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[[Freud]]'s account of [[sexual difference]] is based on the view that there are certain [[psychical ]] characteristics that can be called "[[masculine]]" and [[others ]] that can be called "[[feminine]]", and that these differ from each other significantly. However, [[Freud]] constantly refuses to give any definition of the [[terms]] "[[masculine]]" and "[[feminine]]", arguing that they are foundational [[concepts]] which can be used but not elucidated by [[psychoanalytic theory]].<ref>{{F}} "[[Works of Sigmund Freud|The Psychogenesis of a Case of Female Homosexuality]]", 1920a. [[SE]] XVIII, 171</ref> One feature of this opposition is that the two terms do not function in an exactly symmetrical way. -->===Femininity and Masculinity===[[Masculinity]] is taken by [[Freud]] as the paradigm; he asserts that there is only one [[libido]], which is [[masculine]], and that the [[psyche|psychical]] [[development]] of the [[girl]] is at first identical to that of the [[boy]], only diverging at a later [[moment]]. [[Femininity]] is thus that which diverges from the [[masculinity|masculine paradigm]], and [[Freud]] regards it as a mysterious, unexplored region, a "[[dark continent]]."<ref>{{F}} ''[[Works of Sigmund Freud|The Question of Lay-Analysis]]'', 1926e. [[SE]] XX, 212</ref> The "riddle of the [[nature]] of femininity" comes to preoccupy [[Freud]] in his later writings, and [[drives]] him to ask the famous question, "What does woman [[want]]?"<ref>{{F}} ''[[Works of Sigmund Freud|New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis]]'', 1933a. [[SE]] XXII, 113</ref> [[Masculinity]] is a [[self]]-evident given, [[femininity]] is a zone of mystery:

However, [[Freud]] constantly refuses to give any definition of the terms "[[masculine]]" and "[[feminine]]", arguing that they are foundational concepts which can be used but not elucidated by [[psychoanalytic theory]].<ref>{{F}} (1920a) "The Psychogenesis of a Case of Female Homosexuality", [[SE]] XVIII, 171</ref> ===Masculine Paradigm===One feature of this opposition is that the two terms do not function in an exactly symmetrical way.  [[Masculinity]] is taken by [[Freud]] as the paradigm; he asserts that there is only one [[libido]], which is [[masculine]], and that the psychical development of the girl is at first identical to that of the boy, only diverging at a later moment.  ==="What Does Woman Want?"===[[Femininity]] is thus that which diverges from the [[masculinity|masculine paradigm]], and [[Freud]] regards it as a mysterious, unexplored region, a "dark continent."<ref>{{F}} (1926e) ''The Question of Lay-Analysis'', [[SE]] XX, 212</ref>  The "riddle of the nature of femininity" comes to preoccupy [[Freud]] in his later writings, and drives him to ask the famous question, "What does woman want?"<ref>{{F}} (1933a) ''New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis'', [[SE]] XXII, 113</ref> [[Masculinity]] is a self-evident given, [[femininity]] is a zone of mystery: <blockquote>[[Psychoanalysis]] does not try to describe what a [[woman]] is -- that would be a task it could scarcely perform -- but sets [[about ]] enquiring how she comes into [[being]], how a [[woman]] develops out of a [[child]] with a bisexual disposition.<ref>{{F}} (1933a) ''[[Works of Sigmund Freud|New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis]]'', 1933a. [[SE]] XXII, 116</ref></blockquote>

Apart from a few remarks on the function of the [[mother]] in the [[family ]] [[complexes]],<ref>{{1938}}</ref> [[Lacan]]'s pre-war writings do not engage with the debate on [[femininity]].  

The occasional statements on the [[subject]] which occur in [[Lacan]]'s [[Works of Sigmund Freud|work ]] in the early 1950s are couched in terms derived from [[Claude Lévi-Strauss]]; [[woman|women]] are seen as [[objects ]] of [[exchange ]] which circulate like [[sign]]s between kinship groups.<ref>[[Claude Lévi-Strauss|Lévi-Strauss, Claude]]. ''[[The Elementary Structures of Kinship]]'', Boston: Beacon Press, 1969 [1949b].</ref>  <blockquote>"Women in the [[real ]] [[order ]] serve . . . as objects for the exchanges required by the elementary [[structures ]] of kinship."<ref>{{E}} p.207</ref></blockquote> [[Lacan]] argues that it is precisely the fact that [[woman]] is pushed into the [[position ]] of an exchange object that constitutes the difficulty of the [[feminine position]]: <blockquote>For her, there's something insurmountable, let us say unacceptable, in the fact of being placed in the position of an [[object]] in the [[symbolic order]], to which, on the other hand, she is entirely subjected no less than the man.<ref>{{S2}} p.262</ref></blockquote> 

 [[Lacan]]'s [[analysis ]] of the [[Dora]] [[case ]] makes the same point: what is unacceptable for [[Dora]] is her position as object of exchange between her [[father]] and Herr K.<ref>{{L}} 1951a</ref>  Being in this position of exchange object means that [[woman]] "has a relation of the second degree to this [[symbolic ]] order."<ref>{{S2}} p.262; {{S4}} p.95-6</ref>-->

In 1956, [[Lacan]] takes up the traditional association of [[hysteria]] with [[femininity]], arguing also argues that [[hysteria]] is in fact nothing other than the question of [[femininity]] itself, the question which may be phrased "What there is a woman?". ===Feminine Position=== This is true for both [[male]] and [[female]] [[hysteric]]s.<ref>{{S3}} p.178</ref>  The term "[[woman]]" here refers not to some biological essence but to a position in the [[symbolic order]]; it is synonymous with the term "[[feminine position]]".  no [[Lacansymbolization]] also argues that "there is no symbolisation of woman's sex as such", since there is no feminine equivalent to the "highly prevalent symbol" provided by the [[phallus]].<ref>{{S3}} p.176</ref>   This symbolic dissymmetry forces the [[woman]] to take the same route through the [[Oedipus complex]] as the boy, i.e. to [[identify]] with the [[father]].   However, this is more [[complex]] for the [[woman]], since she is required to take the [[image]] of a member of the other [[sex ]] as the basis for her [[identification]].<ref>{{S3, }} p. 176</ref>

[[Lacan]] returns to the question of [[femininity]] in 1958, in a paper entitled "[[Guiding remarks for a congress on feminine sexuality]]."<ref>{{L}} "[[Works of Jacques Lacan|Propos directifs pour un congrès sur la sexualité féminine]]," 1958d, in {{E}} pp. 725-36</ref>  In this paper he [[notes ]] the impasses which have beset [[psychoanalytic ]] discussions of [[feminine]] [[sexuality]], and argues that [[woman]] is the [[Other]] for both [[men]] and [[women]]. <blockquote>"Man here [[acts ]] as the relay whereby the woman becomes this Other for herself as she is this Other for him."<ref>{{Ec}} p.732</ref></blockquote>-->

 [[Lacan]]'s most important contributions to the debate on [[femininity]] come, like [[Freud]]'s, late in his [[work]].   In the [[seminar]] of [[{{Y}}|1972-3]], [[Lacan]] advances the [[concept ]] of a specifically [[feminine]] ''[[jouissance]]'' which goes "beyond the phallus";<ref>{{S20}} p.69</ref> this ''[[jouissance]]'' is "of the order of the infinite," like mystical ecstasy.<ref>{{S20}} p.44</ref>   [[Women]] may [[experience ]] this ''[[jouissance]]'', but they [[know ]] nothing about it.<ref>{{S20}} p.71</ref>

It is also in this [[seminar]] that [[Lacan]] takes up his controversial [[formula]], first advanced in the [[seminar]] of 1970-1, "[[woman|Woman does not exist]]" (''la femme n'existe pas''),<ref>{{L}} (1973a) ''[[Works of Jacques Lacan|Télévision]]'', [[Paris]]: Seuil, 1973 [''[[Works of Jacques Lacan|Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment]]'', ed. [[Joan Copjec]], trans. Denis Hollier, Rosalind Krauss and Annette Michelson, New York: Norton, 1990]. p.60</ref>), which he here rephrases as "[[woman|there is no such thing as Woman]]" (''il n'y a pas La femme'').<ref>{{S20}} p.68</ref>).   As is clear in the original [[French]], what [[Lacan]] puts into question is not the noun "[[woman]]", but the definite article which precedes it.   In [[French ]] the definite article indicates [[universality]], and this is precisely the characteristic that [[women]] [[lack]]; [[women]] "do not lend themselves to generalisation, even to phallocentric generalisation."<ref>{{L}} "[[Works of Jacques Lacan|Conférence à Genève sur le symptôme]]", 1975b. ''Les Block-Notes de la [[psychanalyse]]'', Brussels.</ref>

Hence [[Lacan]] strikes through the definite article whenever it precedes the term ''[[femme]]'' in much the same way as he strikes through the '''A''' to produce the [[symbol]] for the [[bar]]red [[Other]], for like [[woman]], the [[Other]] does not [[exist]].   To press home the point, [[Lacan]] speaks of [[woman]] as "[[not-all]]" (''[[not-all|pas-toute]]'');<ref>{{S20}} p.13</ref>); unlike [[masculinity]], which is a [[universal ]] function founded upon the [[phallic ]] exception ([[castration]]), [[woman]] is a non-universal which admits of no exception.  [[Woman]] is compared to [[truth]], since both partake of the logic of the [[not-all]] (there is no such thing as all [[women]]; it is impossible to say "the whole truth."<ref>{{L}} 1973a: 64</ref>

 [[Lacan]] goes on in 1975 to [[state ]] that a "a [[woman|woman is a symptom]]."<ref>{{L}} (1974-5: ) ''[[Seminar XXII|Le Séminaire. Livre XXII. RSI, 1974-75]]'', published in ''[[Ornicar?]]'', nos. 2-5, 1975. [[Seminar]] of 21 January 1975.</ref>   More precisely, a [[woman]] is a [[symptom]] of a [[man]], in the [[sense ]] that a [[woman]] can only ever enter the [[psychic ]] [[economy ]] of men as a [[fantasy]] [[object]] (a), the [[cause]] of their [[desire]].

==See Also=={{See}}* [[LacanCastration]]* ''s remarks on [[womanJouissance]] and on ''||* [[feminine sexualityLibido]] have become the focus of controversy and debate in feminist theory.  Feminists have divided over whether to see * [[LacanSexual difference]] as an ally or an enemy of the feminist cause. ||Some have seen his theories as providing an incisive description of patriarchy and as a way of challenging fixed concepts of sexual identity.<ref>e.g. Mitchell and Rose, 1982</ref>  Others have argued that his concept of the * [[symbolic orderSexual relationship]] reinstates patriarchy as a transhistorical given, and that his privileging of the * [[phallusSymptom]] simply repeats the alleged misogynies of [[Freud]] himself.<ref>e.g. Gallop, 1982; Grosz, 1990</ref>{{Also}}