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The search for factors that cause psychic suffering can be confused with the search for truth inasmuch as they are both repressed, misrepresented, displaced, represented by their opposite, and the like. Initially Freud imagined rediscovering the traumatic events in the histories [[Truth]] is one of his patients themselves, but promptly noticing "that there are no indications of reality in the unconsciousmost central, so that one cannot distinguish between the truth and fiction that is cathected with affect" (letter to Wilhelm Fleiss, 21 September 1897), he ended up privileging the psychical reality of the subject, wherein a dynamic verisimilitude was elaborated which would take on the value of truth. This relativization of truth seems to coincide with a Pirandellian conception of it (Each yet most [[complex]] [[terms]] in His Own Way). In fact, truth as a value has not disappeared from the Freudian purview but it has become subtler. Thus interpretation is not about the exhumation of truth but rather construction through the adoption of a coherent paradigm (Viderman, 1970), originating from the unperceived formulations of the subject[[Lacan]]'s free associations or dreams[[discourse]].

Thus for Jacques Lacan, truth extricates itself from reality: "In ==Psychoanalysis==The [[aim]] of [[psychoanalytic anamnesis, it ]] [[treatment]] is not a question of reality, but of truth, because to lead the effect of full speech is [[analysand]] to reorder past contingencies by conferring on them articulate the sense [[truth]] of necessities to come" (1956, p. 48). Truth is not precisely being true to reality, rather it speaks and stutters through its symptomatic distortionshis or her [[desire]].

The analyst has to engage with these "nuclei" [[Truth]] does not await, in some preformed [[state]] of truthfullness, then; Freud, for instance, defined them in relation to be revealed to the [[analysand]] by the sexual theories of children[[analyst]], which despite being untrue nonetheless each contain "a fragment of real truth" (1908c, p. 215). This but is an adult, intellectual mode rather constructed in the [[dialectic]]al movement of investigation whose results, because they are limited to the possibilities of human understanding, would have been false in relation to a broader perspective, but which include nevertheless "inspired" partial but significant interpretations[[treatment]] itself.<ref>{{Ec}} p.144</ref>

The quest for truth proceeds from a "truth fantasy" (Mijolla-Mellor==Philosophy==[[Lacan]] argues, 1985), which relates in opposition to an image of lost harmony (transparency, luminosity) within the I, the others, and one's self. Truth, in terms traditions of the demand for truthfulnessclassical [[philosophy]], that [[truth]] is central to the fundamental rule not beautiful<ref>{{S7}} p.217</ref> and that requires the abandonment of secrecy; however, it also guides the behavior of the analyst in their relationship with the patient, in their vision of the world, and in their research, requiring them is not necessarily beneficial to relinquish personal illusions for learn the construction of a coherent schema[[truth]]. Challenging illusion and narcissistic comfort, truth, according to Freud, is a force in its own right: "The hardest truths are heard and recognized at last, after the interests they have injured and the emotions they have roused have exhausted their fury" (1910d, <ref>{{S17}} p. 215).122</ref>

Piera Aulagnier gives [[Lacan]] speaks [[about]] "[[truth a central place ]]" in relation to the identity of the subject. It is the object of [[singular]], not as a "battle never definitively won nor lost to which periodically the I must surrender in order to modify and defend its positionssingle [[universal]] [[truth]], but as [[particular]] [[truth]], failing which it would be unable unique to turn towards or invest in its own identificatory space" (1984, each [[subject]].<ref>{{S7}} p. 147).24</ref>

The notion of truth in psychoanalysis ==Language==[[Truth]] is tied to the history the subject, only a meaningful [[concept]] in the same way as it is to humanity, because it is not simply a case of a balance between understanding and the thing, but context of a narrative that is reconstructed using the residues left behind by legend.[[language]]:

==definition==Sigmund Freud's notion of truth evolved from a factual conception into a relativistic method where the true and the false are defined both in relation to a conventional and bounded space (that of the cure) and the dynamic effects that "plausible" constructions might have [[Psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is based on the psyche. Truth as an objective no longer remains "the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis" (1914g, pp. 147, 150). It inclines towards the notion of reality testing premise that demands that the subject partially abandon their illusions. Truth as an ideal is inseparable from psychoanalytic inquiry and [[speech]] is unattainable, except partially in the "nuclei" only means of revealing the [[truth present within individual and collective distortions]] about [[desire]].

The search for factors that cause psychic suffering can be confused with the search for truth inasmuch as they are both repressed, misrepresented, displaced, represented by their opposite, and the like. Initially Freud imagined rediscovering the traumatic events in the histories of his patients themselves, but promptly noticing <blockquote>"that there are no indications of reality in the unconscious, so that one cannot distinguish between [[Truth]] hollows its way into the truth and fiction that is cathected with affect" (letter [[real]] thanks to Wilhelm Fleiss, 21 September 1897), he ended up privileging the psychical reality dimension of the subject, wherein a dynamic verisimilitude was elaborated which would take on the value of truth[[speech]]. This relativization of truth seems There is neither [[true]] nor [[false]] prior to coincide with a Pirandellian conception of it (Each in His Own Way)[[speech]]. In fact, truth as a value has not disappeared from the Freudian purview but it has become subtler. Thus interpretation is not about the exhumation of truth but rather construction through the adoption of a coherent paradigm (Viderman, 1970), originating from the unperceived formulations of the subject's free associations or dreams"<ref>{{S1}} p.228</ref></blockquote>

Thus for Jacques ==Science==From [[Lacan]]'s earliest writings, the term "[[truth extricates itself from reality: ]]"In psychoanalytic anamnesishas metaphysical, it is not a question of reality even mystical, but of nuances which problematise any attempt to articulate [[truth, because the effect of full speech is to reorder past contingencies by conferring on them the sense of necessities to come" (1956, p. 48). Truth is not precisely being true to reality, rather it speaks ]] and stutters through its symptomatic distortions[[science]].

The analyst has It is not that [[Lacan]] denies that [[science]] aims to engage with these "nuclei" of [[know]] the [[truth]], then; Freud, for instance, defined them in relation but simply that [[science]] cannot [[claim]] to the sexual theories of children, which despite being untrue nonetheless each contain "a fragment of real monopolise [[truth" (1908c, ]] as its exclusive property.<ref>{{Ec}} p. 215). This is an adult, intellectual mode of investigation whose results, because they are limited to the possibilities of human understanding, would have been false in relation to a broader perspective, but which include nevertheless "inspired" partial but significant interpretations.79</ref>

The quest for truth proceeds from a "truth fantasy" (Mijolla-Mellor, 1985), which relates to an image of lost harmony (transparency, luminosity) within the I, the others, and one's self. Truth, in terms of the demand for truthfulness, [[Lacan]] later argues that [[science]] is central to the fundamental rule that requires the abandonment of secrecy; however, it also guides the behavior of the analyst in their relationship with the patient, in their vision fact based on a [[foreclosure]] of the world, and in their research, requiring them to relinquish personal illusions for the construction concept of a coherent schema[[truth]] as [[cause]]. Challenging illusion and narcissistic comfort, truth, according to Freud, is a force in its own right: "The hardest truths are heard and recognized at last, after the interests they have injured and the emotions they have roused have exhausted their fury" (1910d, <ref>{{Ec}} p. 215).874</ref>

Piera Aulagnier gives The concept of [[truth a central place in relation to ]] is essential for [[understanding]] [[madness]], and modern [[science]] renders [[madness]] meaningless by ignoring the identity concept of the subject[[truth]]. It is the object of a "battle never definitively won nor lost to which periodically the I must surrender in order to modify and defend its positions, failing which it would be unable to turn towards or invest in its own identificatory space" (1984, <ref>{{Ec}} p. 147).153-4</ref>

The notion of truth in psychoanalysis ==Truth and Deception==[[Truth]] is tied to the history the subjectintimately connected with [[deception]], in since lies can often reveal the same way as it is to humanity, because it is not simply a case of a balance between understanding and the thing, but of a narrative that is reconstructed using the residues left behind by legend[[truth]] about [[desire]] more eloquently than honest statements.

* Aulagnier, Piera. (1984). LThe [[analyst]]'Apprenti-historien et le maîtresorcier. Du discours identifiant au discours délirant. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. * ——. (1914g). Remembering, repeating and working-through (Further recommendations on s [[role]] is to reveal the technique [[truth]] inscribed in the [[deception]] of psycho-analysis II). SE, 12: 145-156. * Freud, Sigmund. (1908c). On the sexual theories of children. SE, 9: 205-226. * ——. 1910d). The future prospects of psycho-analytic therapy. SE, 11: 139-151. * ——. (1950a [1887-1902[analysand]]'s [[speech]]). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173-280. * Lacan, Jacques. (1989). Ecrits: A Selection. (Alan Sheridan, Trans.) 5th ed. London: Tavistock/Routledge.

* Reed, Gail S. (1995). Clinical truth and contemporary relativism: Meaning, narration. Journal of the American Psycho-Analytic Association, 43, 713-740. * Sass, L. A., and Woolfolk, R. L. (1988). Psychoanalysis and the hermeneutic turn: On <blockquote>"Narrative truth." Journal of the American Psychoanalytic AssociationIn this I am deceiving to you, 36what you are sending as [[message]] is what I express to you, 429-454. * Schafer, Roy. (1992). Retelling a life. In Narration and dialogue in psychoanalysis. New York: Basic Books. * Spence, Donald. (1982). Narrative truth and historical doing so you are telling the truth. Meaning and interpretation in psychoanalysis. New York: W<ref>{{S11}} p. W139-40; {{S4}} p. Norton and Co. * Spezzano, Charles. (1993107-8). A relational model of inquiry and truth: Conversation. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 3, 177-208.</ref></blockquote>

63-5==Fiction==[[Lacan]] does not use the term "[[fiction]]" in the [[sense]] of 'a falsehood', 141-3 Conversationsbut in the sense of a [[scientific]] [[construct]].<ref>{{S7}} p.12</ref>

Truth (''vérité'') is one of the most centralIndeed, and yet most complex terms in [[Lacan's discourse. A few basic points are clear and constant in Lacan's concept of ]] states that [[truth; truth always refers to truth about desire, and the aim of psychoanalytic treatment ]] is to lead the analysand to articulate this truth[[structure]]d like a [[fiction]]. <ref>{{E}} 306; {{Ec}} 808</ref>

Truth does not await, in some preformed state of fullness, to be revealed ==The Real==The opposition which [[Lacan]] draws between [[truth]] and the [[real]] dates back to the analysand by the analyst; on the contraryhis pre-war writings, it is gradually constructed in the dialectical movement of the treatment itself.<ref>{{Ec, 144}} p.75</ref> and is taken up at various points;

Lacan argues, in opposition <blockquote>"We are used to the traditions of classical philosophy, that real. The truth is not beautifulwe [[repress]]."<ref>S7, 217{{E}} p.169</ref> and that it is not necessarily beneficial to learn the truth.<ref>Sl7, 122</refblockquote>

While Lacan always speaks about 'truth' in the singular, this is not a single universal truth, but an absolutely particular truth, unique to each subject.<ref>see S7, 24</ref>   However, beyond these few simple points, it is impossible to give a univocal definition of the way Lacan uses the term, since it functions in multiple contexts simultaneously, in opposition to a wide variety of terrns.  All that will be attempted here, therefore, is a general indication of some of the contexts in which it functions. ==Truth versus exactitude==Exactitude is a question of 'introducing measurement into the real',<ref>E, 74</ref> and constitutes the aim of the exact sciences. Truth, however, concerns desire, which is not a matter for the exact sciences but for the sciences of subjectivity.  Therefore truth is only a meaningful concept in the context of language: 'It is with the appearance of language that the dimension of truth emerges.'<ref>E, 172</ref>  Psychoanalytic treatment is based on the fundamental premise that speech is the only means of revealing the truth about desire.  'Truth hollows its way into the real thanks to the dimension of speech. There is neither true nor false prior to speech.'<ref>Sl, 228</ref>  ==Truth and [[ScienceLacan]]==From Lacan's earliest writings, the term 'truth' has metaphysical, even mystical, nuances which problematise any attempt to articulate truth and science.  It is not that Lacan denies that science aims to know the truth, but simply that science cannot claim to monopolise truth as its exclusive property.<ref>Ec, 79</ref>  Lacan later argues also points out that science is in fact based on a foreclosure of the concept of truth as cause.<ref>Ec, 874</ref>  The concept of truth is essential for understanding madness, and modern science renders madness meaningless by ignoring the concept of truth.<ref>Ec, 153-4</ref> ==Truth, lies and deception==Truth is intimately connected with deception, since lies can often reveal the truth about desire more eloquently than honest statements.  Deception and lies are not the opposite of truth: on the contrary, they are inscribed in the text of truth.  The analyst's role is to reveal the truth inscribed in the deception of the analysand's speech.  Although the analysand may in effect be saying to the analyst 'I am deceiving you', the analyst says to the analysand 'In this I am deceiving to you, what you are sending as message is what I express to you, and in doing so you are telling the truth.<ref>(S11,139-40; see S4, 107-8)</ref>  ==Truth versus false appearances==The false appearances presented by the analysand are not merely obstacles that the analyst must expose and discard in order to discover the truth; on the contrary, the analyst must take them into account (see [[semblance]]). ==Truth, error and mistakes==Psychoanalysis has shown that the truthabout desire is often revealed by mistakes (parapraxes).<ref>see [[Act]]</ref> The complex relations between truth, mistakes, error and deception are evoked by Lacan in a typically elusive phrase when he describes 'the structuration of speech in search of truth' as 'error taking flight in deception and recaptured by mistake.'<ref>Sl, 273</ref> ==Truth and fiction==Lacan does not use the term 'fiction' in the sense of 'a falsehood', but in the sense of a scientific construct (Lacan takes his cue here from Bentham).<ref>see S7, 12</ref> Thus Lacan's term 'fiction' corresponds to Freud's term Konvention, convention,<ref>see S11, 163</ref> and has more in common with truth than falsehood. Indeed, Lacan states that truth is structured like a fiction.<ref>E, 306; Ec, 808</ref> ==Truth and the real==The opposition which Lacan draws between truth and the real dates back to his pre-war writings,<ref>e.g. Ec, 75</ref> and is taken up at various points; 'We are used to the real. The truth we repress.'<ref>E, 169</ref>However, Lacan also points out that truth is similar to the [[real]]; it is [[impossible ]] to articulate the [[whole ]] [[truth]], and '"[p]recisely because of this [[impossibility]], [[truth ]] aspires to the real.'"<ref>Lacan, 1973a: {{TV}} p. 83</ref>

# Freud, Sigmund. (1908c). On the sexual theories of children. SE, 9: 205-226.# ——. 1910d). The future prospects of psycho-analytic therapy. SE, 11: 139-151.# ——. (1950a [1887-1902]). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173-280.# Lacan, Jacques. (1989). Ecrits: A Selection. (Alan Sheridan, Trans.) 5th ed. London: Tavistock</Routledge.div>

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