Changes

woman (femme) Freud's account of SEXUAL DIFFERENCE is based on theview that there are certain psychical characteristics that can be called 'masculine' and others that can be called 'feminine', and that these differ from each other significantly. However, Freud constantly refuses to give any definition of the terms 'masculine' and 'feminine', arguing that they are foundational concepts which can be used but not elucidated by psychoanalytic theory (Freud, 1920a: SE XVIII, 171).

view One feature of this opposition is that the two terms do not function in an exactly symmetrical way. Masculinity is taken by Freud as the paradigm; he asserts that there are certain is only one libido, which is masculine, and that the psychical characteristics development of the girl is at first identical to that can be called of the boy, only diverging at a later moment. Femininity is thus that which diverges from the masculine paradigm, and Freud regards it as a mysterious, unexplored region, a 'mascudark continent' (Freud, 1926e: SE XX, 212). The 'riddle of the nature of femininity' (Freud, 1933a: SE XXII, l 13) comes to preoccupy Freud in his later writings, and drives him to ask the famous question, 'What does woman want?' (see Jones, 1953-7: vol. 2, 468). Masculinity is a self-evident given, femininity is a zone of mystery:

line' and others Psychoanalysis does not try to describe what a woman is - that can would be called 'feminine'a task it could scarcely perform - but sets about enquiring how she comes into being, and that these differ from eachhow a woman develops out of a child with a bisexual disposition. (Freud, 1933a: SE XXII, 116).

other significantlyApart from a few remarks on the function of the MOTHER in the family complexes (Lacan, 1938), Lacan's pre-war writings do not engage with the debate on femininity. The occasional statements on the subject which occur in Lacan's work in the early 1950s are couched in terms derived from Claude LÈvi-Strauss; women are seen as objects of exchange which circulate like signs between kinship groups (see LÈvi-Strauss, 1949b). 'Women in the real order serve . . . Howeveras objects for the exchanges required by the elementary structures of kinship' (E, Freud constantly refuses to give any definition 207). Lacan argues that it is precisely the fact that woman is pushed into the position of an exchange object that constitutes the difficulty ofthe feminine position:

For her, there's something insurmountable, let us say unacceptable, in the fact of being placed in the position of an object in the terms 'masculine' and 'feminine'symbolic order, to which, on the other hand, she is entirely subjected no less than the man. (S2, arguing that they are foundational262)

(FreudIn 1956, 1920a: SE XVIIILacan takes up the traditional association of HYSTERIA with femininity, 171)arguing that hysteria is in fact nothing other than the question of femininity itself, the question which may be phrased 'What is a woman?'.

One feature of this opposition is that the two terms do not function in an exactly symmetrical way. Masculinity is taken by Freud as the paradigm; he  asserts that there is only one libido, which is masculine, and that the psychical development of the girl is at first identical to that of the boy, only diverging at  a later moment. Femininity is thus that which diverges from the masculine paradigm, and Freud regards it as a mysterious, unexplored region, a 'dark continent' (Freud, 1926e: SE XX, 212). The 'riddle of the nature of femininity' (Freud, 1933a: SE XXII, l 13) comes to preoccupy Freud in his later writings,  and drives him to ask the famous question, 'What does woman want?' (see Jones, 1953-7: vol. 2, 468). Masculinity is a self-evident given, femininity is a  zone of mystery:  Psychoanalysis does not try to describe what a woman is - that would be a  task it could scarcely perform - but sets about enquiring how she comes into  being, how a woman develops out of a child with a bisexual disposition.  (Freud, 1933a: SE XXII, 116).  Apart from a few remarks on the function of the MOTHER in the family complexes (Lacan, 1938), Lacan's pre-war writings do not engage with the debate on femininity. The occasional statements on the subject which occur in Lacan's work in the early 1950s are couched in terms derived from Claude LÈvi-Strauss; women are seen as objects of exchange which circulate like signs between kinship groups (see LÈvi-Strauss, 1949b). 'Women in the real order  serve . . . as objects for the exchanges required by the elementary structures of kinship' (E, 207). Lacan argues that it is precisely the fact that woman is pushed into the position of an exchange object that constitutes the difficulty of  the feminine position:  For her, there's something insurmountable, let us say unacceptable, in the  fact of being placed in the position of an object in the symbolic order, to  which, on the other hand, she is entirely subjected no less than the man.  (S2, 262)  Lacan's analysis of the Dora case makes the same point: what is unacceptable  for Dora is her position as object of exchange between her father and Herr K  (see Lacan, 1951a). Being in this position of exchange object means that  woman 'has a relation of the second degree to this symbolic order' (S2,  262; see S4, 95-6).  In 1956, Lacan takes up the traditional association of HYSTERIA with femi- ninity, arguing that hysteria is in fact nothing other than the question of femininity itself, the question which may be phrased 'What is a woman?'.  This is true for both male and female hysterics (S3, 178). The term 'woman'