The term sujet supposÈ savoir (often abbreviated to S.s.S.) is difficult to translate into English.
Sheridan translates it as 'subject suppposed to know (sujet supposÈ savoir) The term', and this is the translation adopted in most English works on Lacan.
sujet supposÈ savoir (often abbreviated to SHowever, Schneiderman suggests the alternative translation '[[supposed subject of knowledge]]', on the grounds that it is the subject, not just the knowledge, which is supposed.s.S.) is difficult to translate into<ref>Schneiderman, 1980: vii</ref>
English. Sheridan translates it as 'subject suppposed to know', and this is the
translation adopted in most English works on Lacan. However, Schneiderman
suggests The phrase is introduced by Lacan in 1961 in order to designate the alternative translation illusion of a self-consciousness (Ger. ''Selbstbewufltsein''supposed subject ) which is transparent to itself in its act of knowledge', on theknowing (see [[consciousness]]).
grounds that it This illusion, which is born in the subject[[mirror stage]], not just the knowledge, which is supposedput into question by psychoanalysis.
Psychoanalysis demonstrates that [[knowledge]] (Schneidermansavoir) cannot be located in any particular subject but is, in fact, intersubjective.<ref>Lacan, 19801961-2: vii).seminar of 15 November 1961</ref>
The phrase is introduced by Lacan in 1961 in order to designate the illusion
of a self-consciousness (Ger. Selbstbewufltsein) which is transparent to itself in
its act In 1964, Lacan takes up the phrase in his definition of [[transference]] as the attribution of knowing (see CONSCIOUSNEss)knowledge to asubject; 'As soon as the subject who is supposed to know exists somewhere there is transference'. This illusion<ref>Sll, which is born in the232</ref>
mirror stage, This definition emphasises that it is put into question the analysand's supposition of a subject who knows that initiates the analytic process.rather than the knowledge actually possessed by psychoanalysisthe analyst. Psychoanalysis demon-
strates that KNOWLEDGE (savoir) cannot be located in any particular The term 'subject supposed to know' does not designate the analyst himself, buta function which the analyst may come to embody in the treatment.
It isonly when the analyst is perceived by the analysand to embody this function that the transference can besaid to be established.<ref>Sll, in fact, intersubjective (Lacan, 1961-2: seminar of 15 November 1961).233</ref>
In 1964When this occurs, Lacan takes up the phrase in his definition what kind of TRANSFERENCE as knowledge is it that theanalyst is presumed to possess?
attribution of knowledge 'He is supposed to asubject; 'As know that from which no one can escape, as soon as the subject who is supposedhe formulates it - quite simply, signification.'<ref>Sll, 253</ref>
In other words, the analyst is often thought to know exists somewhere there is transferencethe secret meaning of the analysand' (Slls words, 232)the significations of speech of which even the speaker is unaware. This definition
emphasises This supposition alone (the supposition that it the analyst is one who knows) causes otherwise insignificant details (chance gestures, ambiguous remarks) to acquire retroactively a special meaning for the analysandpatient who 'supposes's supposition of a subject who knows that.
initiates It may happen that the analytic processpatient supposes the analyst to be a subject who knows from the very first meinent of the treatment, or even before, but it often takes some time for the transference to become established.rather than the knowledge actually possessed by
In the latter case, 'when the subject enters tlie analsysis, he is far from giving the analyst this place [of the subject supposed to know]';<ref>Sll, 233</ref> the analysand may initially regard the analystas a buffoon, or may withold information from him in order to maintain his ignorance.<ref>S11, 137</ref>
The term However, 'subject supposed to knoweven the psychoanalyst put in question is credited at some point with a certain infallibility' does not designate ;<ref>Sl 1, 234</ref> sooner orlater some chance gestiire of the analyst himself's is taken by the analysand as a sign of some secret intention,some hidden knowledge.
but a function which At this point the analyst may has come to embody in the treatmentsubject supposed to know; the transference is established. It is
only The end of analysis comes when the analysand de-supposes the analyst of knowledge, so that the analyst is perceived by falls from the analysand position of the subject supposed to embody this functionknow.
The term 'subject supposed to know' also emphasises the fact that it is a particular relationship to knowledge that constitutes the unique position of the analyst; the analyst is aware that there is a split between him and the transference can besaid knowledge attributed to be established (Sll, 233)him. When this
occurs, what kind In ´her words. the analyst must realise that he only occupies the position of knowledge ome who is it presumed (by the analysand) to know, without fooling himself that he really does possess the analyst is presumed knowledge attributed to pos-him.
sess? 'He is supposed The analyst must realise that, of the knowledge attributed to know that from which no one can escapehim by the analysand, he knows nothing.<ref>Lacan, as soon as1967: 20</ref>
he formulates However, the fact that it - quite simplyis a supposed knowledge that is the mainstay of the analytic process, rather than the knowledge actually possessed by the analyst, does not mean that the analyst can therefore be content with knowing nothing; on the contrary, signification' (SllLacan argues that analysts should emulate Freud in becoming experts in cultural, 253)literary and linguistic matters. In other words, the
analyst is often thought to know the secret meaning of the analysand's words,
the significations of speech of which even the speaker is unaware. This
supposition alone (the supposition that the analyst is one who knows) causes
otherwise insignificant details (chance gestures, ambiguous remarks) to
acquire retroactively a special meaning for the patient who 'supposes'.
It may happen that the patient supposes the analyst to be a subject who
knows from the very first meinent of the treatment, or even before, but it often
takes some time for the transference to become established. In the latter case,
'when the subject enters tlie analsysis, he is far from giving the analyst this
place [of the subject supposed to know]' (Sll, 233); the analysand may
initially regard the analyst as a buffoon, or may withold information from
him in order to maintain his ignorance (S11, 137). However, 'even the
psychoanalyst put in question is credited at some point with a certain infall-
ibility' (Sl 1, 234); sooner orlater some chance gestiire of the analyst's is taken
by the analysand as a sign of some secret intention, some hidden knowledge.
At this point the analyst has come to embody the subject supposed to know; the
transference is established.
The end of analysis comes when the analysand de-supposes the analyst of
knowledge, so that the analyst falls from the position of the subject supposed
to know.
The term 'subject supposed to know' also emphasises the fact that it is a
particular relationship to knowledge that constitutes the unique position of the
analyst; the analyst is awarethat there is a split between him and the knowl-
edge attributed to him. In ´her words. the analyst must realise that he only
occupies the position of ome who is presumed (by the analysand) to know,
without fooling himself that he really does possess the knowledge attributed to
him. The analyst must realise that, of the knowledge attributed to him by the
analysand, he knows nothing (Lacan, 1967: 20). However, the fact that it is a
supposed knowledge that is the mainstay of the analytic process, rather than
the knowledge actually possessed by the analyst, does not mean that the
analyst can therefore be content with knowing nothing; on the contrary, Lacan
argues that analysts should emulate Freud in becoming experts in cultural,
literary and linguistic matters.
Lacan also remarks that, for the analyst, the analysand is a subject supposed
to know. When the analyst explains the fundamental rule of free association to
the analysand, he is effectively saying; 'Come on, say anything, it will all be
marvellous' (Sl7, 59). In other words, the analyst tells the analysand to behave
as if he knew what it was all about, thereby instituting him as a subject
supposed to know.
Lacan also remarks that, for the analyst, the analysand is a subject supposed to know.
When the analyst explains the fundamental rule of free association to the analysand, he is effectively saying; 'Come on, say anything, it will all be marvellous'.<ref>Sl7, 59</ref>
In other words, the analyst tells the analysand to behave as if he knew what it was all about, thereby instituting him as a subject supposed to know.
