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 The conclusion drawn was that this failure was due to underestimating the depth of Western Christian spiritual foundations, so the accent of subversive activity shifted from politico-economic struggle to "cultural revolution," to the patient intellectual-cultural work of undermining national pride, family, religion, and spiritual commitments, and the spirit of sacrifice for one's country was dismissed as involving the "authoritarian personality"; marital fidelity was supposed to express pathological sexual repression; following Benjamin's motto on how every document of culture is a document of barbarism, the highest achievements of Western culture were denounced for concealing the practices of racism and genocide, and so on. MacDonald devotes many pages to The Authoritarian Personality (1950), a collective project coordinated by Adorno, the purpose of which was, for MacDonald, to make every group affiliation sound as if it were a sign of mental disorder; everything, from patriotism to religion to family-and race-loyally, is disqualified as a sign of a dangerous and defective "authoritarian personality." In addition to ridiculing patriotism and racial identity, the Frankfurt school glorified promiscuity and bohemianhttp://www.nosubject.com/Main_Pagehttp://www.nosubject.com/Main_Page bohemian poverty: "Certainly many of the central attitudes of the largely successful 1960s countercultural revolution find expression in The Authoritarian Personality, including idealizing rebellion against parents, low-investment sexual relationships, and scorn for upward social mobility, social status, family pride, the Christian religion, and patriotism" (CC, p. 194).

Here is what awell-known Slovene Catholic intellectual,ex-minister of culture andex-ambassador of Slovenia inFrance<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">in short, an ethicallycorrupted nobody posing asa high Christian ethicalauthority<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">wrote apropos Jacques Derrida'suntimely death, without theletters written turning redout of shame:

</p><blockquote><i>Theonly weapon is rebellionand destruction, as therecently deceased apostle JacquesDerrida taught us. Whereveryou see a window,throw into it abrick. Where there isa building, there mustbe a mine. Wherethere is a high-risebuilding, a bin Ladenshould come. Where thereis any kind ofinstitution, law, or link,one should find afalsification, a "law" ofthe street or ofthe underground.<a href="#fn1" name="cfn1">¹</a></i><p></pblockquote>

</blockquote> Are lineslike these not anindication of the riseof a new barbarismin today's intellectual life?Phenomena Phenomena like the onequoted above are notlimited to marginal countrieslike Slovenia. In thehomeland of the empireitself, theories are emergingthat, say, explain howthe Frankfurt school appearedon the scene ata precise historical moment:when the failure ofthe socioeconomic Marxist revolutionsbecame apparent. The conclusiondrawn was that thisfailure was due tounderestimating the depth ofWestern Christian spiritual foundations,so the accent ofsubversive activity shifted frompolitico-economic struggle to "culturalrevolution," to the patientintellectual-cultural work of underminingnational pride, family, religion,and spiritual commitments, andthe spirit of sacrificefor one's country wasdismissed as involving the"authoritarian personality"; marital fidelitywas supposed to expresspathological sexual repression; followingBenjamin's motto on howevery document of cultureis a document ofbarbarism, the highest achievementsof Western culture weredenounced for concealing thepractices of racism andgenocide, and so on.The main academic proponentof this new barbarismis Kevin MacDonald, who,in <i>The Culture of Critique</i>, argues thatcertain twentieth-century intellectual movementsled by Jews havechanged European societies infundamental ways and destroyedthe confidence of Westernman; these movements weredesigned, consciously or unconsciously,to advance Jewish interestseven though they werepresented to non-Jews asuniversalistic and even utopian.One of the mostconsistent ways in whichJews have advanced theirinterests has been topromote pluralism and diversity<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">butonly for others. Eversince the nineteeth century,they have led movementsthat tried to discreditthe traditional foundations ofgentile society: patriotism, racialloyalty, the Christian basisfor morality, social homogeneity,and sexual restraint. MacDonalddevotes many pages to<i>The Authoritarian Personality</i> (1950), a collectiveproject coordinated by Adorno,the purpose of whichwas, for MacDonald, tomake every group affiliationsound as if itwere a sign ofmental disorder; everything, frompatriotism to religion tofamily<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">and race<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">loyalty, is disqualifiedas a sign ofa dangerous and defective"authoritarian personality." Because drawingdistinctions between different groupsis illegitimate, all grouployalties<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">even close family ties<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">are"prejudice." MacDonald quotes hereapprovingly Christopher Lasch's remarkthat <i>The Authoritarian Personality</i> leads tothe conclusion that prejudice"`could be eradicated only<sup> </sup>by subjecting the American<sup> </sup>people to what amounted<sup> </sup>to collective psychotherapy<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">by treating<sup> </sup>them as inmates of<sup> </sup>an insane asylum.'"<a href="#fn2" name="cfn2"><sup>2</sup></a> However,<sup> </sup>it is precisely the<sup> </sup>kind of group loyalty,<sup> </sup>respect for tradition, and<sup> </sup>consciousness of differences central<sup> </sup>to <i>Jewish</i> identity that,<sup> </sup>according to MacDonald, Horkheimer<sup> </sup>and Adorno described as<sup> </sup>mental illness in gentiles.<sup> </sup>These writers adopted what<sup> </sup>eventually became a favorite<sup> </sup>Soviet tactic against dissidents:<sup> </sup>anyone whose political views<sup> </sup>were different from theirs<sup> </sup>was insane. For these<sup> </sup>Jewish intellectuals, anti-Semitism was<sup> </sup>also a sign of<sup> </sup>mental illness: Christian self-denial<sup> </sup>and especially sexual repression<sup> </sup>caused hatred of Jews.<sup> </sup>The Frankfurt school was<sup> </sup>enthusiastic about psychoanalysis, ac<a></a><a></a>cording<sup> </sup>to which "`oedipal ambivalencetoward the father andanal-sadistic relations in earlychildhood are the anti-Semite'sirrevocable inheritance'" (<a href="#fn2" name="cfn2"><i>CC</i></a><i>,</i> p.145). In addition toridiculing patriotism and racialidentity, the Frankfurt schoolglorified promiscuity and bohemianpoverty: "Certainly many ofthe central attitudes ofthe largely successful 1960scountercultural revolution find expressionin <i>The Authoritarian Personality</i>, including idealizingrebellion against parents, low-investmentsexual relationships, and scornfor upward social mobility,social status, family pride,the Christian religion, andpatriotism" (<a href="#fn2" name="cfn2"><i>CC</i></a><i>,</i> p. 194).Although he came later,Derrida followed the sametradition when he wrote:"`The idea behind deconstructionis to deconstruct theworkings of strong nation-stateswith powerful immigration policies,to deconstruct the rhetoricof nationalism, the politicsof place, the metaphysicsof native land andnative tongue.... The ideais to disarm thebombs... of identity thatnation-states build to defendthemselves against the stranger,against Jews and Arabsand immigrants'" (<a href="#fn2" name="cfn2"><i>CC</i></a><i>,</i> p.201). As MacDonald putsit, <i>"Viewed at its most abstract level, a fundamental agenda is thus to influence the European-derived peoples of the United States to view concern about their own </i><i>demographic and cultural eclipse as irrational and as an indication of psychopathology"</i> (<a href="#fn2" name="cfn2"><i>CC</i></a><i>,</i> p.195). This project hasbeen successful; anyone opposedto the displacement ofwhites is routinely treatedas a mentally unhingedhatemonger, and whenever whitesdefend their group intereststhey are described aspsychologically inadequate<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">with, of course,the silent exception ofthe Jews themselves: "theideology that ethnocentrism wasa form of psychopathologywas promulgated by agroup that over itslong history had arguablybeen the most ethnocentricgroup among all thecultures of the world"(<a href="#fn2" name="cfn2"><i>CC</i></a><i>,</i> p. 232). Weshould have no illusionshere. Measured by thestandards of the greatEnlightenment tradition, we areeffectively dealing with somethingfor which the bestdesignation is the oldorthodox Marxist term for"bourgeois irrationalists": <i>the self-destruction of reason</i>. Theonly thing to bearin mind is thatthis new barbarism isa strictly postmodern phenomenon,the obverse of thehighly reflexive self-ironical attitude<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">nowonder that, reading authorslike MacDonald, one oftencannot decide if oneis reading a satireor a "serious" lineof argumentation.<p></p>

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;But the saddestsurprise of them allis to see someof the theoretical descendantsof those who areamalgamated by MacDonald intothe same Jewish plotwith Derrida<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">some late representativesof the Frankfurt school<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">proposea kind of symmetricalreversal of the samestory, which ends upin no less atrociousslander. Instead of beingcastigated as an agentof the Jewish plot,Derrida is here, togetherwith Baudrillard and others,thrown into the "postmodern"melting pot that, sothe story goes, opensup the way forproto-Fascist irrationalism, if notdirectly providing the intellectualbackground for Holocaust denial.This brutal intolerance, whichmasks as high moralconcern, found its latestexponent in Richard Wolin,whose <i>The Seduction of Unreason</i> is aworthy successor to Lukács'smost Stalinist work, theinfamous <i>Die Zerstörung der Vernunft</i> from theearly 1950s. Wolin bombasticallylocates me, together withBaudrillard, among those whoclaimed that the U.S.got what it deservedon 9/11:

</p><blockquote><i>Traditionally, dystopianviews of America havebeen the stock-in-trade ofcounterrevolutionary writers such asMaistre, Arthur de Gobineau,and Oswald Spengler. Morerecently, they have madeinroads among champions ofthe postmodern left, suchas Jean Baudrillard andSlavoj <img src="/ucp-entities/Zcaron.gif" alt="&amp;Zcaron;" align="bottom" border="0">i<img src="/ucp-entities/zcaron.gif" alt="&amp;zcaron;" align="bottom" border="0">ek. In theirtheories, America represents theepitome of a postmodern,technological Moloch: a landdevoid of history andtradition in which theseductions and illusions ofa media-dominated mass culturehave attained unchallenged hegemony.The postmodernists allege thatthe traditional orientations offamily, community, and politicshave ceded to thefebrile delusions of "hyperreality."Today, we experience thereign of "simulacra": media-generatedcopies, shorn of originals,that circulate autonomously. Thisattitude helps explain theenthusiasm with which Baudrillardgreeted the September 11attacks: a "dream cometrue."<a href="#fn3" name="cfn3">³</a></i><p></p>

De Maistre, Gobineau,Spengler, Baudrillard, <img src="/ucp-entities/Zcaron.gif" alt="&amp;Zcaron;" align="bottom" border="0">i<img src="/ucp-entities/zcaron.gif" alt="&amp;zcaron;" align="bottom" border="0">ek. NowI know where Ibelong: among the proto-Fascistirrationalists. At least Iam here also ina good company, withpeople like Nietzsche andAdorno.<a href="#fn4" name="cfn4">⁴</a> Wolin is athis lowest when he"observes" how I reporton the 9/11 eventsas if I amdescribing just another mediaticspectacle, with no moraljudgments implied. As a"proof," Wolin quotes aline from my 9/11book: "`America got whatit fantasized about' ...which, <img src="/ucp-entities/Zcaron.gif" alt="&amp;Zcaron;" align="bottom" border="0">i<img src="/ucp-entities/zcaron.gif" alt="&amp;zcaron;" align="bottom" border="0">ek insinuates, ...is merely another wayof saying that <i>America got what it had coming.</i>"<a href="#fn5" name="cfn5">⁵</a>This line of argumentationis a simple empiricallie if there everwas one. First, Ido not claim thatthe U.S. got whatit deserved, but whatit "fantasized about," makingit clear that whenone gets what onefantasizes about, one endsup in a nightmare;second, and much moreimportant, a little bitlater, I explicitly rejectthe leftist <i>Schadenfreude</i>:

<blockquote><i>TheAmerican patriotic narrative<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">the innocenceunder siege, the surgeof patriotic pride<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">is, ofcourse, vain; however, isthe Leftist narrative (withits <i>Schadenfreude</i>: the USAgot what it deserved,what it had beendoing to others fordecades) really any better?The predominant reaction ofEuropean<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">but also American<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">Leftists wasnothing less than scandalous:all imaginable stupidities weresaid and written, upto the "feminist" pointthat the WTC towerswere two phallic symbols,waiting to be destroyed("castrated"). Was there notsomething petty and miserablein the mathematics remindingus of Holocaust revisionism(what are the 3,000dead against millions inRwanda, Kongo, etc.)? Andwhat about the factthat the CIA (co-)createdTaliban and Bin Laden,financing and helping themto fight the Sovietsin Afghanistan? Why wasthis fact quoted asan argument against attackingthem? Would it notbe much more logicalto claim that itis precisely America's dutyto rid us ofthe monster it created?The moment we thinkin the terms of"Yes, the WTC collapsewas a tragedy, butwe should not fullysolidarize with the victims,since this would meansupporting US imperialism," theethical catastrophe is alreadyhere: the only appropriatestance is unconditional solidaritywith <i>all</i> victims. Theethical stance proper ishere replaced by themoralizing mathematics of guiltand horror, which missesthe key point: theterrifying death of eachindividual is absolute andincomparable. In short, letus conduct a simplemental experiment: if youdetect in yourself anyreluctance to empathize fullywith the victims ofthe WTC collapse, ifyou feel the urgeto qualify your empathywith "Yes, but whatabout the millions whosuffer in Africa... ,"you are not demonstratingyour Third World sympathies,but merely the <i>mauvaise foi</i>which bears witness toyour implicit patronizing racistattitude towards Third Worldvictims.<a href="#fn6" name="cfn6">⁶</a></i><p></p>

Perhaps, after findingmyself, together with Derrida,in the same boatwith those slandered bythe moralizing hypocrites whoeffectively manipulate the memoryof the 9/11 victimsin order to scorecheap "theoretical" points, thetime has come todraw the balance ofmy relations with Derrida,in a belated gestureof solidarity. Having writtenmany pages in whichI struggle with Derrida'swork, now<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">when the Derrideanfashion is fading away<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">itis perhaps the momentto honor his memoryby pointing out theproximity of the topicof my work towhat Derrida called <i>différance</i>,this neologism whose verynotoriety obfuscates its unheard-ofmaterialist potential.<p></p>

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In the lasttwo decades of histhought, Derrida emphasized that,the more radical adeconstruction is, the moreit has to relyon its inherent "undeconstructible"condition of deconstruction, themessianic promise of justice.This promise is thetrue Derridean object of<i>belief,</i> and the ultimateethical axiom of Derridais that this beliefis irreducible, "undeconstructible." Derridacan thus indulge inall kinds of paradoxes,claiming, among other things,in his reflections onprayer, not only thatatheists also do praybut that, today, itis perhaps <i>only atheists who truly pray.</i> Preciselyby refusing to addressGod as a positiveentity, they silently addressthe pure messianic Otherness.<a href="#fn7" name="cfn7">⁷</a>It is here thatone should emphasize thegap that separates Derridafrom the Hegelian tradition:

</p><blockquote><i>It would be tooeasy to show that,measured by the failureto establish liberal democracy,the gap between factand ideal essence doesnot show up onlyin ... so-called primitiveforms of government, theocracy,and military dictatorship.... Butthis failure and thisgap also characterize, <i>a priori</i>and by definition, <i>all</i>democracies, including the oldestand most stable ofso-called Western democracies. Atstake here is thevery concept of democracyas concept of apromise that can onlyarise in such a<i>diastema</i> (failure, inadequation, disjunction,disadjustment, being "out ofjoint"). That is whywe always propose tospeak of a democracy<i>to come</i>, not of a<i>future</i> democracy in thefuture present, not evenof a regulating idea,in the Kantian sense,or of a utopia<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">atleast to the extentthat their inaccessibility wouldstill retain the temporalform of a <i>future present</i>,of a future modalityof the <i>living present</i>.<a href="#fn8" name="cfn8">⁸</a></i><p></p>

Herewe get the differencebetween Hegel and Derridaat its purest. Derridaaccepts Hegel's fundamental lessonthat one cannot assertthe innocent ideal againstits distorted realization. Thisholds not only fordemocracy but also forreligion. The gap thatseparates the ideal conceptfrom its actualization isalready inherent to theconcept itself. In thesame way that Derridaclaims that "God alreadycontradicts himself," that anypositive conceptual determination ofthe divine as apure messianic promise alreadybetrays it, one shouldalso say that democracyalready contradicts itself. Itis also against thisbackground that Derrida elaboratesthe mutual implication ofreligion and radical evil.Radical evil (politically: "totalitarianism")emerges when religious faithor reason (or democracyitself) is posited inthe mode of futurepresent. However, against Hegel,Derrida insists on theirreducible excess in theideal concept that cannotbe reduced to thedialectic between ideal andits actualization: the messianicstructure of "to come,"the excess of anabyss that cannot everbe actualized in itsdeterminate content. Hegel's ownposition is here moreintricate than it mayappear: his point isnot that, through gradualdialectical progress, one canmaster the gap betweenconcept and its actualizationand achieve the concept'sfull self-transparency ("Absolute Knowledge").Rather, to put itin speculative terms, hispoint is to asserta "pure" contradiction thatis no longer thecontradiction between the "undeconstructible"pure Otherness and itsfailed actualizations/determinations, but thethoroughly immanent "contradiction" thatprecedes any Otherness. Actualizationsand/or conceptual determinations arenot traces of the"undeconstructible" divine Otherness, but<i>just traces</i> marking their in-between.Or, to put itin yet another way,in a kind ofinverted phenomenological <i>epoche</i>, Derridareduces Otherness to the"to come" of apure potentiality, thoroughly deontologizingit, bracketing its positivecontent, so that allthat remains is thespecter of a promise;and what if thenext step is todrop this minimal specterof Otherness itself, sothat all that remainsis the rupture, thegap as such thatprevents entities from reachingtheir self-identity?<a href="#fn9" name="cfn9">⁹</a> Recall theold reproach of theFrench Communist philosophers toSartre's existentialism: Sartre threwaway the entire contentof the bourgeois subject,maintaining only its pureform, and the nextstep is to throwaway this form itself<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">isit not that, <i>mutatis mutandis</i>,Derrida threw away allpositive ontological content ofmessianism, retaining nothing butthe pure form ofthe messianic promise, andthe next step isto throw away thisform itself? And, again,is this not alsothe passage from Judaismto Christianity? Judaism reducesthe promise of anotherlife to a pureOtherness, a messianic promisethat will never becomefully present and actualized(the Messiah is always"to come"), while Christianity,far from claiming fullrealization of the promise,accomplishes something far moreuncanny: the Messiah <i>is here,</i>he <i>has</i> arrived, thefinal Event already tookplace, <i>and yet the gap (the gap that sustained the messianic promise) remains.</i> One isalmost tempted to proposehere a return tothe earlier Derrida of<i>différance</i>: what if (as,among others, Ernesto Laclauhas already proposed)<a href="#fn10" name="cfn10">¹⁰</a> Derrida'sturn to the "postsecular"messianism is not anecessary outcome of hisinitial "deconstructionist" impetus? Whatif the idea ofinfinite messianic justice thatoperates in an indefinitesuspension, always to come,as the "undeconstructible" horizonof deconstruction, already obfuscatesthe "pure" <i>différance</i>, thepure gap that differsan entity from itself?Is it not possibleto think this purein-between prior to anynotion of messianic justice?Derrida acts as ifthe choice is betweenthe positive ontoethics, thegesture of transcending theexisting order towards anotherhigher positive Order, andthe pure promise ofspectral Otherness. However, whatif we drop thisreference to Otherness altogether?<p></p>

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Perhapsthis brings us tothe limits of theDerridean deconstruction of metaphysics.Three thinkers as differentas Nietzsche, Heidegger, andDerrida all conceive theirown age as thatof the critical turningpoint of metaphysics. Intheir (our) time, metaphysicshas exhausted its potentials,and the thinker's dutyis to prepare theground for a new,postmetaphysical thinking. More generally,the entire Judeo-Christian history,up to our postmodernity,is determined by whatone is tempted tocall the Hölderlin paradigm,which was first articulatedby Augustine in his<i>City of God:</i> "Where the dangeris grows also whatcan save us" ("Woaber Gefahr ist weachstdas Rettende auch"). Thepresent moment appears asthe lowest point inthe long process ofhistorical decadence (the flightof Gods, alienation, andso on), but thedanger of the catastrophicloss of the essentialdimension of being-human alsoopens up the possibilityof a reversal <i>(Kehre)</i><img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">proletarianrevolution, the arrival ofnew gods (which, accordingto the late Heidegger,can only save us),and so on. Arewe able to imaginea "pagan" <i>nonhistorical</i> universe,a universe thoroughly outsidethis paradigm, a universein which (historical) timejust flows with noteleological curvature, in whichthe idea of adangerous moment of decision(Benjamin's <i>Jetzt-Zeit</i>), out ofwhich a "bright future"which will redeem thepast itself can emerge,is simply meaningless?</p>

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Although thisHölderlin paradigm is usuallyidentified with Christianity, Christianity,at its most radical,^{<a></a><a></a>}nonetheless seems to givea unique twist toit: everything that hasto happen <i>already happened;</i> thereis nothing to waitfor; we do nothave to wait forthe Event, for thearrival of the Messiah;the Messiah has alreadyarrived; the Event alreadytook place; we livein its aftermath. Thisbasic attitude of historicalclosure is also themessage of Hegel, ofhis dictum that theowl of Minerva takesoff in the twilight<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">andwhat is difficult, butcrucial, to grasp ishow this stance, farfrom condemning us topassive reflection, opens upthe space for activeintervention. And does thesame not go forKierkegaard who, in spiteof his standard rumblingsagainst the mass societyof the "present age,"also does not seemto rely on theHölderlin paradigm of historicality(and on the <i>hubris</i>in the self-perception ofthe thinker that sucha view involves)<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">there isnothing really exceptional aboutour age; if anything,we live in ordinaryand noninteresting times?</p><hr align="center" noshade="noshade" width="60">

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;What, then,would be this <i>différance</i>that precedes the ethicalcommitment to the abyssof Otherness? On thesouthern side of thedemilitarized zone in Korea,there is a uniquevisitor's site: a theaterbuilding with a largescreenlike window in front,opening up onto theNorth. The spectacle peopleobserve when they takeseats and look throughthe window is realityitself (or, rather, akind of "desert ofthe real"): the barrendemilitarized zone with walls,and so on, and,beyond, a glimpse ofNorth Korea. (As ifto comply with thefiction, North Korea hasbuilt in front ofthis theater a fake,a model village withbeautiful houses; in theevening, the lights inall the houses areturned on at thesame time, although nobodylives in them.) Isthis not a purecase of the symbolicefficiency of the frameas such? A barrenzone is given afantasmatic status, elevated intoa spectacle, solely bybeing enframed. Nothing substantiallychanges here; it ismerely that, viewed throughthe frame, reality turnsinto <i>its own appearance</i>. A supremecase of such anontological comedy occurred inDecember 2001 in BuenosAires, when Argentinians tookto the streets toprotest against their governmentand, especially, against Cavallo,the economy minister. Whenthe crowd gathered aroundCavallo's building, threatening tostorm it, he escapedwearing a mask ofhimself (sold in disguiseshops so that peoplecould mock him bywearing his mask). Itthus seems that atleast Cavallo did learnsomething from the widelyspread Lacanian movement inArgentina<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">the fact that <i>a thing is its own best mask</i>.What one encounters intautology is thus puredifference, not the differencebetween the element andother elements, but howthe element is differentfrom itself.</p>

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The fundamental lessonof Hegel is thatthe key ontological problemis not that ofreality but that ofappearance: not, Are wecondemned to the interminableplay of appearances, orcan we penetrate throughtheir veil to theunderlying true reality? but,How could<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">in the middleof flat, stupid reality,which is <i>just there</i><img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">something likeappearance emerge? The minimalontology is therefore thatof the Möbius strip,of the curved spacethat is bent ontoitself; all that hasto intervene into theReal is an emptyframe so that thesame things we saw"directly" before are nowseen through the frame.A certain surplus-effect isthus generated, which cannotsimply be cancelled throughdemystification. It is notenough to display themechanism behind the frame;the stage-effect within theframe becomes autonomous. Howis this possible? Thereis only one conclusionthat can account forthis gap: there isno "neutral" reality withinwhich gaps occur, withinwhich frames isolate domainsof appearances. Every fieldof "reality" (every "world")is always already enframed,seen through an invisibleframe. However, the parallaxof the two framesis not symmetrical, composedof two incompatible perspectiveson the same <i>x:</i>there is an irreducibleasymmetry between the twoperspectives, a minimal reflexivetwist. We do nothave two perspectives; wehave a perspective andwhat eludes it, andthe other perspective fillsin this void ofwhat we could notsee from the firstperspective.</p>

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;One of the minimaldefinitions of a modernistpainting concerns the functionof its frame. Theframe of the paintingin front of usis not its trueframe; there is another,invisible frame, the frameimplied by the structureof the painting, theframe that enframes ourperception of the painting,and these two framesby definition never overlap.There is an invisiblegap separating them. Thepivotal content of thepainting is not renderedin its visible partbut is located inthis dis-location of thetwo frames, in thegap that separates them.This dimension in-between-the-two-frames isobvious in Kazimir Malevich(what is his <i>Black Square on White Surface</i>if not the minimalmarking of the distancebetween the two frames?),in Edward Hopper (recallhis lone figures inoffice buildings or dinersat night, where itseems as if thepicture's frame has tobe redoubled with anotherwindow frame, or, inthe portraits of hiswife close to anopen window, exposed tosun rays<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">remember the oppositeexcess of the paintedcontent itself with regardto what we effectivelysee, as if wesee only the fragmentof the whole picture,the shot with amissing countershot), and, again,in Edvard Munch's <i>Madonna</i>(the droplets of semenand the small fetuslikefigure from <i>The Scream</i> squeezedin between the twoframes). The frame isalways already redoubled; theframe within "reality" isalways linked to anotherframe enframing "reality" itself.<a href="#fn11" name="cfn11">¹¹</a>Once introduced, the gapbetween reality and appearanceis thus immediately complicated,reflected-into-itself; once we geta glimpse, through theFrame, of the OtherDimension, <i>reality itself turns into appearance</i>. In otherwords, things do notsimply appear, they <i>appear to appear</i>.This is why thenegation of a negationdoes not bring usto a simple flataffirmation. Once things (startto) appear, they notonly appear as whatthey are not, creatingan illusion; they canalso appear to justappear, concealing the factthat they <i>are</i> whatthey appear.</p>

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;This logic ofthe "minimal difference," ofthe constitutive noncoincidence ofa thing with itself,provides the key tothe central Hegelian categoryof concrete universality. Letus take a "mute"abstract universality that encompassesa set of elementsall of which somehowsubvert, do not fit,this universal frame. Is,in this case, the"true" concrete universal notthis distance itself, theuniversalized exception? And, viceversa, is the elementthat directly fits theuniversal not the trueexception? Universality is notthe neutral container ofparticular formations, their commonmeasure, the passive (back)groundon which the particularsfight their battles, but<i>this battle itself,</i> the struggle leadingfrom one to anotherparticular formation. Recall KrzysztofKie<img src="/ucp-entities/sacute.gif" alt="&amp;sacute;" align="bottom" border="0">lowski's passage from documentaryto fiction cinema. Wedo not have simplytwo species of cinema,documentary and fiction; fictionemerges out of theinherent limitation of thedocumentary. Kie<img src="/ucp-entities/sacute.gif" alt="&amp;sacute;" align="bottom" border="0">lowski's starting pointwas the same asthe one of allcineasts in the socialistcountries: the conspicuous gapbetween the drab socialreality and the optimistic,bright image that pervadedthe heavily censored officialmedia. The first reactionto the fact that,in Poland, social realitywas "unrepresented," as Kie<img src="/ucp-entities/sacute.gif" alt="&amp;sacute;" align="bottom" border="0">lowskiput it, was, ofcourse, the move towardsa more adequate representationof the real lifein all its drabnessand ambiguity<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">in short, anauthentic documentary approach:

</p><blockquote><i>Therewas a necessity, aneed<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">which was very excitingfor us<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">to describe theworld. The Communist worldhad described how itshould be and nothow it really was....If something hasn't beendescribed, then it doesn'tofficially exist. So thatif we start describingit, we bring itto life.<a href="#fn12" name="cfn12">¹²</a></i><p></p>

Suffice itto simply mention <i>Hospital</i>,Kie<img src="/ucp-entities/sacute.gif" alt="&amp;sacute;" align="bottom" border="0">lowski's documentary from 1976,in which the camerafollows orthopedic surgeons ona thirty-two-hour shift. Instrumentsfall apart in theirhands, the electrical currentkeeps breaking, there areshortages of the mostbasic materials, but thedoctors persevere hour afterhour, and with humor.Then, however, the obverseexperience sets in, bestcaptured by the sloganused recently to publicizea Hollywood movie: "It'sso real, it mustbe fiction!" At themost radical level, onecan render the Realof subjective experience onlyin the guise ofa fiction. Towards theend of the documentary<i>First Love</i> (1974), in whichthe camera follows ayoung unmarried couple duringthe girl's pregnancy, throughtheir wedding, and endingwith the delivery ofthe baby, the fatheris shown holding thenewborn in his handsand crying. Kie<img src="/ucp-entities/sacute.gif" alt="&amp;sacute;" align="bottom" border="0">lowski reactedto the obscenity ofsuch unwarranted probing intothe other's intimacy withthe "fright of realtears." His decision topass from documentaries tofiction films was thus,at its most radical,an ethical one:

<blockquote><i>Noteverything can be described.That's the documentary's greatproblem. It catches itselfas if in itsown trap.... If I'mmaking a film aboutlove, I can't gointo a bedroom ifreal people are makinglove there.... I noticed,when making documentaries, thatthe closer I wantedto get to anindividual, the more objectswhich interested me shutthemselves off.</i><p></p>

<i>That's probably whyI changed to features.There's no problem there.I need a coupleto make love inbed, that's fine. Ofcourse, it might bedifficult to find anactress who's willing totake off her bra,but then you justfind one who is....I can even buysome glycerine, put somedrops in her eyesand the actress willcry. I managed tophotograph some real tearsseveral times. It's somethingcompletely different. But nowI've got glycerine. I'mfrightened of those realtears. In fact, Idon't know whether I'vegot the right tophotograph them. At suchtimes I feel likesomebody who's found himselfin a realm whichis, in fact, outof bounds. That's themain reason why Iescaped from documentaries.<a href="#fn13" name="cfn13">¹³</a></i><p></p>

Thecrucial intermediary in thispassage from documentary tofiction is <i>Camera Buff</i> (1979),the portrait of aman who, because ofhis passion for thecamera, loses his wife,child, and job<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">a fictionfilm about a documentaryfilmmaker. So there isa domain of fantasmaticintimacy that is markedby a No Trespassing!sign and should beapproached only via fiction,if one is toavoid pornographic obscenity. Thisis the reason whythe French Véronique in<i>The Double Life of Véronique</i> rejects the puppeteer:he wants to penetrateher too much, whichis why, towards thefilm's end, after hetells her the storyof her double life,she is deeply hurtand escapes to herfather.<a href="#fn14" name="cfn14">¹⁴</a> "Concrete universality" isa name for thisprocess through which fictionexplodes <i>from within</i> documentary, thatis, for the waythe emergence of fictioncinema resolves the inherentdeadlock of the documentarycinema. (Or, in philosophy,the point is notto conceive eternity asopposed to temporality, buteternity as it emergesfrom within our temporalexperience<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">or, in an evenmore radical way, asSchelling did it, toconceive time itself asa subspecies of eternity,as the resolution ofa deadlock of eternity.)<p></p>

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Thisbrings us to thevery heart of theconcept of concrete universality.It is not merelythe universal core thatanimates a series ofits particular forms ofappearance; it persists inthe very irreducible tension,noncoincidence, between these differentlevels. Hegel is usuallyperceived as an "essentialisthistoricist," positing the spiritual"essence" of an epochas a universal principlethat expresses itself ina specific way ineach domain of sociallife; say, the modernprinciple of subjectivity expressesitself in religion asProtestantism, in ethics asthe subject's moral autonomy,in politics as democraticequality, and so on.What such a viewmisses is what oneis tempted to calltemporal parallax. In thecomplex dialectic of historicalphenomena, we encounter eventsor processes that, althoughthey are the actualizationof the same underlying"principle" at different levels,cannot occur at thesame historical moment. Recallthe old topic ofthe relationship between Protestantism,Kantian philosophical revolution, andthe French political revolution.Rebecca Comay recently refutedthe myth that Hegel'scritique of the FrenchRevolution can be reducedto a variation ofthe "German" idea ofhow the Catholic Frenchhad to perform theviolent "real" political revolutionbecause they missed thehistorical moment of Reformationthat already accomplished inthe spiritual sphere thereconciliation between the spiritualSubstance and the infinitesubjectivity sought after insocial reality by therevolutionaries. In this standardview, the German ethico-aestheticattitude "sublates" revolutionary violencein the inner ethicalorder, thus enabling thereplacement of the abstract"terrorist" revolutionary freedom bythe concrete freedom ofthe state as anaesthetic organic whole. However,already the temporality ofthis relationship between theFrench political revolution andthe German spiritual reformationis ambiguous. Three possiblerelations seem to overlaphere. First, the ideaof sublation points towardsa succession; the French"immediate" unity of theUniversal and the Subjectis followed by itssublation, the German ethico-aestheticmediation. Then, there isthe idea of asimultaneous choice (or lackthereof), which made thetwo nations follow differentpaths: the Germans optedfor Reformation, while theFrench remained within theCatholic universe and hadthus to take thetortuous route of violentrevolution. However, the empiricalfact that Kant's philosophicalrevolution precedes the FrenchRevolution is also notjust an insignificant accident;in the spectacle ofrevolutionary Terror, Kantian ethicsitself encounters the ultimateconsequence of its own"abstract" character, so thatKant's philosophy should beread retroactively, through theprism of the FrenchRevolution which enables usto perceive its limitations:

</p><blockquote><i>If [the Kantian moralview] presents itself asthe narrative successor tothe revolution, this isnot because it logicallyfulfils or supersedes it:Kant's critical venture <i>phenomenologically</i>succeeds the revolution thatit <i>chronologically</i>, of course,anticipates only insofar ashis text becomes legibleonly retroactively through theevent that in institutionalizingthe incessant short circuitof freedom and crueltyputs the project ofmodernity to its mostextreme trial.... The revolutionitself inflicts on Kant'sown text a kindof retroactive trauma.<a href="#fn15" name="cfn15">¹⁵</a></i><p></p>

Whatthis means is thatthe revolutionary Terror isa kind of obscenedouble of Kant's ethicalthought: its destructive violencemerely "externalizes" the terroristpotential of Kant's thought.This is why<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">and thereinresides Hegel's central insight<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">itis hypocritical to rejectthe "excesses" of theFrench Revolution from thestandpoint of the "German"moral view. All itsterrifying features found theircounterparts in, are containedand <i>repeated</i> within, theKantian spiritual edifice (andthe term <i>repetition</i> hasto be given herethe entire weight ofFreud's <i>Wiederholungszwang</i>):

<blockquote><i>the purityof the moral willcan be no antidoteto the terrifying purityof revolutionary virtue. Allthe logical problems ofabsolute freedom are essentiallycarried over into Hegel'sanalysis of Kantian morality:the obsessionality, the paranoia,the suspicion, the evaporationof objectivity, within theviolent hyperbole of asubjectivity bent on reproducingitself within a worldit must disavow.<a href="#fn16" name="cfn16">¹⁶</a></i><p></p>

So,insofar as we aredealing here with ahistorical choice (between the"French" way of remainingwithin Catholicism, and thusbeing obliged to engagein the self-destructive revolutionaryTerror, and the "German"way of Reformation), thischoice involves exactly thesame elementary dialectical paradoxas the one, alsofrom <i>The Phenomenology of Spirit</i>, between thetwo readings of "theSpirit is a bone,"which Hegel illustrates bythe phallic metaphor<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">the phallusas the organ ofinsemination or phallus asthe organ of urination.Hegel's point is <i>not</i>that, in contrast tothe vulgar empiricist mindthat sees only urination,the proper speculative attitudehas to choose insemination.The paradox is thatthe direct choice ofinsemination is the infallibleway to miss it;it is not possibleto choose directly the"true meaning." That is,one <i>has</i> to beginby making the "wrong"choice (of urination); thetrue speculative meaning emergesonly through the repeatedreading, as the aftereffect(or by-product) of thefirst, "wrong," reading. Andthe same goes forsocial life in whichthe direct choice ofthe concrete universality ofa particular ethical life-worldcan only end ina regression to premodernorganic society that deniesthe infinite right ofsubjectivity as the fundamentalfeature of modernity. Becausethe subject-citizen of amodern state can nolonger accept his immersionin some particular socialrole that confers onhim a determinate placewithin the organic socialwhole, the only wayto the rational totalityof the modern stateleads through revolutionary Terror.One should ruthlessly tearup the constraints ofpremodern, organic, concrete universality,and fully assert theinfinite right of subjectivityin its abstract negativity.In other words, thepoint of Hegel's analysisof the revolutionary Terroris not the ratherobvious insight into howthe revolutionary project involvedthe unilateral direct assertionof abstract Universal Reasonand was as suchdoomed to perish inself-destructive fury, since itwas unable to organizethe transposition of itsrevolutionary energy into aconcrete, stable, and differentiatedsocial order. Hegel's pointis rather the enigmaof why, in spiteof the fact thatrevolutionary Terror was ahistorical deadlock, we haveto pass through itin order to arriveat the modern rationalstate. So, given againthe choice between theProtestant "inner revolution" andthe French violent politicalrevolution, we see thatHegel is far fromendorsing the German self-complacentsuperiority ("we made theright choice and canthus avoid revolutionary madness");precisely because Germans <i>made the right choice at a wrong time</i>(<i>too early:</i> in the ageof Reformation), they cannotgain access to therational state that wouldbe at the levelof true political modernity.One should take anotherstep here: it isnot only that theuniversal Essence articulates itselfin the discord betweenits particular forms ofappearance; this discord ispropelled by a gapthat pertains to thevery core of theuniversal Essence itself. Inhis book on modernity,Fredric Jameson refers tothe Hegelian concrete universalityin his concise critiqueof the recently fashionabletheories of "alternate modernities":

<blockquote><i>How then can theideologues of "modernity" inits current sense manageto distinguish their product<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">theinformation revolution, and globalized,free-market modernity<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">from the detestableolder kind, without gettingthemselves involved in askingthe kinds of seriouspolitical and economic, systemicquestions that the conceptof a postmodernity makesunavoidable? The answer issimple: you talk about"alternate" or "alternative" modernities.Everyone knows the formulaby now: this meansthat there can bea modernity for everybodywhich is different fromthe standard or hegemonicAnglo-Saxon model. Whatever youdislike about the latter,including the subaltern positionit leaves you in,can be effaced bythe reassuring and "cultural"notion that you canfashion your own modernitydifferently, so that therecan be a Latin-Americankind, or an Indiankind or an Africankind, and so on....But this is tooverlook the other fundamentalmeaning of modernity whichis that of aworldwide capitalism itself.<a href="#fn17" name="cfn17">¹⁷</a></i><p></p>

Thesignificance of this critiquereaches far beyond thecase of modernity; itconcerns the fundamental limitationof the nominalist historicizing.The recourse to multitude(there is not onemodernity with a fixedessence, there are multiplemodernities, each of themirreducible to others) isfalse not because itdoes not recognize aunique fixed "essence" ofmodernity but because multiplicationfunctions as the disavowalof the antagonism thatinheres to the notionof modernity as such;the falsity of multiplicationresides in the factthat it frees theuniversal notion of modernityfrom its antagonism, fromthe way it isembedded in the capitalistsystem, by relegating thisaspect to just oneof its historical subspecies.(One should not forgetthat the first halfof the twentieth centuryalready was marked bytwo big projects thatperfectly fit this notionof alternate modernity: Fascismand Communism. Was notthe basic idea ofFascism that of amodernity which provides analternative to standard, Anglo-Saxon,liberal-capitalist modernity, of savingthe core of capitalistmodernity by casting awayits "contingent," Jewish-individualist-profiteering distortion?And was not therapid industrialization of theUSSR in the late1920s and 1930s alsoan attempt at modernizationdifferent from the Western-capitalistone?) And, insofar asthis inherent antagonism couldbe designated as a"castrative" dimension and, furthermore,insofar as, according toFreud, the disavowal ofcastration is represented asthe multiplication of thephallus-representatives (a multitude ofphalluses signals castration, thelack of the one),it is easy toconceive such a multiplicationof modernities as aform of fetishist disavowal.<p></p>

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Jameson'scritique of the notionof alternate modernities thusprovides a model ofthe properly <i>dialectical</i> relationshipbetween the Universal andthe Particular; the differenceis not on theside of particular content(as the traditional <i>differentia specifica</i>)but on the sideof the Universal. TheUniversal is not theencompassing container of theparticular content, the peacefulmedium background of theconflict of particularities; theUniversal as such isthe site of anunbearable antagonism, self-contradiction, and(the multitude of) itsparticular species are ultimatelynothing but so manyattempts to obfuscate, reconcile,master this antagonism. Inother words, the Universalnames the site ofa problem-deadlock, of aburning question, and theparticulars are the attemptedbut failed answers tothis problem. Say thatthe concept of statenames a certain problem:how to contain theclass antagonism of asociety? All particular formsof state are somany (failed) attempts topropose a solution forthis problem.</p>

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;This is howone should answer thestandard critique of Christianuniversalism: what this all-inclusiveattitude (recall St. Paul'sfamous statement, "Where thereis neither Greek norJew" [Col. 3:11]) involvesis a thorough exclusionof those who donot accept Christianity. Inother "particularistic" religions (andeven in Islam, inspite of its globalexpansionism), there is aplace for others, theyare tolerated, even ifthey are condescendingly lookedupon. The Christian motto,All Men Are Brothers,however, means also thatthose who are notmy brothers <i>are not (even) men.</i> Christiansusually praise themselves forovercoming the Jewish exclusivistnotion of the ChosenPeople and encompassing theentirety of humanity<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">the catchhere is that, intheir very insistence thatthey are the ChosenPeople with the privilegeddirect link to God,Jews accept the humanityof the other peoplewho celebrate their falsegods, while Christian universalismtendentiously excludes nonbelievers fromthe very universality ofhumankind.</p>

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Thus Christian universality isnot the all-encompassing globalmedium where there isa place for alland everyone. It israther the <i>struggling</i> universality,the site of aconstant battle. Which battle,which division? To followPaul: <i>not</i> the divisionbetween Law and sin,but between, on theone side, the <i>totality</i>of Law and sinas its supplement and,on the other side,the way of Love.Christian universality emerges atthe symptomal point ofthose who are "partof no-part" of theglobal order. This iswhere the reproach ofexclusion gets it wrong:Christian universality, far fromexcluding some subjects, <i>is formulated from the position of those excluded</i>,of those for whomthere is no specificplace within the existingorder, although they belongto it; universality isstrictly codependent with thislack of specific place/determination.</p>

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Or,to put it ina different way, thereproach to Paul's universalismmisses the true siteof universality. The universaldimension he opened upis not the "neitherGreeks nor Jews butall Christians," which implicitlyexcludes non-Christians; <i>it is rather the difference Christians/non-Christians itself which, as a difference, is universal</i>; thatis, it cuts acrossthe entire social body,splitting, dividing from withinevery kind of ethnicidentity: Greeks are cutinto Christians and non-Christians,as well as Jews.The standard reproach thusin a way knockson an open door.The whole point ofthe Paulinian notion ofstruggling universality <i>is</i> thattrue universality and partialitydo not exclude eachother and also that<i>universal Truth is only accessible from a partial, engaged, subjective position</i>.</p>

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;For strategic reasons, mymaster signifier for the"minimal difference" is not<i>différance</i>, but <i>parallax</i>. Thecommon definition of parallaxis the apparent displacementof an object (theshift of its positionagainst a background) causedby a change inobservational position that providesa new line ofsight. The philosophical twistto be added, ofcourse, is that theobserved difference is notsimply subjective, because thesame object is seenfrom two different stationsor points of view.It is rather that,as Hegel would haveput it, subject andobject are inherently "mediated,"so that an "epistemological"shift in the subject'spoint of view alwaysreflects an "ontological" shiftin the object itself.Or, to put itin Lacanese, the subject'sgaze is always alreadyinscribed into the perceivedobject itself, in theguise of its "blindspot," that which isin the object morethan object itself, thepoint from which theobject itself returns thegaze. Sure, the pictureis in my eye,but me, I amalso in the picture.<a href="#fn18" name="cfn18">¹⁸</a>The first part ofthis Lacanian statement designatessubjectivization, the dependence ofreality on its subjectiveconstitution, while its secondpart provides a materialistsupplement, reinscribing the subjectinto its own imagein the guise ofa stain (the objectivizedsplinter in its eye).Materialism is not thedirect assertion of myinclusion into the objectivereality (such an assertionpresupposes that my positionof enunciation is thatof an external observerwho can grasp thewhole of reality); itrather resides in thereflexive twist by meansof which I myselfam included into thepicture constituted by me.It is this reflexiveshort circuit, this necessary<i>redoubling</i> of myself asstanding outside <i>and</i> insidemy picture, that bearswitness to my materialexistence. Materialism means thatthe reality I seeis never whole<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">not becausea large part ofit eludes me butbecause it contains astain, a blind spot,which signals my inclusionin it.</p>

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Nowhere is thisstructure clearer than inthe case of Lacan's<i>objet petit a</i>, the object-cause ofdesire. The same objectcan all of asudden be "transubstantiated" intothe object of mydesire. What is toyou just an ordinaryobject is for methe focus of mylibidinal investment, and thisshift is caused bysome unfathomable <i>x,</i> a<i>je ne sais quoi</i> in the objectthat cannot ever bepinned down to anyof its particular properties.<i>Objet a</i> is therefore closeto the Kantian transcendentalobject because it standsfor the unknown <i>x,</i>the noumenal core ofthe object beyond appearances,for what is "inyou more than yourself."<i>L'objet petit a</i> can thus bedefined as a pureparallax object: not onlydo its contours changewith the shift ofthe subject; <i>it only exists<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">its presence can only be discerned<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">when the landscape is viewed from a certain perspective</i>. Moreprecisely, the object <i>a</i>is the very <i>cause</i>of the parallax gap,that unfathomable <i>x</i> whichforever eludes the symbolicgrasp and thus causesthe multiplicity of symbolicperspectives. The paradox hereis a very preciseone: it is atthe very point atwhich a pure differenceemerges<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">a difference that isno longer a differencebetween two positively existingobjects, but a minimaldifference that divides oneand the same objectfrom itself<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">that this differenceas such immediately coincideswith an unfathomable object.In contrast to amere difference between objects,<i>the pure difference is itself an object</i>. The parallax gap,the minimal difference, isa pure difference thatcannot be grounded inpositive substantial properties. InHenry James's "The RealThing," the painter-narrator agreesto hire the impoverished"true" aristocrats Major andMrs. Monarch as modelsfor his illustrations ofa deluxe book. However,although they are the"real thing," their drawingsappear fake, so thepainter must rely moreand more on avulgar couple, Miss Churmand the lithe ItalianOronte, whose imitation ofhigh-class poses works muchbetter. Is this notthe unfathomable "minimal difference"at its purest?</p>

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Jacques-Alain Millerrecently proposed a Benjaminiandistinction between "constituted anxiety"and "constituent anxiety," whichis crucial with regardto the shift fromdesire to drive. Whilethe first one designatedthe standard notion ofthe terrifying and fascinatingabyss of anxiety thathaunts us, its infernalcircle that threatens todraw us in, thesecond one stands forthe "pure" confrontation with<i>objet petit a</i> as constituted inits very loss.<a href="#fn19" name="cfn19">¹⁹</a> Milleris right to emphasizehere two features: thedifference that separates constitutedfrom constituent anxiety concernsthe status of theobject with regard tofantasy. In a caseof constituted anxiety, theobject dwells within theconfines of a fantasy,while we only getthe constituent anxiety whenthe subject "traverses thefantasy" and confronts thevoid, the gap, filledup by the fantasmaticobject. As Mallarmé putit in the famousparenthetical lines of hisso-called sonnet <i>en <img src="/ucp-entities/ndash.gif" alt="–" align="bottom" border="0">yx, objet a</i> is"ce seul objet dontle Neant s'honore" ("thissole object with whichNothing is honored").</p>

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Clear andconvincing as it is,Miller's formula misses thetrue paradox or, rather,ambiguity of <i>objet a</i>. Whenhe defines <i>objet a</i> asthe object that overlapswith its loss, whichemerges at the verymoment of its loss(so that all itsfantasmatic incarnations, from breaststo voice and gaze,are metonymic figurations ofthe void, of nothing),he remains within thehorizon of <i>desire</i>. Thetrue object-cause of desireis the void filledin by its fantasmaticincarnations. While, as Lacanemphasizes, <i>objet a</i> is alsothe object of drive,the relationship is herethoroughly different: although, inboth cases, the linkbetween object and lossis crucial, in thecase of <i>objet a</i> asthe object-cause of <i>desire</i>,we have an objectthat is originally lost,that coincides with itsown loss, that emergesas lost; in thecase of <i>objet a</i> asthe object of drive,the "object" <i>is directly the loss itself.</i> Inthe shift from desireto drive, we passfrom the <i>lost object</i> to<i>loss itself as an object</i>. That is tosay, the weird movementcalled drive is notdriven by the "impossible"quest for the lostobject; it is <i>a push to directly enact the "loss"<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">the gap, cut, distance<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">itself</i>.There is thus a<i>double</i> distinction to bedrawn here: not onlybetween <i>objet a</i> in itsfantasmatic and postfantasmatic statusbut also, within thispostfantasmatic domain itself, betweenthe lost object-cause ofdesire and the object-lossof drive.</p>

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;This is whyone should not confusethe death drive withthe so-called nirvana principle,the thrust towards destructionor self-obliteration; the Freudiandeath drive has nothingwhatsoever to do withthe craving for self-annihilation,for the return tothe inorganic absence ofany life tension. Itis, on the contrary,the very opposite ofdying<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">a name for the"undead" eternal life itself,for the horrible fateof being caught inthe endless repetitive cycleof wandering around inguilt and pain. Theparadox of the Freudiandeath drive is thereforethat it is Freud'sname for its veryopposite, for the wayimmortality appears within psychoanalysis,for an uncanny <i>excess</i>of life, for an"undead" urge that persistsbeyond the (biological) cycleof life and death,of generation and corruption.The ultimate lesson ofpsychoanalysis is that humanlife is never justlife. Humans are notsimply alive; they arepossessed by the strangedrive to enjoy lifein excess, passionately attachedto a surplus thatsticks out and derailsthe ordinary run ofthings.</p>

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;What this means isthat it is wrongto claim that the"pure" death drive wouldhave been the impossible"total" will to (self)-destruction,the ecstatic self-annihilation inwhich the subject wouldhave rejoined the fullnessof the maternal Thingbut that this willis not realizable, thatit gets blocked, stuckto a "partial object."Such a notion retranslatesdeath drive into theterms of desire andits lost object. Itis in desire thatthe positive object isa metonymic stand-in forthe void of theimpossible Thing; it isin desire that theaspiration to fullness istransferred to partial objects.This is what Lacancalled the metonymy ofdesire. One has tobe very precise hereif we are notto miss Lacan's point(and thereby confuse desireand drive): drive isnot an infinite longingfor the Thing thatgets fixated onto apartial object; a drive<i>is</i> this fixation itselfin which resides the"death" dimension of everydrive. A drive isnot a universal thrust(towards the incestuous Thing)braked and broken up.It <i>is</i> this brakeitself, a brake oninstinct, its "stuckness," asEric Santner would haveput it.<a href="#fn20" name="cfn20">²⁰</a> The elementarymatrix of drive is<i>not</i> that of transcendingall particular objects towardsthe void of theThing (which is thenaccessible only in itsmetonymic stand-in) but thatof our libido getting"stuck" onto a particularobject, condemned to circulatearound it forever.</p>

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The basicparadox here is thatthe specifically human dimension<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">driveas opposed to instinct<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">emergesprecisely when what wasoriginally a mere by-productis elevated into anautonomous aim. Man isnot more "reflexive"; onthe contrary, man perceivesas a direct goalwhat, for an animal,has no intrinsic value.In short, the zero-degreeof being human isnot a further "mediation"of animal activity, itsreinscription as a subordinatedmoment of a highertotality (say, we eatand procreate in orderto develop higher spiritualpotentials), but the radicalnarrowing of focus, theelevation of a minoractivity into an endin itself. We becomehumans when we getcaught in a closed,self-propelling loop of repeatingthe same gesture andfinding satisfaction in it.We all recall oneof the archetypal scenesfrom cartoons: while dancing,the cat jumps upinto the air andturns around its ownaxis; however, instead offalling back down towardsthe earth's surface inaccordance with the normallaws of gravity, itremains for some timesuspended in the air,turning around in thelevitated position as ifcaught in a loopof time, repeating thesame circular movement onand on. (One alsofinds the same imagein some musical comediesthat make use ofthe elements of slapstick;when a dancer turnsaround in the air,he or she remainsup there a littlebit too long, asif, for a shortperiod of time, heor she had succeededin suspending the lawof gravity. And, inessence, is such aneffect not the ultimategoal of the artof dancing?) In suchmoments, the "normal" runof things, the "normal"process of being caughtin the imbecilic inertiaof material reality, isfor a brief momentsuspended; we enter themagical domain of suspendedanimation, of a kindof ethereal rotation that,as it were, sustainsitself, hanging in theair like Baron Munchhausenwho raised himself fromthe swamp by grabbinghis own hair andpulling himself up. Thisrotary movement, in whichthe liberal progress oftime is suspended ina repetitive loop, is<i>drive</i> at its mostelementary. This, again, is"humanization" at its zero-level:this self-propelling loop thatsuspends or disrupts lineartemporal enchainment.</p>

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Consequently, the conceptof drive makes thealternatives "either burned bythe Thing or maintaininga distance" false. Ina drive, the thingitself is a circulationaround the void (or,rather, hole, not void).To put it evenmore pointedly, the objectof drive is notrelated to the Thingas a filler ofits void; drive isliterally a countermovement todesire. It does notstrive towards impossible fullnessand, being forced torenounce it, get stuckonto a partial objectas its remainder. Driveis quite literally <i>the very "drive" to break the all of the continuity in which we are embedded</i>,to introduce a radicalimbalance into it, andthe difference between driveand desire is preciselythat, in desire, thiscut, this fixation ontoa partial object, isas it were "transcendentalized,"transposed into a stand-infor the void ofthe Thing.</p>

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;This is alsohow one should readLacan's thesis on thesatisfaction of drives. Adrive does not bringsatisfaction because its objectis a stand-in forthe Thing but becausea drive as itwere turns failure intotriumph. In it, thevery failure to reachits goal, the repetitionof this failure, theendless circulation around theobject, generates a satisfactionof its own. AsLacan put it, thetrue aim of adrive is not toreach its goal butto circulate endlessly aroundit. In the well-knownvulgar joke about afool having intercourse forthe first time, thegirl has to tellhim exactly what todo: "See this holebetween my legs? Putit in here. Nowpush it deep. Nowpull it out. Pushit in, pull itout, push it in,pull it out..." "Nowwait a minute," thefool interrupts her, "makeup your mind! Inor out?" What thefool misses is preciselythe structure of adrive that gets itssatisfaction from the indecisionitself, from repeated oscillation.</p><hr align="center" noshade="noshade" width="60">

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;And,because we end witha dirty joke, weshould perhaps conclude ina lighter mode. Inthe documentary <i>Derrida</i>, inanswer to the questionwhat he would asksome great classic philosopherif he were tomeet him, Derrida immediatelysnaps back: "About hissex life." Here, perhaps,one should supplement Derrida.In directly asking thisquestion, one would probablyget a common answer;the thing to lookfor would be ratherthe <i>theory</i> about sexualityat the level oftheir respective philosophies. Perhapsthe ultimate philosophical fantasywould be here thediscovery of a manuscriptin which Hegel, thesystematician <i>par excellence</i>, develops asystem of sexuality, ofsexual practices contradicting, inverting,sublating each other, deducingall (straight and "perverse")forms from the basicdeadlock.<a href="#fn21" name="cfn21">²¹</a> As in Hegel's<i>Encyclopedia</i>, we would firstget the deduction ofthe main "subjective attitudestowards sex" (animal coupling,pure excessive lust, expressionof human love, metaphysicalpassion), followed by theproper "system of sexuality,"organized, as one wouldexpect it from Hegel,into a sequence oftriads. The starting pointis here copulation <i>a tergo</i>,sexual act in itsanimal, presubjective immediacy; wethen pass to itsimmediate (abstract) negation<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">masturbation<img src="/ucp-entities/mdash.gif" alt="—" align="bottom" border="0">in whichlone self-excitation is supplementedby fantasizing. (Jean Laplanchehas shown how masturbation-with-fantasyis the elementary, zero-levelform of the properlyhuman drive as opposedto the animal instinct.)What follows is thesynthesis of the two:sexual act proper ina missionary position, inwhich the face-to-face contactguarantees that the fullbodily contact (penetration) remainssupplemented by fantasizing. Whatthis means is thatthe "normal" human sexualact has the structureof double masturbation; eachparticipant is masturbating witha real partner. However,the gap between theraw reality of copulationand its fantasmatic supplementcan no longer beclosed; all variations anddisplacements of sexual practicesthat follow are somany desperate attempts torestore the balance ofthe two. The dialectical"progress" thus first goesthrough a series ofvariations with regard tothe relationship between face,sexual organs, and otherbodily parts and themodes of their respectiveuses; the organ remainsphallus, but the openingto be penetrated changes(anus, mouth). Then, ina kind of "negationof negation," not onlythe object to bepenetrated changes but thetotality of the personwho is the partnerpasses into its opposite(homosexuality). In a furtherdevelopment, the goal itselfis no longer orgasm(fetishism). Fist-fucking introduces intothis series an impossiblesynthesis of the hand(the organ of instrumentalactivity, of hard work)and vagina (the organof "spontaneous" passive generation).The fist (focus ofpurposeful work, the handas the most tightlycontrolled and trained partof our body) replacesphallus (the organ outof our conscious controlpar excellence, since itserection comes and goesindependently of our will)in a kind ofcorrelate to somebody whoapproaches a state thatshould emerge "spontaneously" ina well-planned, instrumental way(say, a poet whoconstructs his poems ina "rational" way isa poetic fist-fucker). Thereare, of course, furthervariations here that callfor their speculative deduction:in masculine masturbation, vagina,the ultimate passive organ,is substituted by hand,the ultimate active organmaking the phallus itselfpassive. Furthermore, when thephallus penetrates the anus,we obtain the correctinsight into the speculativeidentity of excretion andinsemination, the highest andthe lowest. There isno time to explorehere further variations tobe deduced: doing itwith an animal, witha machine or doll;doing it with manypartners; sadism and masochism,and so on. Themain point is thatthe very "progress" fromone to another formis motivated by thestructural imbalance of sexualrelationship (Lacan's <i>il n'y a pas de rapport sexuel</i>), whichcondemns any sexual practiceto eternal oscillation betweenthe "spontaneous" pathos ofself-obliteration and the logicof external ritual (followingthe rules). The finaloutcome is thus thatsexuality is <i>the</i> domainof "spurious infinity" whoselogic, brought to anextreme, cannot but engendertasteless excesses like thoseof "spermathon" contests: howmany men can awoman bring to orgasmin an hour, andso on. For atrue philosopher, there aremore interesting things inthe world than sex.</p>

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Whataccounts for the weird(if not, for someat least, tasteless) characterof this exercise isnot the reference tosexual practices as suchbut the short circuitbetween two spheres thatare usually perceived asincompatible, as moving atontologically different levels, thatof sublime philosophical speculationand that of thedetails of sexual practices.Even if there isnothing that, a priori,prohibits the application ofthe Hegelian conceptual machineryto sexual practices, itnonetheless appears that theentire exercise is somehowmeaningless, a (rather bad)joke. The unpleasant, weirdeffect of such shortcircuits signals that theyplay a symptomal rolein our symbolic universes.They render palpable theimplicit, tacit prohibitions onwhich these universes rely.One practices concrete universalityby way of confrontinga universality with its"unbearable" example. Of course,Hegelian dialectics can beused to analyze anything;nonetheless, one is tacitlysummoned not to practiceit on sexuality, asif this move wouldmake ridiculous the verynotion of dialectical analysis.Of course, all peopleare equal, but, nonetheless,one is tacitly summonedto treat some ofthem as "less equal,"as if asserting theirfull equality would underminethe very notion ofequality.</p>

<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;This, then, is thenontrivial sense in whichall of us areslandered, by neoconservatives aswell as by thenewly appointed guardians ofuniversal reason, as thosewho undermine the veryethical fundaments of oursocieties. And this slanderedgroup, including some whoare not even onspeaking terms, from GillesDeleuze to Alain Badiou,are engaged in thesame task of <i>practicing concrete universality</i>.</p>

<br><a name="fn1"></a><font size="-1">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#cfn1">1</a>. AndrejCapuder, "Vino in most,"<i>Demokracija</i> (Ljubljana), 9 Dec.2004, p. 9; trans.mine. Incidentally, does this"where there is ahigh-rise building, a binLaden should come" notsound like a newpoliticized version of Freud's"wo es war sollich werden" (Sigmund Freud,<i>New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis,</i> in <i>The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud,</i> trans.and ed. James Strachey,24 vols. [London, 1953<img src="/ucp-entities/ndash.gif" alt="–" align="bottom" border="0">74],22:80)?</font>

<br><a name="fn2"></a><font size="-1">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#cfn2">2</a>. Kevin B. MacDonald, <i>The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements</i>(Westport, Conn., 1998), p.169; hereafter abbreviated <i>CC.</i></font><br><a name="fn3"></a><font size="-1">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#cfn3">3</a>. RichardWolin, <i>The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism</i> (Princeton, N.J.,2004), p. 23. SeeGeorg Lukács, <i>Die Zerstörung der Vernunft</i> (Berlin,1953); trans. under thetitle <i>The Destruction of Reason,</i> by PeterPalmer (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.,1980).</font>

<br><a name="fn4"></a><font size="-1">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#cfn4">4</a>. The same line ofattack was brought toits extreme by JörgLau in Germany, who,after the weird claimthat I celebrate the9/11 attack as theproper Lacanian political act,as the intervention inthe Real which breaksthe spell of capitalistideological hallucinations, ends upby directly characterizing meas a pathological person;there is, in me,"etwas Verkommenes, geistig Verwahrlostes"(Jörg Lau, "Auf derSuche nach dem gutenTerror: Über Slavoj <img src="/ucp-entities/Zcaron.gif" alt="&amp;Zcaron;" align="bottom" border="0">i<img src="/ucp-entities/zcaron.gif" alt="&amp;zcaron;" align="bottom" border="0">ek,"<i>Merkur</i> 2 [Feb. 2003]:162). Is it necessaryto add that Iwas not able toanswer these defamations inany German printed medium?</font>

<br><a name="fn5"></a><font size="-1">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#cfn5">5</a>. Wolin,<i>The Seduction of Unreason,</i> p. 307.</font><br><a name="fn6"></a><font size="-1">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#cfn6">6</a>. Slavoj <img src="/ucp-entities/Zcaron.gif" alt="&amp;Zcaron;" align="bottom" border="0">i<img src="/ucp-entities/zcaron.gif" alt="&amp;zcaron;" align="bottom" border="0">ek,<i>Welcome to the Desert of the Real</i> (London, 2002), pp.51<img src="/ucp-entities/ndash.gif" alt="–" align="bottom" border="0">52.</font>

<br><a name="fn7"></a><font size="-1">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#cfn7">7</a>. See Jacques Derrida, <i>Acts of Religion,</i>trans. Samuel Weber etal., ed. Gil Anidjar(New York, 2002).</font><br><a name="fn8"></a><font size="-1">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#cfn8">8</a>. Derrida, <i>Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International,</i>trans. Peggy Kamuf (NewYork, 1994), pp. 64<img src="/ucp-entities/ndash.gif" alt="–" align="bottom" border="0">65.</font>

<br><a name="fn9"></a><font size="-1">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#cfn9">9</a>. SeeDerrida, "Faith and Knowledge:The Two Sources of`Religion,'" trans. Weber, in<i>Religion,</i> trans. David Webband Weber, ed. Derridaand Gianni Vattimo (Stanford,Calif., 1998), pp. 1<img src="/ucp-entities/ndash.gif" alt="–" align="bottom" border="0">78.</font>

<br><a name="fn10"></a><font size="-1">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#cfn10">10</a>. SeeErnesto Laclau, <i>Emancipation(s)</i> (London,1995).</font><br><a name="fn11"></a><font size="-1">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#cfn11">11</a>. Derrida, of course, developedthis motif in greatdetail in <i>The Truth in Painting,</i> trans.Geoff Bennington and IanMcLeod (Chicago, 1987).</font>

<br><a name="fn12"></a><font size="-1">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#cfn12">12</a>. Krzysztof Kie<img src="/ucp-entities/sacute.gif" alt="&amp;sacute;" align="bottom" border="0">lowski,<i>"Workers '71," Kie<img src="/ucp-entities/sacute.gif" alt="&amp;sacute;" align="bottom" border="0">lowski on Kie<img src="/ucp-entities/sacute.gif" alt="&amp;sacute;" align="bottom" border="0">lowski,</i> ed. Danusia Stok(London, 1993), pp. 54<img src="/ucp-entities/ndash.gif" alt="–" align="bottom" border="0">55.</font><br><a name="fn13"></a><font size="-1">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#cfn13">13</a>. Kie<img src="/ucp-entities/sacute.gif" alt="&amp;sacute;" align="bottom" border="0">lowski,<i>"Station," Kie<img src="/ucp-entities/sacute.gif" alt="&amp;sacute;" align="bottom" border="0">lowski on Kie<img src="/ucp-entities/sacute.gif" alt="&amp;sacute;" align="bottom" border="0">lowski,</i> p. 86.</font>

<br><a name="fn14"></a><font size="-1">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#cfn14">14</a>. For amore detailed account ofthis passage, see <img src="/ucp-entities/Zcaron.gif" alt="&amp;Zcaron;" align="bottom" border="0">i<img src="/ucp-entities/zcaron.gif" alt="&amp;zcaron;" align="bottom" border="0">ek,<i>The Fright of Real Tears: Krzysztof Kie<img src="/ucp-entities/sacute.gif" alt="&amp;sacute;" align="bottom" border="0">lowski between Theory and Post-Theory</i> (London, 2001), chap.1.</font>

<br><a name="fn15"></a><font size="-1">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#cfn15">15</a>. Rebecca Comay, "Dead Right:Hegel and the Terror,"<i>South Atlantic Quarterly</i> 103 (Spring<img src="/ucp-entities/ndash.gif" alt="–" align="bottom" border="0">Summer 2004):392.</font><br><a name="fn16"></a><font size="-1">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#cfn16">16</a>. Ibid., p. 393.</font>

<br><a name="fn17"></a><font size="-1">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#cfn17">17</a>. Fredric Jameson,<i>A Singular Modernity: Essays on the Ontology of the Present</i> (London, 2002), p.12.</font><br><a name="fn18"></a><font size="-1">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#cfn18">18</a>. See Jacques Lacan, <i>The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis,</i>trans. Alan Sheridan, ed.Jacques-Alain Miller (New York,1979), p. 63.</font>

<br><a name="fn19"></a><font size="-1">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#cfn19">19</a>. See Miller,"Angoisse constituée, angoisse constituante,"<a target="_outside" href="http://www.lacan.com/jamsem2.html">http://www.lacan.com/jamsem2.html</a></font><br><a name="fn20"></a><font size="-1">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#cfn20">20</a>. See Eric Santner, <i>On the Psychotheology of Everyday Life: Reflections on Freud and Rosenzweig</i>(Chicago, 2001).</font><br><a name="fn21"></a><font size="-1">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#cfn21">21</a>. Along the samelines, one can imaginehow newly discovered noteson sexuality by Heideggermight look. The essenceof woman is <i>sich anzustellen,</i>to ex-pose oneself, <i>sich Anzubieten,</i>to propose/offer oneself: hereI am, pick meup, catch me, takeme. In contrast tothis stance of provocativeexposure, <i>Herausforderung,</i> a manis boastfully putting himselfup, parading before woman'seyes: his stance isthat of <i>Sichaufstellen,</i> inthe sense of <i>Sichaufspielen, Sichbruesten.</i>A man <i>stellt sich auf,</i> awoman <i>stellt sich an.</i> And, fromhere, one can imaginea Heideggerian erotic ofdisclosure/withdrawal: Being provokes usin its very disclosure,it provokes us throughthe withdrawal in theheart of its disclosure.The essence of <i>Sichanstellen</i>is the <i>Sichanstellen</i> ofthe essence itself, andthe destiny of manis to screw thingsup, to fail inhis attempt to respondproperly to this provocativeexposure. So why nottake the risk ofenacting Heidegger's rhetorics ofreversal ("the essence oftruth is the truthof the essence itself,"and so on) alsoapropos the notion of<i>Abort</i> (toilet). The essenceof abort is the<i>Ab-Ort</i> (dis-placing) of theessence itself. Along thesame lines, the <i>Er-Örterung</i>(explaining, literally, locating atits proper place) ofa poem is simultaneouslyits <i>Ab-Örterung</i> (flushing itdown the toilet). Andwhat about abortion itself?What if the essenceof abortion <i>(Ab-Treibung, Fehl-Geburt)</i> isnothing ontic, but theabortiveness of the essenceitself?<a></a><a></a><a></a><a></a></font>