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Psychoanalysis is critical of the Cartesian vision of the "[[subject as a centered, autonomous ]]"I" whose self-awareness can be taken as a foundation for philosophical inquiry. For psychoanalytic theorists like Freud and Lacan, the subject's autonomy and self-awareness is constantly undermined by impulses from the ([[idFr]] and steered by the pressures of the . ''[[Super-Ego | superegosujet]]. In this sense, "individual" is an inaccurate synonmym for "subject" because the Freudian model of the subject is divided into at least three conflicting parts.'')

A good way to understand The term "[[subject]]" is present from the differences between theoretical approaches is to examine what they emphasize in (and leave out very earliest of) their accounts of the human subject. Feminism[[Lacan]]'s psychoanalytic writings, for example<ref>Lacan, may pay particular attention to the body as a site of cultural impositions based 1932</ref> and from 1945 on gender norms; Marxism may focus on the subject as it occupies a source of productive (and exploitable) labor and as itself the product of ideological conditoningcentral part in [[Lacan]]'s work.

==def==The primary psychic construct produced by the individual’s traumatic accession to the symbolic This is the Lacanian subject. Just as the real is the realm a distinctive feature of undifferentiated consciousness and [[Lacan]]'s work, since the imaginary is the realm term does not constitute part of the ego (pre-symbolic identity formation)[[Freud]]'s theoretical vocabulary, so the symbolic but is coeval more associated with and constitutive of the subject (Evans 195). The ego[[philosophical]], produced by the process of differentiation first experienced in the mirror stage, is superseded by the subject as the primary psychic structure by which the individual relates to the surrounding world. In a radical departure from both traditional humanist conceptions of the self [[legal]] and the Freudian construct of the ego as the privileged mode of human existence, Lacan designates the subject as a function of the signifying chain, a [[linguistic phenomenon produced by the symbolic order which the infant enters in the originary moment of articulating the mother’s absence]] [[discourse]]s. As such, and given the hollowness of signifiers in the Lacanian signifying chain, the subject is reduced to the status of being merely a signifier for another signifier. It exists not independently of the perpetual flux of signification, but only as one in an endless series of events in that flux:

the distinguishing marks of subjectivity are to be found not in the forces, faculties, aptitudes and dispositions that individuals in varying combinations possess, but in the signifying processes of which they are part. [Lacan’s] philosophy of the human subject is self-consciously thin, empty and weightless. He invents a subject without subject-matter. […] ‘The subject’ is no longer a substance endowed with qualities, or a fixed shape possessing dimensions, or a container awaiting the multifarious contents that experience provides: it is a series of events within language, a procession of turns, tropes and inflections. (Bowie 75-76)

Lacan’s subject is without "subjectIn [[Lacan]]'s pre-matter" because it is a bona fide signifier whose "matter" is war papers, the irretrievable loss of a sense of wholeness. term "Represented by a signifier for another signifier, […[subject]] the subject is an effect of language" (Evans 196) which is unsignifiable: "seems to mean no signifier can signify the subjectmore than " (Evans 187); it can be represented as an effect of the signifying chain, but never tied down to any stable contenthuman being. As such, the subject is a necessary epistemological category made available to humans by virtue of the sophistication of our thought processes. This sophistication allows us to conceive of presence and absence not only as existential conditions, but also as temporally-bound conditions of a given entity. More importantly, this sophistication of consciousness prompts us to articulate this knowledge through a system of signification whose first principle is the absence of that about which we speak"<ref>{{Ec}} p.75</ref>

Though I have laid this relationship out as a diachronic process in which conception precedes articulation, fidelity to the Lacanian model of the symbolic order prompts me to point out that such diachrony is impossible. Rather, the conception of presence and absence as variable attributes of the same object is part and parcel of the accession to the symbolic order; the oscillation between presence and absence is inconceivable outside the symbolic order and the symbolic order is inconceivable without the dialectic of presence and absence. The irony of this situation term is that the naming of an object is necessarily also a process of negating it, of insisting on its irremediable inadequacy even in the face of its actuality: "the symbol manifests itself first of all as the murder of the thing" (Ecrits 104). In adherence used to refer to a strictly Hegelian conception of the dialectic, Lacan maintains that the very act of predication (i.e. any symbolisation whatever) is necessarily an act of negation[[analysand]]. The process of saying what something is is simultaneously the process of saying what it is not: "P is Q" deprives P of its essentiality as it becomes something other than P; it is negated in favor of one of its accidents. Further, no accumulation of the accidents of P (say, an infinite number of Q’s) can ever amount to an exhaustive definition (and hence a full representation) of P. In entering the symbolic, then, the human infant unwittingly abandons the immediate world of objects and re-situates himself or herself in a position of always-already mediated epistemology any retreat from which is impossible<ref>{{Ec}} p.83</ref>

An inevitable result of the status of the subject in the symbolic order is that it is fundamentally split; it is an effect of signification whose truth is the absence signification seeks to mask: "because the subject is essentially a speaking being (parlêtre), he is inescapably divided, castrated, split" (Evans 196). As a speaking being, the subject is not only a parlêtre but an entity par lettre, one created only by the divisiveness endemic to the process of signification. And as a result of the play of signifiers in the signifying chain, the subject is therefore at base and irreducibly an absence, a lack whose place is determined and whose truth is deferred, delayed, and decoyed by the signifier. That is to say, the subject is no more a present reality, a manipulable object or entity in the world, than is any other signifier. Originating in this discovery that the shadow of absence falls across all presence, the subject is the pre-eminent fiction by which the signifying chain covers up the void which both structures the symbolic and which it strives to preclude. As such, the subject is all the more closely aligned with this organising originary absence, not merely as one signifier among many, but as their truth as well.--

This truth is perpetually covered over by the flux of signification, however, enforcing the subject’s mobility in the symbolic order, a mobility that thoroughly temporalises the subject and sets the stage for the introduction of the driving force behind its evasive and fleeting existence: "the subject comes into being at the point of intersection between an irrecoverable past and an unattainable future; its structure is that of a ceaseless cross-stitching, in languageIn 1945, [[Lacan]] distinguishes between what-is-no-longer-the-case and what-is-not-yet-the-case" (Bowie 184). A version three kinds of being in its past and future tenses, the [[subject is not only always-already elsewhere, but also always-already elsewhen]]. This temporality is both inextricable from existence in the signifying chain and necessary to its perpetuation; it is what allows the subject to organise his or her experiences in the world in such a way as to retain a sense of order, logic, and meaning. Further, it reveals both how the subject compulsively participates in the signifying chain and how it understands its own need to be forever on the move. ==def==subject (sujet)

The term 'subject' # Firstly, there is present from the very earliest impersonal [[subject]], independent of Lacan's psychoanalytic writings (see Lacanthe other, 1932)the pure grammatical [[subject]], and from 1945 on it occupies a central part in Lacan's work. This is a distinctive feature of Lacan's workthe noetic [[subject]], since the term does not constitute part "it" of Freud's theoretical vocabulary, but "it is more associated with philosophical, legal and linguistic discoursesknown that."

In Lacan's pre-war papers# Secondly, there is the term 'anonymous reciprocal [[subject' seems ]] who is completely equal to mean no more than 'human being' (see Ecand substitutable for any other, 75); and who recognises himself in equivalence with the term is also used to refer to the analysand (Ec, 83)other.

In 1945, Lacan distinguishes between three kinds of subject. Firstly# Thirdly, there is the impersonal personal [[subject]], independent of the other, the pure grammatical subject, the noetic subject, the 'it' whose uniqueness is constituted by an act of 'it is known thatself-affirmation.' Secondly, there is the anonymous reciprocal subject who is completely equal to and substitutable for any other, and who recognises himself in equivalence with the other<ref>{{Ec}} p.207-8</ref>

Thirdly, there is the personal subject, whose uniqueness is constituted by an act of self-affirmation (Ec, 207-8). It is always this third sense of the [[subject]], the [[subject ]] in his uniqueness, that constitutes the focus of [[Lacan]]'s work.

In 1953, [[Lacan plays on ]] establishes a distinction between the various meanings of the term 'subject'. In linguistics and logic, the subject [[ego]] which will remain one of a proposition is that about which something is predicated (see Lacan, 1967: 19), and is also opposed to the 'object'. Lacan plays on most fundamental distinctions throughout the philosophical nuances rest of the latter term to emphasise that his concept of the subject concerns those aspects of the human being that cannot (or must not) be objectified (reified, reduced to a thing), nor be studied in an 'objective' waywork.

'What do we call a subject'? Quite precisely, what in Whereas the development [[ego]] is part of objectivationthe [[imaginary order]], the [[subject]] is outside part of the object' (Sl, 194)[[symbolic]].

References to language come to dominate Lacan's concept of Thus the [[subject from the mid-1950s on. He distinguishes the subject of the statement from the subject of the ENUNCIATION ]] is not simply equivalent to show that because the subject is essentially a speaking being (parlÍtre)[[conscious]] sense of agency, he which is inescapably divideda mere illusion produced by the [[ego]], castrated, SPLIT. In but to the early 1960s [[unconscious]]; [[Lacan defines the ]]'s "[[subject as that which ]]" is represented by a signifier for another signifier; in other words, the [[subject is an effect ]] of language (Ec, 835)the [[unconscious]].

Besides its place in linguistics and logic, the term 'subject' also has philosophical and legal connotations. In philosophical discourse, it denotes an individual self-consciousness, whereas in legal discourse, it denotes a person who is under the power of another (e.g. a person who is subject to the sovereign). The fact that the term possesses both these meanings means [[Lacan]] argues that it perfectly illustrates Lacan's thesis about the determination of consciousness by the symbolic order; 'the subject is a subject only by virtue of his subjection to the field of the Other' (S2, 188, translation modified). The term also functions in legal discourse to designate the support of action; the subject is one who this distinction can be held responsible for his AcTs.traced back to [[Freud]]:

The philosophical connotations of the term are particularly emphasised by Lacan, who links it with Descartes<blockquote>"[Freud] wrote ''Das Ich und das Es''s philosophy of the COGITO: in the term subject . . . I am not designating the living substratum needed by order to maintain this phenomenon of fundamental distinction between the true subject, nor any sort of substance, nor any being possessing knowledge in his pathos . . . nor even some incarnated logos, but the Cartesian subject, who appears at unconscious and the moment when doubt is recognised ego as certaintyconstituted in its nucleus by a series of alienating identifications.<ref>{{E}} p. (S11, 126)128</ref>

The fact that Although [[psychoanalytic treatment]] has powerful effects on the symbol of the subject, S, is a homophone of the Freud's term Es (see ID) illustrates that for Lacan[[ego]], the true subject it is the [[subject of the unconscious. In 1957 Lacan strikes through this symbol to produce the symbol S]], and not the 'barred subject'[[ego]], thus illustrating the fact that the subject is essentially dividedon which [[psychoanalysis]] primarily operates.

The Introduction In [[linguistics]] and [[logic]], the [[subject]] of Zizek' s The Ticklish Subject begins with his assertion a proposition is that' a spectre about which something is haunting Western academia. . .predicated, the spectre of the Cartesian subject' (TTS: 1). The Cartesian subject, or coBita as it and is also known, is, he proclaims, constantly liable opposed to attempts to exorcize it from contemporary thought by New Age obscurantists, postmodern deconstructionists, Habermasians, Heideggerians, cognitive scientists, Deep Ecologists, post-Marxists and feministsthe "object."<ref>Lacan. 1967. In short, just about every reviles the cogitop. Aficionados of ZiZek' s contrary mode of thought will, therefore, not be surprised to learn that, in opposition to all these theoretical factions, he fully endorses the model of the Cartesian s~jecL All of which raises the question: what is the coBita and why does everyone (except Zizek) seem to want done with it?19</ref>

Although [[Lacan]] plays on the idea for it was originally proposed by Saint Augustine (354--430), one [[philosophical]] nuances of the founders latter term to emphasise that his concept of the Christian Church, the caBita in [[subject]] concerns those aspects of the form [[human]] [[being]] that we know it was first advanced by Rene Descartescannot (1596-1650or must not)be objectified (reified, the French philosopherreduced to a thing), mathematician and soldier who is often referred to as the Father of Modern Philosophy. Descartesnor be studied in an 'starting point for the caBita was a cold winterobjective's day. It was so icy that he climbed into a very large stove to keep himself warm and stayed there all day. During his confinement Descartes commenced upon thephilosophic procedure which is named after him: Cartesian doubt. The point of this procedure was to establish what could really be knownway.

Descartes began by isolating the evidence of his senses: was he really sitting by <blockquote>"What do we call a fire in his dressing gownsubject? He concluded that he could not be sure. He had often dreamt of just such a scenario andQuite precisely, what in his dream, this had seemed real to him. However, even if the dream itself were an illusion, what development of the concepts employed by the dreamobjectivation, the mathematical concepts such as shape, number and size which apparently match those is outside of reality? Descartes concedes that although these may seem to be correct, there is a possibility that they are all the invention of an evil genius designed to fool himobject. If this were the case though, Descartes argues that he could not be deceived if he did not exist in some form"<ref>{{S1}} p. Given that his body may be an illusion, Descartes concludes that at the very least his thought must exist, if it is to be deceived:194</ref></blockquote>

(Descartes 1968: 53References to [[language]] come to dominate [[Lacan]]'s concept of the [[subject]] from the mid-54)1950s on.

This phrase and first principle - He distinguishes the [[subject]] of the [[statement]] from the [[subject]] of the [[enunciation]] to show that because the [[subject]] is essentially a [[speaking]] [[being]] (''I think, therifare I am[[parlêtre]]' or 'coBita), erBa sum' - he is what the term' caBita' designatesinescapably [[divided]], [[castrated]], [[split]].

== The Cogito and In the Post-Structuralist ==early 1960s [[Lacan]] defines the [[subject]] as that which is represented by a [[signifier]] for another [[signifier]]; in other words, the [[subject]] is an effect of [[language]].<ref>{{Ec}} p.835</ref>.

There are many ways of interpreting the caBita, but we are interested here only in two - the post-structuralist version and Zizek's version. For the post-structuralists, the caBita is the basis of the centred subject, or, as it is more commonly known, the 'individual', and it is regarded by them as the spoilt brat of philosophy. T individual, as the name ~ggests,~ indivisib~e. In our day-to-day lives, we tend to think of ourselves as individual ause we feel we are com lete in charge o ourselves and not subject to the whims 0 outside forces. When Descartes states 'I who thought thus must be something', we understand that 'I', the 'I' of the caBita, to be an individual. It is the 'I' that does the thinking - the thoughts belong to him rather than him to the thoughts. In other words, the 'I' of the caBita is the master of itself. A!:.lndividual is therefore self-transparent - nothing impedes its understanding of itself because it is In total control and has total autonomyover its actions. There are no dark banana skins of the soul ~tO slip up the psyche, there are no words which threaten to betray the meaning of their speaker, and there are no gusts of history which might suddenly blow the individual from its perch. The world of the individual is an immaculate, windless, danger-free environment.

It is, therefore, a state of perfection. Its main advantage is that nothing impinges upon the autonomy of the individual. Every person, as the saying goes, is an island - self-sufficient, independent Besides its place in [[linguistics]] and free to do what it wills. Its main disadvantage[[logic]], however, is that nothing impinges upon the autonomy of the individual. Every person is an island - self-sufficient, independent and free to do what it wills. In other words, the very features of the individual which seem to confer upon it such blessings are term "[[subject]]" also those which blight it. This is because the individual conceived in this way is utterly subjective; everything remains within its dominion has [[philosophical]] and subject to its control. There is no objectivity at all[[legal]] connotations.

If this seems merely The fact that the term possesses both these meanings means that it perfectly illustrates [[Lacan]]'s thesis about the determination of [[consciousness]] by the [[symbolic order]]. <blockquote>"The subject is a subject only by virtue of his subjection to the field of the Other."<ref>{{S2}} p.188</ref></blockquote> The term also functions in [[legal]] [[discourse]] to designate the support of action; the [[subject]] is one who can be a held [[responsibility|responsible]] for his [[act]]s. ---- The [[philosophical problem]] connotations of the term are particularly emphasised by [[Lacan]], who links it with [[Descartes]]'s [[philosophy]] of the consequences for ''[[cogito]]'':  <blockquote>in the term ''subject'' . . . I am not designating the living substratum needed by this model phenomenon of the subject, nor any sort of subjectivity are equally compelling within 'reality' substance, nor any being possessing knowledge in his pathos . . . nor even some incarnated logos, but the Cartesian subject, who appears at the moment when doubt is recognised as wellcertainty. For example<ref>{{S11}} p.126</ref></blockquote> -- The fact that the [[symbol]] of the [[subject]], until recently'''S''', it was generally accepted is a homophone of the [[Freud]]'s term ''[[Es]]'' (by men at least'[[Id]]') illustrates that only men were masters Df themselvesfor [[Lacan]], the true [[subject]] is the [[subject]] of the [[unconscious]]. Women In 1957 [[Lacan]] strikes through this [[symbol]] to produce the [[symbol]] '''$''', on the other hand"barred subject, were supposed to be " thus illustrating the fact that the [[subject to passions and feelings which they could not properly control]] is essentially [[divided]]. That is to say, women were not