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The [[essence]] of Khrushchev's argument can be best summoned by Neil Kinnock's anti-war argument, when he was the Labour candidate in the UK elections: "I am ready to die for my country, but I am not ready to let my country die for me." It is significant to note that, in spite of the "totalitarian" [[character]] of the Soviet [[regime]], THIS fear was much more predominant in the Soviet leadership than in the US leadership - so, perhaps, the time has come to rehabilitate Khrushchev, not Kennedy, as [[The Real|the real ]] hero of the Cuban missile crisis. - Castro answered Khrushchev on October 31:

I realized when I wrote them that the [[words]] contained in my letter could be misinterpreted by you and that was what happened, perhaps because you didn't read them carefully, perhaps because of the [[translation]], perhaps because I meant to say so much in too few lines. However, I didn't hesitate to do it. Do you believe, Comrade Khrushchev, that we were selfishly [[thinking]] of ourselves, of our generous people willing to sacrifice themselves, and not at all in an [[unconscious]] manner but fully assured of the risk they ran? No, Comrade Khrushchev. Few [[times]] in [[history]], and it could even be said that never before, because no people had ever faced such a tremendous danger, was a people so willing to fight and die with such a [[universal]] [[sense]] of [[duty]]. /.../ We knew, and do not presume that we ignored it, that we would have been annihilated, as you insinuate in your letter, in the event of nuclear war. However, that didn't prompt us to ask you to withdraw the missiles, that didn't prompt us to ask you to yield. Do you believe that we wanted that war? But how could we prevent it if the invasion finally took place? /.../ And if war had broken out, what could we do with the insane people who unleashed the war? You yourself have said that under current [[conditions]] such a war would inevitably have escalated quickly into a nuclear war. / I understand that once [[aggression]] is unleashed, one shouldn't concede to the aggressor the privilege of deciding, moreover, when to use nuclear weapons. The destructive [[power]] of this weaponry is so great and the speed of its delivery so great that the aggressor would have a considerable initial advantage. / And I did not [[suggest]] to you, Comrade Khrushchev, that the USSR should be the aggressor, because that would be more than incorrect, it would be immoral and contemptible on my part. But from the instant the imperialists attack Cuba and while there are Soviet armed forces stationed in Cuba to [[help]] in our defense in case of an attack from abroad, the imperialists would by this act become aggressors against Cuba and against the USSR, and we would respond with a strike that would annihilate them. /.../ I did not suggest, Comrade Khrushchev, that in the midst of this crisis the Soviet Union should attack, which is what your letter seems to say; rather, that following an imperialist attack, the USSR should act without vacillation and should never make the mistake of allowing circumstances to develop in which the enemy makes the first nuclear strike against the USSR. And in this sense, Comrade Khrushchev, I maintain my point of view, because I understand it to be a [[true]] and just evaluation of a specific [[situation]]. [[You May|You may ]] be able to convince me that I am wrong, but you can't tell me that I am wrong without convincing me.