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The term <i>Weltanschauung</i>, literally, "view of the [[world]]," had a very specific [[meaning ]] for [[Freud]], who defined it in the New Introductory Lecture as follows: "A <i>Weltanschauung</i> is an [[intellectual ]] [[construction ]] which solves all the problems of our [[existence ]] uniformly on the basis of one overriding hypothesis, which, accordingly, leaves no question unanswered and in which everything that interests us finds its fixed [[place]]" (1933a [1932], p. 158).Indeed Freud had already used this [[concept ]] as a stick with which to beat philosophies and religions—both lambasted, for example, in his <i>[[Future ]] of an Illusion</i> (1927c). In 1933, however, he broadened the [[notion]], bringing [[science ]] too under its aegis; this with the proviso, though, that "the <i>Weltanschauung</i> of science already departs noticeably from our definition. It is [[true ]] that it too assumes the uniformity of the explanation of the [[universe]]; but it does so only as a programme, the fulfillment of which is relegated to the future." (pp. 158-159). The fact was that the notion of <i>Weltanschauung</i> usefully supplemented that of [[culture]], for it helped specify culture's different spheres and point up their underlying emotional raisons d'être.Freud extolled and defended the virtues of an [[intolerance ]] that refused, in the [[name ]] of "truth," to consider all domains of [[human ]] intellectual [[activity ]] to be of equal [[value]]: "It is simply a fact that the truth cannot be tolerant, that it admits of no compromises or limitations, that research regards every sphere of human activity as belonging to it and that it must be relentlessly critical if any [[other ]] [[power ]] tries to take over any part of it" (p. 160). It has to be said, therefore, that Freud's views on [[religion ]] and especially on [[philosophy ]] were rather narrow—judging, as he did, that they were totally closed to [[doubt]]. On the other hand, his opposition to dogmatism is much easier to comprehend if one bears in [[mind ]] that dogmatism constitutes the major temptation for any theoretician, and no doubt for Freud himself with respect to [[psychoanalysis]]. And it was certainly for the sake of psychoanalysis that he defended the [[ideal ]] of [[scientific ]] ascesis.Apropos of the [[religious ]] <i>Weltanschauung</i>, in 1933 Freud articulated [[ideas ]] he had expressed in <i>[[Totem ]] and [[Taboo]]</i> (1912-13a) on the [[formation ]] of [[religions]], while restating, in [[essence]], some themes of <i>The [[Future of an Illusion]]</i> concerning the way religion panders to humanity's "[[desire ]] for [[knowledge]]" and to its [[infantile ]] [[need ]] for protection. To emphasize how risky a religious view of the world is to [[thought]], which it limits through its interdictions, he also revisited the ideas expressed in "[[Civilized ]] [[Sexual ]] [[Morality ]] and Modern Nervous [[Illness]]" (1908d). Most of Freud's observations on the notion of <i>Weltanschauung</i> were in fact concerned with religion, but he did also mention art, which for him was "almost always harmless and beneficent; it does not seek to be anything but an illusion" (1933a [1932], p. 160), and philosophy, [[about ]] which he wrote: "Philosophy is not opposed to science, it behaves like a science and works in part by the same methods; it departs from it, however, by clinging to the illusion of [[being ]] able to [[present ]] a picture of the universe which is without gaps and is coherent" (p. 160).[[Another ]] kind of <i>Weltanschauung</i>, about which Freud usually had very little to say, save for his considerations on war, was [[politics]], and specifically [[Marxism]], to which he opposed a conception of the evolution of societies that was just as [[materialist ]] as [[Marx]]'s, but without any [[real ]] [[discussion ]] of Marx's theories, which seemed to him to be derived from "the obscure [[Hegelian ]] philosophy, in whose [[school ]] Marx graduated" (p. 177). [[Nihilism ]] of the [[anarchist ]] variety he denounced as pure sophistry; it nevertheless constituted an attack on the very core of scientific ideals, since it abolished the criterion of truth.Finally, Freud's reflections on the notion of <i>Weltanschauung</i> were generally conflated with an earnest and vibrant pleading of the [[case ]] of science, as when he said about the common man: "Truth seems to him no more capable of comparative degrees than [[death]]" (p. 172). His conclusion was a real rallying cry: "A <i>Weltanschauung</i> erected upon science has, apart from its emphasis on the real [[external ]] world, mainly [[negative ]] traits, such as submission to the truth and [[rejection ]] of illusions. Any of our fellow-men who is dissatisfied with this [[state ]] of things, who calls for more than this for his momentary consolation, may look for it where he can find it. We shall not grudge it him, we cannot [[help ]] him, but nor can we on his account [[think ]] differently" (p. 182).

<blockquote>"''Weltanschauung''" is, I am afraid, a specifically [[German ]] notion, which it would be difficult to translate into a foreign [[language]]. If I attempt to give you a definition of the [[word]], it can hardly fail to strike you as inept. By ''Weltanschauung'', then, I mean an intellectual construction, which gives a [[unified ]] solution of all the problems of our existence in virtue of a comprehensive hypothesis, a construction, therefore, in which no question is [[left ]] open and in which everything in which we are interested finds a place. It is easy to see that the possession of such a Weltanshchauung is one of the ideal wishes of mankind. When one believes in such a [[thing]], one feels secure in [[life]], one [[knows ]] what one ought to strive after, and how one ought to organise one's emotions and interests to the best [[purpose]].<ref>{{NILP}} Ch. 7</ref></blockquote>

# [[Freud, Sigmund]]. (1908d). "Civilized" sexual morality and modern nervous illness. SE, 9: 177-204.

# ——. (1933a [1932]). New introductory lectures on [[psycho]]-[[analysis]]. SE, 22: 1-182.