woman ({{Top}}femme) Freud's account of SEXUAL DIFFERENCE is based on the{{Bottom}}
==Sigmund Freud==<!-- ===Masculine and Feminine Psychical Characteristics===[[Freud]]'s account of [[sexual difference]] is based on the view that there are certain [[psychical ]] characteristics that can be called "[[masculine]]" and [[others]] that can be called "[[feminine]]", and that these differ from each other significantly. However, [[Freud]] constantly refuses to give any definition of the [[terms]] "[[masculine]]" and "[[feminine]]", arguing that they are foundational [[concepts]] which can be used but not elucidated by [[psychoanalytic theory]].<ref>{{F}} "[[Works of Sigmund Freud|The Psychogenesis of a Case of Female Homosexuality]]", 1920a. [[SE]] XVIII, 171</ref> One feature of this opposition is that the two terms do not function in an exactly symmetrical way. -->===Femininity and Masculinity===[[Masculinity]] is taken by [[Freud]] as the paradigm; he asserts that there is only one [[libido]], which is [[masculine]], and that the [[psyche|psychical]] [[development]] of the [[girl]] is at first identical to that of the [[boy]], only diverging at a later [[moment]]. [[Femininity]] is thus that which diverges from the [[masculinity|masculine paradigm]], and [[Freud]] regards it as a mysterious, unexplored region, a "[[dark continent]]."<ref>{{F}} ''[[Works of Sigmund Freud|The Question of Lay-Analysis]]'', 1926e. [[SE]] XX, 212</ref> The "riddle of the [[nature]] of femininity" comes to preoccupy [[Freud]] in his later writings, and [[drives]] him to ask the famous question, "What does woman [[want]]?"<ref>{{F}} ''[[Works of Sigmund Freud|New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis]]''mascu, 1933a. [[SE]] XXII, 113</ref> [[Masculinity]] is a [[self]]-evident given, [[femininity]] is a zone of mystery:
line' and others <blockquote>[[Psychoanalysis]] does not try to describe what a [[woman]] is -- that can would be called a task it could scarcely perform -- but sets [[about]] enquiring how she comes into [[being]], how a [[woman]] develops out of a [[child]] with a bisexual disposition.<ref>{{F}} ''[[Works of Sigmund Freud|New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis]]'feminine', and that these differ from each1933a. [[SE]] XXII, 116</ref></blockquote>
==Jacques Lacan==<!--===Development of Thought===Apart from a few remarks on the function of the [[mother]] in the [[family]] [[complexes]],<ref>{{1938}}</ref> [[Lacan]]'s pre-war writings do not engage with the debate on [[femininity]]. ===Women as Objects of Exchange===The occasional statements on the [[subject]] which occur in [[Lacan]]'s [[Works of Sigmund Freud|work]] in the early 1950s are couched in terms derived from [[Claude Lévi-Strauss]]; [[woman|women]] are seen as [[objects]] of [[exchange]] which circulate like [[sign]]s between kinship groups.<ref>[[Claude Lévi-Strauss|Lévi-Strauss, Claude]]. ''[[The Elementary Structures of Kinship]]'', Boston: Beacon Press, 1969 [1949b].</ref> <blockquote>"Women in the [[real]] [[order]] serve . . . as objects for the exchanges required by the elementary [[structures]] of kinship."<ref>{{E}} p. 207</ref></blockquote>[[Lacan]] argues that it is precisely the fact that [[woman]] is pushed into the [[position]] of an exchange object that constitutes the difficulty of the [[feminine position]]:<blockquote>For her, there's something insurmountable, let us say unacceptable, in the fact of being placed in the position of an [[object]] in the [[symbolic order]], to which, on the other significantlyhand, she is entirely subjected no less than the man.<ref>{{S2}} p. 262</ref></blockquote>====Dora Case====[[Lacan]]'s [[analysis]] of the [[Dora]] [[case]] makes the same point: what is unacceptable for [[Dora]] is her position as object of exchange between her [[father]] and Herr K. However<ref>{{L}} 1951a</ref> Being in this position of exchange object means that [[woman]] "has a relation of the second degree to this [[symbolic]] order."<ref>{{S2}} p.262; {{S4}} p.95-6</ref>-->===Hysteria===In 1956, [[Lacan]] takes up the traditional [[association]] of [[hysteria]] with [[femininity]], Freud constantly refuses arguing that [[hysteria]] is in fact [[nothing]] other than the question of [[femininity]] itself, the question which may be phrased "[[woman|What is a woman?]]". This is [[true]] for both [[male]] and [[female]] [[hysteric]]s.<ref>{{S3}} p. 178</ref> The term "[[woman]]" here refers not to some [[biology|biological]] [[essence]] but to give any definition ofa position in the [[symbolic order]]; it is synonymous with the term "[[feminine position]]".
the terms 'masculine' and [[Lacan]] also argues that "there is no [[symbolization]] of woman's sex as such", since there is no feminine'equivalent to the "highly prevalent symbol" provided by the [[phallus]].<ref>{{S3}} p.176</ref> This symbolic dissymmetry forces the [[woman]] to take the same route through the [[Oedipus complex]] as the boy, i.e. to [[identify]] with the [[father]]. However, this is more [[complex]] for the [[woman]], arguing that they are foundationalsince she is required to take the [[image]] of a member of the other [[sex]] as the basis for her [[identification]].<ref>{{S3}} p. 176</ref>
concepts <!--===Feminine Sexuality===[[Lacan]] returns to the question of [[femininity]] in 1958, in a paper entitled "[[Guiding remarks for a congress on feminine sexuality]]."<ref>{{L}} "[[Works of Jacques Lacan|Propos directifs pour un congrès sur la sexualité féminine]]," 1958d, in {{E}} pp. 725-36</ref> In this paper he [[notes]] the impasses which can be used have beset [[psychoanalytic]] discussions of [[feminine]] [[sexuality]], and argues that [[woman]] is the [[Other]] for both [[men]] and [[women]].<blockquote>"Man here [[acts]] as the relay whereby the woman becomes this Other for herself as she is this Other for him."<ref>{{Ec}} p. 732</ref></blockquote>-->===Feminine ''Jouissance''===[[Lacan]]'s most important contributions to the debate on [[femininity]] come, like [[Freud]]'s, late in his [[work]]. In the [[seminar]] of [[{{Y}}|1972-3]], [[Lacan]] advances the [[concept]] of a specifically [[feminine]] ''[[jouissance]]'' which goes "beyond the phallus";<ref>{{S20}} p. 69</ref> this ''[[jouissance]]'' is "of the order of the infinite," like mystical ecstasy.<ref>{{S20}} p. 44</ref> [[Women]] may [[experience]] this ''[[jouissance]]'', but not elucidated by psychoanalytic theorythey [[know]] nothing about it.<ref>{{S20}} p. 71</ref>
==="Woman Does Not Exist"===It is also in this [[seminar]] that [[Lacan]] takes up his controversial [[formula]], first advanced in the [[seminar]] of 1970-1, "[[woman|Woman does not exist]]" (''la femme n'existe pas''),<ref>{{L}} (Freud1973a) ''[[Works of Jacques Lacan|Télévision]]'', [[Paris]]: Seuil, 1920a1973 [''[[Works of Jacques Lacan|Television: SE XVIIIA Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment]]'', 171ed. [[Joan Copjec]], trans. Denis Hollier, Rosalind Krauss and Annette Michelson, New York: Norton, 1990]. p.60</ref> which he here rephrases as "[[woman|there is no such thing as Woman]]" (''il n'y a pas La femme'').<ref>{{S20}} p. 68</ref> As is clear in the original [[French]], what [[Lacan]] puts into question is not the noun "[[woman]]", but the definite article which precedes it. In [[French]] the definite article indicates [[universality]], and this is precisely the characteristic that [[women]] [[lack]]; [[women]] "do not lend themselves to generalisation, even to phallocentric generalisation."<ref>{{L}} "[[Works of Jacques Lacan|Conférence à Genève sur le symptôme]]", 1975b. ''Les Block-Notes de la [[psychanalyse]]'', Brussels.</ref>
One feature ===Not-All===Hence [[Lacan]] strikes through the definite article whenever it precedes the term ''[[femme]]'' in much the same way as he strikes through the '''A''' to produce the [[symbol]] for the [[bar]]red [[Other]], for like [[woman]], the [[Other]] does not [[exist]]. To press home the point, [[Lacan]] speaks of this opposition [[woman]] as "[[not-all]]" (''[[not-all|pas-toute]]'');<ref>{{S20}} p. 13</ref> unlike [[masculinity]], which is that a [[universal]] function founded upon the two terms do not function in an[[phallic]] exception ([[castration]]), [[woman]] is a non-universal which admits of no exception.
exactly symmetrical way<!-- [[Woman]] is compared to [[truth]], since both partake of the [[logic]] of the [[not-all]] (there is no such [[thing]] as all [[women]]; it is [[impossible]] to say "the [[whole]] truth."<ref>{{L}} (1973a) ''[[Works of Jacques Lacan|Télévision]]'', Paris: Seuil, 1973 [''[[Works of Jacques Lacan|Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment]]'', ed. Joan Copjec, trans. Masculinity Denis Hollier, Rosalind Krauss and Annette Michelson, New York: Norton, 1990]. p. 64</ref> -->==="Woman is taken by Freud a Symptom of Man"===[[Lacan]] goes on in 1975 to [[state]] that a "[[woman|woman is a symptom]]."<ref>{{L}} (1974-5) ''[[Seminar XXII|Le Séminaire. Livre XXII. RSI, 1974-75]]'', published in ''[[Ornicar?]]'', nos. 2-5, 1975. [[Seminar]] of 21 January 1975.</ref> More precisely, a [[woman]] is a [[symptom]] of a [[man]], in the [[sense]] that a [[woman]] can only ever enter the [[psychic]] [[economy]] of men as a [[fantasy]] [[object]] (a), the paradigm; he[[cause]] of their [[desire]].
asserts ===Feminist Theory===[[Lacan]]'s remarks on [[woman]] and on [[feminine sexuality]] have become the focus of controversy and debate in [[feminist]] [[theory]]. Feminists have [[divided]] over whether to see [[Lacan]] as an ally or an [[enemy]] of the feminist cause. Some have seen his theories as providing an incisive description of [[patriarchy]] and as a way of challenging fixed concepts of [[sexual]] [[identity]].<ref>Mitchell, Juliet and Rose, Jacqueline (eds) (1982) ''Feminine Sexuality: [[Jacques Lacan]] and the école freudienne'', [[London]]: Macmillan.</ref> Others have argued that there is only one libido, which is masculinehis concept of the [[symbolic order]] reinstates patriarchy as a transhistorical given, and that his privileging of the psychical[[phallus]] simply repeats the alleged misogynies of [[Freud]] himself.<ref>Gallop, Jane. (1982) ''[[Feminism]] and Psychoanalysis: The Daughter's [[Seduction]]'', London: Macmillan. ; Grosz, Elizabeth. (1990) ''Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction'', London and New York: Routledge.</ref>
development of the girl is at first identical to that of the boy, only diverging at==See Also=={{See}}* [[Castration]]* ''[[Jouissance]]''||* [[Libido]]* [[Sexual difference]]||* [[Sexual relationship]]* [[Symptom]]{{Also}}
a later moment. Femininity is thus that which diverges from the masculine==References==<div style="font-size:11px" class="references-small"><references/></div>
paradigm, and Freud regards it as a mysterious, unexplored region, a 'dark[[Category:Psychoanalysis]][[Category:Jacques Lacan]][[Category:Dictionary]][[Category:Sexuality]][[Category:Concepts]][[Category:Terms]]
continent' (Freud, 1926e: SE XX, 212). The 'riddle of the nature of femininity' (Freud, 1933a: SE XXII, l 13) comes to preoccupy Freud in his later writings, and drives him to ask the famous question, 'What does woman want?' (see Jones, 1953-7: vol. 2, 468). Masculinity is a self-evident given, femininity is a zone of mystery: Psychoanalysis does not try to describe what a woman is - that would be a task it could scarcely perform - but sets about enquiring how she comes into being, how a woman develops out of a child with a bisexual disposition. (Freud, 1933a: SE XXII, 116). Apart from a few remarks on the function of the MOTHER in the family complexes (Lacan, 1938), Lacan's pre-war writings do not engage with the debate on femininity. The occasional statements on the subject which occur in Lacan's work in the early 1950s are couched in terms derived from Claude LÈvi-Strauss; women are seen as objects of exchange which circulate like signs between kinship groups (see LÈvi-Strauss, 1949b). 'Women in the real order serve . . . as objects for the exchanges required by the elementary structures of kinship' (E, 207). Lacan argues that it is precisely the fact that woman is pushed into the position of an exchange object that constitutes the difficulty of the feminine position: For her, there's something insurmountable, let us say unacceptable, in the fact of being placed in the position of an object in the symbolic order, to which, on the other hand, she is entirely subjected no less than the man. (S2, 262) Lacan's analysis of the Dora case makes the same point: what is unacceptable for Dora is her position as object of exchange between her father and Herr K (see Lacan, 1951a). Being in this position of exchange object means that woman 'has a relation of the second degree to this symbolic order' (S2, 262; see S4, 95-6). In 1956, Lacan takes up the traditional association of HYSTERIA with femi- ninity, arguing that hysteria is in fact nothing other than the question of femininity itself, the question which may be phrased 'What is a woman?'. This is true for both male and female hysterics (S3, 178). The term 'woman' here refers not to some biological essence but to a position in the symbolic order; it is synonymous with the term 'feminine position'. Lacan also argues that 'there is no symbolisation of woman's sex as such', since there is no feminine equivalent to the 'highly prevalent symbol' provided by the phallus (S3, 176). This symbolic dissymmetry forces the woman to take the same route through the Oedipus complex as the boy, i.e. to identify with the father. However, this is more complex for the woman, since she is required to take the image of a member of the other sex as the basis for her identification (S3, 176). Lacan returns to the question of femininity in 1958, in a paper entitled 'Guiding remarks for a congress on feminine sexuality' (Lacan, 1958d). In this paper he notes the impasses which have beset psychoanalytic discussions of feminine sexuality, and argues that woman is the Other for both men and women; 'Man here acts as the relay whereby the woman becomes this Other for herself as she is this Other for him' (Ec, 732). Lacan's most important contributions to the debate on femininity come, like Freud's, late in his work. In the seminar of 1972-3, Lacan advances the concept of a specifically feminine JOUISSANCE Which goes 'beyond the phal- lus' (S20, 69); this jouissance is 'of the order of the infinite', like mystical ecstasy (S20, 44). Women may experience this jouissance, but they knoW nothing about it (S20, 71). It is also in this seminar that Lacan takes up his controversial formula, first advanced in the seminar of 1970-1, 'Woman does not exist' (la femme n'existe pas - Lacan, 1973a: 60), which he here rephrases as 'there is no such thing as Woman' (il n'y a pas La femme - S20, 68). As is clear in the original French, what Lacan puts into question is not the noun 'woman', but the definite article which precedes it. In French the definite article indicates universality, and this is precisely the characteristic that women lack; women 'do not lend themselves to generalisation, even to phallocentric generalisation' (Lacan, 1975b). Hence Lacan strikes through the definite article whenever it precedes the term femme in much the same way as he strikes through the A to produce the symbol for the barred Other, for like woman, the Other does not exist (see BAR). To press home the point, Lacan speaks of woman as 'not-all' (pas-toute; S20, 13); unlike masculinity, which is a universal function founded upon the phallic exception (castration), woman is a non-universal which admits of no exception. Woman is compared to truth, since both partake of the logic of the not-all (there is no such thing as all women; it is impossible to say 'the whole truth') (Lacan, 1973a: 64). Lacan goes on in 1975 to state that 'a woman is a symptom' (Lacan, 1974-5: seminar of 21 January 1975). More precisely, a woman is a symptom of a man, in the sense that a woman can only ever enter the psychic economy of men as a fantasy object (a), the cause of their desire. Lacan's remarks on woman and on feminine sexuality have become the focus of controversy and debate in feminist theory. Feminists have divided over whether to see Lacan as an ally or an enemy of the feminist cause. Some have seen his theories as providing an incisive description of patriarchy and as a way of challenging fixed concepts of sexual identity (e.g. Mitchell and Rose, 1982). Others have argued that his concept of the symbolic order reinstates patriarchy as a transhistorical given, and that his privileging of the phallus simply repeats the alleged misogynies of Freud himself (e.g. Gallop, 1982; Grosz, 1990). For representative samples of the debate, see Adams and Cowie (1990) and Brennan (1989). For a Lacanian account of feminine sexuality, see Leader (1996). == [[Kid A In Alphabet Land]] == [[Image:Kida_w.gif |right|frame]]'''Kid A In Alphabet Land Wallops Another Wayward Wench - The Wanton Woman!''' Wouldn't I Like To Whack You - But Isn't That What You Want! You Fill Out The Lack In Man! You Are The Ideal Partner With Whom The Sexual Relationship Is Finally Realized - Not! Hmph! The Woman Doesn't Exist![[Category:Kid A In Alphabet Land]]__NOTOC__
