Truth

   truth (vÈritÈ)           Truth is one of the most central, and yet most complex

   terms in Lacan's discourse. A few basic points are clear and constant in

    Lacan's concept of truth; truth always refers to truth about desire, and the

    aim of psychoanalytic treatment is to lead the analysand to articulate this truth.

    Truth does not await, in some preformed state of fullness, to be revealed to the

    analysand by the analyst; on the contrary, it is gradually constructed in the

    dialectical movement of the treatment itself (Ec, 144). Lacan argues, in

    oPposition to the traditions of classical philosophy, that truth is not beautiful

    (S7, 217) and that it is not necessarily beneficial to learn the truth (Sl7, 122).

    While Lacan always speaks about 'truth' in the singular, this is not a single

    universal truth, but an absolutely particular truth, unique to each subject (see

    S7, 24). However, beyond these few simple points, it is impossible to give a

univocal definition of the way Lacan uses the term, since it functions in

   multiple contexts simultaneously, in opposition to a wide variety of terrns.

   All that will be attempted here, therefore, is a general indication of some of the

   contexts in which it functions.

   e    Truth versus exactitude         Exactitude is a question of 'introducing mea-

   surement into the real' (E, 74), and constitutes the aim of the exact sciences.

   Truth, however, concerns desire, which is not a matter for the exact sciences

    but for the sciences of subjectivity. Therefore truth is only            a meaningful

   concept in the context of language: 'It is with the appearance of language

   that the dimension of truth emerges' (E, 172). Psychoanalytic treatment is

    based on the fundamental premise that speech is the only means of revealing

   the truth about desire. 'Truth hollows its way into the real thanks to the

    dimension of speech. There is neither true nor false prior to speech' (Sl, 228).

    e    Truth and scIENCE    From Lacan's earliest writings, the term 'truth' has

    metaphysical,  even mystical,    nuances which problematise any attempt to

    articulate truth and science. It is not that Lacan denies that science aims to

    know the truth, but simply that science cannot claim to monopolise truth as its

    exclusive property (Ec, 79). Lacan later argues that science is in fact based on

    a foreclosure of the concept of truth as cause (Ec, 874). The concept of truth is

    essential for understanding madness, and modern science renders madness

    meaningless by ignoring the concept of truth (Ec, 153-4).

    e    Truth, lies and deception       Truth is intimately connected with deception,

    since lies can often reveal the truth about desire more eloquently than honest

    statements. Deception and lies are not the opposite of truth: on the contrary,

    they are inscribed in the text of truth. The analyst's role is to reveal the truth

    inscribed in the deception of the analysand's speech. Although the analysand

    may in effect be saying to the analyst 'I am deceiving you', the analyst says to

    the analysand 'In this I am deceiving to you, what you are sending as message

    is what I express to you, and in doing so you            are telling the truth' (S11,

    139-40; see S4, 107-8).

    e    Truth versus false appearances         The false appearances presented by the

    analysand are not merely obstacles that the analyst must expose and discard in

    order to discover the truth; on the contrary, the analyst must take them into

    account (see SEMBLANCE).

    e    Truth, error and mistakes Psychoanalysis has shown that the truth

    about desire is often revealed by mistakes (parapraxes; see AcT). The complex

    relations between truth, mistakes, error and deception are evoked by Lacan in a

    typically elusive phrase when he describes 'the structuration of speech in

    search of truth'   as 'error taking flight in deception and recaptured by mis-

    take' (Sl, 273).

    e    Truth and fiction     Lacan does not use the term 'fiction' in the sense of 'a

falsehood', but in the sense of a scientific construct (Lacan takes his cue here

from Bentham - see S7, 12). Thus Lacan's term 'fiction' corresponds to

Freud's term Konvention, convention (see S11, 163), and has more in com-

  mon with truth than falsehood. Indeed, Lacan states that truth is structured like

  a fiction (E, 306; Ec, 808).

  , Truth and the REAL        The opposition which Lacan draws between truth

and the real dates back to his pre-war writings (e.g. Ec, 75), and is taken up at

various points; 'We are used to the real. The truth we repress' (E, 169).

  However, Lacan also points out that truth is similar to the real; it is impossible

  to articulate the whole truth, and '[p]recisely because of this impossibility,

truth aspires to the real' (Lacan, 1973a: 83).