as they are both repressed, misrepresented, displaced, represented by their opposite, and the like. Initially Freud imagined rediscovering the traumatic events in the histories [[Truth]] is one of his patients themselves, but promptly noticing "that there are no indications of reality in the unconsciousmost central, so that one cannot distinguish between the truth and fiction that is cathected with affect" (letter to Wilhelm Fleiss, 21 September 1897), he ended up privileging the psychical reality of the subject, wherein a dynamic verisimilitude was elaborated which would take on the value of truth. This relativization of truth seems to coincide with a Pirandellian conception of it (Each yet most [[complex]] [[terms]] in His Own Way). In fact, truth as a value has not disappeared from the Freudian purview but it has become subtler. Thus interpretation is not about the exhumation of truth but rather construction through the adoption of a coherent paradigm (Viderman, 1970), originating from the unperceived formulations of the subject[[Lacan]]'s free associations or dreams[[discourse]].
Thus for Jacques Lacan, truth extricates itself from reality: "In ==Psychoanalysis==The [[aim]] of [[psychoanalytic anamnesis, it ]] [[treatment]] is not a question of reality, but of truth, because to lead the effect of full speech is [[analysand]] to reorder past contingencies by conferring on them articulate the sense [[truth]] of necessities to come" (1956, p. 48). Truth is not precisely being true to reality, rather it speaks and stutters through its symptomatic distortionshis or her [[desire]].
The analyst has to engage with these "nuclei" [[Truth]] does not await, in some preformed [[state]] of truthfullness, then; Freud, for instance, defined them in relation to be revealed to the [[analysand]] by the sexual theories of children[[analyst]], which despite being untrue nonetheless each contain "a fragment of real truth" (1908c, p. 215). This but is an adult, intellectual mode rather constructed in the [[dialectic]]al movement of investigation whose results, because they are limited to the possibilities of human understanding, would have been false in relation to a broader perspective, but which include nevertheless "inspired" partial but significant interpretations[[treatment]] itself.<ref>{{Ec}} p.144</ref>
The quest for truth proceeds from a "truth fantasy" (Mijolla-Mellor==Philosophy==[[Lacan]] argues, 1985), which relates in opposition to an image of lost harmony (transparency, luminosity) within the I, the others, and one's self. Truth, in terms traditions of the demand for truthfulnessclassical [[philosophy]], that [[truth]] is central to the fundamental rule not beautiful<ref>{{S7}} p.217</ref> and that requires the abandonment of secrecy; however, it also guides the behavior of the analyst in their relationship with the patient, in their vision of the world, and in their research, requiring them is not necessarily beneficial to relinquish personal illusions for learn the construction of a coherent schema[[truth]]. Challenging illusion and narcissistic comfort, truth, according to Freud, is a force in its own right: "The hardest truths are heard and recognized at last, after the interests they have injured and the emotions they have roused have exhausted their fury" (1910d, <ref>{{S17}} p. 215).122</ref>
Piera Aulagnier gives [[Lacan]] speaks [[about]] "[[truth a central place ]]" in relation to the identity of the subject. It is the object of [[singular]], not as a "battle never definitively won nor lost to which periodically the I must surrender in order to modify and defend its positionssingle [[universal]] [[truth]], but as [[particular]] [[truth]], failing which it would be unable unique to turn towards or invest in its own identificatory space" (1984, each [[subject]].<ref>{{S7}} p. 147).24</ref>
The notion of truth in psychoanalysis ==Language==[[Truth]] is tied to the history the subject, only a meaningful [[concept]] in the same way as it is to humanity, because it is not simply a case of a balance between understanding and the thing, but context of a narrative that is reconstructed using the residues left behind by legend.[[language]]:
ALAIN DE MIJOLLABibliography<blockquote>"It is with the appearance of [[language]] that the [[dimension]] of [[truth]] emerges."<ref>{{E}} p.172</ref></blockquote>
* Aulagnier, Piera. (1984). L'Apprenti-historien et le maîtresorcier. Du discours identifiant au discours délirant. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. * ——. (1914g). Remembering, repeating and working-through (Further recommendations [[Psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is based on the technique fundamental premise that [[speech]] is the only means of psycho-analysis II). SE, 12: 145-156. * Freud, Sigmund. (1908c). On revealing the sexual theories of children. SE, 9: 205-226. * ——. 1910d). The future prospects of psycho-analytic therapy. SE, 11: 139-151. * ——. (1950a [1887-1902[truth]] about [[desire]]). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173-280. * Lacan, Jacques. (1989). Ecrits: A Selection. (Alan Sheridan, Trans.) 5th ed. London: Tavistock/Routledge.
Further Reading<blockquote>"[[Truth]] hollows its way into the [[real]] thanks to the dimension of [[speech]]. There is neither [[true]] nor [[false]] prior to [[speech]]."<ref>{{S1}} p.228</ref></blockquote>
* Reed, Gail S. (1995). Clinical truth and contemporary relativism: Meaning, narration. Journal of the American Psycho-Analytic Association, 43, 713-740.==Science== * SassFrom [[Lacan]]'s earliest writings, L. A., and Woolfolk, R. L. (1988). Psychoanalysis and the hermeneutic turn: On term "Narrative [[truth.]]" Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 36, 429-454. * Schaferhas metaphysical, Roy. (1992). Retelling a life. In Narration and dialogue in psychoanalysis. New York: Basic Books. * Spence even mystical, Donald. (1982). Narrative nuances which problematise any attempt to articulate [[truth ]] and historical truth. Meaning and interpretation in psychoanalysis. New York: W. W. Norton and Co. * Spezzano, Charles. (1993). A relational model of inquiry and truth: Conversation. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 3, 177-208[[science]].
It is not that [[Lacan]] denies that [[science]] aims to [[know]] the [[truth]], but simply that [[science]] cannot [[claim]] to monopolise [[truth]] as its exclusive property.<ref>{{Ec}} p.79</ref>
[[Lacan]] later argues that [[science]] is in fact based on a [[foreclosure]] of the concept of [[truth]] as [[cause]].<ref>{{Ec}} p.874</ref>
==new==The concept of [[truth]] is essential for [[understanding]] [[madness]], and modern [[science]] renders [[madness]] meaningless by ignoring the concept of [[truth]].<ref>{{Ec}} p.153-4</ref>
63-5==Truth and Deception==[[Truth]] is intimately connected with [[deception]], 141-3 Conversationssince lies can often reveal the [[truth]] about [[desire]] more eloquently than honest statements.
[[Deception]] and lies are not the opposite of [[truth]]: on the contrary, they are inscribed in the [[text]] of [[truth]].
Truth (The [[analyst]]''vérité'') s [[role]] is one of to reveal the most central, and yet most complex terms in Lacan's discourse. A few basic points are clear and constant [[truth]] inscribed in Lacan's concept of truth; truth always refers to truth about desire, and the aim [[deception]] of psychoanalytic treatment is to lead the [[analysand to articulate this truth]]'s [[speech]].
Truth does not await, Although the [[analysand]] may in some preformed state of fullness, to effect be revealed saying to the analysand by the [[analyst; on the contrary]] "I am deceiving you, it is gradually constructed in " the dialectical movement of [[analyst]] says to the treatment itself.<ref>Ec, 144</ref> [[analysand]]:
Lacan argues, in opposition <blockquote>"In this I am deceiving to the traditions of classical philosophyyou, that truth what you are sending as [[message]] is not beautiful<ref>S7what I express to you, 217</ref> and that it is not necessarily beneficial to learn in doing so you are telling the truth.<ref>Sl7, 122{{S11}} p.139-40; {{S4}} p.107-8)</ref></blockquote>
While Lacan always speaks about 'truth' ==False Appearances==The false [[appearance]]s presented by the [[analysand]] are not merely obstacles that the [[analyst]] must expose and discard in [[order]] to discover the singular, this is not a single universal [[truth]]; on the contrary, but an absolutely particular truth, unique to each subjectthe [[analyst]] must take [[them]] into account (see [[semblance]]).<ref>see S7, 24</ref>
==Error and Mistakes==
[[Psychoanalysis]] has shown that the [[truth]] about [[desire]] is often revealed by mistakes ([[parapraxes]]).
HoweverThe complex relations between [[truth]], beyond these few simple pointsmistakes, it is impossible to give error and [[deception]] are evoked by [[Lacan]] in a univocal definition typically elusive phrase when he describes "the [[structuration]] of the way Lacan uses the term, since it functions speech in multiple contexts simultaneously, [[search]] of truth" as "error taking flight in opposition to a wide variety of terrnsdeception and recaptured by mistake."<ref>{{S1}} p. 273</ref>
All that will be attempted here==Fiction==[[Lacan]] does not use the term "[[fiction]]" in the [[sense]] of 'a falsehood', therefore, is but in the sense of a general indication of some of the contexts in which it functions[[scientific]] [[construct]].<ref>{{S7}} p.12</ref>
==Truth versus exactitude==Exactitude is a question of Thus [[Lacan]]'s term "[[fiction]]" corresponds to [[Freud]]'s term ''Konvention'introducing measurement into the real', convention,<ref>E, 74{{S11}} p.163</ref> and constitutes the aim of the exact scienceshas more in common with [[truth]] than falsehood.
TruthIndeed, however, concerns desire, which [[Lacan]] states that [[truth]] is not [[structure]]d like a matter for the exact sciences but for the sciences of subjectivity[[fiction]]. <ref>{{E}} 306; {{Ec}} 808</ref>
Therefore ==The Real==The opposition which [[Lacan]] draws between [[truth is only a meaningful concept in ]] and the context of language: 'It is with the appearance of language that the dimension of truth emerges.'[[real]] dates back to his pre-war writings,<ref>E, 172{{Ec}} p.75</ref> and is taken up at various points;
Psychoanalytic treatment is based on the fundamental premise that speech is the only means of revealing <blockquote>"We are used to the real. The truth about desirewe [[repress]]."<ref>{{E}} p. 169</ref></blockquote>
'Truth hollows its way into However, [[Lacan]] also points out that [[truth]] is similar to the [[real thanks ]]; it is [[impossible]] to articulate the dimension [[whole]] [[truth]], and "[p]recisely because of speech. There is neither true nor false prior this [[impossibility]], [[truth]] aspires to speechthe real.'"<ref>Sl, 228{{TV}} p. 83</ref>
==See Also==
{{See}}
* [[Analysand]]
* [[Analyst]]
* [[Cause]]
* [[Desire]]
||
* [[Dialectic]]
* [[Philosophy]]
* [[Science]]
* [[Semblance]]
||
* [[Speech]]
* [[Structure]]
* [[Subject]]
* [[Treatment]]
{{Also}}
==Truth and [[Science]]References==From Lacan's earliest writings, the term 'truth' has metaphysical, even mystical, nuances which problematise any attempt to articulate truth and science. <div style="font-size:11px" class="references-small"><references/></div>
It is not that Lacan denies that science aims to know the truth, but simply that science cannot claim to monopolise truth as its exclusive property.<ref>Ec, 79</ref> __NOTOC__
[[Category:Psychoanalysis]][[Category:Jacques Lacan later argues that science is in fact based on a foreclosure of the concept of truth as cause.<ref>Ec, 874</ref> ]] The concept of truth is essential for understanding madness, and modern science renders madness meaningless by ignoring the concept of truth.<ref>Ec, 153-4</ref> ==Truth, lies and deception==Truth is intimately connected with deception, since lies can often reveal the truth about desire more eloquently than honest statements. Deception and lies are not the opposite of truth[[Category: on the contrary, they are inscribed in the text of truth. Linguistics]]The analyst's role is to reveal the truth inscribed in the deception of the analysand's speech. Although the analysand may in effect be saying to the analyst 'I am deceiving you', the analyst says to the analysand 'In this I am deceiving to you, what you are sending as message is what I express to you, and in doing so you are telling the truth.<ref>(S11,139-40; see S4, 107-8)</ref> ==Truth versus false appearances==The false appearances presented by the analysand are not merely obstacles that the analyst must expose and discard in order to discover the truth; on the contrary, the analyst must take them into account (see [[semblanceCategory:Dictionary]]). ==Truth, error and mistakes==Psychoanalysis has shown that the truthabout desire is often revealed by mistakes (parapraxes).<ref>see [[ActCategory:Language]]</ref> The complex relations between truth, mistakes, error and deception are evoked by Lacan in a typically elusive phrase when he describes 'the structuration of speech in search of truth' as 'error taking flight in deception and recaptured by mistake.'<ref>Sl, 273</ref> ==Truth and fiction==Lacan does not use the term 'fiction' in the sense of 'a falsehood', but in the sense of a scientific construct (Lacan takes his cue here from Bentham).<ref>see S7, 12</ref> Thus Lacan's term 'fiction' corresponds to Freud's term Konvention, convention,<ref>see S11, 163</ref> and has more in common with truth than falsehood. Indeed, Lacan states that truth is structured like a fiction.<ref>E, 306; Ec, 808</ref> ==Truth and the real==The opposition which Lacan draws between truth and the real dates back to his pre-war writings,<ref>e.g. Ec, 75</ref> and is taken up at various points; 'We are used to the real. The truth we repress.'<ref>E, 169</ref>However, Lacan also points out that truth is similar to the real; it is impossible to articulate the whole truth, and '[p[Category:Symbolic]]recisely because of this impossibility, truth aspires to the real.'<ref>Lacan, 1973a: 83</ref>==def==Sigmund Freud's notion of truth evolved from a factual conception into a relativistic method where the true and the false are defined both in relation to a conventional and bounded space (that of the cure) and the dynamic effects that "plausible" constructions might have on the psyche. Truth as an objective no longer remains "the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis" (1914g, pp. 147, 150). It inclines towards the notion of reality testing that demands that the subject partially abandon their illusions. Truth as an ideal is inseparable from... == References ==<references/> [[Category:LacanConcepts]]
[[Category:Terms]]
[[Category:ConceptsEdit]][[Category:Psychoanalysis]]{{OK}}
